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Post 0

Thursday, June 12 - 12:28pm

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Joe,

Thanks for the thoughtful article. You say it was a rough draft, but it was well written enough in my mind to be a finished essay. Nevertheless, I regret to say that disagree with your thesis. Let me explain why.

In your article, you state:

What happens when the principle [of honesty] is converted into some kind of rule? In the context of the murderer at your door, the rule is said to be taken out of context. You have to discard the rule. But what's the point in formulating it as a rule, especially one that can be broken? What do you gain from it?

Joe, the rule isn't "broken" when you lie to the murderer; it doesn't require that you tell him the truth.

You don't get the benefit of having a real moral rule, which is that you can apply it in an unthinking way. Because the rule has exceptions, you can't simply follow it. You have to decide whether the rule is beneficial to follow or not.

The so-called "exceptions" are PART of the rule or principle. The principle is qualified qua principle. You might as well argue that there is no such thing as a "right" to free speech, which everyone must respect on principle, because there can be no right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater. There is no right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater, because the right to free speech doesn't include it, to begin with. The right to free speech already has certain qualifications. It doesn't mean the right to say anything to anyone at any time. All moral principles are qualified by reference to one's ultimate standard of value.

The end result is that you just add an extra level of complexity to your decisions. You formulate a rule, intended to make it easier to act without thinking through the consequences, but you still have to think through the consequences to decide if the rule applies. Formulating a moral rule out of it is a worthless step.

You think through the consequences in advance, which is what you do when you formulate moral principles to begin with, since these principles are designed to serve your life and happiness. When I refrain from stealing your money, I don't do so based on assessing the likelihood of your finding out or of being apprehended by the police. If that were my approach, what value would the principle of rights have to begin with? It would serve no useful purpose, since it would be entirely irrelevant to my decision. When I refrain from stealing your money, I do so based on the recognition that unless people refrain from sacrificing others to themselves, they will create a society in which no one is safe from his neighbors or free to produce the values his life require. When I decide to be honest, I do so based on the recognition that trustworthiness is an important social value, one which optimizes inter-personal relations and benefits the lives of everyone involved.

There is more wrong with translating these into moral rules. A moral rule demands you act in a particular way. Yes, you might make exceptions to them when your life is on the line, but in all other cases you have to obey them. This removes your ability to make an optimal choice based on your clearest idea of the costs and benefits involved.

You see, this is where your thinking goes awry. The costs and benefits are already considered in advance of formulating the principle. The principle reflects an assessment of these costs and benefits. It tells you which actions are beneficial and which are not. The principle is qualified to exclude those cases in which following it is not beneficial.

Moral rules act as intrinsic values. Intrinsic values aren't integrated in with the rest of your values. Because they're valued for their own sake, and not in relation to your life, there's no rational way to compare them to your other values.

Not true. This is not the Objectivist view of moral rules or principles. For Objectivism, moral principles are based their value to your life and happiness. You are refuting a strawman.

A moral rule tells you that you should act in a particular way in all cases.

Yes, in all cases falling under the rule -- in all cases subsumed by the principle. That's what a principle is. It applies without exception to every single case falling under it. Otherwise, it's not a principle. For example, it makes no sense to say that you have a right to your property, but that the state may take it when it deems it in the public interest. Your property rights are inviolable on principle.

You may create exceptions, but every situation where it applies, it applies with equal strength. If you follow the moral rule that you must always be honest except in emergency situations, then in every other situation your choices are artificially restricted.

Not artificially restricted, assuming that the principle is valid; restricted by the facts justifying the principle. However, I would not say that you are obligated to be scrupulously honest in every situation except life-threatening emergencies. You don't have to volunteer information to people who are not entitled to it. If you are asked a question which your refusal to answer would by implication convey the information that you don't want revealed and to which the questioner is not entitled, then you have every right to lie as a way of protecting your privacy. This is not an emergency situation, but it is nevertheless one that allows for a less than honest answer. If however, you've been cheating on your wife, and she questions you about it, you owe her the truth. The principle is, if a person is entitled to the truth, you owe it to him or her.

You can't make a rational judgment about whether any particular lie may be beneficial or not, or to what degree is it harmful. Because it's expressed as a rule, you blind yourself to the possibilities.

You don't blind yourself to the possibilities. The possibilities are assessed in advance and are incorporated into the principle. In your approach, principles become irrelevant, because all you're doing is assessing the costs and benefits on an ad hoc basis. So why have a moral principle to begin with. Why have a principle of rights? Since you're not obligated to respect it, there's no need for the principle. It serves no useful purpose.

- Bill

P.S. This is part of a reply that I posted to the thread "Getting the right Rights right" in the General Forum.

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/12, 5:48pm)

Post 1

Thursday, June 12 - 1:00pm

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The basic problem is considering it as 'moral rules'... because they're NOT.... a code of values to guide one thru life does NOT consist of rules, but principles, which are not rules, as they pertain to understandings instead of commandments.....

Post 2

Thursday, June 12 - 5:51pm

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Robert,

I'm not using "rule" in that sense of the term. I mean it in the sense of a principle of conduct, not in the sense of an arbitrary, unconditional duty. I thought that was clear from the context of my discussion.

- Bill

Post 3

Thursday, June 12 - 7:05pm

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Bill, I'm sorry to hear you disagree. Perhaps if it wasn't such a rough draft, I could have made it clearer.

What seems to be the deep divide between our positions is our different views of principles. As I stated, principles are a form of identification. Moral principles are identified causal relationships. This is an epistemological function. It provides us factual statements about what are the long range consequences of our possible actions. So for me, the moral principle of honesty does not tell me I must be honest in all cases, or even in all cases that fit some general criteria. It tells me the consequences of being honest or dishonest. It provides me a tool of factual analysis. When I see clearly the consequences of being dishonest in normal situations, I can evaluate that option and recognize that it's a poor choice. Similarly with rights. As principles, they identify causal relationships between certain kinds of actions and long term effects. One example is if I steal from others, preventing them from living their lives, I create a disharmony of interest and they will likely (and rightly) retaliate. Or that others will rightly view me as a threat to their lives too.

On the other hand, you claim that moral principles are not identifications of cause and effect, but a conclusion based on that identification. The conclusion tells you should act in a particular way within general contexts that you determined ahead of time.

In both of our views, we have made a cause and effect identification that is the basis for figuring out how we should behave.

So what are the differences in practice?

With your view of moral principles, which I call "rules-of-thumb", you do your thinking once during the formulation process. From then on, you can simply apply your conclusion without any re-evaluation. There are some advantages here. First, you don't normally need to think about the problem. You have a rule that you can apply blindly, but only within the context. The other advantage is that it shifts the thinking to an earlier point in time, so you can make quick decisions. And third, someone else can do the formulation for you, and you can simply learn the expected context. I bring these up, not because I really believe in them, but because some people do view these as advantages.

The first question to ask is whether making an evaluation at the time of the decision making provides a better or worse result than formulating a rule-of-thumb ahead of time and applying it blindly (within a fixed context). Which gives a better result? Both of these approaches can fully take account of the general cause-effect relationship mentioned earlier. In one case you do it ahead of time. In the other, you do it at the time. There's no good reason why any of the insights would be lost in either case. It's the same application of the same generalized abstractions.

There is a difference, though. In the case where you apply the generalization (what I call the principle) ahead of time, you don't have all of the information about that specific situation. You can figure out likely contexts in which it applies, and likely contexts in which it doesn't apply. But can you perfectly predict every scenario? No! Are there borderline cases? Yes! There is information loss by making the decision in the past, so the decision can't be as well optimized.

In the other thread, you gave an example of having the opportunity to steal from someone. If you formulate the rule-of-thumb in the past, there's no new choice. You can't steal from him because it violates the principle. You then offered that if you were to apply the same reasoning that allowed you to formulate the principle, but at the time when the choice appears, it wouldn't work. This implies that it actually IS in your interest to steal in this case, and by formulating the rule-of-thumb earlier, you're acting in a non-optimal way. And yet, it was a criticism of my position, even though it is claimed that your position leads to non-optimal results.

If some newbie on the site asked whether stealing is in your interest, even if you're just sure that you can get away with it, there are multiple possible responses. Your example seems to suggest the reason for not stealing is that you formulate a rule-of-thumb that doesn't apply in this context, but that you should follow it anyway. But in general, I would expect you and other Objectivists to argue that it's only a short-range thinking that would lead someone to the conclusion that it was proper to steal. They'd argue that you might get caught (despite claims that you're sure you wouldn't). They'd argue that you'd be sacrificing your integrity and pride for a pittance. They'd argue that violating the trader principle turns you into a parasite and distracts you from the far more lucrative approach to productivity. The list would be long. But the general point is that it isn't in your interest.

This is worth repeating. A rule-of-thumb, what you insist on calling a moral principle, is based on a certain process of reasoning and inductive generalization that connect cause and effect and provide a deeper understanding of the likely consequences. If a particular situation, evaluated with these exact tools plus the specific context, says to do action A, and your rule-of-thumb says to do action B, it's only because the rule-of-thumb is ignorant of the details of the situation. In that case, it is the rule-of-thumb that's flawed.

I know this isn't universally accepted. Some people would like to formulate a rule and apply it in every situation, and not leave it up to contextual application. These people would argue that we should follow the rule, even when it is destructive of our lives. I think that's entirely wrong and a throwback to altruistic and religious thinking that views morality as making tough choices for the sake of being "good".

There is another major difference in our views of moral principles. I maintain that rules-of-thumb, even if they have certain "exception" areas, are still deeply flawed. Rules demand the same behavior wherever they apply. They are all or nothing. I wrote a long article/speech on the topic.

Rules don't allow for degrees. Either they apply entirely, or they don't apply at all. Let's look at one example that shows how limiting this is. Take independence. Of course, some people view this virtue as being about not subverting your own judgment because of other people's views. It's great because you can apply it all the time, and there doesn't seem to be a good reason to ever reject it. But when you widen the view of independence to be primarily about living your own life and being able to rely on your own means instead of other people's, it's not long useful as a rule. It applies to varying degrees. And rules don't handle that at all. Rules only work when they demand a specific behavior or demand that your don't do something (don't steal, don't kill, don't lie, etc). Anything else, anything with degrees, can't be decided ahead of time when you don't know the specifics. It's the specifics that set the degrees.

This is also true of borderline cases with rules. There's a fuzzy boundary where the rules don't work definitively, but they don't clearly not apply. All of these scenarios that have been brought up, where you're hungry and find an abandoned house and all of that, have shades of gray. Do you break in and get some food when you might find another house with someone who will help further down the street? Moral rules don't work well here because it's not clearly one side of the line or the other. And if you have to go through some re-evaluation process, you're abandoning the rules and going back to the principles that you used to formulate those rules.

In fact, moral rules have all of the downsides of intrinsic values. They act as intrinsic values. And it doesn't matter if you qualify them by saying they apply in some circumstances only. Instead of informing you about the relative values of your choices, they act to blind you to certain possibilities or alternatives. You must do this. You must not do that. Now pick between the rest of your alternatives. Instead of seeing the value in acting a particular way, or the disvalue that comes from acting in some other way, and seeing these in relation to your other choices, these moral rules tell you to not compare and instead tell you to obey.

So my view of principles as being identifications, not rules, produce the best results, work in borderline cases, and can successfully deal with varying degrees. Your view of principles as rules (applied in known contexts) breaks down in borderlines, doesn't work at all when degrees vary, and produce non-optimal results at times. Why struggle to maintain that view of principles when it's significantly inferior?

You ended your post by saying "In your approach, principles become irrelevant, because all you're doing is assessing the costs and benefits on an ad hoc basis. So why have a moral principle to begin with. Why have a principle of rights? Since you're not obligated to respect it, there's no need for the principle. It serves no useful purpose."

This statement doesn't make any sense given my view of principles as identifications and wide-reaching cause-effect relationships. The principles are useful, even when you are assessing costs and benefits in an ad hoc basis. In fact, they're critical. They're what allow you to look beyond the range of the moment and see the real consequences of your choices. That's their purpose.

Why would you think they don't have a purpose? Maybe if you thought I viewed moral principles as some kind of "preference" for how to act, but then still looked at the costs and benefits to make the decision. Then they would be worthless. But that's closer to your use of them, not mine. I don't view principles as telling you to do anything. I view them as identifications that allow you to analyze each of your choices and the likely consequences of them. Far from being pointless when you're making decisions, this is a crucially important function.

Bill, I'm posting this to show you that of the two views of principles, yours (which is probably the most common view I admit) is deeply flawed, while mine escapes all of those flaws. Why? Because moral rules are an unnecessary tool that's a hold over from ethical systems where obedience and sacrifice are valued. You don't have to stick with that point of view, just because you're used to it. There's nothing it accomplishes that my view of principles can't accomplish, and mine doesn't have the flaws.

At the very, very best view of these moral rules-of-thumb, it is a convenient method of doing your thinking once and applying it later. In it's best case, it works as a tool of efficiency. But look at the consequences? Because you don't want to discuss the reasons and identifications behind the formulation of the rules-of-thumb, and instead focus on the rules-of-thumb as if these inaccurate short-hands were something more significant, we see constant debates over "rights", and whether they "exist" or "apply" in some circumstances.

But this is essentially a meaningless debate. It only happens because the focus is not on the actual reasoning and identification behind the rules-of-thumb, but on the rules-of-thumb themselves. What should be just a simple short-hand is viewed as being the most morally significant part. So instead of trying to understand what actions are in a person's interests, and to what degree (and based on what), instead we have people thinking that these short-hands are the whole point of morality. That you're immoral if you violate them.

This view is based on the idea of morality as a method of determining moral status, instead of as a method of making the most optimal choices. Moral status favors rules. You want clear boundaries where if you don't do it, you are now immoral. All of these pointless conversations get sidetracked down this blind alley because they revolve around moral rules. Is it any wonder that people strongly disagree with you when you view these moral rules as not applying when they don't benefit you? That's the point of having rules!

If we could all just ignore these rules and focus on the optimal decision making, we could see that these principles
(my use) are incredibly useful as a tool of cognition. They don't demand some behavior. They clarify your choices. And you can then compare them based on a standard of value and pick the greater value.

This is a very different view of moral principles than you're used to, but if you stopped to look at the advantages, plus the disadvantages of the moral rules, I think you'd see that this is the right way to view it all.

Post 4

Friday, June 13 - 12:40am

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Joe, you write,

What seems to be the deep divide between our positions is our different views of principles. As I stated, principles are a form of identification. Moral principles are identified causal relationships. This is an epistemological function. It provides us factual statements about what are the long range consequences of our possible actions. So for me, the moral principle of honesty does not tell me I must be honest in all cases, or even in all cases that fit some general criteria. It tells me the consequences of being honest or dishonest.

But if it tells you the consequences of being honest or dishonest, then it must do so in some specified context, which is all I am saying the principle does.

It provides me a tool of factual analysis. When I see clearly the consequences of being dishonest in normal situations, I can evaluate that option and recognize that it's a poor choice.

Exactly! You have already grasped the consequences of being dishonest in normal situations, and that understanding is what the principle gives you. You do not then have to go through the job of figuring it out all over again in each new situation you confront. You have already done that, and that knowledge is embodied in the principle that you've accepted and are applying.

Similarly with rights. As principles, they identify causal relationships between certain kinds of actions and long term effects.

I don't disagree with this.

One example is if I steal from others, preventing them from living their lives, I create a disharmony of interest and they will likely (and rightly) retaliate. Or that others will rightly view me as a threat to their lives too.

That's one way of looking at it, and one possible reason for not stealing from others. But I would say that it would be wrong to steal even if you knew for certain that you could get away with it. It's not clear to me that you share that view. Do you?

On the other hand, you claim that moral principles are not identifications of cause and effect, but a conclusion based on that identification.

What's the difference? The identification IS the conclusion.

The conclusion tells you should act in a particular way within general contexts that you determined ahead of time.

In both of our views, we have made a cause and effect identification that is the basis for figuring out how we should behave.

So what are the differences in practice?

With your view of moral principles, which I call "rules-of-thumb", you do your thinking once during the formulation process. From then on, you can simply apply your conclusion without any re-evaluation.

Yes, unless you have some compelling reason to re-evaluate it. But that's true for any idea. Take the idea that capitalism is the most productive economic system. I already have reasons for accepting that idea as true, and I'm not going to re-evaluate it, unless some new evidence gives me a reason to do so.

There are some advantages here. First, you don't normally need to think about the problem. You have a rule that you can apply blindly, but only within the context.

Why do you say "blindly." It's not applied blindly; it's applied with the full knowledge and understanding that have given rise to the principle.

The other advantage is that it shifts the thinking to an earlier point in time, so you can make quick decisions. And third, someone else can do the formulation for you, and you can simply learn the expected context.

Well, you have to understand the reasons for the principle, don't you? You can't just accept someone else's word as say-so.

I bring these up, not because I really believe in them, but because some people do view these as advantages.

The first question to ask is whether making an evaluation at the time of the decision making provides a better or worse result than formulating a rule-of-thumb ahead of time and applying it blindly (within a fixed context).

First of all, it's not a "rule of thumb." You keep saying this, and it isn't true. "A rule of thumb is a principle with broad application that is not intended to be strictly accurate or reliable for every situation." (Wikipedia) A moral principle is not a rule of thumb. Secondly, you don't apply the principle blindly. You keep saying this as well, and it isn't true. You apply it with the knowledge that its application leads to desirable consequences.

Which gives a better result? Both of these approaches can fully take account of the general cause-effect relationship mentioned earlier. In one case you do it ahead of time. In the other, you do it at the time.

Joe, this doesn't make any sense. How do you know that it's applicable, if you haven't thought it out ahead of time? Are you seriously telling me that when applying moral principles, your past knowledge is irrelevant?

There's no good reason why any of the insights would be lost in either case. It's the same application of the same generalized abstractions.

There is a difference, though. In the case where you apply the generalization (what I call the principle) ahead of time, you don't have all of the information about that specific situation. You can figure out likely contexts in which it applies, and likely contexts in which it doesn't apply. But can you perfectly predict every scenario? No! Are there borderline cases? Yes! There is information loss by making the decision in the past, so the decision can't be as well optimized.

But you can't know whether something is a borderline case, unless you already have a principle that you understand to be applicable within certain contexts, and aren't sure whether or not the present context fits the principle. For example, you may not be sure whether or not your situation is a life-threatening emergency. In that situation, you will have a "borderline case" in which you'll have to make a less-than-certain decision according to your own best judgment.

In the other thread, you gave an example of having the opportunity to steal from someone. If you formulate the rule-of-thumb in the past, there's no new choice. You can't steal from him because it violates the principle. You then offered that if you were to apply the same reasoning that allowed you to formulate the principle, but at the time when the choice appears, it wouldn't work. This implies that it actually IS in your interest to steal in this case, and by formulating the rule-of-thumb earlier, you're acting in a non-optimal way. And yet, it was a criticism of my position, even though it is claimed that your position leads to non-optimal results.

No, no, no! You're missing the point of the example. What I was trying to illustrate is that if you look only at the immediate context without the benefit of past knowledge, it could appear to you that it is in your self-interest to steal the money. Of course, it isn't, but you can only know this, because of the previous knowledge that you bring to bear. You already have an understanding of why this type of action is against your long-range self-interest, and that knowledge is embodied in the moral principle that you apply in that situation.

I know this isn't universally accepted. Some people would like to formulate a rule and apply it in every situation, and not leave it up to contextual application. These people would argue that we should follow the rule, even when it is destructive of our lives. I think that's entirely wrong and a throwback to altruistic and religious thinking that views morality as making tough choices for the sake of being "good".

This is not my view, as you well know. So, I don't know why you're presenting it here.

There is another major difference in our views of moral principles. I maintain that rules-of-thumb, even if they have certain "exception" areas, are still deeply flawed. Rules demand the same behavior wherever they apply. They are all or nothing. I wrote a long article/speech on the topic.

Rules don't allow for degrees. Either they apply entirely, or they don't apply at all. Let's look at one example that shows how limiting this is. Take independence. Of course, some people view this virtue as being about not subverting your own judgment because of other people's views. It's great because you can apply it all the time, and there doesn't seem to be a good reason to ever reject it. But when you widen the view of independence to be primarily about living your own life and being able to rely on your own means instead of other people's, it's not long useful as a rule.

But that's not the Objectivist view of the virtue of independence. Go read Rand's account of it, and you'll see why.

It applies to varying degrees. And rules don't handle that at all. Rules only work when they demand a specific behavior or demand that you don't do something (don't steal, don't kill, don't lie, etc). Anything else, anything with degrees, can't be decided ahead of time when you don't know the specifics.

But you have to some basis for evaluating the specific behavior; principles provide that basis. Furthermore, how do you respect someone's rights in degrees? You either respect them or you don't. It isn't an issue of degrees. Also, you have to have some idea of what the principle specifies; otherwise, it become a rubber principle that can be stretched to mean anything to anybody.

I wrote, "In your approach, principles become irrelevant, because all you're doing is assessing the costs and benefits on an ad hoc basis. So why have a moral principle to begin with. Why have a principle of rights? Since you're not obligated to respect it, there's no need for the principle. It serves no useful purpose."

This statement doesn't make any sense given my view of principles as identifications and wide-reaching cause-effect relationships. The principles are useful, even when you are assessing costs and benefits in an ad hoc basis. In fact, they're critical. They're what allow you to look beyond the range of the moment and see the real consequences of your choices. That's their purpose.

Could you give me an example to illustrate what you're talking about, because it's not entirely clear to me. If the principle enables you to look beyond the range of the moment and see the real consequences of your choices, it thereby specifies what actions are appropriate in certain contexts, does it not?

Why would you think they don't have a purpose? . . . I don't view principles as telling you to do anything. I view them as identifications that allow you to analyze each of your choices and the likely consequences of them. Far from being pointless when you're making decisions, this is a crucially important function.

Fine; I'm not saying that principles are commandments, but they are prescriptive, if only because they identify the means to the achievement of one's values. If you want to achieve those values, then you "must" take the appropriate means to their achievement.

At the very, very best view of these moral rules-of-thumb, it is a convenient method of doing your thinking once and applying it later. In it's best case, it works as a tool of efficiency. But look at the consequences? Because you don't want to discuss the reasons and identifications behind the formulation of the rules-of-thumb, and instead focus on the rules-of-thumb as if these inaccurate short-hands were something more significant, we see constant debates over "rights", and whether they "exist" or "apply" in some circumstances.

Who said that I don't want to discuss the reasons and identifications behind the formulation of my principles? When did I ever state or even suggest this?

Joe, you're certainly entitled to your opinion, but I don't think Rand would agree with you. I know that Peikoff and company wouldn't, because they've said as much. They don't agree with the cost-benefit approach to ethics. Their view is that while the costs and benefits are used to formulate the principles, the principles should be used to determine one's choices.

- Bill

Post 5

Friday, June 13 - 2:21am

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Bill,

Your "principles" are not identifications of consequences, they're prescriptions of actions. You would say "In normal situations, you should not lie to people". Whereas I would say, lying to people has foreseeable consequences, including elevating non-reality to be more important than reality, creating a disharmony with others and being afraid they'll find out, likely needing to lie in order to lie some more, etc. These principles are real principles, as in "a fundamental, primary, or general law or truth from which others are derived". They're for understanding. Once you understand the consequences clearly, then you can compare your alternative based on your standard of value. Yours jumps to a conclusion, which blinds you to knowledge. Yours tells you that you shouldn't act in a particular way, ignoring the reasons why. Your "principles" are commandments.

I've pointed out some glaring flaws, such as the fact that your rules demand all or nothing behavior and can't deal with degrees. You don't deny this, and instead claim that Objectivism doesn't support a wider sense of independence, and comment that rights are all or nothing (which isn't true, as some rights violations are worse than others, something your rules can't make sense of). Either you're being intentionally argumentative, or you believe the purpose of principles is to create more rules that demand obedience. Fine. Defend your position. And I don't care if you think Rand or Peikoff or anyone else agrees. Why are rules necessary?

As I've already stated, I view the purpose of morality as providing a means of picking the best alternative as it relates to your life. Your moral rules do not help with that function. They make it harder. So defend them. Tell me why it is better to obey a rule when it contradicts your life. Why should you sacrifice your best judgment? Why must you obey your "principles" when it is clear that the choice is inferior? What do you think the purpose of morality is that it would require sacrifice for the sake of being able to say you obeyed a principle?

Could you give me an example to illustrate what you're talking about, because it's not entirely clear to me. If the principle enables you to look beyond the range of the moment and see the real consequences of your choices, it thereby specifies what actions are appropriate in certain contexts, does it not?

No. If you read my article, you should already know how I would answer that. There is a difference between understanding the consequences of an action and evaluating those consequences. Those are two distinct functions. The principle doesn't tell you that you must do this or that. It tells you what the consequences are, and you decide yourself. I already gave examples of this, including my discussion of honesty. The principle of honesty would tell you that by lying to the murderer, you'll prevent him from being successful in his actions, and that he'll likely get angry at you when he finds out. These effects might be viewed as bad in normal contexts when dealing with friends, but in this scenario the outcome is the best of the possible choices. Your moral rules just don't apply in this situation (which I find untenable given your position that cost and benefits should never trump a "principle"). Your rule is useless, and provides you no guidance. It says you should tell the truth in normal situations, but in this situation its as if it winked out of existence, providing no guidance at all for you. Whereas a principle as I've described it is perfectly valid still precisely because it doesn't try to substitute for your judgment.

Fine; I'm not saying that principles are commandments, but they are prescriptive, if only because they identify the means to the achievement of one's values. If you want to achieve those values, then you "must" take the appropriate means to their achievement.

This is like saying that physics is prescriptive because it allows you to identify how to achieve your values through certain means. This is an accurate analogy. I view physics as a method of understanding the consequences of my choices. If I shoot a gun up into the air, I can expect that the bullet will come down at some point and possibly hit someone. But these laws of physics are not prescriptive. They don't tell me I must never shoot a gun in the air. They simply provide a means of foreseeing consequences. It's my job to go the next step and evaluate the alternatives. Moral principles are no different. Properly, they are not prescriptive in this same sense. They seek to identify the likely results, but you still have to determine whether they are beneficial or not.

Joe, this doesn't make any sense. How do you know that it's applicable, if you haven't thought it out ahead of time? Are you seriously telling me that when applying moral principles, your past knowledge is irrelevant?

No, I'm not saying that. Nothing remotely close. I'm saying that the principles, these wide-reaching generalization, or as the dictionary describes them "a fundamental, primary, or general law or truth from which others are derived", are absolutely necessary. This is the past knowledge that is relevant. I'm not rejecting the use of these kinds of principle. I'm saying they're necessary and proper to use. I'm rejecting your view that principles are already-formed conclusions about what choices are best before you even know what the alternatives are. You want to go into a situation with an existing answer so you don't have to think about it. I want to go into a situation with the tools to really comprehend what the alternatives are, and then make my judgment based on all of the information.

No, no, no! You're missing the point of the example. What I was trying to illustrate is that if you look only at the immediate context without the benefit of past knowledge, it could appear to you that it is in your self-interest to steal the money.

Who said anything about making choices without the benefit of past knowledge? The past knowledge that I claim we use (and should use) is the wide-reaching generalizations. The cause and effect relationships. But the past knowledge that you are arguing for is the conclusions that you should act in a particular way. You've decided ahead of time that certain actions are not permissible. But why does that decision need to be made ahead of time? If you had the information to formulate the principle before, you have it at the time of the decision. The only difference is that you lacked specific knowledge of the situation. Be clear here. Are you really claiming that you are able to make better decisions with less knowledge?

Also, this is a strawman attack. I could just as easily argue that when you were formulating the principle, it might appear that it is in your interest to steal. Look at the prudent predator arguers. So saying that doing the same process of evaluation at the time of the decision potentially has this flaw is unfair. Since you have all of the same information as you had when you formulate the "rule", plus additional information that wasn't available to you, there's no reason to expect the decision to be worse. It should be equal or better.

But you can't know whether something is a borderline case, unless you already have a principle that you understand to be applicable within certain contexts, and aren't sure whether or not the present context fits the principle. For example, you may not be sure whether or not your situation is a life-threatening emergency. In that situation, you will have a "borderline case" in which you'll have to make a less-than-certain decision according to your own best judgment.

It should be clear that these borderline cases for your moral rules are not borderline cases for my principles of identification. For you, there's some fuzzy line that when you cross it, the "principle" is no longer valid. For me, the principle still provides crucial information, and instead I just evaluate the consequences as more or less desirable than the alternatives. When you find yourself in a life-threatening situation, all bets are off because your rule doesn't work in that context. For me, the principle still identifies the critical issues, but I evaluate the results in the context of my alternatives. Which is why I can still recognize that stealing is less of an offense than murder, whereas by your methodology, they're all just rights violations and all are simply "bad". Your "principles" avoid the need of weighing values, and so lose the advantage of weighing them.

They don't agree with the cost-benefit approach to ethics. Their view is that while the costs and benefits are used to formulate the principles, the principles should be used to determine one's choices.

I'm not arguing with them, I'm arguing with you. I'll assume you hold this position.

So what does it mean in practice? You claim there is a difference between evaluating costs and benefits versus following "principles". That means there are cases where they diverge. Where exactly is that? Can you provide an example? When is it that these rules tell you to do something that in your best judgment is a less optimal choice? (And try to avoid the strawman you used earlier). And after you provide an example, please explain why you think this is a flaw in cost/benefit analysis and not a flaw in your "principle", since it would seem to indicate that your "principle" is demanding a non-optimal choice. How is that consistent with a morality of rational self-interest?

Post 6

Friday, June 13 - 4:59am

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Good discussion, gentlemen.

I may be able to contribute later. For the time being, I'd just like to point out an apparent trichotomy. I think it was JS Mill who said it was really a wonderful experience to argue with peers; something about each one caring about the truth more than simple conformity of opinion. Anyway, there seems to be a trichotomy here, between Bill, Joe, and myself.

In borderline cases, concepts are tested or strained (though that's not necessarily best or even good). In these cases, Bill appears to be taking the middle-road -- and Joe and I have attempted to fortify our positions more out on the extremes. Take rights. When push comes to shove and the [ __ ] hits the fan, it either appears that we don't have them at all, or that they are not contextually useful. In such cases,

(1) Bill responds by saying we don't have them -- in those specific contexts where we're not obliged to respect them

(2) Joe responds by saying that we "shouldn't" have had them -- when their nature is understood as a super-contextual "absolute"

(3) I respond by saying that we have them absolutely, but that we shouldn't follow them absolutely -- I differentiate the Law of Identity's prescribing us Rights from the contextual exercise of these absolute rights we have (in virtue of our nature as humans)

Bill says principles help you act, being initially based on cause and effect; Joe says principles help you understand, but don't prescribe morally-superior behavior for you to follow, and I say principles help you to be a really good, "upright" morally-superior person -- even if it kills you and everything you love (just kidding!).

:-)

Anyway, is that an accurate analysis of what's been said so far? If so, is it useful?

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/13, 5:00am)

Post 7

Friday, June 13 - 11:30am

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Joe writes,

Your "principles" are not identifications of consequences, they're prescriptions of actions. You would say "In normal situations, you should not lie to people". Whereas I would say, lying to people has foreseeable consequences, including elevating non-reality to be more important than reality, creating a disharmony with others and being afraid they'll find out, likely needing to lie in order to lie some more, etc. These principles are real principles, as in "a fundamental, primary, or general law or truth from which others are derived". They're for understanding. Once you understand the consequences clearly, then you can compare your alternative based on your standard of value. Yours jumps to a conclusion, which blinds you to knowledge. Yours tells you that you shouldn't act in a particular way, ignoring the reasons why. Your "principles" are commandments.

Joe, Joe, you're ignoring virtually everything I've said. I've said that my principles do not ignore the reasons why, yet you continue to repeat your claim that they do. I don't disagree with you when you say that the principles should identify the consequences of actions and thus enable you to compare the alternatives based on your standard of value, but you seem to think that this is incompatible with their prescriptive function. It isn't. A prescription simply says that if you want X, then you "must" do Y in order to achieve it. It identifies a means to an end. That's all moral principles are -- principled identifications of means to ends. Suppose I said, "In order to drive from San Francisco to Los Angeles, you must take I-5 South." That's prescriptive, but it's also descriptive, because it tells you how to get to where you want to go. The "must" in my direction is not a "commandment"; it is the identification of a causal relationship. It doesn't tell you that must drive to Los Angeles; all it says is that IF you want to drive to Los Angeles from San Francisco, THEN you must follow a certain route in order to get there.

I've pointed out some glaring flaws, such as the fact that your rules demand all or nothing behavior and can't deal with degrees. You don't deny this, and instead claim that Objectivism doesn't support a wider sense of independence, and comment that rights are all or nothing (which isn't true, as some rights violations are worse than others, something your rules can't make sense of).

What I meant when I wrote -- "How do you respect someone's rights in degrees? You either respect them or you don't. It isn't an issue of degrees" -- is that you can't respect them in a "lesser degree" without violating them. But I now see what you meant. Of course, some rights violations are greater in degree than other violations. Evidently, we were arguing at cross purposes, for there's nothing in my approach to this issue which would deny that.

Either you're being intentionally argumentative, or you believe the purpose of principles is to create more rules that demand obedience.

Not true in either case.

And I don't care if you think Rand or Peikoff or anyone else agrees.

Nor should you. However, since this is an Objectivist list, I don't think I was out of line to mention it.

As I've already stated, I view the purpose of morality as providing a means of picking the best alternative as it relates to your life.

I agree with this wholeheartedly.

Your moral rules do not help with that function. They make it harder. So defend them. Tell me why it is better to obey a rule when it contradicts your life. Why should you sacrifice your best judgment? Why must you obey your "principles" when it is clear that the choice is inferior? What do you think the purpose of morality is that it would require sacrifice for the sake of being able to say you obeyed a principle?

Joe, I don't believe any of this. Where, oh where, did you get that idea that I do?

I asked, "Could you give me an example to illustrate what you're talking about, because it's not entirely clear to me. If the principle enables you to look beyond the range of the moment and see the real consequences of your choices, it thereby specifies what actions are appropriate in certain contexts, does it not?"

No. If you read my article, you should already know how I would answer that. There is a difference between understanding the consequences of an action and evaluating those consequences. Those are two distinct functions. The principle doesn't tell you that you must do this or that. It tells you what the consequences are, and you decide yourself.

Yes, yes, I agree with this, but I was assuming that you already had as your goal the furtherance of your life and happiness, so that given that goal, you must follow certain principles of conduct in order to achieve it.

I already gave examples of this, including my discussion of honesty. The principle of honesty would tell you that by lying to the murderer, you'll prevent him from being successful in his actions, and that he'll likely get angry at you when he finds out. These effects might be viewed as bad in normal contexts when dealing with friends, but in this scenario the outcome is the best of the possible choices. Your moral rules just don't apply in this situation (which I find untenable given your position that cost and benefits should never trump a "principle").

I didn't say that costs and benefits should never trump a principle; obviously, the principle should be based on the costs and benefits.

Your rule is useless, and provides you no guidance. It says you should tell the truth in normal situations, but in this situation its as if it winked out of existence, providing no guidance at all for you.

I don't follow you. The principle recommends that you be honest in order to achieve certain desirable results. Obviously, in this case, being honest won't achieve those results; quite the opposite; therefore, honesty is not recommended by that principle. The principle of honesty hasn't winked out of existence; it simply doesn't specify being honest in this situation, which is what I meant when I said that it doesn't "apply" here. I think you're getting hung up on the words I'm using and misinterpreting their meaning.

Whereas a principle as I've described it is perfectly valid still precisely because it doesn't try to substitute for your judgment.

Nor should it.

I wrote, "Fine; I'm not saying that principles are commandments, but they are prescriptive, if only because they identify the means to the achievement of one's values. If you want to achieve those values, then you "must" take the appropriate means to their achievement."

This is like saying that physics is prescriptive because it allows you to identify how to achieve your values through certain means. This is an accurate analogy. I view physics as a method of understanding the consequences of my choices. If I shoot a gun up into the air, I can expect that the bullet will come down at some point and possibly hit someone. But these laws of physics are not prescriptive. They don't tell me I must never shoot a gun in the air. They simply provide a means of foreseeing consequences. It's my job to go the next step and evaluate the alternatives. Moral principles are no different. Properly, they are not prescriptive in this same sense. They seek to identify the likely results, but you still have to determine whether they are beneficial or not.

But look, that's all "prescriptive" means. A doctor can be said to prescribe a certain method of treatment. That doesn't mean that he's commanding you to follow it. He's assuming that you value your life and your health, so his "prescription" is based on that assumption. He's saying, in effect, that if you want to recover your health, then you "should" follow the prescribed course of treatment, because it will give you the desired result.

I wrote, "Joe, this doesn't make any sense. How do you know that it's applicable, if you haven't thought it out ahead of time? Are you seriously telling me that when applying moral principles, your past knowledge is irrelevant?"

No, I'm not saying that. Nothing remotely close. I'm saying that the principles, these wide-reaching generalization, or as the dictionary describes them "a fundamental, primary, or general law or truth from which others are derived", are absolutely necessary. This is the past knowledge that is relevant. I'm not rejecting the use of these kinds of principle. I'm saying they're necessary and proper to use. I'm rejecting your view that principles are already-formed conclusions about what choices are best before you even know what the alternatives are. You want to go into a situation with an existing answer so you don't have to think about it.

That's not true. Obviously, I want to have some already formed principles that enable me to evaluate the alternatives, but I still have to think in order to apply them.

I want to go into a situation with the tools to really comprehend what the alternatives are, and then make my judgment based on all of the information.

Okay. Just so I understand you, you're not saying, are you, that you have no idea what you would do in a given situation unless you're already in that situation?

I wrote, "No, no, no! You're missing the point of the example. What I was trying to illustrate is that if you look only at the immediate context without the benefit of past knowledge, it could appear to you that it is in your self-interest to steal the money."

Who said anything about making choices without the benefit of past knowledge? The past knowledge that I claim we use (and should use) is the wide-reaching generalizations. The cause and effect relationships. But the past knowledge that you are arguing for is the conclusions that you should act in a particular way. You've decided ahead of time that certain actions are not permissible. But why does that decision need to be made ahead of time? If you had the information to formulate the principle before, you have it at the time of the decision. The only difference is that you lacked specific knowledge of the situation. Be clear here. Are you really claiming that you are able to make better decisions with less knowledge?

No, but a principle enables you to evaluate the situation based on the fact it is the KIND of situation to which the principle applies. Principles are generalizations that recommend certain courses of actions under certain conditions. Obviously, you have to be aware of the conditions in order to apply the principle.

Also, this is a strawman attack. I could just as easily argue that when you were formulating the principle, it might appear that it is in your interest to steal. Look at the prudent predator arguers. So saying that doing the same process of evaluation at the time of the decision potentially has this flaw is unfair. Since you have all of the same information as you had when you formulate the "rule", plus additional information that wasn't available to you, there's no reason to expect the decision to be worse. It should be equal or better.

I wrote, "But you can't know whether something is a borderline case, unless you already have a principle that you understand to be applicable within certain contexts, and aren't sure whether or not the present context fits the principle. For example, you may not be sure whether or not your situation is a life-threatening emergency. In that situation, you will have a "borderline case" in which you'll have to make a less-than-certain decision according to your own best judgment. It should be clear that these borderline cases for your moral rules are not borderline cases for my principles of identification. For you, there's some fuzzy line that when you cross it, the "principle" is no longer valid. For me, the principle still provides crucial information, and instead I just evaluate the consequences as more or less desirable than the alternatives.

The point is that this may not be an easy decision, because you're not sure which is more or less desirable. The function of principles is to facilitate that decision by prescribing certain courses of action under certain conditions for the sake, obviously, of serving your own life and happiness. The principle of justice is a case in point. A jury has to decide what happens to the accused in a murder trial, but it does so based on applying the principle of justice by deciding whether or not he violated the victim's right to life.

When you find yourself in a life-threatening situation, all bets are off because your rule doesn't work in that context.

What do mean, it doesn't work?! The prohibition against violating the person's rights doesn't apply in that case. That's not the same as saying that it "doesn't work."

For me, the principle still identifies the critical issues, but I evaluate the results in the context of my alternatives.

What principle? The principle that the person has certain rights which should not be violated? That's the principle that I'm referring to.

Which is why I can still recognize that stealing is less of an offense than murder, whereas by your methodology, they're all just rights violations and all are simply "bad".

Come on, Joe, you know that's not my position. What do you gain by misrepresenting me in this manner?

Your "principles" avoid the need of weighing values, and so lose the advantage of weighing them.

This is absolute rubbish!

So what does it mean in practice? You claim there is a difference between evaluating costs and benefits versus following "principles". That means there are cases where they diverge. Where exactly is that?

No, I'm saying that the principles are the means of evaluating costs and benefits. Respecting the principle of rights insures that we realize the benefits of living in society. We don't approach every alternative fresh, as if we have no previous knowledge of what actions are appropriate. For example, we've already evaluated the costs and benefits of initiating force in order to obtain values from others, and we know that it doesn't work. Hence, we formulate a principle of rights that embodies this knowledge. We don't have to re-evaluate the principle every time someone proposes a law that would violate it. We already know, based on the principle, that it's a bad law, because it violates the principle. Similarly, if someone is convicted for robbing a bank, we don't have to decide whether or not he acted unjustly. We already know that he acted unjustly, because he violated a law that prohibits robbery. That's the function of philosophy (and the philosophy of law) -- to give us this kind of knowledge.

Can you provide an example? When is it that these rules tell you to do something that in your best judgment is a less optimal choice? (And try to avoid the strawman you used earlier).

What strawman? I've already explained that you misunderstood the example, which was not intended to show that you should follow a principle that is against your interest.

And after you provide an example, please explain why you think this is a flaw in cost/benefit analysis and not a flaw in your "principle", since it would seem to indicate that your "principle" is demanding a non-optimal choice. How is that consistent with a morality of rational self-interest?

Joe, I have never said that one should follow a principle that is inconsistent with one's self-interest. Nor would I. So, there is no example that I could give you to illustrate that view, because it is not one that I hold.

- Bill

Post 8

Friday, June 13 - 4:25pm

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Ed, I think I agree with your formulation.

Bill, I think there's something preventing us from clearly communication. For instance, I do know that when you are in a lifeboat situation, that you personally are able to recognize that theft is more tolerable than murder. I'm not trying to claim you personally can't see the difference. What I am saying is that your explicit methodology fails in this case.

I think we need to be extremely precise here. I think that your moral rules fail you in some situations, and the only reason you are able to make a good choice anyway is because you stop referring to the moral rule and instead revert to using the principles in the way I describe them. What that means is that you can use your rules some of the time, but sometimes they fail, whereas you can always go back to the cause-effect relationships and understanding.

Here's an example of one of your style of moral "principles".

"Since we benefit significantly from living peacefully in society, and initiating force against others disrupts that harmony, you should not initiate force".

What happens in these emergency situations (such as being lost in the woods, starving, and finding a cabin)? This rule breaks down. Obviously the conclusion of it is no longer accurate. So the rule doesn't provide you any guidance at all. It was in the form of telling you to behave a certain way. When that is no longer reasonable, the rule provides no guidance at all, since you can't follow it. If you have the option of stealing or murdering, this "principle" can't provide you guidance because it's in the form of telling you to do neither. If you decide that stealing is less of an offense than murdering, you came to that conclusion by some other means, but not the rule itself.

The obvious point is that in these situations, you ignore the rule and instead look at the justification for the rule. By understanding that the greater the disruption of the harmony of interest, the more you pit your life against others (and society), you can see that the choice is less valuable.

The question, then, is what's the value of formulating this sort of rule when you can just use the justification portion without the conclusion? In practice, if you always have to verify that the conclusion is valid by looking at whether the justification still holds, what have you gained? I say very little, and the cost is significant.

The one advantage to pre-concluding these values is a theoretical gain in efficiency during the value selection process at the time of the choice. I'm not discounting that, but I do want to note that this is a separate function, as I described in my article. Efficiency is fine, although I would argue that you aren't really gaining efficiency. But that's another debate. For here we should note that efficiency is a win if it doesn't actually detract from making an optimal decision. And in a discussion of morality, accuracy is the goal instead of speed of judgment. So if formulating these rules is an efficiency gain only, they're not relevant. And yet, most of the recent arguments have not been about the justification for rights, but about the short-cut moral rule of rights.

There's another way to write rule I gave above. Try this:

"Since we benefit significantly from living peacefully in society, and initiating force against others disrupts that harmony, you disvalue initiating force[was:should not initiate force]".

The interesting difference here is that this new version can be interpreted in two ways. One is essentially the same. If you disvalue initiating force entirely, then it's essentially a rule that says you must not do it. But if instead you view it as a modification to your value measurement process, it isn't all or nothing. While you disfavor initiating force (and significantly so), under extreme situations the alternative might be worse. With this style of wording, it stops being a moral rule.

This might help clarify why rules are so bad. Rules have to make a value judgment ahead of time, telling you that something is absolutely necessary to do, or absolutely shouldn't be done. But moral decision making isn't performed in a vacuum. It's a process of comparing two alternatives. You can't just specify a value for one, such as saying I value watching this television at 15 utils. I value stealing from people at -1500 utils. Instead, you compare two alternatives and decide that one leads to a preferred result. You have to have the alternatives in order to do a comparison. If you want to decide ahead of time that you disvalue initiating force, that's fine. But how much do you disvalue it? Without something to compare against, your left with plus or minus infinity. If you disvalue it to a degree (even a large degree), you're still stuck doing the comparison. So you can disvalue something to some extent, or value something to some extent, but the only way to avoid the comparison is to treat them as all or nothing.

But values with infinite degrees are intrinsic values, since those are not able to be compared. Trying to decide your actions ahead of time is essentially claiming an infinite value or disvalue. And this is exactly why borderline cases fail. By trying to assign a value that isn't to be compared, as soon as you come across a scenario where the alternatives are so extreme, the rule fails utterly. And unless you do the comparisons, you can't tell if you're in a borderline situation. Only by comparing, and seeing that the values are in fact quite close or reversed from normal, can you decide to discard the rule. But if you're already doing this, the rule doesn't provide any new guidance.

Let me also mention one of the previous arguments concerning rights on this forum. A debate revolved around "what is an emergency situation?". From my perspective, we don't need to identify a situation as "emergency" in order to use our moral tools. "Emergencies" don't change the rules. We use the same methods, but because the our needs are different, certain alternatives become more valuable than others. There isn't a sharp edge where the rules suddenly don't work. There isn't even a fuzzy edge where the rules change. The rules don't change. You apply the same principles to the new situation, and the results are different. So for my view of principles, there's no point to trying to clearly define emergencies.

When moral rules are used, there is a point. The moral rules demand specific conduct, and the claim is that they avoid the complexity of having to make value judgments at the moment of decision making. To avoid value comparisons, you have to only use rules that can treat certain values or disvalues as infinite in value, at least in some contexts. But how do you know when they don't apply? The most optimal manner is to do a value comparison every time, but that defeats the claimed point of these rules. So instead, you have to define a type of scenario where they don't apply. In the rights conversation, it was "emergency situations". When your life is on the line, the rule doesn't apply. And then there's a debate over what counts as an emergency. Look how complicated it all has to be!

I want to make one more point about borderline cases, because they are in fact different between moral rules and moral principles as I describe them. The borders are not the same at all.

For the moral principles, the borderlines are conceptual. Any principle of rights is most solidly related to other adults living harmoniously in society. When you start dealing with children, senile elders, the mentally retarded, the insane, newborns, unborns, or further into primates like gorillas, the principle isn't as clear. The harmony may not apply in some cases at all, in others there may be potential but not actual harmony, in others it may exist to some degree. Due to the nature of concepts, borderlines are quite common. Principles are just another form of abstraction, and so they're going to deal with these kinds of borderlines.

The moral rules have these limitations as well (whether they admit them or not...they could ignore these borderlines and treat all cases as equal). But they have another borderline. Because the moral rule tries to make a value decision without comparing it to the alternative, the borderline is when the value of the alternative approaches the value specified by the rule. So you may think you should tell the truth, but as you get closer to the point where the alternative is actually better, you approach the border of the rule. And as I've shown, the principle that is used to justify the rule does not have a borderline at that point. It can be equally powerful when a murderer is at your door asking where your family is, whereas the rule is long discarded. The rule actually stops being useful when they become anywhere near close in value, since that would demand that you start comparing them more carefully.

This is in contrast to the emergency view. The emergency view makes an exception for the rule when it's clearly contradicting your life. But what about when it's close? Again, the only way to know you're close is to compare the values, which contradicts the whole point of moral rules.

Now Bill, I'm starting to feel like you're objections are not clear. You told me that I was not only wrong, but impugned my Objectivist credentials by suggesting that Rand and others wouldn't possibly agree with the cost-benefit analysis and instead favor your rule-based approach. But now you claim that there's no difference in the results between the two, and that you can't provide a single example where cost-benefit method is incorrect. I actually think there will be significant differences between moral rules and principle-based cost-benefit analysis, as I've described in this post and others.

Post 9

Sunday, June 15 - 10:41pm

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I wrote, "Since we benefit significantly from living peacefully in society, and initiating force against others disrupts that harmony, you should not initiate force".

Joe replied,

What happens in these emergency situations (such as being lost in the woods, starving, and finding a cabin)? This rule breaks down.

The rule doesn't break down, because it doesn't apply to emergencies. Perhaps, I should have made the rule more explicit: ". . . you should not initiate force in non-emergencies, but I thought that this qualification was understood.

Obviously the conclusion of it is no longer accurate. So the rule doesn't provide you any guidance at all.It was in the form of telling you to behave a certain way. When that is no longer reasonable, the rule provides no guidance at all, since you can't follow it. If you have the option of stealing or murdering, this "principle" can't provide you guidance because it's in the form of telling you to do neither.

Not true. The (qualified) rule -- don't initiate force except in emergencies -- does provide guidance insofar as it permits the initiation of force in emergencies.

The obvious point is that in these situations, you ignore the rule and instead look at the justification for the rule.

You don't ignore the rule. The rule says that in emergencies, the initiation of force is justified if it serves your interest, but that in non-emergencies, it is not justified, because it does not serve your interest.

The question, then, is what's the value of formulating this sort of rule when you can just use the justification portion without the conclusion?

I don't understand this objection. The justification is the justification of the rule or principle. To understand and accept the justification of the principle is to conclude that the principle is justified and that it should be adhered to. If I understand and accept the justification for a law against murder, then I'm concluding that the law is justified and that it should be adhered to.

In practice, if you always have to verify that the conclusion is valid by looking at whether the justification still holds, what have you gained? I say very little, and the cost is significant.

You're not looking at whether or not the justification still holds. If you've justified the principle, you already know that it holds.

There's another way to write rule I gave above. Try this:

"Since we benefit significantly from living peacefully in society, and initiating force against others disrupts that harmony, you disvalue initiating force [was: should not initiate force]".

Okay, but as far as I can see, this is a distinction without a difference, because that's all I meant anyway. To say that I disvalue initiating force because it prevents people from living peacefully in society simply means that I don't view it as serving my interests under normal circumstances, which is the same as saying that, given my values, I shouldn't initiate in it under those circumstances.

The interesting difference here is that this new version can be interpreted in two ways. One is essentially the same. If you disvalue initiating force entirely, then it's essentially a rule that says you must not do it. But if instead you view it as a modification to your value measurement process, it isn't all or nothing. While you disfavor initiating force (and significantly so), under extreme situations the alternative might be worse. With this style of wording, it stops being a moral rule.

Okay, I think I see what you're saying. But don't you still have to say that if people don't share your values, they're wrong -- that they ought to share them -- that they ought to value not initiating force in non-emergencies, because it's in their objective self-interest to do so?

Also, what approach should the government take in implementing your morality? Is it your view that the government cannot establish any firm laws against the initiation of force, because it can never know in advance whether or not an initiation of force is justified -- that it must examine each particular act in order to decide that question? Or should the government prohibit the initiation of force on principle, and make it a crime to rob, rape, murder and plunder, regardless of the particular conditions under which these acts are committed?

Now Bill, I'm starting to feel like you're objections are not clear. You told me that I was not only wrong, but impugned my Objectivist credentials by suggesting that Rand and others wouldn't possibly agree with the cost-benefit analysis and instead favor your rule-based approach. But now you claim that there's no difference in the results between the two, and that you can't provide a single example where cost-benefit method is incorrect. I actually think there will be significant differences between moral rules and principle-based cost-benefit analysis, as I've described in this post and others.

My point was that the cost-benefit analysis should be employed in formulating your principles, but that once that is done, there is no point in re-evaluating the principles, unless you have some reason to doubt their validity. For example, if you have a law against murder, you don't need to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of that particular law for each and every murderer you arrest. You've already done the analysis; you know that murder is an unjust act with bad social consequences.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/15, 11:20pm)

Post 10

Monday, June 16 - 3:00am

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Bill, first thing to note is that I wasn't quoting you in the example of the moral rule. I was trying to give an example that fit your method. So your first line which says "I wrote...", you didn't write. Sorry for the confusion.

Now sometimes I get the impression you start responding to my post before you finish reading it. Is that the case? In this particular reply of yours, you bring up the exception for emergencies even though I argued against it in my post further on. Clearly when your life is the line, it's easy to posit an exception for these rules. But anything that isn't absolutely so clear ends up fostering debate over what is and isn't an "emergency". This is an artificial debate based on the idea of upholding a moral rule, and then having to have clear contexts which it applies. And it eludes clear definition because it must be all or nothing. If instead we recognized that rules are moral blinders, then we could focus on judging the alternatives in these situations based on a standard of life. Why try to approach this straightforward problem through such an indirect method?

I think I've said nearly everything I want to say on this topic. The most potent point, in my opinion, is that a moral rule (even within a context) is equal to saying that you value or disvalue something infinitely. If you have a moral rule to be honest, you value that means to an infinite degree. Similarly if you disvalue initiating force, you disvalue it to an infinite degree. By following a moral rule, you're taking certain values or disvalues and removing them from comparison. This amounts, in practice, to ignoring the actual magnitude of these values. It's obvious this only appears to be useful within contexts where the cost/benefit analysis happens to come to the same conclusion as the moral rule. As long as the value or disvalue ended up being greater in magnitude compared to the alternatives, then you can treat it as infinite magnitude. But of course it isn't infinite, and that's where it breaks down. Anytime the value is close in magnitude to the alternatives, the flaw in the infinite value becomes clear.

Okay, I think I see what you're saying. But don't you still have to say that if people don't share your values, they're wrong -- that they ought to share them -- that they ought to value not initiating force in non-emergencies, because it's in their objective self-interest to do so?

I agree with the spirit of this. I do believe in objective morality, and I would say these people are wrong if they initiate force. I'm not sure why you would suspect otherwise? All I've argued against is trying to retain the moral principles (identifications of cause and effect) in a rule form. But that doesn't open the door to people getting to subjectively choose when the principle applies.

And ultimately, if someone chooses to initiate force, we don't retaliate simply because they acted in a manner that was not optimal to their own lives. They can do that all they want, as long as they don't attack us or other peaceful members of society. When they do that, the crime is not to themselves, but to us.

Also, what approach should the government take in implementing your morality? Is it your view that the government cannot establish any firm laws against the initiation of force, because it can never know in advance whether or not an initiation of force is justified -- that it must examine each particular act in order to decide that question? Or should the government prohibit the initiation of force on principle, and make it a crime to rob, rape, murder and plunder, regardless of the particular conditions under which these acts are committed?

I haven't thought it all the way through, but my first thought on the topic is that the government would still have to establish rules of some sort, but when the courts are involved the courts should be dealing with the principles, not the blind rules. Take the case where you're lost and starving, and find an abandoned house. Should they lock you away for years for breaking and entering? A jury should recognize the context. They should recognize that you were justified in your action, although you still owe the owner.

Or how about a life-boat situation where there's only enough food/water/air for one person. Of course they should recognize the context of the situation and ask themselves whether it was appropriate.

Or how about the terrorist who makes someone choose between their lives and others. Again, the jury should recognize the horror of the situation and treat it accordingly.

Or how about the man who steals the galactic ray gun to shoot down the asteroid zooming for earth, about to annihilate us all?

But now imagine the jury said "rules are rules", and ignores the point or justification for the rules. Imagine they decided to take the mental short-hand and say they already justified these rules, so they can follow them blindly.

I do want to point out that this switch to the government is not a direct parallel with a personal morality. I've pointed out earlier that moral rules are attractive because they make moral judgment easy, and that the point of a personal morality is not moral judgment, but optimal decision-making. But the point of a system of laws is in fact geared towards moral judgment.

My point was that the cost-benefit analysis should be employed in formulating your principles, but that once that is done, there is no point in re-evaluating the principles, unless you have some reason to doubt their validity. For example, if you have a law against murder, you don't need to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of that particular law for each and every murderer you arrest. You've already done the analysis; you know that murd