| | MR. REED: An appeal to man to act against his nature by NOT changing inconvenient features of the happenstance "natural order" cannot be justified except by ascribing "natural law" to something allegedly "higher" than man, such as God. Which is, unfortunately, the unstated basis of Stolyarov's argument. By failing to acknowledge that it is in accordance with Man's nature to change the nature of other things, Stolyarov is bringing God in through the back orifice.
MR. STOLYAROV: I have used Natural Law to state that a certain process will be carried through without intervention, not that man cannot or that it is not within his nature to intervene. The only reason why man must not intervene here, is not because he is disrupting an inexorable process, but because of the result of that inexorable process, i.e. a living human being. This does not deny the capacity for man to intervene per se nor the desirability of him doing so in other situations. So, this still does not link to a God.
MR. REED: But an _idea_ can only exist in a conscious, functioning mind. In whose mind, then, does the fetus already exist as "the idea of the particular mind in full?" Certainly in no human mind, since no human mind has examined its "unique genetic scheme" at this point. So this other base of Stolyarov's structure also inserts his God into the back orifice of the argument, as the only mind in which this "idea of the particular mind in full" could conceivably exist.
MR. STOLYAROV: I am surprised to see an Objectivist write this. Remember, Mr. Reed, that existence and existents are absolute, that were every possible observer wiped from the face of this Earth, the existents he would have observed would continue to exist. To say that a mind has to exist to perceive DNA is to say that knowledge is generated by the mind, which is entirely relativistic. In fact, knowledge exists outside the mind, as does the concept of the universe, the concept of rationality, and the concept that the DNA will inexorably lead to the creation of a human being with time.
MR. REED: Then Stolyarov inserts God into the argument a third time, asserting that the DNA of the fetus has the moral status of an inventor's blueprint for a product, so that "if you entered the factory and burned the blueprint, you would already be guilty of property and patent violations." Against whom? In the case of a real blueprint, against the designer. But in fact there is no designer, since the DNA is the product of a process of random evolutionary accidents. So whose property is being infringed in the case of abortion? Again, the only possible answer is the God in Stolyarov's back orifice.
MR. STOLYAROV: Recall, Mr. Reed, that this is where I had stated the analogy was shaky. The child (see my earlier posts and references to Locke) possesses a property in himself. (No two issues are quite the same. Every analogy will diverge and become irrelevant at some point, so it is helpful to know where that point is so that no misunderstandings are had.)
MR. ZUMA: Something is a potential not because it might not be actualized but only because it hasn’t been actualized. Even if a change is unavoidable, what an entity will become, strictly speaking, is still only a potential until it becomes what it will become. Usually, we focus on cases where there are alternatives – obviously we can deliberate about the alternatives. However, the concept of potential is one that integrates identity and change – not identity and chance.
MR. STOLYAROV: But do you not concur that there is an essential difference between an event toward which there is a multitude of pathways and an event toward which there is only one? To a passive spectator, it is the difference between the possible and the inevitable. Hence, a conceptual distinction must be rendered between the two. You seem to use the term "potential" to refer to anything that may or will occur in the future. I use "potential" as a subcategory of your term. Let us agree on nomenclature. In physics, potential energy is the energy of an object in a set position. The object does not move, but if it starts (in any given direction) we can calculate its velocity, and the distance it will travel. So, potential should define only those instances where the direction is not yet evident, where there are many occurrences. I think the larger term that encompasses potential and futuristic certainty should be not "potential" but rather "event" or "happening," because this is the level of breadth required to encompass the two.
MR. ZUMA: And I accept that. Now, let’s add another point that hopefully we both agree: a potential exists only in virtue of some actual. For the case of the fetus, it is the actual DNA, physiological processes and the woman’s nourishment that supports the potential. (However, aftet this we disagree.) What actually exists is not yet a human being (rational animal). It is not merely an incidental difference that time will heal but a substantial difference. A person may be incidentally sleeping – but retains the physical structure that enables human consciousness: a funtioning brain. A fetus, in the 1st 2 trimesters, is substantially different – it lacks the physical structure that enables human consciousness.
You claim that since DNA fully defines the individual and its construction is in progress, it is as good as done. The dye as been cast, the plan is set, it's in the cards, the play is written and character defined, etc. Right? I claim a substantial change hasn’t occurred. You claim it’s been defined. I claim: so what? At this point you invoke Stolyarov maxim: regard each entity as that which it will almost certainly become (aka "futuristic certainty"). At which point, I claim that a substantial change can’t be ignored or faked – no matter how well defined and certain its outcome. A fetus is not a person – and thus it has no rights.
I think this sums up our differences. Right?
MR. STOLYAROV: As far as I see it, yes. You have correctly outlined the issue.
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