RoR: Forum

Post 20

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 12:48pm

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Lots of good reading here! Nice to 'see' you again Trinity!

Kernon wrote:

"When someone says "things could have been different" it is always, AFAIK, taken to mean
that, at the time, people might have chosen differently, resulting in different outcomes."

Yes, I understand that. :) But they did not choose differently for whatever reasons existed at the time, whether lack of knowledge, fear, misinformation, cultural traditions, etc. It is of some use to study how they might have chosen differently, or how their beliefs forced certain choices on them, but on the whole, I am generally not inclined to replay or rework these kinds of events. That is what I was trying to say.

(PS/NB: What is AFAIK?)

Still with Kernon here:

Originally you wrote: "Just because a certain state of affairs exists in today's world, does not
mean that that is the way that it had to be."

And I was simply saying that studying the reasons why something historically went one way or another is of some value for future action, it is has no more value than that. Yes, that bit of the past didn't have to be that way, but it was. Let's study why it was rather than trying to rebuild the situation in terms of what could have happened back then. I don't see rebuilding the past with different choices terribly productive unless you wanted to write an alternative history kind of story or game. :)

You also wrote:
" [..] changed, the only other explanation for denying this type of statement is to embrace casual determinism."

I'm not sure what casual determinism is and hopefully I haven't confused matters even more by my explanation. *grin*

Elizabeth! :)

You know, your wording sparked a great analogy for me regarding 'hard' or difficult as opposed to work.

Having (the actual birth process) a baby has been described many ways from incredibly hard and painful and agonizing to 'a piece of cake'. I've had three natural childbirths and they were 'hard' ... work! *grin*

By that I mean, it was physically exhausting, but exciting and fun and an incredibly awesome experience.

I view attaining values in much the same way. Whether you want to say effort, difficult or work and describe it as hard but satisfying (no lewd comments here! :)) it is a description given about an experience, a personal experience. I think the problem with some of these discussions is one of context. I'm not a philosopher, I don't know the terms used and when I say something seems hard or difficult to me, I'm speaking about my experiences, not describing some malevolent universe! LOL! Me of all people!

Joy :)

Post 21

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 12:59pm

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I know it is not common to distinguish them, but not doing so causes a lot of confusion. That's why I use these terms. I think it unravels the whole thing.

Metaphysical determinism = everything has a cause.
Epistemic determinism = we make no choices.

Note that both do not express the same fact. That everything has a cause does not imply that we, at the personal level, do not make any choices. In fact, the existence of volition is pretty much dependant on causality !

Post 22

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 1:36pm

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I think most every body is trying to expound on the law of casualty instead of casual determinism. Determinism itself implies that something has to be a certain way despite the factors which cause it to be that way in the first place, thus rejecting casuality. To explain this in clearer terms lets use simple addition. Lets say we have four unknown variables that represent four different integers a,b,c, and d with none representing any number less than one. We add a to b and we get c (assuming that c is in fact the logical result). Determinism says that since c is the result, it doesn't matter what numbers were added together to get c because c was fated to be the result. So we would also be able to say that c+b+a+d= c. Feel free to continue reading after you quit laughing.

Obviously that line of thinking is false and I don't think that hardly anyone on this forum means to imply such. Most everyone is adamant about explaining what they mean and clarifying what appears to be unclear. That in an of itself implies the value of objectivity and that through utilizing logic, reality and everything contained therein is knowable. The logical extension of the ideas of the axiom of Existence, and the axiom of identity, is the idea of casuality (id est the idea of identifying actions and their logical results).

Whew! My brain hurts!

Post 23

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 1:46pm

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*grin* Yeah, what he said! Thanks Adam!

Joy :)

Post 24

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 2:02pm

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PS that's "causal" and "causality". As in "cause". ;)

Post 25

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 3:07pm

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Francois,

Yes, but in the case of our postmodern trollsters in the Fundamentals Gallery, it would be "casualty":)

Anthony

Post 26

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 3:08pm

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Hey guys,

Quick (or not so quick) post before I depart for the weekend...

Matt (or Matthew?):

That's what I remember reading about Rand & free will...

Also, I agree that the things worth working for or working harder for are much more appreciated. I just think that some of the difficulties are placed there by the way things are, but don't have to be. And most importantly we should never want them to be that way just so we could be more satisfied when we achieve something.

It might be easy for me to tell my mom the truth about losing grocery money, while it may be hard for a wife who gets beat to tell her husband the truth that she lost the grocery money. It's not necessarily that truth is hard, but the circumstances in which it appears.

Another example, Michael Newberry's foundation is trying to change the art culture. It's hard, and when he succeeds he'll be extremely happy. But no one would want that crazy art world instead of one that appreciated wonderful masterpieces. Michael might not have that cause to fight then, but he could spend his time giving us more of his artwork. So again, it's hard because of the way things are. But if things were different, it would be easier to achieve his goal (or harder).

Joy:

AFAIK = as far as I know (just learned that one!)

You wrote: Yes, I understand that. But they did not choose differently for whatever reasons existed at the time, whether lack of knowledge, fear, misinformation, cultural traditions, etc.

I don't know, we may just disagree here or I'm reading it wrong. They didn't choose differently based on their thoughts, but they _could_ have. If you don't agree with that, I still see that as determinism. ?? People HAD choices to make just as we have choices to make now.

The definition of determinism on the importanceofphilosophy.com web site says:

Determinism is the belief that human choice is an illusion, and we are entirely controlled by outside factors.

At any point in time you have to make a decision, and you can't change history, so here we are today. But did people have the opportunity to have chosen differently? If I don't think that, then I don't see how I could say that you have choice & free will now. You too have a cap on what information you possess, you are influenced by culture, your upbringing, etc. Once you make a decision (like to go grocery shopping last night) it's done, but I would argue that you had the free will to go or not go even though it's in the past.

So (to go back), yes, difficult achievements bring more satisfaction. And many achievements _are_ difficult. But to say that they must be as difficult as they are goes back to the malevolent universe thing for me where there can be no other way.

Okay, I'm done. :) Have a good weekend all!

-Elizabeth

Post 27

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 3:13pm

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Oh, and Elizabeth, what could you possibly find wrong with a universe populated with "male valet's"? :) (just a joke)

Post 28

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 3:18pm

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As I figured, there's a bunch of posts written as I was writing. But I second what Pianoman says there and that we're all agreeing, just gotta get the terminology down.

-Elizabeth (who is really leaving this time!)

Post 29

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 3:20pm

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okay, still here! :) so close...

Gotta know... Anthony, what's a male valet? Pardon my ignorance.

-E

Post 30

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 5:08pm

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I hope I can say something without being jumped on...

re the apparent difference between these (Tremblay defined) determinisms,

"Metaphysical determinism = everything has a cause.
Epistemic determinism = we make no choices. "

I agree but I'd say on this account that metaphysical determinism (which I'd just call determinism simpliciter) would entail epistemic determinism, since, if everything has a cause then it follows necessarily that we would make no free choices, or at least we would not have the option to choose otherwise.

The distinction only really makes sense if you consider a kind of blending of the two. "Compatiblism", compatiblism (also called soft determinism) is a kind of denial of the entailment thesis, ie, that causal determinism is compatible with free-will. Of course there are all sorts of issues with this - it's not really my area (being a philosopher of science) but I found a good link with lots of books listed regarding the theories of determinism.

http://www.egodeath.com/determinismbooks.htm

I've read a bit of Plantinga, Nelson Pike and also David Lewis writes some interesting stuff on determinism and necessity. The original determinism story was by Laplace (Laplacian Determinism) here's a Laplace quote I included in a paper I wrote several years ago...

"Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it � an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis � it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past would be present to it�s eyes." (Laplace, [1920] 1951, p.4)

A problem for realists, is reconciling a desire to admit to or postulate regularities or "laws of nature" which might provide some predictive and explanatory power to science but at the same time deny determinism which on the Laplacian view seems to deny any possibility of freewill. Needless to say this is a bloody difficult line to walk. Deductive scientific explanation thrives in a deterministic environment, but obviously freewill can't. (hence the invention of compatiblism)

steve

PS: please note, I have not committed to any of these options - I'm not saying I'm a determinist, indeterminist or a compatiblist, or any other variation, so please don't jump down my throat saying I'm wrong, the truth is I haven't made my mind up yet - I'm not sure.

Post 31

Friday, November 15, 2002 - 5:17pm

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"metaphysical determinism (which I'd just call determinism simpliciter) would entail epistemic determinism"

No, like I said that is not true. They are completely different levels. Free will is a question of neurology and psychology, not physics. Furthermore, as I pointed out, free will is not possible without metaphysical determinism.

Post 32

Sunday, November 17, 2002 - 3:55pm

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Then your definitions make no sense.

This is what you said;

"Metaphysical determinism = everything has a cause.
Epistemic determinism = we make no choices. "

But now it seems you've changed your mind and you say,

"They are completely different levels. Free will is a question of neurology and psychology, not physics"

You are claiming that neurology and psychology are totally free from causation. I'm sure psychologists and neurologists would disagree with you. Or you are saying there is some kinds of "cause" that are deterministic and some kinds of cause that are not deterministic (I don't think this view can ever work).

Of course it certainly seems that we do infact make choices, but the question begs, why. If "causation" is the cause (if you like) of determinism, then where there is causation going on there is at least some determinism going on.

So lets take an example,
If I see a bus approaching a bus stop and I want to catch it, and I infer that I will miss it if I don't run - I run for the bus. The *cause* of my running is due to my inference that I will miss the bus if I don't - I'm not just running randomly. The choice I've made is caused (hence determined). Of course I could have chosen to walk and hence miss the bus, but there would have been a causal belief in that case too, something like "bugger it, I'll just have to catch the next bus because I can't be bothered running"

Furthermore, and more broadly, intentionality is considered the reason (or the cause) for much (of course not all - somethings are instinctual I guess) of our behaviour - we do the things we do because we expect a certain outcome.

If you say that metaphysical determinism is defined as "everything has a cause" then it clearly follows that this entails epistemic determinism, since the choices we make are caused by "intentional states of mind". Otherwise you seem to be saying our choices are random, and this seems an even worse situation than determined choices because I certainly don't think I make random choices.

My decision, or my choice (an intentional state) to do something, x, is *caused* by my belief (an intentional state) that if I do x it will result in some desired situation.

Don't tell me you are going to argue that no choices we make are causal choices - if they are not then what exactly determines what choices we make. Since the only other options seems to be random choice.

Or are you going to argue that intentional states are non-causal. What this amounts to is that, nothing going on in my mind will causally affect anything else, I think most people will see that this is absurd.

I think the view you are trying to espouse is a compatibilist one and I tend to sway toward this view - it's certainly pragmatic. As I say this stuff isn't really my area but there certainly isn't any simple philosophical answer to it.

However (food for thought), I think if you consider the possibility - that not everything is caused, then you can allow the possibility that some events or states of affairs at higher levels are simply not caused. I think Penrose trys to argue this in the Emperors New Mind... interesting read, although for a variety of reasons I (think I) disagree with him.

steve

Post 33

Sunday, November 17, 2002 - 7:08pm

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I�ve never heard of determinism being used in any context other than a (false) alternative to free will. (Francois� �epistemic determinism.�) What Francois refers to as �metaphysical determinism� sounds like what I have always referred to as the law of causality: that things will act in accordance with their nature.

I disagree with Francois� claim that �free will is a question of neurology and psychology.� It�s a component of man�s metaphysical nature and I don�t think it's subject to the medical sciences. (I remember listening to a recorded Q&A session on Objectivism where a student suggested that there was no free will in Communist Russia. LOL!)

I also disagree with Steve�s bus example. I don�t agree that the *cause* of his running is his assumption that he will miss the bus otherwise. To me, �cause� means �necessarily.� IF this THEN this. The *cause* of his running is the outcome of his brain telling his legs to work in a certain fashion as a result of a decision he made to run for the bus. i.e. He wasn�t *determined* to run for the bus because he seemed about to miss it. He could have chosen otherwise (free will).

I agree that �we [choose to] do things we do because we expect a certain outcome.� This is called rationality � making decisions to act in accordance with reality and the way reality operates. As we develop from children, we learn the effects of particular causes and begin to expect them. But we always have the choice to act otherwise, hence free will. This reinforces Francois� (I think) point that free will could only be compatible with the law of causality. If there were no law of causality, it wouldn�t matter what choices we made and the concept of free will would be meaningless.

Steve wrote:

�Or are you going to argue that intentional states are non-causal. What this amounts to is that, nothing going on in my mind will causally affect anything else.�

This is essentially true. Nothing going on in your mind will causally affect anything else *until* you act on it. You won't *necessarily* act as a result of what's going on in your mind. You have the choice (free will) and your actions and the thing you are acting on will all act in accordance with their natures (law of causality.)

G.

Post 34

Sunday, November 17, 2002 - 7:23pm

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"What Francois refers to as �metaphysical determinism� sounds like what I have always referred to as the law of causality: that things will act in accordance with their nature."

It is based on it, but it is more than causality. It is the idea that causality applies to the entire contents of the universe.

"I disagree with Francois� claim that �free will is a question of neurology and psychology.� It�s a component of man�s metaphysical nature"

What's the difference ? Is the brain not a given, for us who possess it ? Or are you trying to make another point ?

Post 35

Sunday, November 17, 2002 - 7:25pm

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Elizabeth: A male valet is a valet who happens to be male:) A valet is someone who will park your car for you, carry your bags into a hotel, and expect a tip. New York City is full of them.

Glenn: Thank you for making these clarifications, I was afraid some posters were missing the point completely, not to mention the bus:)

Francois: Can you please elaborate on this? �free will is a question of neurology and psychology.�
I think I know where you were going, but I don't want to speak for you lest I be wrong and muddy the waters of your usual crystal clear explanations. Remember some of our readers don't know that a metaphor is not an argument against an objective reality.

Post 36

Sunday, November 17, 2002 - 7:52pm

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Hi Fracois,

I didn't mean to suggest that causality applied to anything less! :)

My point there was (and forgive me if I've misunderstood you) that we don't induct the idea of free will from neurology or psychology. I've always understood it to be a lot more abstract than that, the idea that consciousness has an identity. Or perhaps you are saying that (proper) psychology and neurology confirms this, in which case, I agree.

G.

Post 37

Monday, November 18, 2002 - 9:18am

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"My point there was (and forgive me if I've misunderstood you) that we don't induct the idea of free will from neurology or psychology"

I agree with that point.

What I was saying is that our volition - as an instance of free will - is a neurological capacity, and therefore is studied by psychology, neurology, etc.
The concept itself of free will is the province of epistemology.

Sorry for the confusion.

Post 38

Monday, November 18, 2002 - 4:09pm

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I guess what I said above about the confusion of metaphysical determinism and the law of casuality got lost. Oh well. I'll just have to be less boring in what I write next time! :)

Post 39

Monday, November 18, 2002 - 5:50pm

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Francios said:
"It is based on it, but it is more than causality. It is the idea that causality applies to the entire contents of the universe. "

Once again you contradict yourself. Are you saying that causality applies to the entire contents of the universe EXCEPT, our choices, because our choices are not causally effected (according to free-will). On this point Glenn agrees with you. Glenn says,

"To me, �cause� means �necessarily.� IF this THEN this." he goes on to say,

"I agree that �we [choose to] do things we do because we expect a certain outcome.� This is called rationality "

So then isn't "rationality" the cause(?) of our choices?

But Glenn is (or is he?) also trying to say there is no causation going on between brain events and mind events, and hence actions?

Once again objectivists completely bunk receieved wisdom in neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy of mind!

The general belief is that mental characteristics are supervenient on physical characteristics. Or that no mental event can occur without some physical event occuring in the brain.

Disagree with this and it starts looking like you are prescribing dualism. And that doesn't look like Randian philosophy to me? Given that the philosophy is physicalist in nature (maybe as usual I've interpreted it wrong)

Alternatively then, tell me what does "CAUSE" mental events like thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. You are both saying nothing causes them - where do they come from then? Do they just arise spontaneously from nothing (ab initio)

Additionally denial of any causal influence on behaviour from belief, desire, intentional thought is largely a denial of cognitive-behavioural psychology, the current clinical paradigm.

If you want to hold that causation occurs at a physical level but not at a psychological level then ...

quotes from Francios
"They are completely different levels. Free will is a question of neurology and psychology, not physics. Furthermore, as I pointed out, free will is not possible without metaphysical determinism. " and

"Metaphysical determinism = everything has a cause"

... how do physical brain events (firings of neurons, etc) effect mental or psychological events and/or vice-versa? You're making no sense!

Steve.