RoR: Forum

Post 60

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 12:56pm

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Mr. Stolyarov II,

On the surface, your argument seems to rest on the truth and/or validity of the idea of a "futuristic certainty". Some critical issues I have with this idea in general:

-When has life begun?

-When has the "process" ultimately leading to "life" begun?

-Is it possible (even necessary) to infinitely regress the context back to pre-conception events(as both the act of fertilization, as well as the conditions leading up to it, are as "necessary" as the process as fetal development is, in regard to any "futuristic certainty" of anything in this context)?

I have attempted to reformulate your argument (or, at least my impression of it) in standard form (syllogistic reasoning) below, as is required by the "treaty".

In order to avoid the charge of creating a "straw man" out of your argument (pragmatically, for ease of attack), I request your impression of my reformulation ("generous","fair","uncharitable","slanderous",etc).

Attempted Reformulation:

-Under the valid assumption that humans have a right to life ...

Premise 1
since a process that proceeds to a predictable conclusion without intervention is a metaphysical primary,

Premise 2
and the end of the process initiated by conception can be defined as a "human being"

Conclusion
Therefore, the beginning of this process can be defined as a "human being" as "that which had to be" (which has a right to life)

Please respond with feedback on this interpretation of your reasoning.

Ed

Post 61

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 1:47pm

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Mr. Thompson, your interpretation of my reasoning is generally correct, but I would like to add one slight adjustment (in bold).

Premise 1
since a process that proceeds to a predictable conclusion without intervention is a metaphysical primary,

Premise 2
and the end of the process initiated by conception can be defined as a "PARTCULAR human being"

Conclusion
Therefore, the beginning of this process can be defined as a "PARTICULAR human being" as "that which had to be" (which has a right to life)

Note that I define the beginning of the process (conception) as that time when there is no longer a chance a million possibilities for what will form, but rather a definite possibility that life A with genetic code B will emerge. (Twinning is irrelevant; at least one definite life already exists, so let us not get bogged down in the realm of when precisely twinning may occur).

Now, to address your presentation of the "fallacy of the continuum." Evidently, in reference to temperature, it would indeed be incorrect to label a tub filled with water at its melting point (32 degrees Fahrenheit= 0 degrees Celsius. I think the Celsius system would be more fitting for this analogy, because 100 degrees also happens to be the boiling point of water. Also, the difference is more extreme and more fitting to your analogy) "hot" because water at its boiling point evidently is.

But let us pretend that you are immersed in a tub of water slightly above melting point, undertaking a therapeutic ice bath (assuming such exists, which is quite likely). From beneath the tub (which is elevated with an opening underneath) a cannibalistic savage lights a fire and sets a protective locked barrier around it so that you cannot extinguish it. Your attempts to preempt this action are in vain.

Do you then not consider the tub to be hot in a futuristically certain mode, and that if you remain in it, your ice bath will turn into a boiling pot for the savages' next ceremonial stew? Having the option to leap out of the tub (as it is not guarded by savages who could not think better) and escaping, you should undertake it immediately, under conditions of futuristic certainty, not wait until the water scalds you and THEN, under the premise of actuality, escape.

Let us then distinguish between the continuums where my reasoning would indeed be fallacious and those where it is applicable.

It is time to define some terms:

Static Continuum: a continuum referring to various objects possessing different magnitudes of the same property or interplay of properties that can be arranged in a linear fashion.

Example: A comparison of the melting points of various substances would be a static continuum. In general, static continuums describe properties independent of temporal progression.

Dynamic Continuum: a continuum wherein a particular object or objects shift their magnitudes of a property.

Examples: A 100-foot race in the Olympics, wherein each runner increases his distance from the start line and decreases his distance from the finish line with the progression of time. This can also apply to a single runner. In this continuum, however, any runner can choose to turn back (and lose the race), but direction of a particular object's movement along the continuum is not metaphysically defined.

Futuristic Certainty or One-Way Continuum: A continuum wherein a particular object or objects shift their magnitude of a property (or interplay of properties) in a single direction only.

Examples: The very progression of time is such a continuum, with all of us changing in the magnitude of this property at the same rate. This is also true of the growth stages of the child and fetus, as well as the hypothetical "human stew in a tub" scenario that I had described.

Note that no matter how hard any doctor will try, he cannot reverse the fetus's development process. He can only abort it. The movement may have been averted, but it cannot be reversed.

Now, the fallacy of the continuum is clearly committed in your temperature argument, as we are dealing with a static continuum. In a dynamic continuum, the judgment of whether the fallacy is committed depends very much on the situation.

Is it a volitional dynamic continuum, such as a race, wherein we can expect, under standard conditions, for the runners to follow the track and head in a certain direction? Then, we can state that, say, in under a minute, Runner A will have already crossed the finish line, and we can be prepared to hand him a garland celebrating his accomplishments. Here, we can already assume that the runner will finish, hence the fallacy of the continuum is inapplicable.

Or is it a circumstantial dynamic continuum (i.e. based on non-human or non-volitional human agency) wherein magnitudes can fluctuate to-and-fro? Here, probability calculations play a role, as far as our technological capacity allows. The movement of clouds and wind can affect temperature, and it can be predicted to a certain extent. However, we must be prepared for several alternatives. We can store jackets should temperature decline or keep sunglasses handy should it rise, if both possibilities are high. So, responding to hot or cold weather, could be logical even in perfectly temperate conditions.

The futuristic-certainty continuum, as has been explicated above, is also exempt from what we can term the Fallacy of the Static Continuum.

Thank you immensely for your post. It provoked much thought within me and compelled me to discover a new aspect of metaphysics.

Post 62

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 1:53pm

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I think Stolyarovian Continuum Theory shall be sufficient to answer Mr. Glenn's latest post, with a single addendum:

Mr. Glenn neglects the fact that the nature of an entity is not static, and that its progression on a one-way continuum is also an inextricable part of it, which should be responded to in treatment of the entity. Time is a crucial component of the nature of all things.

Yes, for the time being, death is a futuristic certainty. By remaining conscious of that, we can take steps to prolong life via fitness, nutrition, safety precautions, etc. To neglect that aspect of an entity is to neglect perhaps the most crucial one.

As I have stated prior, an entity's future state is not its present state, but is derived therefrom, and, especially in the case of futuristic certainty, implications for present consideration exist.

Post 63

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 4:56pm

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MR. THOMPSON: When has life begun?
MR. STOLYAROV:When the fetus first develops a brain that is capable of any sort of volitional processes.

MR. THOMPSON: When has the "process" ultimately leading to "life" begun?
MR. STOLYAROV: At conception, when the unique genetic code of the embryo is created.

MR. THOMPSON: Is it possible (even necessary) to infinitely regress the context back to pre-conception events(as both the act of fertilization, as well as the conditions leading up to it, are as "necessary" as the process as fetal development is, in regard to any "futuristic certainty" of anything in this context)?
MR. STOLYAROV: The difference there is that there is no one set pathway by which the human being will develop, no one unique genetic code. An immensely large amount of possibilities for a genetic code can exist, which are merely potential in the true sense of the term. Is each of them a human being? No.

Post 64

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 5:15pm

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Only thirty percent of fetuses make it past the first three months...seventy percent of them are naturally aborted.

There is more certainty that a pregnancy will end naturally than the embryo will even develop past three months.

I definitely wouldn't continue to argue that life starts at conception and with the embryo. The embryo itself gives evidence that it does not have a "futuristic certainty" of being a conscious human being.

Post 65

Friday, June 20, 2003 - 9:19pm

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Mr. Stolyarov writes:

Yes, for the time being, death is a futuristic certainty.

And I guess it would be a breach of "natural law" to try and change that, right? :)

I knew there was a problem with that idea! I think you've just debunked your own theory. You've argued that if X is "futuristically certain" of becoming Y, then we treat it as such. Apply this to the above statement and I don't think I need to say anymore.

That's called an own-goal. :)

g.

Post 66

Saturday, June 21, 2003 - 8:05am

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MR. GLENN: You've argued that if X is "futuristically certain" of becoming Y, then we treat it as such. Apply this to the above statement and I don't think I need to say anymore.

MR. STOLYAROV: I have never argued that! How many times must I repeat that we must treat them DIFFERENTLY, with the same UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS. There exists almost a question of value. Do we value death? NO. Hence, we must not treat futuristically certain death as present death, but rather attempt to intervene for the precise purpose of delaying it. Life is a value, death is anti-value.

Man cannot breach natural law, except by subjectivist delusion. Intervening in any futuristic certainty is still acting within the bounds of that law. It is merely that additional factors are introduced to a process that, in their absence, would have inevitably reached a certain conclusion.

Mr. Glenn's arguments are absolute non-sequiturs and grossly misinterpret my position. I have already responded to this precise extreme fallacy both in the article and in this discussion.

Post 67

Saturday, June 21, 2003 - 8:10am

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MR. J.L.: Only thirty percent of fetuses make it past the first three months...seventy percent of them are naturally aborted.

MR. STOLYAROV: I would like to see your sources on that. The claim I find improbable, but I grant that it is possible, due to the many imperfections is the natural birthing mechanisms of human beings. Despite any flaws, I would think that accidents would be the exception, not the rule.

Nevertheless, even if it were the case, this is irrelevant to my definition of futuristic certainty.

"This futuristic certainty is defined as inevitable development in the absence of volitional human or circumstantial (i.e. non-human or non-volitional human) interventions into the process whereby this development occurs."

Natural abortion is classified as circumstantial intervention. Where it is preventable, steps should be taken to thwart it. Where it is not, no man can be blamed.

Post 68

Sunday, June 22, 2003 - 1:23pm

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MR. STOLYAROV

While being a libertarian, like yourself, I find your arguments on this topic circular and totally subjective.

I will not perpetuate myths and moral conjecture as you most certainly have to continue this thread.

I find this entire argument spurious and frankly regard it as inconsequential. If my wife and I agree to terminate a birth it is NO FUCKING BUSINESS of yours or any stinking government legislature. If you came and lectured otherwise, to my face, at the time, as a libertarian, you could not afford the subsequent dental work...period

Post 69

Sunday, June 22, 2003 - 1:26pm

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Post 70

Sunday, June 22, 2003 - 4:37pm

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Mr. Stolyarov, consider any of the following questions rhetorical because this is my last post on this thread. We�re going around in circles. Your position remains unclear, but I think you�re aware that it needs to be in order to maintain it. It seems to me that you come to this debate with an agenda to show, a priori, that abortion is immoral because you want it to be, regardless of objective facts.

To summarize your thesis, you assert that abortion is immoral because it�s the intentional destruction of an entity that has the right to life. It has the right to life because it is �futuristically certain� that the entity will become a human life.

Now substitute the term �futuristically certain� for �God�s will� or �Nature�s will� or any other primacy of consciousness assertion, and tell me how it�s different.

You�ve failed to adequately define the concept of (human) life and thereby the moment where the right to life becomes applicable. You�ve conceded that you �never argued that Mr. Glenn's definition was improper in any manner�, yet my definition excluded embryos. You�ve oscillated between claiming (1) that an embryo/fetus is a life and (2) that an embryo/fetus is not a life, but is somehow entitled to the right to life. In other words, treating it as if it is a life. And then, muddying the waters further, you then claim that you�ve �never argued� that we must treat them the same.

You ask, �There exists almost a question of value. Do we value death? NO.�

No, we don�t, but I fail to see how you can�t and remain consistent. Values require a standard and for Objectivists, that standard is life. But for you, �futuristic certainty� in the name of �natural law� takes primacy. After all, it�s not important that an embryo is a non-self-generating, non-conscious embryo, what�s important is that it will become a life. It follows that it�s not important that a life is a rich, full, conscious, exciting life, what�s important is that it will become death. If you argue otherwise, what application does �futuristic certainty� have beyond the abortion debate?

Now, I don�t think you believe that and I do think that you hold life to be a value. But only as a floating abstraction tied somewhat mystically in human DNA (but only where it�s convenient) and independent of the real, actual concretes that make life a value. This is demonstrated by your comparison of abortion with a �holocaust� in your article; i.e. the termination of a non-conscious, non-life at the choice of the host with the systematic murder of millions of conscious, productive, rich, actual, real lives with histories and experiences and families and loved ones and friends at the hands of the state.

You not only refute the Objectivist position on abortion, but through the course of this debate, by implication, you�ve refuted the Objectivist position on the nature of life and definition formulation (and therefore the law of identity.) �Natural law� does not feature prominently within Objectivism and the idea of �futuristic certainty� doesn�t features at all and seems to have no application in philosophy beyond the abortion debate, which makes it spurious. Your political/legal position on abortion is equally inapplicable and if attempted, would result in gross privacy and liberty violations, even for those who intended to carry their baby to term. These violations are the inevitable result of ascribing rights to a non-entity or a non-life. In other words, attempting to force non-A to be A via legislation.

I think it should be clear to those following this debate whose side reality is on.

G.

Post 71

Monday, June 23, 2003 - 9:49am

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DANG: While being a libertarian, like yourself, I find your arguments on this topic circular and totally subjective.

I will not perpetuate myths and moral conjecture as you most certainly have to continue this thread.

I find this entire argument spurious and frankly regard it as inconsequential. If my wife and I agree to terminate a birth it is NO FUCKING BUSINESS of yours or any stinking government legislature. If you came and lectured otherwise, to my face, at the time, as a libertarian, you could not afford the subsequent dental work...period.

MR. STOLYAROV: A libertarian, propagating the use of force! How ironic! All arguments in this vehement and absolutely disgraceful post have already been addressed in this discussions and via my links. I need not say any more.

Post 72

Monday, June 23, 2003 - 9:58am

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I'm deciding to stand with the traditional Objectivist view of abortion. While the unpleasantness of the concept makes my stomach churn and blood boil, the fact is: I have no right to tell a woman, (or any one else, but women in this case) what to do or not do with their bodies. Futuristic certainty of an entity does not truly exist. Furturistic certainty negates Free Will. Destroying free will in the name of something that ~may~ happen (birth of a human being) is tyrannical. Thanks for separating the wheat from the chaff, as Sciabarra puts it.
J

Post 73

Monday, June 23, 2003 - 2:14pm

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Obviously, �futuristic certainty� is a key component in your argument. Perhaps you can clarify a few points.

By the phrase, �futuristic certainty�, is it your intention to introduce a new concept or make explicit an idea already in use?

Is the certainty part necessary? For example, if a certain percent (say 30%) of fetuses spontaneously abort due to abnormalities, does you argument change? Is it not sufficient for your argument to assume a fetus will become a child if normal functioning maintains?

Is continuity necessary? If the process was digital and change was abrupt would your argument change? To illustrate what I�m talking about, imagine the following counterfactual scenario. Suppose that the fetus developed without a brain but at a certain point plugged in a brain (presumable developing in tandem) and became a functioning entity. Would the fetus parts (body and brain) have rights while separated or only when combined unit is formed? Let�s assume the process is certain so that your principle of �futuristic certainly� applies. Isn't continuity irrelevant to your argument?

What role does DNA play in your argument? You imply DNA defines the individual. Do not a person�s ideas, values and distinctive manner of being conscious define the person as an individual? If we accept that man is born tabula rasa and we reject determinism, mustn�t we reject both the idea that a pre-born is an individual and reject the idea that the pre-born is an individual with �futuristic certainty� (i.e. one potential out of many)?

Post 74

Monday, June 23, 2003 - 2:49pm

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Mr. Stolyarov II,

As far as your position on this issue, an issue often considered to be the most emotionally-charged issue of discourse among contemporary humans, I would hope that we can avoid "digging into our positions for defense"; or an arbitrary, whimsical "polarization" just in order to be "polarized and proud". Nevertheless, read on ...

In the spirit of my original post (all that stuff about "unconditional positive regard" for reasoning, etc), I must take issue with your arguably blithe dismissal of the idea of getting "bogged down" by the issue of twinning. On the contrary; perhaps, like a master chess player, you felt that you might be able to outwit such an intellectual juggernaut as I, by simply attempting to slip the subject right past my mind by superfluous mention? (A more fruitful strategy would have been to recognize that you were dealing with someone who carries a rather long and sharp intellectual battle sword, who appears to wield it with near-uncanny skill and almost-ironic ease, and to have stayed quiet about it with fingers crossed and eyes closed, just hoping it would be passed over and forgotten)

The issue of twinning is crucial to your argument because not all post-conceptual twins remain twins. (This next sentence is to be read as if it were from an medieval fantasy-action film that idealizes mysticism) And here is where your certainty will destroy you! (actually, I would prefer to annihilate the idea, but at the same time, to leave the man behind it intact): the infrequent, but pivotal, absorption of one embryo by the other (pivotal, because the validity of your argument rests on it not occurring), which is dubbed spontaneous fetal reduction happens to occur in more than 1% of twinning cases [1]! Do we hold a murder trial (indeed a trial on cannibalism!) for the surviving fetus that absorbs its twin?!?! I sincerely don't know how you are going to escape this pitfall/dilemma that I have set up for you, but I suppose that I should be open to your mastery of debate (I hope that your response is more than linguistic acrobatics, however, as would have been dictated by that treaty that we signed � the one that I believe I may have violated here, but I will let you "keep me honest" in that regard).

I rest my case (until your attempted rebuttal of course � and I will not fall into that trap of saying "now this is my last post, you Bible-thumping, woman-hater!", or any other emotionally-controlled reactions, only to be dismissed as soon as you "get under my skin" with your next argument!).

Source:
Sampson A, De Crespigny LC. Vanishing twins: the frequency of spontaneous fetal reduction of a twin pregnancy. Ultrasound Obstet Gynecol. 1992 Mar 1;2(2):107-9.

Ed

Post 75

Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 9:10am

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MR. JOHNSON: Furturistic certainty negates Free Will.

MR. STOLYAROV: Do the laws of physics, the fact that your stopping distance in a vehicle is proportional to the square of your velocity, negate Free Will? Why, you cannot just wish to stop right away and make it so. Nor can you wish that a pregnancy will not carry through to its logical conclusion and make it so. Futuristic certainty does not deny free will, it merely illustrates a metaphysical process, defined by set natural laws which man cannot mend, but can merely adjust to. It is known that a pregnancy will result in a human being. Now, given that fact, what does a man do? What SHOULD a man do in the face of the emergence of a human life, a life with the same UNDERLYING right to exist as himself?

To say that futuristic certainty violates free will is to lapse into hedonistic subjectivism, "altering" (of course not in actuality, just in one's mind) the facts of reality for a "convenience" that is just as illusory. (A pregnancy's identity is such that it does not in most cases physically endanger the mother's organism. Where it does, I agree, the mother's well being must take precedence, but only then.)

MR. ZUMA: By the phrase, �futuristic certainty�, is it your intention to introduce a new concept or make explicit an idea already in use?

MR. STOLYAROV: As far as I am aware, this is a concept of my own discovery, though it has been in existence as long as time itself. Simply put, most traditional abortionists have never sought to exposit a rational, metaphysical case against the practice, so I am treading on fairly new ground. But the idea of such a concept (whether one agrees with it or not) should be grasped by any rational being, just like my Continuum Theory.

MR. ZUMA: Is the certainty part necessary? For example, if a certain percent (say 30%) of fetuses spontaneously abort due to abnormalities, does you argument change? Is it not sufficient for your argument to assume a fetus will become a child if normal functioning maintains?

MR. STOLYAROV: No, 100% "certainty," i.e. freedom from accident, is not necessary. It can never be attained! Futuristic certainty applies to the absence of both volitional and circumstantial interventions. Refer back to my "stew in a tub" scenario. Perhaps, by chance (and a fairly large one, given that most savages inhabit tropical regions), a heavy cold rain will start to pour while your tub is warming up, turning the temperature sometime around the thirty-degree mark. Do you HOPE for that chance intervention or do you jump out of the tub as soon as you know that the savages have installed a fire underneath with the intent to boil you?

Accidents do happen, for better or for worse, but they cannot be relied on as a standard of judgment. How will the process occur without chance or volitional interventions? That is what must first be decided BEFORE volitional intervention can occur. (Note that I never claimed that it should not occur. In the "stew in a tub" case, you SHOULD intervene, as in the case of delaying death. The issues of your values and the rights of other human beings are what should decide.)

MR. ZUMA: Is continuity necessary? If the process was digital and change was abrupt would your argument change? To illustrate what I�m talking about, imagine the following counterfactual scenario. Suppose that the fetus developed without a brain but at a certain point plugged in a brain (presumable developing in tandem) and became a functioning entity. Would the fetus parts (body and brain) have rights while separated or only when combined unit is formed? Let�s assume the process is certain so that your principle of �futuristic certainly� applies. Isn't continuity irrelevant to your argument?

MR. STOLYAROV: Continuity is irrelevant, because, even if a brain has not formed at one instant and will form during the next, there is still the certainty (absent intervention) that there will be a brain.

MR. ZUMA: What role does DNA play in your argument? You imply DNA defines the individual. Do not a person�s ideas, values and distinctive manner of being conscious define the person as an individual? If we accept that man is born tabula rasa and we reject determinism, mustn�t we reject both the idea that a pre-born is an individual and reject the idea that the pre-born is an individual with �futuristic certainty� (i.e. one potential out of many)?

MR. STOLYAROV: DNA defines a man's form of consciousness, not its content. But to judge a man devoid of rights due to a lack of content is to advocate, once again, the killing of first-graders not yet exposed to the Bill of Rights. So long as the capacity for rationality is futuristically certain, the right to exist is present.

We do not know WHAT CONTENT the individual will possess during his life, but we know with certainty THAT he will be able to obtain it in the future. He who is born tabula rasa is still entitled to existence, despite that absence of content. Otherwise, are not newborns' minds as non-determined as those of fetuses?

Post 76

Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 9:18am

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MR. THOMPSON: Do we hold a murder trial (indeed a trial on cannibalism!) for the surviving fetus that absorbs its twin?!?!

MR. STOLYAROV: No. The fetus cannot be held liable for actions beyond his volitional control. The fact that his volition is futuristically certain does not render it present to have committed the act. We can classify those cases as circumstantial intervention.

For the same reason, children are subject to lower criminal penalties than adults, in proportion to their PRESENT rational capacity. Once they are fully able to wield it, they will also exhibit full responsibility for his actions. Now, if an adult cannibalized that fetus, criminal penalties should be instituted. But, in the status quo, they are not.

Futuristic certainty imparts UNDERLYING considerations (such as the right to exist) but not PARTICULAR considerations (such as responsibility for an act committed prior to the development of a corresponding level of consciousness).

Post 77

Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 10:02am

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Most of your article merely spells out the simple fact that a fetus is an early stage in the development of a human being. The certainty of the outcome (barring pathology and human intervention), the gradual nature of the growth process, and all other details of fetal growth are beside the point. The very concept of a fetus contains the idea of the biological end: an individual human being. We all know what a fetus seeks to become and will become as long as pathology or human intervention does not comes into play. We disagree over what a fetus is in an important respect � is it a being with rights?

Only the end product, a human being, has rights. Remember, that rights are a factual requirement. An adult has rights because of his survival needs. The needs of any life-form change through out its development. An acorn, having no leaves, cannot photosynthesize sunlight. By its nature, it will grow into an oak and will require sun to flourish. Its needs change as it grows. A fetus needs the womb and nourishment via a connection to the woman. When there exists an adult, he will need the conceptual use of his mind and require rights for his survival.

It is at this point that you make an equivocation between current needs and future planning. It is true that the oak tree�s need for sun implies we should plant it in a sunny location, just as it is true that for the future survival of our children we should move to a country where rights are respected. However, if we want to avoid having an oak tree or a child, we stop the process. The difference for the child is that we must do this before its rights accrue. Once it is born and has rights, we no longer have a choice if we wish to remain moral.

Rights imply a moral obligation on our part � when there are rights. Before there are rights, it is not a moral question but a question of our goals and abilities. We must plan for the child�s future rights if we want to plan for its future life. Until it has those rights, our planning for it�s life and rights is our option. Your thesis claims that if it will have rights in the future, it has rights now. This will be shown to be absurd.

Objectivism holds that there is only one fundamental right: the right to life. This is the right to self-ownership; it includes, as a necessary component, a right to liberty, property, etc. Killing a person is the most egregious violation of a person�s right to self-ownership. The various aspects of the right to life accrue over time. A child does not fully have a right to life: he can not enter into contracts, consent to sex, etc. However, a child has the core right that protects it from physical harm and violent death. Rights (the aspects of the right to life) accrue as development continues.

Now let�s consider your idea that future rights imply that they exist now (not merely that we must plan for them). Does the fact that a child will grow to become an adult mean that it can consent to sex? Can it enter contracts? Of course not! Yes, it does mean we have to prepare a child to be able to engage in these actions when it becomes an adult. Education is a moral obligation of a parent. However, your total argument rests on the very notion that a future right is a current right � not merely something to plan for. This general notion can not withstand scrutiny. We can void a child�s contract, refuse to allow a child to have sex, and send them to their room. If we did this to an adult, we would most certainly violate their right to self-ownership in a severe and illegal manner.

The fetus, in the 1st two trimesters, does not have what is required for rights: a brain. This is a precondition to self-ownership and self-determination for a conceptual being. If a women wishes to prepare for such an outcome, she continues to nourish the fetus, give it life, nurture and educate the child, and otherwise provide for the developmental process. If she does not want this outcome, she may choose to terminate this process at any time before the very first aspect of the right to life accrues: the right not to be killed by another. An abortion is the last means to avoid the point of development at which rights accrue.

There is nothing about the goal of fetal development, its certainty, its continuity, its uniqueness, its sameness, its prospects, its potential or its place in the total life process that makes future rights current rights. Facts that have not occurred are not yet facts. Our need for preparation only reflects that they will be or might be � not that they are. There are no fetus rights; we can kill the fetus and avoid the situation where there exists a being with rights.

Post 78

Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 10:09am

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Post 79

Tuesday, June 24, 2003 - 8:55pm

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Mr. Stolyarov II,

In the spirit of the dreaded "treaty" (man � I just won't quit bringing that damn thing up, will I? I guess that is because I picture it as imperative for a meaningful resolution of our quandary in short order; perhaps in no more than a half-dozen more posts, combined)

I must admit that I have not followed through with my end of the bargain. Recall that we were BOTH to submit arguments in standard form (this is imperative for a "mutual understanding", dictated by the treaty under Rules #1 and #2). And then (and this part was only implicitly communicated), using an objective standard of evidence and review, we were to decide which is the more defensible of the 2 arguments (we were to adopt a "may the best argument win" attitude, using mutually-agreed upon criteria). Before providing my syllogism, I propose that we use Damer's 4 cardinal criteria for judging effective rational argumentation:

1. Relevance
2. Acceptability
3. Sufficiency
4. An effective rebuttal to the rival argument

I will now proceed to meet these 4 criteria, by first giving birth to (yes, that was intended) an evidence-based, logic-guided line of reasoning. For proper acknowledgement, the following stems rather heavily from Rand's ideas, as well as from Mortimer Adler's (I know, I know � how can you combine an Atheist with a Christian and maintain any semblance of coherence? I'll leave it to the reader to decide whether I successfully accomplished this seemingly-insurmountable task):

Treaty Rule #1 (collaborate for mutual understanding)

Part 1 - "Come to terms":

Human being: An individual animal with volitional consciousness and the capacity to reason
(author's preferred definition)

Individual: being an individual or existing as an indivisible whole; existing as a distinct entity : SEPARATE
(selected from m-w.com)

Part 2 � "Speed resolution"

Identify & define the relevant Precision & Scope:
Precision must be as narrow as evidence allows; Scope must be as wide as a biocentric view permits (reason: life matters more than anything � indeed, it is only BECAUSE life matters, that anything matters)

General Assumption:
Human beings have the inalienable "right to life"

Treaty Rule #2 (evidence & reasoning; and ONLY evidence & reasoning)
"Show me the 'money'; in small unmarked bills (the "evidential reasoning" in standard, syllogistic form; so that we can "see" what we are arguing about)"

The 'Money' Train (a train of thought)

*attempts at paraphrasing Adler:

Things are the only existences that are subject to change

To even speak of a change, we are speaking of some enduring "thing" that changes
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That which is the subject of change must have an enduring identifiable identity

If the thing is a whole, it is divisible

While it remains a subject of change, it must remain undivided (it must have persistent unity)
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If it divides, then it ceases to be that one individual thing

Embryos have split to form 2 separate entities

If it divides, then it ceases to be that one individual thing
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Embryos are only potentially individual entities (not actual human beings)

The merely possible has no actual existence (has no reality)

That which has some potentiality for existence and tends toward existence is barely more than merely possible
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Potentialities have perhaps the least degree of reality (but certainly less than actualities have)

*attempts at paraphrasing the objectivist view

Man is an actual individual that has to relate to reality very specifically in order to survive (reality-imposed teleological direction)

This creates a moral standard for man to be guided by (man's life), if he has the freedom (right) to act by the guidance of this standard
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Rights rest on the fact that man is an actual individual that has to relate to reality very specifically in order to survive (rights are rights to the kind of actions necessary for the preservation of actual human life)

Since rights are imposed and validated by reality

And potentialities have less degree of reality than actualities do
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The rights of an actuality must always supersede a potentiality

Whew! I may have missed a few things, but it is getting late (and I'm experiencing "brain-drain"). A quick attempt at an effective rebuttal (objective standard #4 from above):

Your confirmed argument (from 23 Jun 2003):

since a process that proceeds to a predictable conclusion without intervention is a metaphysical primary,

and the end of the process initiated by conception can be defined as a "PART[I]CULAR human being"
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Therefore, the beginning of this process can be defined as a "PARTICULAR human being" as "that which had to be" (which has a right to life)

� and now a point-by-point rebuttal �

since a process that proceeds to a predictable conclusion without intervention is a metaphysical primary,

[if, and only if, twinning were unreal would this be valid � see below]

and the end of the process initiated by conception can be defined as a "PART[I]CULAR human being"

[no such "particular" human being can be defined, ESPECIALLY if an embryo splits (losing its "identity" by ceasing to become that "one and the same thing" that is undergoing change � see above), 2 fetuses develop (2 particulars) and one vanishes � see my last post]
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Therefore, the beginning of this process can be defined as a "PARTICULAR human being" as "that which had to be" (which has a right to life)

[nothing further is necessary, as conclusions themselves never need to be refuted � all the strength of any and every argument is found in the truth of the premises and the validity of the logic connecting them to the conclusion]

Earnestly interested in your response, Mr. Stolyarov II;
Ed