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Post 20

Wednesday, December 1, 2004 - 7:53pmSanction this postReply
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Dr. Machan,

I post to Objectivist web sites because Rand played a huge role in my intellectual growth, even if I do not agree with her conception of human nature anymore.  I also enjoy discussing with Objectivists because they are intelligent people, despite my disagreements with them.

Of course, I do discuss problem the issue metaphysically, but the kind of intellectualism that comes into play during such discussions is very annoying and often frustrates me because I prefer to discuss the evidence from science rather than the abstract philosophical problems. 

The view of causation that plays a role in the hard determinist thesis is impossible to prove exhaustively.  Most hard determinists argue that all relevant causal factors necessitate a particular outcome (the law of sufficient reason applied to causality) and combine this with the idea that the human will can be analyzed in terms of causal factors.  All the libertarian has to argue is that we do not know enough knowledge to show that.  Then the libertarian is free to make careful arguments that appeal to varieties of skepticism and incomplete understanding.

Moreover, if the hard determinist is right, what does that affect?  According to him, people can't act other than they did, but what is the practical result of that?  Even if he is right, he is right in a very trivial way.

But if the human will does have influences, it is a good place to start.  And from there, we can see what can and will not assault our notions of moral responsibility.

Unfortunately, I have not read your book (I haven't had time to hit the library) and therefore cannot advance arguments against your specific thesis.  When I do, I will say what I think about it. 




Post 21

Wednesday, December 1, 2004 - 8:10pmSanction this postReply
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Kurt,

That is my point - when we post the argument at the high level of "free will" vs. "determinism", the determinists always look like the villains who are trying to deny all is great and good in human nature and who are trying to destroy our freedoms.

But when we see that determinism "lite" (at the very least) does have its benefits, I think that we can level the moral playing field a bit and see that even the evil determinist has his points.  His view is the view of most scientists who study human behavior and who are trying to help human beings by understanding them.

What determinism most importantly me to me is this: that I can study human nature insightfully.  I can see the fears of the indeterminists, but as Dennett and Pinker have argued, the hard determinist thesis has no serious practical use for us even if it is true. 

However, since even the lighter form of scientific determinism Pinker argued for has serious effects on libertarian views of free will, I think that people who want to preserve their moral views will have to reconceive some parts of them.  Pinker's book, The Blank Slate, is a good place to start.  No need to buy the book, which is excellent - just read the chapter called "The Fear of Determinism".




Post 22

Wednesday, December 1, 2004 - 8:15pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

Pretty much every behavioral trait is believed to be influenced by these factors.  Depression is a well known example, and there are many others.

Look into research on identical twins, and look into the correlations between the size of the ventremedial prefrontal cortex and the exhibition of violent criminal behavior.




Post 23

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 8:49amSanction this postReply
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Pretty much every behavioral trait is believed to be influenced by these factors.  Depression is a well known example, and there are many others.
The fact that something "is believed" by someone proves nothing.  Influenced, how?  And depression is not a behaviour, it is a mood or a feeling, neither of which are under immediate, direct conscious control.


Look into research on identical twins,
 The identical twins I know certainly retained free will.  They did many things differently. 

and look into the correlations between the size of the ventremedial prefrontal cortex and the exhibition of violent criminal behavior.
Volitional consciousness is an attribute of a normal brain.  The properties of an abnormal brain prove nothing.  In any event, the articles I read (2 of them) only provide data that show a correlation between low ventromedial prefrontal cortex mass and APD -- correlation, not causation.

The fact that chemical changes in the body, whether induced by external factors or caused by normal biological functions, can cause uncomfortable physical sensations is not in dispute.  The issue is whether these changes destroy an individual's ability to decide how to act.  I've seen no evidence or this.




Post 24

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 8:56amSanction this postReply
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I have one example. When I first met my husband, some of his behaviors appeared completely incredulous to me. Then my parents-in-law came and lived with us for quite a while. That helped me a great deal to understand my husbands upbringing and thus his behavior today.

Are you saying that he no longer has the power to control his behavior?  That he has no choice about what he does?

Are you talking about his behavior or his emotions?  We have no immediate, direct control over our emotions -- they can only be changed over time by introspection and thinking -- but we do have the ability to decide how to react to our emotions.





Post 25

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 10:26amSanction this postReply
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Michael,

Your rush to display your aversion to anything smacking of determinism hasn't aided your understanding of this determinist's position.  I would recommend that you moderate your tone and read what I have specifically written on this thread and see if it resembles the caricature of determinism at which your arguments are directed.

If you are arguing that free will is the ability to look at a variety of possibilities and reason based on our knowledge of them, of course human beings have free will, or "volition".  But so do chess playing computers when they play chess - they evaluate a variety of moves, and select the best ones based on the algorithms and methods of evaluation that they have been programmed with.  The better hardware and software the chess playing computer has, the better moves it will make.

The question as posed by this determinist (me) is whether there are grounds for seeing whether an individual would make one choice rather than another (or others), or for behaving in one way rather than another, and whether these differences are based on factors we can analyze scientifically.  If there are, then the will is influenced by causal factors which are not the same thing as the will.  For example, if genes specify brain size, and brain size influences intelligence, and intelligence influences choices, then the kinds of choices a person makes is partly dependent on causal factors which can be traced back to his genes in part.

Having laid out the framework, I will address your specific objections:

"The fact that something "is believed" by someone proves nothing.  Influenced, how?  And depression is not a behaviour, it is a mood or a feeling, neither of which are under immediate, direct conscious control."
But depression does influence conscious choice, often reducing its quality, as anyone who has been seriously affected by it will tell you.  So you are simply talking past this determinist's contention.

The fact that you "believe" that you have free will proves nothing either.  Such an uncharitable reading of a person's position is incredible.

But what is the point?  Scientists believe that the human beings are what they are because of genes, likewise ants and other animals.  Therefore, all behavior, or at least, the inchoate capacity to produce it, must be encoded in the genes to some degree. Now, certain aspects of behavior will not be influenced by genes.  For example, the language you speak is not a matter of genes: it is about the environment.  Eye color is genetically determined, as is hair texture.  However, things like intelligence come in between.  The genes specify the nature of the brain, so there is some influence.  The degrees are still being fleshed out.

The success of this "belief" in arriving at new ideas and good testable conclusions that have withstood repeated testing have made it strongly held by most scientists.  If you have a problem with it, fine.  In the end, all proofs still require people to intelligently understand the evidence and accept the reasoning.  And nothing serious is going to happen to you if you refuse to believe it because your livelihood doesn't depend on scientific success in genetic or behavioral research. 
The identical twins I know certainly retained free will.  They did many things differently.
This doesn't affect the determinist thesis, because no one argues that genes determine EVERYTHING about an individual.  But the degree of similarity between the twins on a range of behavioral traits revealed that many things thought to be mostly environmental in origin or freely chosen had genetic influences.  Bed-wetting is/was a trivial example, but IQ and temperament are/were not.

Volitional consciousness is an attribute of a normal brain.  The properties of an abnormal brain prove nothing.  In any event, the articles I read (2 of them) only provide data that show a correlation between low ventromedial prefrontal cortex mass and APD -- correlation, not causation.will.  They did many things differently.
Thanks for providing me with a good example of the kind of writing which I call the "intellectualism" that makes me stay away from the metaphysical free-will vs. determinism debate.  What is a "normal brain"?  Are some brains more normal than others? And why should "free-will" be affected by the brain of the individual?

The fact that chemical changes in the body, whether induced by external factors or caused by normal biological functions, can cause uncomfortable physical sensations is not in dispute.  The issue is whether these changes destroy an individual's ability to decide how to act.  I've seen no evidence or this.

That is probably because of how you construe "destroy an individual's ability to act" and because you are probably one of those dualists who have not seriously tried to bridge the gap between matter and consciousness.  Depression, and even ailments like diabetes are not "uncomfortable physical sensations".  They have serious effects on volition and conscious behavior, but their symptoms are fully physical as well as mental and are a result of serious hormonal imbalances.  These disorders seriously affect a person's ability to act.  The person's volition still operates, but he makes much poorer choices because
1) the range of possibilities of behavior apparent to him is perceived as being much narrower, in the case of depression
and
2) there is a perceived lack of energy, in the case of diabetes.

Now, if you have any more arguments to make, I would seriously recommend that you direct them at my specific form of determinism, which argues that:

Scientific analysis of the nature of the will provides insight into human nature and into the process of volition, including its causal factors (thoughts, decisions and functional characteristics).




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Post 26

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 12:03pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,
Are you saying that he no longer has the power to control his behavior?
Why should he need to control his behavior? I didn't say anything about wether his behavior is good or bad. Please don't make assumptions that's not there.

All I am saying is that by knowing my parents-in-law, I gained a understanding of his genes, and the environment that he grew up in. And I no longer wonder why he behaves as he does. 

(Edited by Hong Zhang on 12/03, 11:24am)




Post 27

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 1:34pmSanction this postReply
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Your rush to display your aversion to anything smacking of determinism hasn't aided your understanding of this determinist's position.  I would recommend that you moderate your tone and read what I have specifically written on this thread and see if it resembles the caricature of determinism at which your arguments are directed.
I could, of course, say that since my genetic code predisposes me to a harsh tone, it is futile for you to ask me to change it. 

The question as posed by this determinist (me) is whether there are grounds for seeing whether an individual would make one choice rather than another (or others), or for behaving in one way rather than another, and whether these differences are based on factors we can analyze scientifically.
 
The choice to focus or not to focus one's mind on a conceptual level is man's basic choice -- it is an irreducible primary, it cannot be attributed to anything else.  It is, simply, free will.

We know this because it is axiomatic, in the sense that any claim to knowledge -- including your claim that our behavior is determined -- presupposes the ability to make this basic choice free of any external factors.  If you are not free to choose to think or not to think,  then you do not know the extent to which you control your mind versus the extent to which it is affected by deterministic factors -- and thus you have no way of knowing whether your conclusions are the result of a process of thought governed by logic, or merely the result of some genetic predisposition to believing in determinism. 

The very process of trying to "analyze scientifically" presupposes that you are in control of your mind's processes, free of any deterministic forces that may cause you to ignore evidence, think illogically, etc.

Thus,  for anyone that truly believes that their mental processes may be determined by factors other than their own volition, the only logical behavior is to sit down and shut-up. Since you cannot be sure why you believe what you believe, you have no business trying to convince others.

Nor does it change anything to say that your position is not that behavior is determined, but merely influenced.  The issue is, do I control my mental processes freely and clearly, or am I working under the handicap of an outside "influence"


For example, if genes specify brain size, and brain size influences intelligence, and intelligence influences choices, then the kinds of choices a person makes is partly dependent on causal factors which can be traced back to his genes in part.
This is a non-sequitur.  It does not follow that because brain size is genetically determined, decisions are genetically determined.  The ability to focus or not focus, to think or not to think, is independent of one's level of intelligence. 

The fact that people with larger brains tend to go to college more frequently than those with smaller brains certainly does not prove a genetic predisposition toward deciding for college.  If it did, then what would explain the big-brainers that never get out of grade school?  You are confusing correlation with causation.


 
But depression does influence conscious choice, often reducing its quality, as anyone who has been seriously affected by it will tell you.  So you are simply talking past this determinist's contention.
Many factors may influence a person's choices.  But influence and determine are miles apart.  A depressed person is still free to choose to think or not to think.  A sick person's decision to stay in bed until he gets better does not change the fact that it was his decision, and he could decide otherwise.


 
But what is the point?  Scientists believe that the human beings are what they are because of genes, likewise ants and other animals.  Therefore, all behavior, or at least, the inchoate capacity to produce it, must be encoded in the genes to some degree.

This is another non-sequitur.  The fact that our physical make-up is encoded in our genes does not change the fact that an attribute of man's physical make-up is a volitional consciousness. 


 
Now, certain aspects of behavior will not be influenced by genes.  For example, the language you speak is not a matter of genes: it is about the environment.  Eye color is genetically determined, as is hair texture.  However, things like intelligence come in between.  The genes specify the nature of the brain, so there is some influence.  The degrees are still being fleshed out.

This is more non-sequitur.  It does not follow that because some human characteristics are genetically determined, decisions are genetically determined.



 
The success of this "belief" in arriving at new ideas and good testable conclusions that have withstood repeated testing have made it strongly held by most scientists.  If you have a problem with it, fine.  In the end, all proofs still require people to intelligently understand the evidence and accept the reasoning.  And nothing serious is going to happen to you if you refuse to believe it because your livelihood doesn't depend on scientific success in genetic or behavioral research.

I have a problem with it because it is inherently self-contradictory.  No scientist can claim to "know" that what you think you know might really be the result of genetic influences, for that would apply to his alleged knowledge as well.  To put it another way, we would dismiss any scientist that claims to have engaged in the mental process of rigorously objective scientific inquiry and then claims that as a result, he knows for a fact that one can never be sure that one's mental processes are rigorously objective and scientific, because they might be tainted by outside forces.



 
Thanks for providing me with a good example of the kind of writing which I call the "intellectualism" that makes me stay away from the metaphysical free-will vs. determinism debate.  What is a "normal brain"?  Are some brains more normal than others? And why should "free-will" be affected by the brain of the individual?
A normal brain is one that has not been obviously damaged.  Doing a frontal lobotomy may change many of that particular brain's capabilities, none of which has any implications for the functioning of a normal brain.  A man born with no arms will not be capable of playing baseball.  This does not mean that the decision to play baseball is genetically determined.



 
That is probably because of how you construe "destroy an individual's ability to act" and because you are probably one of those dualists who have not seriously tried to bridge the gap between matter and consciousness. 
There is no duality or gap between matter and consciousness.  Volitional consciousness is an attribute of man's mind.  It arises out of the biological identity of man.



 
Depression, and even ailments like diabetes are not "uncomfortable physical sensations".  They have serious effects on volition and conscious behavior, but their symptoms are fully physical as well as mental and are a result of serious hormonal imbalances. 

These disorders seriously affect a person's ability to act.  The person's volition still operates, but he makes much poorer choices because
1) the range of possibilities of behavior apparent to him is perceived as being much narrower, in the case of depression
and
2) there is a perceived lack of energy, in the case of diabetes.

A poor choice is still a free choice, not a "determined" one.  Many people who are depressed make the proper decision to seek help.  Many diabetics make the proper decision to get insulin.  There is no evidence here that any decision they make is determined by their condition.  Certainly, they take their own conditions into account -- and some individuals will decide to evade reality and do nothing about their condition.  But it is still their decision.



Now, if you have any more arguments to make, I would seriously recommend that you direct them at my specific form of determinism, which argues that:

Scientific analysis of the nature of the will provides insight into human nature and into the process of volition, including its causal factors (thoughts, decisions and functional characteristics).


Scientific analysis presupposes free will, completely, utterly and totally free will -- otherwise one has no way of knowing how and why one reached whatever conclusions one professes to have reached.  And volition is its own causal factor.





Post 28

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 5:22pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

I read your post and since it still displayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the determinist position (actually, I think that your arguments are ideologically motivated, but I will still lay out my case), I decided to present my position in a way that would enlighten more people, rather than spend my time responding to arguments that I have made the case against too many times to my satisfaction.  If you think that there is any single point you would like me to respond to in detail, mention it.

Your common mode of argument is to claim that this or that factor (on its own) is not a sufficient influence to explain this or that phenomenon.  Unless in extreme cases, with all other factors being equal (or independent of the factor being being analyzed), no single factor is sufficient to explain anything we observe in the world.  No determinist I know understands his argument to be your caricature of it.  All causes and effects are complicated things which are the results of a lot of influences.  Influences in complex causation are exactly the same as determinants.  There is no dichotomy.

Sufficient influences are influences that necessitate a given effect.  Necessary influences are influences that are required, but do not on their own, necessitate a given effect.  Sufficient influences are hard to work out without an "all other things equal clause".

Sometimes, a biologically related phenomenon can have only one type of major necessary influence e.g. the sex of an individual is a result of the chromosome from the sperm in fertilization.  Some of your arguments take the form that because a woman is a woman now, the X chromosome from the sperm makes no difference to her being a woman.  Neither does her being a woman affect the kinds of choices she makes (it's totally magic that women like dolls and boys like guns for toys).

Sometimes, it can be achieved in a complex way and we can isolate some necessary influences: for example, a 8 ft man with limited jumping ability can a 6ft man with great jumping ability can both dunk basketballs.  Some of your arguments take the form that because one cause doesn't explain all the rules and the exceptions, it doesn't play a role in explaining anything whatsoever.

But sometimes, we can see that certain things preclude certain possibilities or make them implausible at the very least because they lack any of our necessary influences (a 4ft man dunking, even with decent jumping ability).  None of your arguments accept the impossibility of certain choices because the individual sees that they are impossible for reasons grounded in his biology.

The complex view is the kind of view of causation that has to be taken to understand the position of the determinist.

So that you will realize that this is the Objectivist position on determinants to some degree, let us look at OPAR.

""The choices involved in performing a thought process are different in an important respect from the primary choice.  These higher-level choices, as we may call them, are not irreducible.  In their case, it is legitimate to ask, in regard both ends and means: why did the indivdiual choose as he did?  What is the cause of his choice?  Often, the cause involves several factors, including the individual's values and interest, his knowledge of a given subject, the new evidence available to him, and his knowledge of the proper methods of thinking." - (OPAR, pg. 64) 

"The factors shaping a thought process, to stay with our example, do not work automatically. A man's previous knowledge, I have said, is one possible determinant." (OPAR, pg 65)

Hopefully, Peikoff's use of the word, "determinant", might alert you to the possibility that "determine" and "influence" are often used the same way in philosophy, the only differences being that former ("determine") is more often used in a context that argues that all other things being assumed equal or independent of it, the factor or determinant was the main reason why something happened while the latter ("influence") is used when the factor or influence is not the sole thing that is adduced as the main reason.

Even Rand and Peikoff argue that even after the primary choice to "focus", there are still very important determinants influencing the choice that was made that cannot be evaded.  OPAR's claim is that the choice could have been "otherwise", and that is the metaphysical debate on determinism and free will that I consider a waste of time because it depends on too much intellectualism and skepticism.

To conclude the thrust of my argument, it is easy to claim that a SINGLE line of evidence leads to a non-sequitur.  It is when the lines of evidence are combined and correlated to yield stronger causal systems that we see that there is more truth in them.

Take for example, GMAT scores.  GMAT scores are the highest single predictor of success in business school according to GMAC data.  They are not perfect, but they are the best.  When combined with college GPA, their predictability increases, so a good college GPA and a high GMAT score predict school success better than just GMAT scores.

Now, the indeterminist can always throw out GMAT scores.  His position, if held consistently, is that the will can always change things and there is nothing illuminating about analyzing it.  The moment he gives credibility to even trying to explain the GMAT scores in terms of causal influences like level of education, he is methodologically a determinist because he is arguing that the quality of the answers that people chose on the GMAT were influenced by something.

With that, I will rest my case unless you have something specifically interesting to mention.  There are more than enough books and web sites on neuroscience and genetics out there for people who want to do the reading to do it.





Post 29

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 7:29pmSanction this postReply
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Next, in the first paragraph above you say:

 I decided to present my position...

You then go on to argue at length against the human faculty of decision-making.

Now which is it? You can't have it both ways. 




Post 30

Thursday, December 2, 2004 - 9:23pmSanction this postReply
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Lance,

I doubt you seriously read beyond that first line, because the article was partly an analysis of human decision making, not an argument against it.  I have written repeatedly that volition exists, and that I know of no determinist whom I respect who denies its existence (okay, maybe one) .It is the nature of volition that is being debated here.

So my simple answer to your question is that the fact that my actions are determined doesn't negate the perspective which argues that it is a fact that I make them.  The question is what is the nature of "I" or the self - is it open to reductive/determinist analysis or not?

In other words, to adduce causes for a phenomenon is not a denial that the phenomenon happens, or that the phenomenon is real.  However, the causes adduced can affect the typical description or explanation for the phenomenon.

It is a fact that thunder exists, but a man who attributes thunder to the anger of  Zeus sees it differently from a meteorologist.

That is as good as I can get.




Post 31

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 11:09amSanction this postReply
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I'm not particularly interested in lengthy debate, but I did want to note my convictions, and besides I can never resist a questionaire (Foucault rolls his eyes and sighs).

1) Is human behavior predictable?
Dispute the term "human behavior", but in the last analysis, no.
2) Can it be subsumed under causal laws? 
No.
3) Can aspects of a person's nature/behavior be predicted by his genes and/or the environment he grows up in?
In the last analysis, no.
4) By using knowledge, can a person manipulate aspects of human behavior (one or a multitude of persons), or predict what will occur under certain circumstances?
In the last analysis, no.
5) If a person's behavior was predictable under certain circumstances, do we now absolve him of moral responsibility?
I think there's something dishonest in trying to get the "right answer" to the "moral responsibility" issue regardless of philosophic truth.  But to answer: if in the last analysis, yes.  (but it isn't)
6) Has self understanding reduced or improved the quality of your choices?
Improved.
7) Have you ever given a verbal explanation for your behavior which upon reflection, you realized wasn't true?
Yes.
8) Have you read anything about behavioral genetics?
A little.
9) Have you read anything about neuroscience?
A little more.
10) Do you think that laws impact the behavior of some people?
Not sure what the question means- what kind of "laws"?
11) How similar are you to your parents physically and mentally?
Physically, quite a bit, in principle almost compeltely.  Mentally, there are congruences, mirror image reverse congruences, and totally contrary elements.
12) Do you speak like your friends in high school or like your parents?
Like neither.  I speak like a wierd combination of my teachers and my subculture(s).




Post 32

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 11:41amSanction this postReply
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Next Level;

 

The common form of your argument is to offer an example as evidence in support of determinism, and when I refute it, you claim that it isn't that simple, that there are really many more factors involved and I am caricaturing your argument. That is what you have done with every post.

 

I'm only working with what you are giving me.  All of the non-sequiturs that I pointed out in your last post remain non-sequiturs. They do not become valid simply because of your claim that " The complex view is the kind of view of causation that has to be taken to understand the position of the determinist."

 

 

To conclude the thrust of my argument, it is easy to claim that a SINGLE line of evidence leads to a non-sequitur.  It is when the lines of evidence are combined and correlated to yield stronger causal systems that we see that there is more truth in them.

Combining and correlating several non-sequiturs does not bring us to the truth. It just brings us to a bunch of non-sequiturs. 

 

 

 

I have written repeatedly that volition exists, and that I know of no determinist whom I respect who denies its existence (okay, maybe one) .It is the nature of volition that is being debated here.

 

So my simple answer to your question is that the fact that my actions are determined doesn't negate the perspective which argues that it is a fact that I make them.  The question is what is the nature of "I" or the self - is it open to reductive/determinist analysis or not?

In other words, to adduce causes for a phenomenon is not a denial that the phenomenon happens, or that the phenomenon is real.  However, the causes adduced can affect the typical description or explanation for the phenomenon.

 

This is a fine bit of fence straddling.  Yes, volition exists, but it might not be fully voluntary?












Post 33

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 1:34pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

I am not here to convince people about the truth of all variants of determinism nor to argue that one becomes a better man when one accepts any variant of determinism.  Many people who are wrong about this or that fact are good people.  I am arguing that determinism plays a very important role in the biological sciences that even people with an aversion to determinism should get clear. After that is clear, and if we agree on the value of science, we can then try to see what the problems with determinism are and how to reconcile them with our moral notions.

You see, when you wrote:

A poor choice is still a free choice, not a "determined" one.  Many people who are depressed make the proper decision to seek help.  Many diabetics make the proper decision to get insulin.  There is no evidence here that any decision they make is determined by their condition.  Certainly, they take their own conditions into account -- and some individuals will decide to evade reality and do nothing about their condition.  But it is still their decision.
I shook my head because your mode of reasoning was the same as the reasoning that Ayn Rand used to claim that smoking didn't cause cancer.  Smoking doesn't cause cancer because there are individuals who smoke who do not have cancer.  Likewise, there are individuals with cancer who do not smoke.  Brilliant refutation.

NOTE: I will not discuss diabetes because it has some physical symptoms unrelated to the mind.

I can see that your problem is more with moral responsibility than with discussing facts about the will.  Many people have committed suicide when in bouts of depression; others have been unable to maintain employment. However, according to you, there is "no evidence" that the decision to commit suicide was taken because they were depressed because it wasn't determined by their condition. Wise words.

Moreover, most people with depression get diagnosed by other people or get sent to doctors by other people.  It is rare to find a person who is depressed who initially sought out counsel on his or her own.  But of course, the actions of this people didn't influence or determine the decision of the person who eventually went in for treatment.  Wise thoughts.

Thankfully, many people are not as resistant to common sense you are, Michael, and the practical result of accepting the fact that these people needed help because their conditions were ruining (as in determining their choices for the worse)  has resulted in many people living much better lives.

The real problem is this: you, like many other indeterminists, have mastered the art of doubting causation (or Humean skepticism) because you have learned that making logical conclusions is something that lies in intelligence.  Therefore, any evidence that makes a line of reasoning more plausible can simply be denied as being inconclusive by using your imagination.  You have mastered the art that Ayn Rand used to deny that smoking caused cancer and feel free to apply it to areas which hold no practical significance to your livelihood.  If they did hold practical significance to your livelihood, you would learn pretty quickly that imagination and truth are pretty distinct.

That is the kind of argument that Christians use to deny evolution.  They look at the world, appeal to human intuitions about design, and then argue that could life really be the result of "natural selection"?  They don't even understand evolution, or care that the evidence of similar genetic codes and organs along different lines of animal ancestry is strong evidence for evolution, as is mutation (and lots of findings in neuroscience etc.).  Moreover, the subtle and explanatory power of specific theories tied to evolution is disregarded by Christians just to worship their false gods.  Any single aspect of evolution can be plausibly argued against or put into another framework, but it is the confluence of all the different "non-sequiturs", to adopt your terminology, that gives evolutionary biology its power.


Combining and correlating several non-sequiturs does not bring us to the truth. It just brings us to a bunch of non-sequiturs. 
Calling something a non-sequitur doesn't make it so.  I could just as skeptically argue that driving while intoxicated doesn't cause accidents because I have driven many times while intoxicated and I have never been in a car accident while driving.

This is a fine bit of fence straddling.  Yes, volition exists, but it might not be fully voluntary?
You've hardly displayed a sophisticated understanding of what I've written, so I am not surprised that you call my position fence straddling.

What is "fully voluntary"?  I follow Daniel Wegner in defining a voluntary action as "something a person can do when asked."

Obviously, some voluntary actions vary widely from individual to individual, but many voluntary actions are common to and possible for most of us.  This is fully compatible with determinism, which argues that there is always a set of determinants for any resultant effect, and the resultant effect is the only possible outcome of the determinants (I omit random causation because that helps no indeterminist when it comes to human beings). 

When applied to the human will, or volition, the controversy is whether the will can be reductively analyzed or not, and not whether people have the capacity to choose or not.  That "I choose to post on SOLOHQ" and that "I am determined to post on SOLOHQ" are both compatible with determinism.

You have argued variously that
1) the will cannot be reduced (FOCUS) and the choice to focus has no relation to antecedents, or that
2) the will can be reduced but that doesn't support the determinist thesis because you can point to exceptions, or that the influences make the choices poorer, but do not make it less free.
3) knowledge cannot be given a deterministic analysis

All three are wrong, and some indeterminists have admitted this much, but arguing with a person who refuses to apply decent standards of evidence is pretty difficult.

You didn't even attempt a discussion of Peikoff's use of the word, "determinant", because it would have tied you in knots.  I am still waiting for your explication of it.

I would recommend that you at least define what you mean by "determinism" and "free will" since I have been unable to clarify what I mean by those terms to you.  That might help me take aim at the straw man.

Cheers.




Post 34

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 1:53pmSanction this postReply
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Jeanine,

Nice answers. 1, 2, 3 and 4 make you an indeterminist, obviously.

5 makes you an incompatibilist - in that even if determinism were true, you would find it incompatible with free will and moral responsibility.

You might be mildly surprised to know that 6 is incompatible with indeterminism, though I think you know enough about philosophy to predict that objection. Self-analysis for an undetermined self would be pretty hard to do if you couldn't figure out what aspects of yourself produced certain behaviors and certain results.  And if it was simply a matter of choice, then there would be no need for self analysis because all you would have to do was will what you wanted to do.

7 is incompatible with conscious self-determinism and libertarianism, because a consciously self-determined will would know why it was acting the way it did.  Of course, maybe my question was framed unclearly, and what you meant was that you lied to other people about your behavior but knew that you were lying.

10 is meant to be a question about the legal arena.  The point is ask whether certain laws can impact people's choices. 

11 is about the genetic inheritance of behavioral traits.

12 is more about the fact that people tend to get their accents from their friends or social circles, though the tone of their voice can be inherited from their parents.




Post 35

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 4:50pmSanction this postReply
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It is interesting that determinists often scold those with whom they argue, just as if their adversaries could have acted quite differently from how they did. This very fact is discussed in James N. Jordan's "The Determinist's Dilemma," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 23 (September 1969), pp. 48-66. 



Post 36

Friday, December 3, 2004 - 5:17pmSanction this postReply
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Dr. Machan,

It is also interesting that libertarians and indeterminists still try to analyze human behavior in terms of cause and effect like every other determinist does.  They psychologize about the behaviors of other people (including determinists), label them with definitive adjectives, and act as if they can predict their arguments and responses.

The name game goes both ways.  I do not take the inevitability argument against or for determinism seriously, except when it is used to defend naive fatalism, because it detracts from the real issue which science needs to function.

As you probably know, Dennett rejects your characterization of the determinist position.  The real question, is whether human nature can be analyzed reductively.  It is easy to say, "it is human nature to be free".  What is the precise nature of that freedom?  Determinists (especially compatibilists) have answers, as do scientists who are trying to help people with mental disorders - indeterminists just use the determinist answers and deny those answers when they feel like it.

What is your view of psychotherapic drugs, Dr. Machan?  Do you think that they could have been discovered within the indeterminist paradigm?  Thanks.




Post 37

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 1:09pmSanction this postReply
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You see, when you wrote:

A poor choice is still a free choice, not a "determined" one.  Many people who are depressed make the proper decision to seek help.  Many diabetics make the proper decision to get insulin.  There is no evidence here that any decision they make is determined by their condition.  Certainly, they take their own conditions into account -- and some individuals will decide to evade reality and do nothing about their condition.  But it is still their decision.
I shook my head because your mode of reasoning was the same as the reasoning that Ayn Rand used to claim that smoking didn't cause cancer.  Smoking doesn't cause cancer because there are individuals who smoke who do not have cancer.  Likewise, there are individuals with cancer who do not smoke.  Brilliant refutation.


Nonsense.  You are completely evading the context here,  There is a considerable body of scientific evidence linking smoking and lung cancer (evidence, incidentally, which was not around when Rand would have made that statement).  You have presented nothing supporting determinism that even remotely resembles that kind of proof. 

Instead, you've made assertions such as the one that depression somehow "degrades" volition.  Here is the only evidence you offered in support of that assertion:

1) the range of possibilities of behavior apparent to him is perceived as being much narrower, in the case of depression
and
2) there is a perceived lack of energy, in the case of diabetes.
In the absence of any other evidence, my points do in fact refute your assertion. 



Many people have committed suicide when in bouts of depression; others have been unable to maintain employment. However, according to you, there is "no evidence" that the decision to commit suicide was taken because they were depressed because it wasn't determined by their condition. Wise words.
Here you are trying to misrepresent my position by equivocating the meaning of "taking a decision" with the phrase "determined by".  The statement that, "I did something because of factor X" is not the same as saying "Without my knowledge factor X tilted me into a decision."  Again, you offer absolutely no evidence that their decision was in any way determined.  You offer no proof that they were not free to change their mind and stay alive. 

What makes you think you can misrepresent my position to me and get away with it?

 
Moreover, most people with depression get diagnosed by other people or get sent to doctors by other people.  It is rare to find a person who is depressed who initially sought out counsel on his or her own.  But of course, the actions of this people didn't influence or determine the decision of the person who eventually went in for treatment.  Wise thoughts.
Here you are blatantly equivocating "influence" and "determine".  The fact that man has a rational faculty and is open to persuasion does not mean that other people determine one's behavior.  You are, quite preposterously, using an attribute of man's volition -- namely, his willingness to listen to reason -- as an argument for determinism.


Thankfully, many people are not as resistant to common sense you are, Michael, and the practical result of accepting the fact that these people needed help because their conditions were ruining (as in determining their choices for the worse)  has resulted in many people living much better lives.
This is unbelievable.  The fact that some individuals are willing and able to choose not to let their conditions ruin their lives is presented as evidence of determinism?  This is your evidence?


The real problem is this: you, like many other indeterminists, have mastered the art of doubting causation (or Humean skepticism) because you have learned that making logical conclusions is something that lies in intelligence.  Therefore, any evidence that makes a line of reasoning more plausible can simply be denied as being inconclusive by using your imagination.  You have mastered the art that Ayn Rand used to deny that smoking caused cancer and feel free to apply it to areas which hold no practical significance to your livelihood.  If they did hold practical significance to your livelihood, you would learn pretty quickly that imagination and truth are pretty distinct.

So far, here is your evidence.  Some depressed people lose their jobs, others commit suicide, others listen to their friends and get help -- therefore depression determines their behavior.  The fact that this does not persuade me makes me a Humean skeptic?  Listen, I do not regard your evidence as "inconclusive"; I regard it as downright self-contradictory.


That is the kind of argument that Christians use to deny evolution.  They look at the world, appeal to human intuitions about design, and then argue that could life really be the result of "natural selection"?  They don't even understand evolution, or care that the evidence of similar genetic codes and organs along different lines of animal ancestry is strong evidence for evolution, as is mutation (and lots of findings in neuroscience etc.).  Moreover, the subtle and explanatory power of specific theories tied to evolution is disregarded by Christians just to worship their false gods.  Any single aspect of evolution can be plausibly argued against or put into another framework, but it is the confluence of all the different "non-sequiturs", to adopt your terminology, that gives evolutionary biology its power.
This analogy falls flat on its face because it ignores a glaring distinction between evolution and determinism:  the working of evolution is based on an identified mechanism -- natural selection -- backed up by an enormous amount of empirical data.  Your theories of determinism have identified no mechanism by which human volition can be overridden or influenced by outside factors.  You haven't a clue about any such mechanism. You have no empirical evidence, only a collection of vague correlations.


Calling something a non-sequitur doesn't make it so.  I could just as skeptically argue that driving while intoxicated doesn't cause accidents because I have driven many times while intoxicated and I have never been in a car accident while driving.

If I asserted the position that intoxication causes accidents -- and all I offered in evidence is the fact that some drunks have had wrecks -- then your response would be correct.
 
However, in the case of intoxication and automobile accidents, I could easily generate data showing how alcohol adversely affects reaction times, hand-eye coordination, balance, vision and hearing, all of which obviously affects one's ability to drive. I could generate hard data that anyone anywhere could repeat.  Your theory of determinism is so far from doing this that comparing it to drunk driving and wrecks is laughable.



This is fully compatible with determinism, which argues that there is always a set of determinants for any resultant effect, and the resultant effect is the only possible outcome of the determinants (I omit random causation because that helps no indeterminist when it comes to human beings). 

When applied to the human will, or volition, the controversy is whether the will can be reductively analyzed or not, and not whether people have the capacity to choose or not.  That "I choose to post on SOLOHQ" and that "I am determined to post on SOLOHQ" are both compatible with determinism.

Your capacity for openly embracing contradictions is remarkable.  Most determinists are smart enough to avoid this.



You didn't even attempt a discussion of Peikoff's use of the word, "determinant", because it would have tied you in knots.  I am still waiting for your explication of it.
I didn't bother responding to this because Peikoff spends pages and pages refuting your positions -- as you surely must know.  Invoking Peikoff by taking his comments out of context and ignoring all of his arguments against determinism, surely ranks as one of the lamest attempts at the appeal to authority that I have ever seen.

 

 

 

I would recommend that you at least define what you mean by "determinism" and "free will" since I have been unable to clarify what I mean by those terms to you.  That might help me take aim at the straw man.

 

I defined what I meant by free will in post 27.  There is no point in reviewing it, however.  Anyone that can hold such blatant contradictions is outside the province of persuasion.








Post 38

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 5:30pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

At least, I gave you a chance to understand my position. Now for your errors.

In an earlier post, you wrote:

Nor does it change anything to say that your position is not that behavior is determined, but merely influenced.  The issue is, do I control my mental processes freely and clearly, or am I working under the handicap of an outside "influence"

First of all, it is a fact that Peikoff uses the word, "determinant", in a manner synonymous with "influence".  I provided references.  If you cannot explain to me why he does so using your distinction between the words, I will assume that your object of whim-worship understands that "determines(v)" and "influence(v)" can be used synonymously, the former ("determine") being used more often with an "all other things being equal" clause, and the other being used more often when there is a claim that that the "influence" is working in a system with other influences, but both being quite synonymous.  As external sources corroborating my use of the words, I refer you to ANY dictionary or thesaurus of repute.  If something "influences" a decision, it is a part of the cause.  If something "determines" a decision, it is argued as the efficient cause, but it is still only a part of the cause, as any intelligent thinker can verify by realizing that causality is a relationship between the attributes of entities and that any determinant must be only one of the attributes.

I can only guess your reasons for refusing to admit your error on this point, but please address it if you choose to respond.

Now, given that a lot of your arguments rest on this misunderstanding of the nature of an "influence", I will stress its importance.

You cannot say: "Ayn Rand's Objectivism was a major influence on my thought" without arguing that Objectivism is a part of the cause.  If before you read Objectivism, you were an altruist who gave alms to beggars, and after reading Rand, you stopped doing so and claimed that Objectivism was a part of the influence or that Rand influenced your thinking, you cannot claim that your reading of Rand was not a part of the cause of your repudiation of alms-giving and maintain Rand was an influence.

I will return to an earlier post of yours (27) where you rode this distinction to delude yourself.

Now, you agree that brains are involved in decision making (at least, I hope you do).  Then  you go on to write:

The choice to focus or not to focus one's mind on a conceptual level is man's basic choice -- it is an irreducible primary, it cannot be attributed to anything else.  It is, simply, free will.


Obviously, this has to be a property of the brain, so why do you claim it cannot be attributed to anything else if it cannot occur without a brain?  You have also admitted that it depends on the nature of the brain (the brain has to be normal though you do not specify the empirical nature of an undamaged brain so that one can distinguish it from a damaged brain). I will address more of this later.

We know this because it is axiomatic, in the sense that any claim to knowledge -- including your claim that our behavior is determined -- presupposes the ability to make this basic choice free of any external factors.  If you are not free to choose to think or not to think,  then you do not know the extent to which you control your mind versus the extent to which it is affected by deterministic factors -- and thus you have no way of knowing whether your conclusions are the result of a process of thought governed by logic, or merely the result of some genetic predisposition to believing in determinism. 
This is nonsense.  If you agree that human beings can make errors even when they have free will (on your argument), and they can make them while believing that they are in full control of their free will (on your argument), what are you proving?  Do human beings know to what extent that their errors are affected by internal and external factors according to your position?  If so, how?
The very process of trying to "analyze scientifically" presupposes that you are in control of your mind's processes, free of any deterministic forces that may cause you to ignore evidence, think illogically, etc.
This is only true if you make a dualistic distinction between yourself and your mind's processes - the signature of an equivocating dualist like you who makes a false distinction between himself and his brain/nervous system (awaiting your verbal denials to the contrary).  Without your mind's processes, what are you?  The issue is not "control", but proper functioning.

Thus,  for anyone that truly believes that their mental processes may be determined by factors other than their own volition, the only logical behavior is to sit down and shut-up. Since you cannot be sure why you believe what you believe, you have no business trying to convince others.

And what about the determinist who argues that volition consists of factors?  And what about the determinist who tries to correct the external factors determining the improper thinking of others?
This is a non-sequitur.  It does not follow that because brain size is genetically determined, decisions are genetically determined.  The ability to focus or not focus, to think or not to think, is independent of one's level of intelligence. 

The fact that people with larger brains tend to go to college more frequently than those with smaller brains certainly does not prove a genetic predisposition toward deciding for college.  If it did, then what would explain the big-brainers that never get out of grade school?  You are confusing correlation with causation.
1) Are you arguing that brain size has nothing to do with intelligence?  Are you arguing that there are no parts of the brain associated with one's ability to "focus", in your rationalistic view?  Where are your empirical studies on the phenomenon of "focusing"?  Have the empirical studies distinguished it from concentrating?  Evidence?

2) A positive correlation in science, especially one above 0.3 in the biological sciences, and has been consistently reproduced or bettered in every single study I know of which was performed, is not trivial.  If you know any experts that testify to the contrary, I would like to hear from them.

3) What would explain the big-brainers who don't get out of school would be an appeal to other influences.

Many factors may influence a person's choices.  But influence and determine are miles apart.  A depressed person is still free to choose to think or not to think.  A sick person's decision to stay in bed until he gets better does not change the fact that it was his decision, and he could decide otherwise.
I agree with the first part I emboldened.  You have read my views on your weaseling dichotomy between "influence" and "determine" and the rest.  My position is that he could decide otherwise if some determinant were different.

This is another non-sequitur.  The fact that our physical make-up is encoded in our genes does not change the fact that an attribute of man's physical make-up is a volitional consciousness. 
But if the brain is a physical structure, and the genes make it qualitatively and quantitatively different from animal to animal and from individual to individual, where is the non-sequitur?  Either you are being irrational or you're still under the command of dualism.

This is more non-sequitur.  It does not follow that because some human characteristics are genetically determined, decisions are genetically determined.
Refer to my discussion of your dichotomy between "influence" and "determine".

A normal brain is one that has not been obviously damaged.  Doing a frontal lobotomy may change many of that particular brain's capabilities, none of which has any implications for the functioning of a normal brain.  A man born with no arms will not be capable of playing baseball.  This does not mean that the decision to play baseball is genetically determined.
But a man with genetically determined shorter fingers?  With a genetically retarded brain (or you need studies to show you that genes can impact brain functioning)?  Once again, does brain size influence mental performance?  You sure know how to stop your chain of reasoning when it suits you.

There is no duality or gap between matter and consciousness.  Volitional consciousness is an attribute of man's mind.  It arises out of the biological identity of man.

 How?  On your account, it just does.  When did ignorance become a justification for arrogance?

A poor choice is still a free choice, not a "determined" one.  Many people who are depressed make the proper decision to seek help.  Many diabetics make the proper decision to get insulin.  There is no evidence here that any decision they make is determined by their condition.  Certainly, they take their own conditions into account -- and some individuals will decide to evade reality and do nothing about their condition.  But it is still their decision.
No, it is always to some degree their RESPONSIBILITY, but sometimes, it is not their decision, as I told you earlier.  Sometimes, it is the parents of such individuals who force them into counseling, and in all cases, it is a confluence of factors, including the knowledge and the availability of treatment. And once again, you refuse to count "influences" as "determinants".

Scientific analysis presupposes free will, completely, utterly and totally free will -- otherwise one has no way of knowing how and why one reached whatever conclusions one professes to have reached.  And volition is its own causal factor.

From someone who claims to be philosophically sophisticated, the emboldened is among the most inane statements I've ever read.  Explain to me how something (or anything) can be synonymous with its cause.  Explain how something synonymous with it cause could ever emerge.  In order words, cause and effect are being conflated as being one and the same.  Or volition causes the very same volition.  Philosophical quackery.




Post 39

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 7:01pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

Onto post 37.

First and foremost, you evaded discussing my major justification for determinism.  I would like you to explain how scientific inquiry into human nature is justified without determinism.  Why do/should scientists, including psychologists, study genes and other influences if these genes and other influences never determine choices? Is there any aspect of human nature that doesn't factor directly or indirectly into choices?  Thanks.

Nonsense.  You are completely evading the context here,  There is a considerable body of scientific evidence linking smoking and lung cancer (evidence, incidentally, which was not around when Rand would have made that statement).  You have presented nothing supporting determinism that even remotely resembles that kind of proof.
Because determinism presupposes proof.  You have to accept the view of complex causation before you can even appreciate the view of the determinist.

There was a body of evidence around when Rand was a smoker, but she kept on claiming it was simply a statistical correlation, just as you do.  You can claim that statistical correlation isn't conclusive, but to claim that it says nothing clearly shows you've learned a lot from Rand.

Here you are trying to misrepresent my position by equivocating the meaning of "taking a decision" with the phrase "determined by".  The statement that, "I did something because of factor X" is not the same as saying "Without my knowledge factor X tilted me into a decision."  Again, you offer absolutely no evidence that their decision was in any way determined.  You offer no proof that they were not free to change their mind and stay alive. 

And what kind of proof would satisfy you?  Your becoming extremely depressed (like Rand's cancer convinced her of the causal chain)?  Brain scans of depressed people showing the physical problems and imbalances that characterize their problems?  Specify the evidence you require and what form it must take.

For the record, determinism doesn't exclude factors internal to the will like knowledge.  I stressed that to you, but you repeatedly ignored it in your desire to argue.  Brand Blanshard, who is a famous hard determinist, argued that the structure of reality is a necessary determinant of the conclusions people reach.  He used such examples as syllogisms or "2+2=4" to argue that correct thinking was often determined by the subject matter.

What makes you think you can misrepresent my position to me and get away with it?


Silence.

Here you are blatantly equivocating "influence" and "determine".  The fact that man has a rational faculty and is open to persuasion does not mean that other people determine one's behavior.  You are, quite preposterously, using an attribute of man's volition -- namely, his willingness to listen to reason -- as an argument for determinism.

1) What are the constituents of a rational faculty and are they the proper subjects of scientific inquiry?
2) Are they open to reductive analysis?
I gave the example of Blanshard who did exactly what you claim determinists cannot do without preposterous equivocation, to show your ignorance (which Spinoza would argue is why you are defending free will).  I also provide the following paper as an example of an empirical inquiry into the nature of perception, which describes certain biases inherent in the process:

http://www.objectivistcenter.org/events/advsem01/RobinsonAdvSeminar2001.pdf

Even process which are considered axiomatic are capable of empirical study to illuminate our understanding of them.

This is unbelievable.  The fact that some individuals are willing and able to choose not to let their conditions ruin their lives is presented as evidence of determinism?  This is your evidence?

No.  That some individuals are unable to make certain decisions in one state of mind, but are able to do so when influenced by chemicals is my evidence.  Without the chemicals, they often return to their former states.  Do they consciously choose that fate too, in your free willing view?

So far, here is your evidence.  Some depressed people lose their jobs, others commit suicide, others listen to their friends and get help -- therefore depression determines their behavior.  The fact that this does not persuade me makes me a Humean skeptic?  Listen, I do not regard your evidence as "inconclusive"; I regard it as downright self-contradictory.

Do you know anyone with depression?  I thought most people did and would be able to empathise with the problem so I haven't provided studies, but I can.  There is no proof that can convince a dualist who thinks that consciousness is apart from the brain.  But anyone who has seen the differences between depressed people with and without their drugs will understand the importance of determinism to the sciences.

This analogy falls flat on its face because it ignores a glaring distinction between evolution and determinism:  the working of evolution is based on an identified mechanism -- natural selection -- backed up by an enormous amount of empirical data.  Your theories of determinism have identified no mechanism by which human volition can be overridden or influenced by outside factors.  You haven't a clue about any such mechanism. You have no empirical evidence, only a collection of vague correlations.
Brain damage is an "outside" factor.  Does it influence choice?
Alcohol is an outside factor.  Does it influence choice?
Hormonal imbalances in the brain are internal factors - do they influence choices?

I'm not sure what the problem here is - maybe you really are determined to misunderstand my arguments.

If I asserted the position that intoxication causes accidents -- and all I offered in evidence is the fact that some drunks have had wrecks -- then your response would be correct.

However, in the case of intoxication and automobile accidents, I could easily generate data showing how alcohol adversely affects reaction times, hand-eye coordination, balance, vision and hearing, all of which obviously affects one's ability to drive. I could generate hard data that anyone anywhere could repeat.  Your theory of determinism is so far from doing this that comparing it to drunk driving and wrecks is laughable.
Hmm - alcohol does all these things to a human being but it doesn't influence volition.  Remarkable claim.  And driving is not a volitional activity, I presume?

By the way, "some drunks have wrecks" is not the same as a significant correlation between drunk driving and automobile accidents.  Educate yourself on that point.


Your capacity for openly embracing contradictions is remarkable.  Most determinists are smart enough to avoid this.

Since you've never shown that you've understood the determinist position in any of your writings,  I'm not surprised.  You've not even cited one determinist to verify any of your points, or shown any knowledge of the existing literature.

The list of determinists who embrace my position on determinism (compatibilism) is long.  They argue that volition is real, but is reducible to internal influences, and that libertarian free will is a variety of free will not worth wanting, to paraphrase Dennett.  You could show your acquaintance with "smart" determinists and stupid ones by providing a list of those you have read?  That will show your honesty in trying to understand what determinists say, and the degree to which you have relied upon the Objectivist caricature of determinism.

Edidted to correct a minor error.

(Edited by Next Level on 12/04, 8:43pm)




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