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Monday
April 23, 2007

Human Certainty: The only kind there is. by Ed Thompson

The subtitle to this essay hints at the fact that human certainty is something special. Now, there are 2 ways to be certain:

1) psychologically (whenever any animate, perceptual being is "convinced" of things being a certain way)
2) philosophically (whenever any conceptual being has discovered an identifiable and potentially-measurable difference among the existents in the world)
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Discuss this Article (13 messages)

Post 0

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 3:00pm

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Additional thought on these issues can be found in the two essays whose ABSTRACTS are shown below.

Both of these essays can be read at Objectivity Archive .

“On Probability” by Merlin Jetton

Volume 2, Number 1, Pages 1–29

Jetton argues that there are two related concepts of probability going under the same name. One is probability as it pertains to chances in the world. The other is probability as it pertains to confidence in our expectations.

An overview of some of the mathematics of probability is given. This includes calculation of conditional probabilities, laws of large numbers of trials, and probability distributions. With this knowledge of the mathematics of probability in hand, Jetton leads us into the philosophical interpretations of probability.

He discusses the logical interpretation of probability maintained by J. M. Keynes, the subjective interpretation of Bruno de Finetti, and the objectivist interpretations of Richard von Mises and Karl Popper. For each of these interpretations, Jetton assesses its strengths and weaknesses in giving an account of the two types of probability: chances in the world and levels of confidence.

“Time, Prescience, and Biology” by Merlin Jetton

Volume 2, Number 2, Pages 59–104

Jetton argues for a revision of the traditional philosophic concepts necessity, possibility, and the a priori in terms of the survival requirements of human beings in changing environments. With the illumination from modern evolutionary biology and neurobiology—revolutionary information not available to Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Leibniz, and Kant—he redraws the dispute between empiricists and rationalists over innate ideas. His resolution is not Kant’s. The perspectives of Henry Plotkin, Gerald Edelman, and Ruth Millikan are utilized in this biologically informed account.

Post 1

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 7:11pm

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Just one minor criticism. The term a priori means "before the fact." You say that The terms "Necessary," "Logical," and "A priori" all follow for all conceptual truths known. I don't think you meant to imply that we know the truth before we know the facts.

Also, I'd draw the further observation that philosophical certainty came about because we learned that what you call psychological certainty was indeed fallible. In other words, we had to doubt before we could truly come to know what certainty really is, just as one cannot really know what it is to be healthy until one has been sick.

I would relate an anecdote from my early teens, when my family lived in South Jersey and my father was travelling monthly to Washington State. He would call home at various times unexpected by us. Whenever he did, I knew it was him before anyone answered the phone. Caller ID was not available yet. My family eventually saw that I was accurate in my predictions, and I was indeed psychologically certain of them. But I didn't believe in ESP. My mom and sisters wanted to know my trick. I honestly said I didn't know how, but I just knew, and without a doubt.

Eventually, because I myself was troubled by how it was possible that I knew he was calling, I figured it out. Whenever he called from out West, the first ring of the phone was of a shorter length than the normal rings. I had been perceiving the difference without being able to explicitly identify what I was sensing.

In one way, it was cool to figure out what was going on. Yet my family immediately lost interest. It was like the magic trick had been explained. But I've never much cared for magic tricks.

Ted

Post 2

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 8:18pm

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Ted, "a priori" has 2 senses:

1) prior to experience
2) independent of experience

... and I meant the second sense of the term.

I don't think you meant to imply that we know the truth before we know the facts.

No, I merely meant that we can know some truths without further appeal to outside experience (i.e., by just analyzing some already-experienced truth). In a sense, when we're thinking, we're having an "inner" experience. Here's a brief example:

If you see a ball balanced on the tip of a triangular shape, then you know what that looks like (i.e., the universal symbol on the door of the Ladies' Room). Without seeing it, however, you know what it would look like if those figures were juxtaposed -- with the triangle balanced on the ball (i.e., like a boy wearing a pointed hat). You do not need any more experience in the world, in order to know what the second image looks like. You can gain that knowledge without any further experience. In fact, one only needs to have seen a single ball and single triangle -- in order to get a whole epistemological 'fishing-net' of truths off the ground.

... we had to doubt before we could truly come to know what certainty really is, just as one cannot really know what it is to be healthy until one has been sick.

Good point. Contrast is epistemologically crucial. Deep-ocean fish have absolutely no idea what it is that water is (aside from the point about them having antero-grade amnesia!).

;-)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/23, 8:25pm)

Post 3

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 8:33pm

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I should add that the 'synthetic' part to that truth about dice-rolling (that you won't ever get 13 or higher), is covered by merely perceiving a single die -- or single cube, for that matter -- and only after perceiving it one single time.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/23, 8:36pm)

Post 4

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 8:45pm

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And another thing:
It could be said that dice rolls have an inherent capacity for change which we know -- with certainty -- ranges from 2-12. And, much more epistemologically-brazen now, knowing the precise limits of this capacity for change, one might even muster up the courage to say that we know -- with certainty -- the 'metaphysical essence' of dice rolls ...

;-)

Ed

Post 5

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 10:05pm

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Fun with numbers

What if I told you that you didn't even need to know 1% of something or another -- in order to accurately differentiate (distinguish, delineate) it from something else? Pretty interesting phenomenon, huh (not even knowing 1 % about something, but yet still being able to make statements -- with certainty -- about it)?

One of the numbers below refers to pi (and the other, to the fraction of 22/7). Can you -- with certainty -- know which is which (even with information that is greater than 99% incomplete)?

a) 3.14285 ...
b) 3.14159 ...

Answer withheld as an exercise for the reader.

;-)

Ed

Post 6

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 10:40pm

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Ed, I get your point here, that everyone knows which of those two decimals is Pi, and that the difference between them is less than 1%. But you are making a slight error. People do not have the ratio of Pi in their heads, they have a memory of the spoken sequence: "three point one four one five nine two six" in their minds. Likewise, they do not hold 22/7 as an unpacked series in their conscious minds. Again, crow epistemology limits us to "twenty two over seven is close to pi" as the entity retained. Thus we have a phrase of nine syllables and a phrase of 11 syllables remembered as words, not unpacked decimal series remembered as rational or irrational numerical constants.

Nevertheless, one can easily distinguish white from .1% sky blue or .1% light pink by sight. One can memorize a speech, or tell when Shakespeare is misquoted, when Bill Clinton is lying, and no idiot would think a $99.99 bill was anything but make-believe.

You seem almost drunk with these ideas. And I mean that in the proper way, like a Greek philosopher at a symposium or a solemn Jew on Passover, after his ritual third cup. I like the joy you express here without the need to bewail trivialities or tilt against vulgarity. If you have a good dictionary, look up "enthusiasm," as it applies in the wholesome original sense.

Ted

Post 7

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 12:21am

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Certainty is Something to Celebrate

Ted, thank you for your continued interaction here.

But you are making a slight error. People do not have the ratio of Pi in their heads, they have a memory of the spoken sequence: "three point one four one five nine two six" in their minds.

But they can find it -- because Pi can be derived. And 22/7 can be worked out as well -- leading rational agents to a persistently-effective distinction (hence to valid, albeit contextual and relational, knowledge).

You seem almost drunk with these ideas.

I am.

;-)

Ed
[certainty is something to celebrate!]

Post 8

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 4:41am

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certainty is something to celebrate!]

and more importantly, it is not a belief, but a knowing.....

Post 9

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 9:53am

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Ed,

The common definition of analytic is a conceptual truth arrived at by mere analysis (a "pure" rationalism), the common definition of synthetic is a conceptual truth requiring some kind of an observation about a thing, an observation not "contained" in the mere "definition" of the thing (a conceptual truth which requires some kind of perceptual experience in the world).

This isn't quite right. The word "analytic" refers to a statement which is true or false by definition. ("There are no married bachelors" is analytic in this sense.) A "synthetic" statement is simply one which is not analytic - one which cannot be known as true or false by definitions alone. You seem to be conflating "synthetic" with the term "a posteori", meaning: following from empirical observations. You're quite right that most synthetic truths are also a posteori ones. In fact, many people (Kant being an exception) believe that all synthetic truths are a posteori, and I think I agree. But there is a very important conceptual difference between the two terms.

Which leads me on to...

As it turns out, all conceptual truths require some kind of perceptual experience in the world. Therefore, all conceptual truths are both analytic and synthetic (there is no such thing as a purely analytic, or a purely synthetic, conceptual truth). The terms "Necessary," "Logical," and "A priori" all follow for all conceptual truths known.

It is true that we can only know anything with the help of our senses, but some of the things we know are analytic, and some are synthetic, nevertheless. Without my senses I would never have known about marriage and would never have known about the concept of a bachelor. But once I do, "There are no married bachelors" is analytic. Wheras, "Mr X is a bachelor" is not. It doesn't matter that my senses were necessary for me to make both statements.

To take your dice example:

That no standard dice roll (I assume you mean of two dice) can give a score of 13 or more is a synthetic truth, because we might have lived in a world where the "standard dice" (those most commonly used) had 8 sides each. That no six-sided die roll can score 13 is analytically true, but it is a synthetic truth that standard dice have six-sides - unless you interpret "standard" to be identicle with "six-sided", in which case your statement becomes analytic. (I have never seen a 139 sided dice. However, I can be logically certain when I say that no such dice will ever score 140.) It's one or the other, analytic or synthetic, but it's not both!

So...

Once it's known that the U.S. has 50 (identifiable and measurable) states, then it's not possible to be wrong about that. The reason that it becomes impossible to be wrong about this contingent fact, is because -- in gaining understanding about what it is that the U.S. is -- one "reaches" a point wherein one's knowledge "becomes" analytic, necessary, logical, and a priori (not depending on "further" experiences).

Doesn't stand up. There are 50 US states : this is a true, synthetic statement. But there is nothing analytic about it, and there is nothing logical, necessary, or a priori about it either. (If it were logical, necessary, or a priori, then it would be just like saying "If there are 50 US states, then there are more than 49 US states", but surely you can see the difference.) Hence, it is not "certain" in the way you use the word. I would say that it is indeed "certain" that there are 50 US states, because the evidence that there are 50 states is overwhelming and it would be irrational to doubt it. But this is not the same sense of certain, as " There are no married bachelors" is certain. Both of these statements ought to command psychological certainty, but for quite different reasons.

Post 10

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 11:29am

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Jeremy B.,

You seem to be conflating "synthetic" with the term "a posteori", meaning: following from empirical observations. You're quite right that most synthetic truths are also a posteori ones. In fact, many people (Kant being an exception) believe that all synthetic truths are a posteori, and I think I agree.

I'm actually in agreement with Kant on that (Galt save my soul!).

;-)

Without my senses I would never have known about marriage and would never have known about the concept of a bachelor. But once I do, "There are no married bachelors" is analytic. Wheras, "Mr X is a bachelor" is not. It doesn't matter that my senses were necessary for me to make both statements.

Yes it does. Perhaps more on this, later.

Got to go now ...

Ed

Post 11

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 1:45am

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Actually, I think I can sum up my previous post rather more concisely after a little thinking last night!

I think the key distinction is really between propositions and concepts. Propositions can be true or false, and can either be analytic or synthetic - "Mr X is a bachelor", "There are no married bachelors". Propositions are not, themselves, a priori or a posteori: these are adverbs, not adjectives, which apply to the act of knowing or being able to know. "There are no married bachelors" is an analytic proposition, and also, one which I can know a priori. (It may be that all analytic propositions are also knowable a priori, and vice versa, but these two concepts are distinct.)

Concepts are psychological creatures - they only exist when there is someone around to have them. I have the concept of Marriage, of Bachelors, of Analyticity etc.* Now, concepts are what we use to make up propositions, but they themselves are not propositions and do not share any of their properties : in particular they are neither true nor false, analytic or synthetic, a priori or a posteori. I have the concept of a Unicorn - but I don't believe in unicorns (that is to say I don't assert the proposition "There exist unicorns"). The concept of Unicorn isn't false, in itself. Neither is it a posteori, despite the fact that I generated the concept after empirical observations (of fairy-tale books).

Therefore, the fact that all of our concepts are all formed by abstraction from sensory perception has nothing to do with whether propositions are analytic, or a posteori, or indeed, with propositions at all. Propositions do not care how we came to have the concepts which we do.

* Note : Of course the objects to which concepts correspond exist whether I like it or not. The relationship between concepts and objects is a whole different kettle of fish...
(Edited by Jeremy B
on 4/26, 6:18am)

Post 12

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 6:19pm

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Jeremy, good point about propositions vs. concepts. Allow me to re-word what you say -- in order to illuminate the issue even more. For "analytic" I've substituted "known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question" -- and for "a priori" I've substituted "known true (or false) independent of any further experience."

Propositions can be true or false, and can either be [known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question] or [NOT known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question] ...

True.

Propositions are not, themselves, [known true (or false) independent of any further experience] or [NOT known true (or false) independent of any further experience]: these are adverbs, not adjectives, which apply to the act of knowing or being able to know.

False. Propositions are always things made by thinking agents (active knowers). They don't exist outside of living, intentional beings. Propositions are intentional things. They are always things which refer back to agents potentially capable of knowing their truth or falsity. It's a floating abstraction (a stolen concept) to think otherwise.

Propositions are always either known true (or false) independent of any further experience, or they are not so known. We refer to the latter as empirical propositions, but once known, they become rational propositions. It's when we speak of the way things are, that we have moved from the empirical questioning and discovering, to the analytical talk of found findings.

For example, it's empirical to find out whether having blue eyes is related to getting cancer, it's rational to talk about the findings once found. All scientists, when they write about findings found, write as analytic philosophers. Findings found are always a picture of what is or what had appeared to be. There is no changing of the findings found. They are with us forever. The raw data of all the scientists that ever existed, is not subject to a Kuhnian paradigm-shift (only the analytical interpretations of found findings can ever change).

In this sense then, propositions are all either "a priori" (known true -- or false -- without further experience) or "a posteriori" (only known true -- or false -- via further experience. The "knowing agent" in question makes all the difference in the world. For some knowing agents, something may be known true without further experience, for others, further experience may be required.

It may be that all [known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question] propositions are also knowable [independent of any further experience], and all [known true (or false) independent of any further experience] propositions are also [known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question] ...

Half-right. All analytic propositions are known true (or false) a priori, but not all a priori propositions are known true (or false) by an analysis of the conventional or operational definition of the subject in question. The set of a priori propositions is larger than -- and contains -- the set of analytic propositions.

Concepts are psychological creatures - they only exist when there is someone around to have them.

But this refers to propositions, too. As an a-conceptual proposition would be absurd. The subject may be a proper noun (a concept-free and merely-remembered existent), but the predicate must stand for something conceptual, something qualitative or quantitative.

Now, concepts are what we use to make up propositions ...

Exactly.

... but they themselves are not propositions and do not share any of their properties : in particular they are neither true nor false, [known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question] or [NOT known true (or false) from the very definition of the subject in question], [known true (or false) independent of any further experience] or [NOT known true (or false) independent of any further experience].

Inaccurate. Concepts are a priori -- i.e., when being used, further experiences aren't required to know about their correspondence to reality -- concepts are NOT hypotheses.

Propositions do not care how we came to have the concepts which we do.

Accurate. In fact, propositions don't give a damn about anything. Propositions are thinking tools, just like concepts are. They're things we utilize to gain more conceptual knowledge and understanding of our world.

Of course the objects to which concepts correspond exist whether I like it or not.

Not without qualification. There are 3 ways for something to exist:

1) subjectively (privately; internally, in one's own mind -- e.g., a toothache or a day-dream)
2) externally (out in the world, somewhere to be found)
3) intentionally (publically, in the minds of every conceptual being who concentrates on it -- e.g., the concepts of justice or injustice, freedom or compulsion, love or hate, etc.)

Ed