However, on a non-conceptual level (please bear with me and use traditional terminology here, not the new one you want to have accepted), these basic attributes are "integrated" into the perception of the existent - and thus into the ensuing basic physical mental unit, the initial percept, from which higher ones will be integrated.

• How can things be "integrated" unless they are first DIFFERENTIATED?
• How can things be differentiated unless the identity of the differentia are known?
• How can something (differentium) be identified without a classificatory concept?

* How can things be "integrated" unless they are first DIFFERENTIATED?

"We don't perceive identities, but properties. Perception is not identification [not in the essential characteristic, conceptual common denominator sense of identification--ie. true, objective, conceptual identification], conception is. While we do perceive entities, we do not perceive that we perceive them--we conceive of this"

"'The perception of what a thing is [ie. the perceptible properties of things, not the essential characteristics of things, not the conceptual common denominator of things, as they are related to other things] and the perception of what it means are not separate, either. To perceive that a surface is level and solid is also to perceive that it is walk-on-able.'"

* How can things be differentiated unless the identity of the differentia are known?

"... by merely examining particulars--while holding context."

" ... by examining particulars against a reference standard."

" ... all that the perceptual level is capable of is awareness of "unidentified" particulars ... "

"We also have certain knowledge [certitude] of the relations between ... things conceived of, after having become aware of them--in our perceptual field (this stone is larger than that) ..."

" ... we know what a thing is, only in relation to what it is not--knowledge is a relational phenomenon"

"Not to beat a dead horse here, but I do not need to know all there is to know about the pony (or say, pony-ness) in order to accomplish this task. I need only be able to conceptually discern ponies from TVs, ponies from sofas, and ponies from lamps."

"We know it, even if we don't, in actuality, know everything about it--such as its trillionth digit, for example (though, we can, in principle and potentially, know as much about it as we yearn for--because we know what it is, and is not, among everything else known). We know it because of its unique place among other known things. We have a veridical conceptual discernment regarding what it is that pi is. Therefore, our knowledge of it cannot ever be false."

"Perceptual experience is a direct pickup of exactly what it is that is in our environment. Conceptual powers (which can err, but can be made not to) identify what it is that the perceptions are about."

"You're right, Nathan. It is not possible to hold a concept without differentiation. It was merely a useful redundancy for me to speak of conceptual discernment--to hammer the point home that correct concept formation automatically yields knowledge."

"Concepts are not beliefs--concepts are that by which we are aware of contrast in the world."

"Omniscience is not the standard, effective differentiation is. We can be certain (having certitude) of how something relates to other things [insert knowable relation here; such as black being darker than white, etc]"

"While the REASON that the [black-darker-than-white] proposition cannot be false (it has certitude) stems from the basic [wavelengths of light--and our visual apparatus], the "informative" aspect stems from how we think about the [wavelengths, as viewed by us] (concepts), not from the previously-unintegrated [wavelengths] themselves."

"A key underlying theme of my essay is that knowledge is relational (we need only to effectively discern relations--in order to be in possession of knowledge)."

* How can something (differentium) be identified without a classificatory concept?

Do you mean that sound might exist and have a specific identity with a specific nature? And the sense organ and part of the brain that deals with sound might exist and have a specific identity and specific nature too?

So how about having a thing called "memory" that might exist and have a specific identity too? With its own specific nature? And the "mental units"?

That stored unit would be what is compared against new similar data. (Then integrated, when that time comes.)

So - what determines what type of data can get compared against the stored data?

 

Back to the sound and light waves again. The nature of the organic hardware is what.

The capacity to distinguish between different instances of different data does not come about from a "pre-learned" state. It is inherent in the organs themselves, like sound and light processing.

Gotta start somewhere.

Rand recognizes that perceptions integrate, but she failed to recognize that integration requires identification--because she was reserving that for concepts.

She was partly right, that's part of conceptualization. But that necessarily makes perceptual activity CONCEPTUAL.

Now of course you have a different definition of percept than the one she used and you want to call the whole shebang concept, ... 
 

as if Rand's idea of percept was a whole different animal from concept, not part of the identification and integration chain.

 

Also, you have mentioned including a process you call "organization" in this. As an attribute of living cells, I will certainly buy that. Even digestion has "organization" built into it. All life does.

Actually I feel closer to what you are talking about than the "non-physical existence" stuff for human consciousness. Our problem is in what to call it, not whether the "it" has an intelligible form or not in the physical reality inside our brain.
 
To me, that stuff is spooksville. I have a real problem with non-physical "essences."


 

On reflecting on this though, I did come across an interesting thought. That is the difficulty of arriving at the exact physical form of a specific consciousness, such as yours or mine, in order to be able to reproduce it. I do believe that one day we will create a consciousness in the lab from inorganic matter, just as we will life. But creating a specific one will be just as hard as creating an exact specific anything. And that will be the case so long as subatomic articles continue in movement.

This is just the definition of pi; how much 'genuine knowledge' is there in a definition?

Heres another definition:
Joel Català is an idiot.