About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Objectivism

Objectivism, "Contextual Knowledge" and the Correspondence Theory of Truth
by William Scott Dwyer

Part 1 (of a 3-part series)

In a taped lecture entitled “Contextual Knowledge” (available from the Ayn Rand Bookstore), Peter Schwartz defends his version of the Objectivist position on knowledge and truth. He argues that all knowledge occurs within and is dependent on a given context. “It is not just that we acquire knowledge in a context,” he says, “but that we acquire it because of that context. The context is the why, and it determines the what; it determines what it is that we grasp about reality as we form knowledge.” Furthermore, he says that “you cannot know what a conclusion is apart from the context that gave rise to it…. This applies categorically to any piece of knowledge – to any statement – any utterance. Context is what…gives [an] idea its meaning…its existence and therefore its identity.”

In general, Schwartz’s point about the relevance of context to knowledge is well taken. It is certainly true that a proposition arrived at for the wrong reasons or inferred from false premises does not constitute knowledge. Schwartz is also correct that the meaning and identity of a conclusion depends on its context. What is curious, however, is Schwartz’s argument that a conclusion derived from false premises does not qualify as true. In fact, he says that a conclusion based on false premises does not even have the same meaning as it would if based on true premises—a view which enables him to deny any agreement between himself and those (such as non-Objectivist libertarians) who appear to share his conclusions but not his premises.

Schwartz’s unconventional views may come as a surprise to those who see truth simply as the correspondence of a proposition to the facts of reality. How then does he support his theories of truth and meaning, and do his arguments for them withstand scrutiny?


“Love is Good”

To answer these questions, let us begin by considering an example that Schwartz uses to show how the meaning and truth of a statement depend on its context, an example which he then cites to support his claim that false premises necessitate a false conclusion.

Take the statement “Love is good,” which he says that Objectivists would “unhesitatingly on its face subscribe to,” but which may have been “shaped [by its context] into something entirely different from what it appears to be.” Suppose, he says, that that statement “were derived from two other false premises in an argument that went like this:”

Love is based on selflessness.
Selflessness is good.
Therefore, love is good.


Now, says Schwartz,
the first two propositions pose no problem. Each is categorically false. Love is not selfless; it’s selfish. Likewise, selflessness is not good; it is bad. So those two are false. That’s clear. What about the third—what about the conclusion, ‘Love is good’? Isn’t that one true? And the answer is no, it is false. Now how could we say it’s false? Why should it matter that the first two premises are false? The conclusion should still be considered true… Well, it’s false because the context reveals that what the conclusion is referring to in reality is not the same thing that (say) Objectivism would be referring to when it says the same words, “Love is good.” What those words in this syllogism’s conclusion really mean is this: “An emotional attachment which is of no selfish value to either party is good.” …Now is that statement true? No, that is a false statement.
In other words, according to Schwartz, the conclusion that “Love is good” is false, because the context reveals that the term “love” in that conclusion refers to a selfless emotional attachment (not a selfish one), and since a selfless emotional attachment is not a good thing, according to Objectivism, the statement that “Love is good” is false. I.e.,

Love is based on selflessness. (False)
Selflessness is good. (False)
Therefore, [selfless] love is good. (False!)



Check Your Premises

Does Schwartz’s evaluation of his syllogism make sense? Well, it’s certainly true, as he says, that the context of a syllogism determines the meaning of a (valid) conclusion. That much is clear. The question is: Does the context of his syllogism reveal that his conclusion “Love is good,” means what he says it means? Well, what part of a syllogism’s context determines the meaning of a valid conclusion? The premises! Since a valid conclusion is a derivation from the premises, it must reflect the meaning of the context from which it is derived. So what do the premises say about the meaning of the term “love” in this syllogism?

Recall Schwartz’s statement that “the first two propositions pose no problem. Each is categorically false. Love is not selfless; it’s selfish. Likewise, selflessness is not good; it is bad. So those two are false.” In other words, according to Schwartz, the first premise (namely, that “Love is based on selflessness”) is false because “Love is not selfless; it’s selfish”—which implies that the first premise uses the term “love” in the sense of a selfish emotional attachment (rather than a selfless one). That’s why Schwartz says that the premise is false—because it states that selfish love is based on selflessness! But if so, then the term “love” must have the same (selfish) meaning in the conclusion, since the conclusion is a derivation from the premises—in which case, far from revealing a conclusion in which the meaning of “love” is selfless, what the context of his syllogism actually reveals is a conclusion in which the meaning is selfish! So, instead of being false, as he claims, the conclusion of his syllogism is true! I.e.,

[Selfish] love is based on selflessness. (False)
Selflessness is good. (False)
Therefore, [Selfish] love is good. (True!)


However unlikely it is that someone would actually accept both of the false premises in this syllogism, if he did, those premises would commit him to a true conclusion, not a false one. Therefore, to infer, as Schwartz does, that the conclusion of his syllogism is false is not only mistaken, but also drops the very context that he claims is so important in assessing its meaning—namely, the premises from which the conclusion is derived.

What is even worse, however, is that, from a careless misreading of his very own example, Schwartz proceeds to generalize his mistaken inference to all arguments in which the premises are false.


“A Vital Principle”

He states:
The “why” of the statement—that is, the reason someone came to the conclusion that “love is good”—the “why” tells us the meaning of the “what.”
[True]
Or the context of the first two premises reveals the nature of the concluding piece of knowledge
[True]
and tells us, therefore, why that is false.
[Not true!]
So, we have here a vital principle which you all should retain, namely, that a seemingly right conclusion arrived at via the wrong reason is the wrong conclusion.
First of all, let’s be clear on what Schwartz means by “right” and “wrong” in this context. If he means “valid” and “invalid,” then his principle is true, but uncontroversial. A seemingly valid conclusion arrived at for an invalid reason is an invalid conclusion. Who could disagree with that?! But that is not what Schwartz means, for his syllogism is intended as an example not of a seemingly valid conclusion arrived at for an invalid reason, but of a seemingly true conclusion validly derived from false premises. So, by “right” and “wrong” in this context, he evidently means “true” and “false.” Therefore, his “vital principle,” translated into clear and unequivocal language, is as follows:

“A seemingly true conclusion validly derived from false premises is a false conclusion.”

Observe, however, that the very syllogism Schwartz uses to illustrate his "vital principle" serves as a stunning counter-example to it. I.e.,

[Selfish] love is based on selflessness. (False)
Selflessness is good. (False)
Therefore, [Selfish] love is good. (True!)


So much for the syllogism as an illustration (and refutation) of Schwartz’s vital principle. Consider a less formal but more dramatic example by which he seeks to justify that principle.


“Thou Shalt Not Kill”

Take the case of a Christian who believes that murder is wrong, because the Bible says so. Although Biblical, authority is the wrong reason to oppose murder, it would seem that the Christian’s belief in the wrongness of murder is still true, since murder is in fact wrong. Yet, According to Schwartz, the devout Christian believer in the Biblical commandment, “Thou shalt not kill” (understood as “Thou shalt not murder”) is not an opponent of murder—does not believe that murder is wrong. Why not? Because that commandment “has the same moral status as any of God’s alleged wishes. One obeys not because it is objectively right, but just because God says so.” Therefore, argues Schwartz, the Christian “is perfectly willing to commit murder. Under what circumstances? If God demands it!”—in which case, a seemingly true conclusion (that murder is wrong) turns out to false—turns out to be different from what it appears—because it was derived from false premises (i.e., from a believe in God’s commandments).

This is an appealing argument, especially to those of us who are atheists. Wouldn’t we love to think that Christians are not only mystics but proponents of murder as well! Unfortunately, the argument becomes less appealing when one realizes that it can be used to prove not only that the Christian is not an opponent of murder but also that he is not even a Christian. After all, the Christian’s belief in Christianity, like his belief in the wrongness of murder, has the same status as any of God’s alleged wishes. Just as the Christian believes in the wrongness of murder because it is God’s will, so he believes in Christianity because it is God’s will—for according to Christian mythology, Jesus Christ was the son of God. Therefore, given Schwartz’s argument, even a devout Christian does not believe in Christianity, because the Christian is perfectly willing to renounce that belief. Under what circumstances? If God demands it!

But this is a reductio ad absurdum of Schwartz’s argument, for the Christian’s willingness to renounce Christianity if God demands it does not mean that the Christian is not a Christian. It just means that he is not an unconditional Christian—that his belief in Christianity depends on God’s sanction. Nor, by the same token, does the Christian’s willingness to commit murder if God demands it mean that the Christian is not an opponent of murder. It just means that he is not an unconditional opponent of murder—that his opposition to murder also depends on God’s sanction. To be sure, if instead of “Murder is wrong,” the conclusion were that “Murder is wrong unless God should demand it,” then that conclusion would be false, but it would be false because it does not correspond to reality, not because bad reasons happen to be given for it.

It should now be clear that Schwartz’s “vital principle” (viz, that “a seemingly true conclusion derived from false premises is a false conclusion”) is itself false and is contradicted by some rather obvious counter examples. Furthermore, the counter examples illustrate a vital principle of their own, namely that a conclusion is true if and only if it corresponds to reality (regardless of whether its premises are true or false).

(To be continued...)
Sanctions: 24Sanctions: 24Sanctions: 24 Sanction this ArticleEditMark as your favorite article

Discuss this Article (38 messages)