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Post 40

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 7:58pmSanction this postReply
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Num++ wrote:

I would like to point out "one" minor flaw:

'One' is NOT a prime number.



I seem to recall that historically 1 was considered a prime number by many, fulfilling one definition of primeness.

But indeed it does not fit contemporary definitions, especially those which say "natural number greater than one."

NH




Post 41

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 8:13pmSanction this postReply
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Perception is automatic - one does not perceive that which is not there, anymore than an animal does.



Post 42

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 1:12amSanction this postReply
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Robert:

Perception is automatic


That's largely true, I think, but it's also quite true that perception can be altered by our conscious thoughts. 


... one does not perceive that which is not there, anymore than an animal does.

 

Perception is defined as: the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perception

Robert, the literature of cognitive science abounds with evidence about misperception. People can fail to perceive things which are there, and perceive things which are not there.

The latter include illusions, optical and otherwise, hallucinations, and phantom sensory experience, i.e., perceptions which originate in the nervous system and not in external reality.

I mentioned phantom limbs as an instance of this. That was in a very long post, so perhaps you missed it.

Ordinarily our senses are very reliable, but they are not infallible.

Nathan Hawking




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Post 43

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 1:49pmSanction this postReply
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Fundamental theorem of arithmetic: every positive integer greater than 1 can be written as a product of prime numbers in only one way.

If 'one' is defined a prime, no other number can be prime. By adding qualifications to the fundamental theorem, we can define 1 as prime. However, this will result in many other qualifications for a lot of proofs in number theory. That would be against the principle of parsimony ("Ockham's Razor").

A lot of my problems in the article are of a mathematical nature. Anytime an infinite set is admitted in the discussion of 'truth', we will run smack into 'Godel's Proof'.

The study of the foundations of mathematics is a fascinating subject that has stymied even the most brilliant of mathematicians. Mathematicians usually fall into a vague Platonism on these things.

__________________________


Answer to puzzle:

Ed_# · (5·5) - (5·5) - 5 = Nathan_#



Post 44

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 4:48pmSanction this postReply
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Nathan, I don't see the point in continuing on with you like this. Our differences seem too fundamental to be overcome (in the next decade) via point-counterpoint debate. A recap:

-I accept Gibson's Ecological Theory of Direct Perception, you do not (and this, in itself, is a discussion stopper)

-I accept Rand's Objective Theory of Concept Formation, you do not (another untraversable bridge between us)

-I accept my restatement essay of Rand's insight--a restatement in terms with which contemporary philosophers are familiar and adept, you do not

I'm still glad that we had this otherwise fruitful exchange, however--you helped me refine my ideas (thank you).

Ed



Post 45

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 6:25pmSanction this postReply
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Nathan, I don't see the point in continuing on with you like this. Our differences seem too fundamental to be overcome (in the next decade) via point-counterpoint debate. A recap:



 

Agreeing to disagree is OK, Ed.
 
-I accept Gibson's Ecological Theory of Direct Perception, you do not (and this, in itself, is a discussion stopper)


How one defines "direct" and "perception" is important.

As I define them, at some biological levels perception might be said to be direct. A cell sensing a photon, for example. But how "direct" is a million cells sending nerve impulses along a cord to a brain for processing?

I don't think Gibson stops at single cells with his "direct," though, so you're probably right.

-I accept Rand's Objective Theory of Concept Formation, you do not (another untraversable bridge between us)

 
Actually, I agree with a lot of it. Not all. Definitely not with any implication of certitude.

But untraversable? I'd hope not. I'd like to think that reason at least has the potential for overcoming differences.
 

-I accept my restatement essay of Rand's insight--a restatement in terms with which contemporary philosophers are familiar and adept, you do not.
 
I'm still glad that we had this otherwise fruitful exchange, however--you helped me refine my ideas (thank you).


Thank you as well. Feel free to join the discussion on concepts and percepts in the other thread, if you wish.

Nathan Hawking

 




Post 46

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 9:04amSanction this postReply
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Background (direct perception)

Because of the difficulty preempting basic criticism of direct perception (with my paragraph-long explanation of what perception is), I've decided to add to this thread a repertoire of key insights from Gibson--to prevent any further, rationally-unnecessary basic criticisms of direct perception.

Ecological Theory of Direct Perception (excerpts):
------------------------

Highlights from:
http://tip.psychology.org/gibson.html ...

"The theory of information pickup suggests that perception depends entirely upon information in the "stimulus array" rather than sensations ..."

" ... the ambient array includes invariants such as shadows, texture, color, convergence, symmetry and layout that determine what is perceived."

"All perceptions are made in reference to body position and functions (proprioception). Awareness of the environment derives from how it reacts to our movements."

"The critical concept is that pilots orient themselves according to characteristics of the ground surface rather than through vestibular/kinesthetic senses.

"In other words, it is the invariants of terrain and sky that determine perception while flying, not sensory processing per se."
------------------------


Highlights from:
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/gibsonj.html

"Gibson formulated the concept of ‘stimulus ecology,’ referring to the stimuli that surround a person."

"He believed in ‘invariance’ of perception, whereby the environment provides an active organism with a continuous and stable flow of information to which it can respond."
------------------------

Highlights from:
http://www.huwi.org/gibson/intro.php

"But a direct explanation of the perception of the properties of the visible environment may be possible if these properties are taken from concepts of ecology instead of from mathematics and physics. (Perhaps they are ultimately "reducible" to the latter, but the psychologist cannot wait on such a reduction.)"

"Spatial Properties (We do not visually perceive "space," but we do perceive the following persisting, i.e., relatively invariant, properties of the world.) ... Surface layout ... Substance or composition ... Lighting or illumination"

"Spatio-Temporal Properties (We do not perceive "time" as such, but we do perceive changes or varying properties of the world, which are spatio-temporal."

"Proprioception accompanies perception; we proprioceive visually as well as perceive visually, and this kind of detection is also spatio-temporal."

"Note that the term perception is reserved for the environment, and detection or registration is applied to the self."
------------------------

Highlights from:
http://www.huwi.org/gibson/prelim.php

"VI. The detecting of affordances by young animals

"The human young must learn to perceive these affordances, in some degree at least, but the young of some animals do not have time to learn the ones that are crucial for survival. Ethologists therefore are interested in what they call "sign-stimuli" and "releasers." If the foregoing is correct, however, the behavior in question should be reconsidered in terms of stimulus information, not of stimuli."

"There has been a great gulf in psychological thought between the perception of space and objects on one hand and the perception of meaning on the other. But when space and objects are defined in terms of t he opaque solid geometry of surface layout, and when meaning is defined in terms of the affordances of places, substances, surfaces and objects (hereafter termed "things"), these problems are seen to be linked. For example, what anything affords an organism depends in some degree on its shape or the features of its shape (solid shape, of course, not pictorial form). Hence it is that the shape of something is especially meaningful. The meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords. Note the implications of this proposed definition. What a thing affords a particular observer (or species of observer) points to the organism, the subject. The shape and size and composition and rigidity of a thing, however, point to its physical existence, the object. But these determine what it affords the observer. The affordance points both ways. What a thing is and what it means are not separate, the former being physical and the latter mental as we are accustomed to believe."

"The perception of what a thing is and the perception of what it means are not separate, either. To perceive that a surface is level and solid is also to perceive that it is walk-on-able."


Highlights from:
http://www.kyb.tuebingen.mpg.de/bu/people/astros/gibson.htm

" ... humans perceive objects against backgrounds in the real world by perceiving invariant relationships among the features of the figure and ground."

" ... an event is specified by a local change in the ambient array, while locomotion is specified by a global change of the ambient array."

"The essential feature of learning is the resonating of the nervous system to the invariant properties of the stimulus flux over objective time."

"The crux of the theory . . . is the existence of certain types of permanence and underlying charge. These invariants are in the stimuli at least potentially."

[My "take" on perception--Direct pickup of contrasts and variants (and therefore, of invariants) within the organismo-environmental complex; through time]

Ed



Post 47

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 9:17amSanction this postReply
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Ed,
This is valuable material.  May I suggest it be transferred or copied or at least this thread referenced,
in the Concepts and Percepts thread?

Thanks for providing this.

Jeff




Post 48

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 5:21pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff, I just edited in a hyperlink from my post 25 (on the other thread).

I agree with you on the importance of the above--feel free to copy and paste (onto the other thread) any of the above individual quotes at will.

Ed



Post 49

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 6:41pmSanction this postReply
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Ed (and anyone else),
In case you haven't read it already, you might enjoy
Reasons For Realism

Which is a collection of essays on Gibson's theory.




Post 50

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 7:49pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:

Thanks for posting this.

"The crux of the theory . . . is the existence of certain types of permanence and underlying charge. These invariants are in the stimuli at least potentially."

 
 
I approach this somewhat differently, I think. I've been formulating some of the foundational concepts an intelligent organism would require to build upon.  In post 10 of my Concepts/Percepts thread I gave a few examples:


[Foundational] concepts like:

  • Something is present.
  • This is where the thing begins and ends.
  • Everything between the edges of the thing is the thing.
  • There can be more than one thing.
  • Things with substantially different properties (like location) are different things.
  • This thing is the same thing even if it changes some of its apparent properties.
  • This thing is unique in properties x, y, and z.
  • If another thing comes between me and the thing, the thing will still be there.
  • Etc.
     
In other words, it's not enough to just perceive invariant properties, though that's no small feat (it only sounds easy).

I can repeatedly present a computer with two arrays of data, changing save for invariant commonalities, and the computer will not have any innate sense of sameness. I can run a diff program, and the computer can list the differences and similarities, and still make no judgment as to class or identity.

A computer, or an organism, must also hold the encoded concept "This thing is the same thing even if it changes some of its apparent properties." It must answer the question: "Invariant properties--what is their significance?" Among many, many others.

Nathan Hawking




Post 51

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 8:12amSanction this postReply
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Just what can we afford?

On Nathan's thread, I was caught in pedantic error about perceptions attributing things. While existence is always attributed to things perceived, my stance is that no formal identification occurs via perception.

The affordances Gibson notes--while useful for an animal that does not need to understand, but only needs to react instinctually--offer no path to an identification that involves conceptual understanding.

In short, while animals perceive that tables are "walk-on-able"--they do not perceive what-it-is that tables were made for (nor that they are instances of "furniture"). If a table is low enough, an animal will walk all over the damn thing, dragging dust and mud and dander. Pet-owners use rote learning to "teach" cats not to walk on the dinner table.

Ed





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Post 52

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 10:48amSanction this postReply
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Ed, we have a slight problem in definition. You wrote:
...my stance is that no formal identification occurs via perception.

...offer no path to an identification that involves conceptual understanding.

...while animals perceive that tables are "walk-on-able"--they do not perceive what-it-is that tables were made for...
From your comments, you seem to think "identity" must be conceptual to be present in knowledge. I know that "identity" is an axiomatic concept on the conceptual level, but that does not mean that a brain cannot attribute a specific identity to an entity on the perceptual level.

(In my understanding, percepts do not do anything at all. They are mental units within a brain, which is the faculty that does the "doing," - i.e. integrating, unit forming, evaluating and all the rest.)

One common example. A dog will be able to identify its master from all other humans. This is on the perceptual level. This is not a concept (which is "a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." Rand - ITOE).

Actually this is a higher form of percept. A lower form would be the dog whimpering at thunder - i.e. being able to emotionally evaluate a specific identifiable thing (sound). Some of this is automatic. Some is learned.

Once a percept is formed, it then exists in the memory of the brain that integrated it. That is what Rand called "unit." It may be a slight or strong memory - or it may even disappear over time when brain cells die off. But that does not negate its initial existence as a memory.

If you gather from this argument that I consider percepts and concepts to be physical "things" in a brain, you would be correct. It is the nature of these "things" that I particularly am pursuing right now.

There is a study on microwave and ultrasound remote word transmission - and remote mechanical thought reading - that frankly scares the holy bejeezus out of me. There are registered patents on some of the things mentioned, not to mention the involvement of a vast array of organizations with differing agendas. This study gives very practical examples of some ways the physical properties of thoughts in living brains can be handled - in reality and not just in theory.

Michael

Edit - Just one last thought, Ed. The very nature of repeatability of results in scientific experiments, and the fact that the study I mentioned contains references to countless experiments carried out on the physical properties of thoughts, lends great credence to your claim of "veridicality."

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 5/09, 10:53am)




Post 53

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 2:35pmSanction this postReply
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Michael, some replies ...

From your comments, you seem to think "identity" must be conceptual to be present in knowledge.
Yes, yes I do. We perceive entities, but we do not perceive identity (as you said: "identity" must be conceptual to be present in knowledge). In my post 18, I said:
Perception = direct pickup—-by an organism-—of the contrasts or variances (and therefore, of the invariances) in that organism’s environment [We don’t perceive identities, but properties. Perception is not identification, conception is. While we do perceive entities, we do not perceive that we perceive them-—we conceive of this.]

Also, you said ...
... that does not mean that a brain cannot attribute a specific identity to an entity on the perceptual level.
I'd argue that all that the perceptual level is capable of is awareness of "unidentified" particulars (though some attributes, such as flatness and solidness, may "afford" the perception of being walk-on-able; as stated above).

A dog will be able to identify its master from all other humans. This is on the perceptual level. This is not a concept ...
Right, I agree.

Actually this is a higher form of percept. A lower form would be the dog whimpering at thunder - i.e. being able to emotionally evaluate a specific identifiable thing (sound). Some of this is automatic. Some is learned.
These "higher" and "lower" forms seem to only be evaluated against a standard of acquaintance--ie. if a dog had been through 100 thunderstorms without harm, then I'd suspect the wimpering to cease (a good example is Pavlov's set of experiments, where dogs ceased to be emotionally shocked by electric shocks--they just got used to it).

My rebuttal is that the only difference between masters and thunderstorms on a purely perceptual level (besides one being comforting and the other not)--is that one is familar and remembered, and one is not. This is a difference in degree, not in kind. I believe that less exposure to a master (or more exposure to thunderstorms) would cancel out the noted differences.

If you gather from this argument that I consider percepts and concepts to be physical "things" in a brain, you would be correct.
A profound view, Michael. One aspect that I'd like to repeat though (which may steer your search for these physical things), is that concepts are not THAT WHICH we are aware of, when we are aware of abstractions or units--this leads to either Nominalism, or Ontological Idealism; depending on how robust you take the source of the concepts to be. Instead, concepts are that BY WHICH we understand, and are aware of, abstractions or units.

This study gives very practical examples of some ways the physical properties of thoughts in living brains can be handled - in reality and not just in theory.



Michael, I have no doubt that minds can be manipulated (indeed, psycho-pharmacology--from truth serum to anti-depressants--is based precisely on this aspect of reality). However, I do not think that this entails a physicality of concepts at least--leaving out percepts for clarity. Though the mind cannot exist without the brain, I'd argue that the mind is not the brain (emergentism is one theory that I have "in mind"--though perhaps not "in brain").


Ed
 

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 5/09, 2:38pm)




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Post 54

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 6:35pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I don't know how well you are following the other thread, but I will cull (and modify where needed) some thoughts from some of my posts over there on the physicality of percepts and concepts:

START OF EXCERPTS

Merriam Webster (Definition 1 a):
Brain (1 a): The portion of the vertebrate central nervous system that constitutes the organ of thought and neural coordination, includes all the higher nervous centers receiving stimuli from the sense organs and interpreting and correlating them to formulate the motor impulses, is made up of neurons and supporting and nutritive structures, is enclosed within the skull, and is continuous with the spinal cord through the foramen magnum.
A brain is an organ that bears the faculty of integrating. A percept is one type of integrated mental unit housed in a brain. Stimuli data from sense organs are what is originally integrated by a brain, then the mental units themselves also become elements that can be integrated into other mental units.

Percepts and concepts are physical "things" ("mental units") and they are created, held and manipulated physically inside a living brain in this reality.

Their initial physical raw materials are sensorial stimuli (physical reality external to the agent), the senses themselves (physical interface between the agent's internal reality and the reality external to the agent but in physical contact with it), and their own inherent potential form (the agent's internal physical reality - a brain thing) after the data is delivered through the senses and integrated.

Once this "physical thing" is created inside a brain, it can also be used to make other similar "physical things" through memory and integration.

Just so you don't imagine that I think a percept/concept is a lump of stuff like a small pebble, I consider its physical form ultimately will be determined in the chemical and energy reactions on living brain cells - with measurable attributes just like with anything else physical.

Consciousness is irreducible as an axiomatic concept, however it still is interconnected with and dependent on the axiomatic concepts of existence and identity. A consciousness must exist, a specific one, in order to be conscious. Do you know of anything that exists and has identity that is not physical? I don't.

END OF EXCERPTS

Thus there can be no tools or processes of consciousness outside of physical reality. The physical housing for all individual consciousness is a living brain. When the brain dies, all percepts and concepts in it die with it, being that they are organic and use organic processes.

Now we come to part of the meat of your contentions. To start with, what is done when a sense organ comes into contact with external stimuli? Obviously it absorbs the information inherent in its nature to absorb (light waves, sound waves, etc.), converts it into an energetic and chemical form and sends it on to the brain via nerve cells, where it is processed, i.e. stored and integrated.

You can all these integrated "mental units" gobs and stuff if you want instead of percepts and concepts, but they will all have two things in common: (1) they will be products of memory and integration, and (2) they will exist on a range from extremely simple to highly complex. This means that there are not only two fixed types - there are many - with two extreme ends. Sort of like saying that there are only two colors, black and white, with the full color spectrum in between.

Actually, if you want to call the sensation stage by another name like doodle (or concept), for instance, you can, but you won't get around the fact that you have an agent with a specific sense organ and external data with specific characteristics that contacts it, and that the conversion, transmission, storage and integration processes will be carried out according to the agent's neurological nature.

As a last comment, did you actually look at that study? Did you see how many heavyweights are out there doing that stuff? This is not about "mental manipulation" in the traditional sense. It is about putting physical "things" ("mental units" - concepts, but measured and manipulated according to one sense only for the time being) into the brain and reading such things remotely. This is much different than truth serum. This is Big Brother for real.

While we debate whether or not ideas have a physical form in our brains, those guys out there are merrily going about their business inventing how to physically insert and delete ideas in our heads. I repeat, physically.

That is one hell of a wake up call to get real.

Michael




Post 55

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 7:15pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:
 
On Nathan's thread, I was caught in pedantic error about perceptions attributing things. While existence is always attributed to things perceived, my stance is that no formal identification occurs via perception.


 
You still have not answered the question that NOBODY has answered: How is something differentiated without being identified?
 
Here's the logical chain:
  1. Percepts integrate (AR et al).
  2. NH: How do percepts integrate without first differentiating?
  3. NH: How do percepts differentiate without a concept of identity?
Until we can answer those questions, we are only PRETENDING to have an epistemology.

The affordances Gibson notes--while useful for an animal that does not need to understand, but only needs to react instinctually--offer no path to an identification that involves conceptual understanding.

In short, while animals perceive that tables are "walk-on-able"--they do not perceive what-it-is that tables were made for (nor that they are instances of "furniture"). If a table is low enough, an animal will walk all over the damn thing, dragging dust and mud and dander. Pet-owners use rote learning to "teach" cats not to walk on the dinner table.



Unfortunately, Ed, you're still making straw animal arguments. Dogs and cats both have cognitive processes which are very different from humans. As a result, it is more difficult to identify higher conceptual cognition in their behavior. It's there, but less obvious.

Second, there is a built-in bias to your thought experiment. Most animals do not share our values about furniture, and it would be foolish to expect them to. In addition, HUMAN children may exhibit the same behavior because, to them, tables are also "jump-off-able."

The experiment must test whether animals think categorically, not about TABLES, which mean little to them in their ordinary lives, but something which fits into the animal's world, the animal's values, free of human bias.

To see why this is so, imagine bringing a Cro-Magnon into a modern household. He is as intelligent as we are, but in his world a "coffee table" has no meaning. He would simply sit on it, or jump up if he wanted to see out a high window. His values are not the same as ours, but he has all our mental abilities, and would be indistinguishable if raised in our culture.

But rather than do thought experiments with animals whose cognitive abilities are hard to assess, why don't you go to the primate and bird studies and see what these animals can do?

If your mind is open, you will be amazed.

Nathan Hawking




 




Post 56

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 7:26pmSanction this postReply
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Michael:


One common example. A dog will be able to identify its master from all other humans. This is on the perceptual level. This is not a concept (which is "a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." Rand - ITOE).

 

How does one identify a "distinguishing characteristic" with no concept of those characteristics? How does one distinguish it from another without conceptual thinking?
 
I'm sorry, but "direct" and "integration" and "units" only avoid those questions, not answer them.

Nathan




Post 57

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 7:52pmSanction this postReply
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Michael:

A brain is an organ that bears the faculty of integrating. A percept is one type of integrated mental unit housed in a brain. Stimuli data from sense organs are what is originally integrated by a brain, then the mental units themselves also become elements that can be integrated into other mental units.

 
 
Questions: You say that perceptions "integrate" our sense data.
  1. Do our minds integrate all sense data in every possible permutation and store every one of those "integrations" as a percept?
  2. Or does the mind do this selectively?
  3. If the mind does this selectively, the obvious answer, then how does perception know which sense data should be "integrated" with what to form a usable perception?
  4. In short, it must have some "idea" of each of the components it is integrating--identity.
  5. How can perceptions identify the elements without a concept of what each element is?
...

Actually, if you want to call the sensation stage by another name like doodle (or concept), for instance, you can, but you won't get around the fact that you have an agent with a specific sense organ and external data with specific characteristics that contacts it, and that the conversion, transmission, storage and integration processes will be carried out according to the agent's neurological nature.

 
 
No, you can't call sensation or perceptions "concepts" if you accept Rand's definition. In mine, you can't call sensations concepts except in a very minimalistic way. Sensations, per se, do no integrating. They only differentiate.


While we debate whether or not ideas have a physical form in our brains, those guys out there are merrily going about their business inventing how to physically insert and delete ideas in our heads. I repeat, physically.

That is one hell of a wake up call to get real.


 
I'm not sure of the article you're talking about. Apparently I missed that. But mapping the human mind and being able to manipulate it directly is as essential, in my view, to human progress as the genome project.

Whether we use it for good or sinister purposes is like any other knowledge.

Nathan Hawking







Post 58

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 7:59pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:

Michael, some replies ...



From your comments, you seem to think "identity" must be conceptual to be present in knowledge.
Yes, yes I do. We perceive entities, but we do not perceive identity (as you said: "identity" must be conceptual to be present in knowledge). In my post 18, I said:
Perception = direct pickup—-by an organism-—of the contrasts or variances (and therefore, of the invariances) in that organism’s environment [We don’t perceive identities, but properties. Perception is not identification, conception is. While we do perceive entities, we do not perceive that we perceive them-—we conceive of this.]


You say: "We don’t perceive identities, but properties."
 
How do you suppose we distinguish properties, one from another, without identification?
 
Hint: "Directly" is hand-waving, not an answer.
 
Nathan Hawking
 
 
 
 
 





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Post 59

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 8:00pmSanction this postReply
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Nathan,

One attribute of an existent is its own existence. Another is its own uniqueness. These happen to be the first two axiomatic concepts (existence and identity). They are inherent to and transmitted together with all initial sensory stimuli.

However, on a non-conceptual level (please bear with me and use traditional terminology here, not the new one you want to have accepted), these basic attributes are "integrated" into the perception of the existent - and thus into the ensuing basic physical mental unit, the initial percept, from which higher ones will be integrated.

With the coming into being of this mental unit, memory (storage) also occurs.

A deer does not need to conceptually understand that a lion exists, a very particular mean and hungry lion, in order to automatically integrate those two axiomatic facts and haul ass out of there.

The deer will even remember to do it again, only faster this time.

Michael




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