| | This thread has long been defunct, and I don't know if there is much point in reviving it, but I saw that no one had replied to Brendan's response to Robert Bidinotto, and, for whatever it's worth, I wanted to address a couple of Brendan's points.
Robert wrote: “But there are two aspects of Rand's self-interest ethics. The moral standard is only one. The other is the moral purpose. The moral standard is 'Man's life.' But the moral purpose of that standard is 'one's own life.' And the latter has ethical primacy.”
Brendan replied, Robert, I appreciate your comprehensive reply to my post. I agree with your general point that our actions take place within various constraints, that there is no such thing as perfect freedom of action, but rather degrees of freedom and coercion. I don't think this is what Robert was saying. In principle, there is such a thing as perfect freedom of action, which exists when there is no coercion. Robert was referring to the fact that we do not live under a political system in which such freedom currently exists. He wasn't saying that there is "no such thing" as perfect freedom of action -- that it's not a meaningful goal or moral principle. Indeed, he would say that perfect freedom of action is the goal of a just political system and is, in principle, achievable.
Brendan also wrote, In regard to the way the standard and purpose apply in extreme situations, you say that moral purpose – “ones own life” -- has primacy over the standard of value, and when the two are in conflict, the former prevails. No, that's not what Robert was saying. You don't understand the distinction between "purpose" and "standard" in this context. There is no conflict between the two, nor can there be. The purpose determines the standard. The purpose of ethics is the furtherance of one's own life and happiness. The standard -- man's life qua man -- is that which one uses as a guide in determining how best to achieve the purpose.
Perhaps an analogy will help: A surgeon's goal in performing a heart operation is to save a particular patient's life. The standard the surgeon uses to guide him in saving the life of his patient is one based on human anatomy and physiology. In other words, he uses the life of the patient qua human being as his standard, whereas a veterinarian who is performing a heart operation on an animal would use a different standard, e.g., the life of the patient qua dog or cat. Clearly, there is no "conflict" between "standard" and "purpose" in either of these medical contexts. Neither is there in the context of the Objectivist ethics.
Brendan continues: I don’t think this resolves the issue, for several reasons. Two important ones are:
1) The standard as “man’s life”. On Rand’s epistemology, the generic term “man” subsumes or means – or at least should mean – something like “all existing men”, or “each existing man”. Whichever meaning is taken, the phrase “man’s life” therefore subsumes all human lives, ie, your life, my life, and of course the lives of the hostages in question. But in that case, the standard subsumes the purpose, and it’s not clear why the purpose should have ethically primacy over the standard. No, you're missing the point. The standard does not subsume the purpose. The standard is based on the purpose; in other words, the purpose determines the standard. "Man's life" or more precisely, "man's life qua man," does not mean man collectively; it means man as an individual in his capacity as a certain kind of living organism. 2) Even if one were able to establish the ethical primacy of purpose, this takes us back to the original question: whose purpose, that is, whose life, takes precedence? The answer is: Each person's life takes precedence for him or her. In other words, each person's life is his or her own highest value.
- Bill
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