Jordan,
Here is a summary list of the variables necessary for the identification of reason - and therefore, volition - in living organisms (hereafter: agents):
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1. first principles (implicit or explicit identification of axiomatic truths)
2. final ends (identification of behavioral teleology – goal-oriented actions)
3. particulars (a range of stimuli - against which to measure a range of response options)
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Jordan, your example – and even its modification (changing “8” to “red”) - is guilty of assuming too much, and uncovering too little. For the unmodified version (which you yourself found suspect), in order to get to the number 8, a “crow-bound” agent would need to rely on the concepts of numbers (a hypothetical agent able to directly perceive 8 unique things however - would not need such advanced mental action).
But, changing the modifier from “8” to “red” uncovers another dilemma – red, as a color, has no significance except as contrasted against a background of non-red things (considering distinctions: the “difference” makes all the difference in the world). Identification of red is only possible/productive when some things are red, some not (and especially when this difference makes a real difference to the frustration/satisfaction of the agent, when contrasted against a background of their goal-oriented actions).
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Variable #1 – background, axiomatic truths
Returning to the Big 3 (numbered above), we need to add detail to your example in order to recognize (inferentially; through the agent’s behavior) that axiomatic truths are at least implicitly acknowledged by the agent. The permanence of objects is an example – even 18 month-old infant/toddlers realize object permanence (“magic” impresses them, causing statistically-significant increases in “duration of stare” (measure of disbelief that objects can disappear/reappear).
Variable #2 - ends
Also, we need details on a goal or end that the agent aims at – such as the kind that is immediately obvious to us when we see a cheetah that is chasing a pronghorn antelope at highway speeds.
Variable #3 - particulars
This is the one variable that your example touched on, though not in enough detail. Your example was so watered-down that it would fail to intoxicate us with the intellectual understanding that we are after – even if repeated, over and over (our stomachs would fill before we could get a high enough concentration of the “good stuff” to cross our blood-brain barrier). You’ve got some particulars here, but – anyway you slice it – you only have 2 groups of similars (there’s a skeleton there, but not enough meat). For starters, the example requires a group of “differents” for each group of similars.
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Jordan, as you can see, this (decisively identifying reason in living organisms) is no small task. We can’t just put some blocks on the floor, show an organism that they can be stacked on top of each other, and then measure how high the stack gets (to infer about the organism’s reliance on the various laws of physics at play).
Some version of block-stacking though – with blocks so different from each other that they lead to a wide range of consequences when used in various combinations – is the best example I can come up with on such short notice.
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