RoR: Forum

Post 0

Friday, March 5, 2004 - 6:12am

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Objectivism doesn't try to avoid the borderline case. It's a natural byproduct of how we do our thinking. Instead of fearing the borderline case, we recognize it for what it is.

Yes! Exactly.

Interestingly, as I was reading the latter part of your article, I was saying to myself, "but he's pointing out the solution to this problem in each example," and then, of course you demonstrated exactly that.

You did not mention it, but in most cases, the so-called borderline cases arise, because we use concepts (somewhat forming them on-the-fly) in context. To say something is "hot" or "smooth" means, "in the context of these things about which we are now speaking," this is "hot" and this is "smooth," and most arguments about the imprecision of concepts are usually a matter of context-dropping. Your example of the green and blue cars is perfect.

It [Objectivist epistemology] discusses how it is we can take different entities in reality, and create a useful mental abstraction.

Just want to mention the fact, that when discussing concepts with anyone other than Objectivists, I have discovered it is necessary to point out a concept is not an abstraction, it is an identification. As you and I know, concepts are formed by the two processes, abstraction and integration, but the result, the actual concept, is not itself an abstraction in the sense that most poeple use that word. The symbol (word) representing a concept is, "abstract," but the concept itself identifies an entity or class of entities and performs the same function as pointing at something and saying "I mean that," or "I mean one of those."

The reason this is important is because so many people believe a concept is the holding of an actual "abstraction" of that which it means (its extension or units), as though the concept man consisted of a miniature image of man in the mind. This false idea of a concept is continually presented as proof of why "real knowledge is never possible" because our concepts are only 'abstractions' and can never fully capture the nature of anything with all it complexity."

If you have not run into this argument, you will. It is ubiquitous. It is the reason Ayn Rand continually emphasized the fact that a concept "identifies" a unit or class of units, and means those units with all their attributes and characteristics, even if very few of them are known, and is the reason an adult and a child can both say "car" and mean exactly the same thing.

So concept formation always requires multiple instances.

This is not exactly true, unless you mean by multiple instances, instances of the same thing as well as different ones. Objectivist epistemology, of course, is not a description of how people actually do form concepts, but of how one who bothers to discover it, correctly forms concepts, or ought to. In real life most people do not actually form concepts according to the principles of Objectivist epistemology, and is the reason they are so confused.

A child's earliest concepts are all, "particular," and simply identify units, such as dada, mama, rattle, etc. Some of the early concepts evolve into general "universal" concepts, but at first, are all particular. The child may learn to identify the family cat, as "Pussycat," but, if it happens to see the neighbor's cat, it will identify it as, "Pussycat," also, even it if is actually "Tom," because has not yet formed the universal concept, "cat."

Thanks for the article. Do some more. There is precious little thinking about epistemology among Objectivists, and it is the heart of philosophy.

Regi

Post 1

Friday, March 5, 2004 - 12:56pm

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Thanks Regi,

I haven't come across the particular argument you mentioned, but probably because I don't talk with such specific language outside of Objectivist circles. If I'm going to discuss concept-formation, I try to show what it means through examples first.

My comment about multiple instances was both similar things, and different things. You have to have at least two instance of things that are similar, and one instance of something different. That's just do to the relative nature of things. Not sure how you understood it.

You're definitely right about context being important. I agree, but wanted to keep the article focused (and that was hard enough!). It's probably worth another article.

I have a few disagreements with your comments. Here are a few thoughts on that.

First, you mention that a child's earliest concepts are particulars, like mama and dada. Of course, those aren't concepts by the strict Objectivist definition. They're names. Later, when the child says "your mama" or "my mama", he's identified the concept of mother. This is true even in adult hood. Not all of the mental entities we keep in our heads are concepts.

Also, you say that Objectivist epistemology is not the way that people actually formulate concepts. This is true in a way, but it's a little simplistic.

For instance, you don't have to create a concept yourself from scratch. You can learn about it from other people. If someone tells you about something technical, like a new high-tech gizmo, you may not have experienced it first hand and done the abstraction.

But in order for you to retain the knowledge in the form of a concept, you still need to have the comparisons. You need to identify the way in which those gizmos are similar to each other, and different from other things. You need a body of knowledge, a context, in which to compare it to other things.

So the process is very much the same. You still need the different elements. The order might be a little different when learning from another person, but I believe all the steps need to be there.

And what happens if you miss steps? Well, then you have the floating abstractions. You have a fuzzy idea of what the concept is. You might not be able to see the boundaries very easily. Or worst of all, you might not have any idea what the referents of the concepts are. You may know that the word is supposed to have meaning, but not have a clue of what it is.

Post 2

Saturday, March 6, 2004 - 10:03am

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Joe,

Thanks for the thoughtful comments, You have raised a lot of interesting questions, but one is most interesting to me.

You said:

First, you mention that a child's earliest concepts are particulars, like mama and dada. Of course, those aren't concepts by the strict Objectivist definition. They're names. Later, when the child says "your mama" or "my mama", he's identified the concept of mother.

You also said:

But in order for you to retain the knowledge in the form of a concept, you still need to have the comparisons. You need to identify the way in which those gizmos are similar to each other, and different from other things. You need a body of knowledge, a context, in which to compare it to other things.

These are both related to the question, which is about "particular concepts." What you have said implies there are no such things. It is an implication in Rand's epistemology as well.

She said, A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurement omitted.

If this were true, it would be impossible to form a concept identifying anything which one never found more than one example of in the world. This is obviously absurd, and certainly not what Rand meant, but neither she, or any Objectivist since, as far as I know, has bothered to identifiy the problem, if they are aware of it.

The mistake is obvious as soon as it is identified. Take your example, You need to identify the way in which those gizmos are similar to each other, and different from other things, is not going to be possible if the gizmo in question happens to be the only one in the world, because, while it is different from all other gizmos, it is not similar to other gizmos of the same kind, because there are no others of that kind.

Let me assure you, I totally agree with Rand's definition of a concept quoted above except that it is limited to universal concepts only (and I would have said, "differentiating quality omitted," where she says "measurement omitted.") Her definition could have been expanded to include all concepts by adding, (or subsequently explaining) concepts for individual entities or "units" (particulars) "include" the "differentiating" quality for that particular, that is otherwise ommitted from the universal concept.

Rand's definition makes no provision for particular concepts, but we use particular concepts all the time. Every time we refer to a specific object, my car, the toaster, Niki (my cat), or Joe, for example, we mean one specific entity. The concept for a specific entity cannot be the mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s).

One might say, a particular concept means "one of these units of this universal concept" but "one of these," does not specify which, and that is exactly what a particular concept must do. Not recognizing this leads to the absurd conclusion that proper names, (Boston, Joe, Regi) or names in general, (mom, dad) are not concepts. If they are not concepts which actually identify something, what are they?

In passing, I also noticed this: But in order for you to retain the knowledge in the form of a concept, you still need to have the comparisons. ... You need a body of knowledge, a context, in which to compare it to other things.

Since knowledge consists of concepts, if a body of knowledge is required before knowledge can be retained "in the form of a concept," how are the first concepts ever formed, since there is no knowledge yet? Knowledge cannot be a prerequisite for knowledge.

Regi

Post 3

Saturday, March 6, 2004 - 7:32pm

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Regi,

You claim the need for the "particular concepts" by giving an example of a single object. How could you form a concept if you haven't seen more than one?

I'll one up you, if I may. How about objects you've never actually seen, because they don't really exist? I'm thinking dragons, unicorns, a benevolent dictator, and pixies. Now shall we call these "nonexistent concepts"? I think not.

Obviously we can do it, so how to explain it? I would have to say imagination. When you make the high-tech gizmo, there may only be one. But a concept doesn't just refer to those instances that exist now, but all those that exist in the future, past, or imagination. If I make up a story about a guy named Fred, I'm using thee concept "guy", even though no such guy exists. So if you go through the process of formulating a concept of the gizmo, you imagine that there are more than one, and that some qualities may very (your gizmo might be blue, but you can imagine a red one). You determine which characteristics are the important ones when you make the classification, and you formulate the concept based on that. Thus, a unicorn is a horse with a single horn sticking out of the front of it's forehead.

If you really formulate the concept, then it works like any other concept. If someone were to build a similar device, you'd either include it in the concept, or reject it as too different. So far, there's no need for a "particular concept".

A better example of a "particular concept" is the term 'God'. For monotheists, it's not that there is only one god, but there can never be more than one. In that sense, the term God is particular. But again, it's not a concept. It's just a name. The concept "god" is like the greek gods, or the biblical god, or any others. Ultra-powerful beings that rule the universe, or something.

You seem to be going down this path because you assume that all knowledge consists of concepts. But unless you're using knowledge in a very strange way (you've redefined words in the past), this just isn't the case. If I've experienced anger in the past, I know what that feels like. It's not a concept. It's a memory. But it's still knowledge. Same with any other memory. If I remember petting a dog, that's not a concept. I don't have a concept for "petting my dog Spot on the back of his neck".

In fact, a lot of the knowledge we have is not conceptual. I know that man is a rational animal, but I also know specific things. I know Lindsay likes red wine and Mario Lanza. That's not conceptual. It's not abstract. But it's still knowledge.

Post 4

Tuesday, March 9, 2004 - 5:54am

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Joe,

Thanks for the comments.

You said: You seem to be going down this path because you assume that all knowledge consists of concepts. But unless you're using knowledge in a very strange way (you've redefined words in the past), this just isn't the case.

I use the word knowledge in this way:

"...man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts.... All knowledge is in terms of concepts." [Emphasis added][Ayn Rand, "Foreword," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 1]

You also said: In fact, a lot of the knowledge we have is not conceptual. I know that man is a rational animal, but I also know specific things. I know Lindsay likes red wine and Mario Lanza. That's not conceptual. It's not abstract. But it's still knowledge.

Since the context of this discussion is Objectivist epistemology, it seems you are using the word knowledge in a "strange way." How can you have knowledge without concepts? I know many, like Bertrand Russell, confuse things like "memory," and "experience" with knowledge, but Objectivism, as far as I know, does not accept anything as knowledge that is not retained by means of concepts.

Regi

(Edited by Reginald Firehammer on 3/09, 9:55am)

Post 5

Tuesday, March 9, 2004 - 10:06pm

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Regi,

Your quote is a little misleading. The emphasis that you added was not on Rand's words, but someone she was quoting.

I also think that you using this quote is a little peculiar. After all, you claim that Rand's views of concepts is wrong in the first place, because it doesn't take into account "particular concepts". It's true that widening concepts to include particulars could solve the problem of defining knowledge to be purely conceptual, but there's no reason to accept that definition as definitive.

Later in the same book, Rand discusses knowledge in more detail. She says, "For instance, the concept 'knowledge' is formed by retaining its distinguishing characteristics (a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation) and omitting the particular fact(s) involved".[Emphasis added] [pg 35]

I think that's pretty clear. Knowledge is a mental grasp of a fact of reality. The form by which you hold it isn't critical, and I don't see that it can be conceptual, unless you start redefining what conceptual means. I gave the example of Lindsay's preferences. I don't hold that as a concept. Even if I had something to abstract (All Lindsay Perigo's like red wine?), what measurements have I omitted, and what symbol/word have I given it?

Now there's some validity in saying that memories or sense-perceptions are not knowledge. They're unanalyzed. If you burn yourself on the stove, you know what pain is (really...you do), but you have to mentally connect that pain with the stove before you have knowledge of the cause/effect relationship.

Post 6

Wednesday, March 10, 2004 - 6:16pm

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I would point out that Rand doesn't provide much evidence that the mind actually forms concepts in the way she mentions. What is the proof that little children form concepts by way of a process of measurement omission?

As has been pointed out, if I see a gizmo for the first time, I don't need another to form the concept "gizmo."

Someone once gave the example of a "chicken sexer" who can identify the sex of the chicken within the egg just by looking at the egg. The person can't give a good explanation of why -- he just "kind of knows" -- but it is knowledge nonetheless.

I realize that many Objectivists consider ITO to be Rand's greatest achievement, but I think it's the weakest part of her philosophy.