| | I wrote, "Wilhelm, my dear fellow, you are dropping context. You had asked, 'A larger problem: in what sense is it more, broadly speaking, rational to be irrational in terms of the problem in order to spare the child's life?' My response was that since the goal is to save the child's life, it can't be irrational to take the necessary means to that end, because taking the appropriate means to achieve a desirable end or goal is what it means to be rational in this context. Obviously, if you change the context to the question, not of what is appropriate as a means, but of what is appropriate as an end, then rationality would apply to the end as well." You replied, My good man! Is this really what I see? You chastising me for your own ambiguity! I now see that I wasn't clear; my apologies. When you wrote, "'[R]ationality" is defined as taking the appropriate means to achieve a desirable end or goal," you obviously had in mind the context provided by this earlier statement: "So, here, as you can see, the imperative to think logically is conditional; it is dependent on one's cognitive goal or purpose." Duly noted. But do you not see the distinction between the two? By your appeal to context, you have "rationality" conflated with "the imperative to think logically." But "rationality," is just "to think logically." An "imperative to think logically" is something entirely different, no? One might call it "an imperative to be rational." I agree; there is a distinction between the two. But how have I conflated rationality with the imperative to think logically? The imperative to think logically is conditional. To say that you "ought" to think logically (or rationally) means that you ought to do so for the sake of - or as a means to - some particular end or goal. But rationality is not limited to taking the appropriate means to a particular end or goal; it can apply to the end or goal itself. We can say that the end itself is rational, just as well as the means to its achievement. Now I did argue, in so many words, that the statement, "X is a means to Y, a valued end" is equivalent to the statement, "You 'ought' to do X, if you value Y." Do you have a problem with that? Or is goal-creation unguided by reason? Ex. A serial killer has a desired goal of senselessly slaughtering someone, and takes the appropriate means to achieve this goal. Rational or irrational? I replied: "Irrational, because he is violating one of the conditions that make it possible for people to achieve their values in a social context. If his goal is to live well and be happy, then he does this best by adhering to a principle of rights." But, I must point out, is this necessarily the case? The Nazi doctor Dr. Joseph Mengele, who committed the most disgusting experimentation on Jews, fled to Argentina and lived to a ripe old age. He certainly had the "self-preservation" notion of happiness down pat. On this definition, he was a happy person. And yet he by no means adhered to a principle of rights. He used other human beings as lab rats. You've quoted Rand as saying, "Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." Yes, maybe if we're talking about the human race as a whole...how can we maximize survival on the whole...but for an individual? An individual can survive quite well at the expense of others, as just shown above with the Mengele example. He is surviving, yes, but only by default. In sacrificing others to himself, he was practicing a principle that permitted others to sacrifice him. The fact that he was not a victim of his own principle is due not to the presence of the principle, but precisely to its absence. In other words, Mengele survived in spite, not because of, the brutality that he practiced. Had others practiced it against him, he would not have survived. You see, we have to ask, what principles of conduct will best guarantee our own survival and well-being in a social context? Whatever they are, we have to assess their consequences when practiced by each and every moral agent, not simply when practiced by me or by others. I cannot claim myself or others as exceptions to the moral principles that I consider appropriate. If I do that, I'm endorsing a double standard.
You wrote that we ought to be thankful that Kant's views have had such a strong influence on people. I replied, "Why? Kant's views have so perverted morality that the average person views it as an arbitrary, self-sacrificial duty, unrelated to the person's actual interests, which undercuts his or her motivation and sabotages the desire to be moral." Don't get me wrong. I'm not a proponent of Kant's ethics. As for me, I side with Aristotle and Aquinas in the ethics department, something like a cross between virtue ethics and natural law. So yes, Kant's ethics are problematic, but they are much, much more palatable than Rand's, as I see it. I rank Rand's ethics (or lack thereof) right down there in the hole with Nietzsche's. Why? And, by the way, Kant doesn't think that morality is completely unrelated to a person's actual interests. In fact, Rand has made quite a caricature out of him. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argued that this Highest Good for Humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter. Yes, but, according to Kant, happiness is not the goal of moral virtue, and in fact to pursue a virtuous act for the sake of happiness disqualifies it as virtuous. As I noted in my previous post, Kant held that "the renunciation of all interest is the specific mark of the categorical imperative...." Unfortunately, virtue does not insure wellbeing and may even conflict with it. Then what is the purpose of virtue? Is it not to achieve happiness? And if not happiness, then what? Further, there is no real possibility of moral perfection in this life and indeed few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy. To say that there is no real possibility of moral perfection makes no sense; if doing what is moral is not possible, then it cannot be moral. As Rand puts it, "A sin without volition is a slap at morality and an insolent conltradiction in terms: that which is outside the possibility of choice is outside the province of morality." And on what grounds do you say that few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy? Don't deserve, by what standard?
You say, Reason cannot prove or disprove the existence of Divine Providence, nor the immortality of the soul, which seem necessary to rectify these things. Sure it can. A disembodied consciousness is impossible, whether in the form of "divine providence" or in the form of an immortal soul. Consciousness requires physical sense organs, a brain and nervous system. Awareness is an attribute of living organisms and cannot exist outside that context. Nevertheless, Kant argued, an unlimited amount of time to perfect ourselves (immortality) and a commensurate achievement of wellbeing (insured by Divine Providence) are “postulates” required by reason when employed in moral matters." Did you really expect me to respond to this last comment? If you did, I'm afraid I'm going to have to disappoint you. It just isn't worth a serious reply.
Now you may return to the 17th Century, a time much better suited to your archaic views of metaphysics and morals, Herr Leibniz. I bid you a fond fairwell!
- William
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