Denis Prager poses a question

[Robert Davidson:] "Branden's point is well taken and I generally agree with it. But I only applaud the action, if it indeed furthers the cause of freedom by striking a blow at the enemy or inspires others to accomplish that goal; otherwise it a pointless gesture, akin to suicide."

We should take into account that Mr. Prager is an observant Jew. If I am not wrong --and please correct me if I am--, according to Judaism it is not moral to trade the life of an individual for the life of a collective.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/14, 10:38am)

Post 81

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 11:22am

Joel,

It's Davison.

You may be correct. Prager does fight for many libertarian causes, I do not intend to revile him or not give him his due.

But he can't get beyond religion and altruism. He truly believes acts of selflessness are the height of morality.

Post 82

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 1:53pm

I have not read through the forum comments yet but will do so shortly. However, I heard Prager on the radio a week or two ago and he mentioned that morality requires religion. His example was in comparison to the usual non-philosophy of the post-modernists. So, I wrote him an email mentioning Objectivism and Rand and linked Solo too, so I wonder if that had anything to do with this? I hope so, or better yet that others had the same idea and all wrote him about it!

Post 83

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 4:53pm

Kurt,

I have written him several times over the years on this subject and have never gotten a response. So, don't hold your breath.

I posted this because I hear this idea often expressed. It was a prevalent thought among the founding fathers that religion was a civilizing influence on the 'average' man. The argument usually goes: a life of reason is fine for a few suited to it, but it is beyond the capability of most people. So we must not make religion an enemy, but keep it in place so that the hoi palloi will have a moral code to guide them.

Post 84

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 4:15am

Robert,

You seem to connect morality and intelligence. Could you state your current opinion on the degree of relation between morality and intelligence/reason? Thanks.

Joel Català

PS: My position is stated in post #50.

Post 85

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 7:49am

Hi Joel,

I looked at your post #50 and saw among other things this.

I don’t think there is a moral code “based upon reason and rational self interest”. The moral code defines what is your goal, and reason is a tool for defining how to go for it.

Morality (Ethics) makes the distinction between right and wrong. For Rand these were not arbitrary decisions. In Rand’s Ethics you will not find such things as 'You shall have no other philosophers before Me.' or 'You shall not make for yourself a carved image--any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.' Joseph Rowlands in his recent essay “Objectivism: Not Just a Better Set of Rules” explains this quite well, I suggest you read it, if you have not done so.

Ethics, for Objectivists are not rule based, they are what an individual determines to be correct and good for man qua man within the context of his own life. In other words those things that further a man’s life are good and those that do not are bad. This is why Objectivists feel that sacrificing one man to another or group of others is evil. A man’s own life is his highest value and it is within the context of this life that he must determine what is right and what is wrong.

To address your question, which is about the relationship between morality and intelligence:

If morality is a set of rules, level of intelligence is not a factor. Anyone can understand a list of don’ts. The difference sets in when morality is not ‘dispensed’ and one must develop a code of morality for oneself. This requires focus, the tools of logic and reason, and the recognition that reality is the final arbiter.

On a basic level, I believe nearly everyone is capable of this kind of thinking. But, there are those who think that reason is okay for those to whom it comes naturally, but that most people would be immoral if left to their own devices. They believe we should encourage religion for that reason, i.e., so that the hoi polloi will be moral.

Ps--I just looked at my post 83 and see that I am repeating myself, so perhaps this will not answer your question. If it does not ask again in a different way.

(Edited by Robert Davison on 6/15, 7:53am)

Post 86

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 10:01am

[Robert Davison:] I looked at your post #50 and saw among other things this.

I don’t think there is a moral code “based upon reason and rational self interest”. The moral code defines what is your goal, and reason is a tool for defining how to go for it.

[Robert Davison:] “Ethics, for Objectivists are not rule based, they are what an individual determines to be correct and good for man qua man within the context of his own life.”

Here you are strictly referring to the context. The absolute ethics defended by Mr. Prager also takes into account the context. You may see post #76 in where I discussed the issue of context with Mr. Oiver. There are the following paragraphs:

“[Related to context] please read the following lines from Mr. Prager, in were he points out (rather poignant) practical differences:

”"An act that is wrong is wrong for everyone in the same situation, but almost no act is wrong in every situation. Sexual intercourse in marriage is sacred; when violently coerced, it is rape. Truth telling is usually right, but if, during World War II, Nazis asked you where a Jewish family was hiding, telling them the truth would have been evil.” [Italics and bold mine.]”

[Robert Davison:] “In other words those things that further a man’s life are good and those that do not are bad.”

Indeed, Mr. Prager defends that, too. But please notice that you need a set of rules before being in each particular context, Robert.

[Robert Davison:] “This is why Objectivists feel that sacrificing one man to another or group of others is evil.”

If “sacrifice” has the (almost trivial) Objectivist sense of “to give up a higher value for a lower value or non-value”, Mr. Prager would subscribe that, too.

[Robert Davison:] “A man’s own life is his highest value and it is within the context of this life that he must determine what is right and what is wrong.”

If the highest value of Objectivism is “a man’s own life”, then Objectivism would accept the demise of the rest of mankind if that implied to safe the highest value: “a man’s own life”. To put it in other way: if you would prefer to save the rest of mankind by dying, that would be a sacrifice in the Objectivist sense...

Perhaps you missed something here, because that would be very close to equating of Objectivism with the most complete Egotism. Or perhaps I underestimated the role of the Objectivist “emergency ethics”. What do you think about that?

[Robert Davison:] “To address your question, which is about the relationship between morality and intelligence:

“If morality is a set of rules, level of intelligence is not a factor.”

(Your “if” sounds to me as that if you still have not defined your position on the issue.)

[Robert Davison:] “Anyone can understand a list of don’ts.”

Yes, and that gives a very clear set of rules to all individuals. Besides, it’s the best way to fix a legislation (the list of “can’s” is infinite!).

[Robert Davison:] “The difference sets in when morality is not ‘dispensed’ and one must develop a code of morality for oneself.”

Here I understand you are saying that every individual constructs his morality. That’s moral relativism: a morality relative to every subject.

[Robert Davison:] “This requires focus, the tools of logic and reason”

Your words here imply that, by your own definition of morality, mentally challenged people can’t be moral. But I know there are mentally challenged people that are moral.

[Robert Davison:] “and the recognition that reality is the final arbiter.”

I can’t see how the Objectivist “reality” (e.g., something within the universe that is not a judiciary system) can develop the role of “final arbiter”: in example, when a thief is successful in a robbery, has “reality” made the steal a good deed for the fact of being successful? (of course a Theist as Mr. Prager would say that the “reality” exerting the role of “final arbiter” is the Creator, and He would "judge" the steal as a bad deed independently of its success.)

[Robert Davison:] “On a basic level, I believe nearly everyone Is capable of this kind of thinking.”

See my example of the mentally challenged people.

[Robert Davison:] “But, there are those who think that reason is okay for those to whom it comes naturally, but that most people would be immoral if left to their own devices.”

I think reason is okay as a tool, a very powerful tool. And I also tend to agree with the second point you raise: that at least a lot of people would be immoral if left to their own devices.

Yes, I think we humans need the correct set of absolute moral rules in order to develop and sustain a civilized life. That's closely related to what you see as "a problem" in the thread yourself started on "Obligations of the Negative Kind". To put it in more precisely, there you wrote:

"Daniel wrote:

>>When Objectivists say individual rights impose negative obligations on other people, I think they really mean something like, "if your goal is for other people to live their own lives however they choose, then you must not violate their individual rights."

Your entire response was good and reasonable. What you [Daniel] are suggesting is obligation as an invitation to morality, which can be rejected, just as you say someone could choose not to pay his rent.

The problem with the argument is that she says 'no obligation, EXCEPT of the negative kind". So there is an obligation and if to obligate means to bind financially or morally, we have a problem.

[Bold mine]

Robert, I understand that you prefer to think that morality and reason must be somehow dependent on each other, before thinking that it actually exists an objective, absolute morality --"of the negative kind"-- independently of reason.

Perhaps the reason of your preference is that an objective, absolute morality independent of reason smacks you of "divinely given commandments", namely Theism. Am I right?

Best wishes,

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/15, 11:58am)

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/15, 12:28pm)

Post 87

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 8:27pm

Has anyone noticed that if you make Denis Prager into a spoonerism, it becomes Penis Drager?

Adam

Post 88

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 10:39pm

I just waded my way through this entire thread, skimming a lot obviously, but trying to make a conscious effort to discern the actual arguments going on. My boredom meter simply went through the roof a few times - but then I was rewarded by Adam's playful post.

LOLOLOL...

What a hoot!

Getting to the issue, George, as Barbara said, that was one mother of an inspiring post! You did not divorce a man's life from context, as has been done consistently on this thread, and you included short term to long term thinking. The emotional manner you expressed your commitment to reason simply makes me feel good - it gives my computer screen a nice warm glow.

Hong, I agree with you that the Golden Rule is rational. It even provides an implication that a man's own life is the standard, but actually that is incidental. It's main use is as a wonderful tool for implementing value judgments. I have always considered the Golden Rule to be more of a method and a yardstick to test my own value judgments than a virtue in itself. I find it useful as all get out.

I saw that Prager defined his mysticism right at the outset, including subjugation of morality to faith, so I did not bother with reading too much else of him. George answered the question of whether or not reason was used by non-Jews helping Jews during the Holocaust right at the beginning. Of course, Prager's definition of reason and how it is used is very limited by his mysticism.

I saw one item mentioned quite often in this thread that jumped out at me, that reason is an amoral tool. For those who hold this, I would like to refer a good (or new) reading of The Virtue of Selfishness. Morality and ethics are based on value judgements. Rand cuts to the core by asking what is a value, and of value to whom and for what? Then you can start judging what is moral or amoral. Most any Objectivist knows that, but sometimes it is good to review.

The use of reason is a value (man's form of survival) that is volitional. So is use of faith. Choosing which one to use on any issue is a moral choice. I will not accept any standard other than rational thought for making essential value judgments - especially not a bunch of contradictory writings passed on from generation to generation by scribes over the centuries (as fascinating as they may be for other uses). For lesser values and really minor ones, sometimes whim is even my own moral standard, since they are not very important.

As I cannot use my reason to choose which body of writings will tell me about the Supreme Unknown and Unknowable Force who will decree my ethics (there is an assortment - Talmud, Koran, Greek Scriptures, etc.), I will have to choose one. Without reason, I have two standards to use to make that choice - either accident of birth/exposure or whim. In other words, accident-wise I was born into a doctine's culture or I was exposed to it by chance, or whim-wise I just simply liked one over the others. All of these methods rely on a strong emotional appeal. And that's one hell of a way to choose one of these books, especially as people are killing each other over the differences between them.

There is also one point I want to mention on the issue of sacrificing your own life to save one billion people. In a scenario that presents a choice like that to any human being, saving my own life as a trade for destruction of human value on that scale would make me feel that nothing would be of any value to me at all afterwards. Having to make that choice in itself would represent my own death to me. So no sacrifice would be involved in dying since nothing of value would be lost. Living only has value if I can live in an environment according to my nature as a rational value chooser (at least to some extent). Living on emotions alone gets boring very quickly. It's a context thing.

Michael

Post 89

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 11:51pm

Michael:

There is also one point I want to mention on the issue of sacrificing your own life to save one billion people. In a scenario that presents a choice like that to any human being, saving my own life as a trade for destruction of human value on that scale would make me feel that nothing would be of any value to me at all afterwards.

Well said, with your usual eloquence.

I wanted to keep my side of the discussion focused upon the principle behind the thought experiment, for reasons anyone who closely followed my testy exchange with RCR might appreciate.

But I'm pleased that several of you talked about the emotional consequences for you personally if you chose to preserve your own life rather than exchange (NOT sacrifice) it for a multitude.

It troubles me that some can intellectualize this subject with such cold detachment, as though others have so little value this problem could be analyzed with a pocket calculator. I don't advocate emotionalism, but such coldness is unsettling.

Nathan Hawking

Post 90

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 1:09am

Thank you, Nathan.

One question, since you emphasized it in bold. What is the principal you were arguing behind the thought experiment?

I kept my emotional reaction personal, but an emotion is a value judgment. This particular one is based on a principle. The principle is that a living being's (in this case man's) will to live is based on its possibility of living in an environment that permits it to not contradict its own nature.

Accepting that is providing a rational premise. Accepting an irrational or incomplete premise is the subtle trap in reasoning I think you were arguing against with your "fans."

We may disagree on what separates man from other animals, but we have to agree that rational thought is an essential characteristic of man. Volition also is. As a member of a species, I would even say a "species" type valuing of other members is too, which is vastly different than Altruism - I am talking here about an innate emotion. (There is a whole area I wish to explore over time on species-related values and behavior in humans that Objectivism has very scantily treated so far in its zeal against Altruism.)

If a man has to contradict his own nature so violently as to kill massive amounts of other humans in order to live, life as a human being will not have any meaning. There is no value there to base ethics on other than simply existing as an organic processing tube. Once again, accepting man's nature as a premise is extremely rational.

What you were arguing against, to me, was someone (or someones) stating that since a man's own life is his standard, preserving his life is worth annihilating one billion others and blah blah blah. Such "thinkers" do not accept any other context for valuing "a man's own life" other than simply existing. A life of unending agony or apathy has no value, so that cannot be used as any standard, except by those who practice what my dear Kat calls stinkin' thinkin'.

One of the problems I see with many Objectivists who go to these absurd lengths is that they substitute valuing with introspecting. A good deal of the original Objectivist philosophy was developed by Ayn Rand through introspection and not by empirical evidence from scientific experiments, surveys and so forth. But she never lost site of the fact that she was talking about living, breathing, thinking human beings. She valued them (especially those who fulfilled their potential) and she valued being one. That was always her premise and starting point.

How these "cold" people who leave you so uneasy develop their arguments is by accepting a premise divorced of anything but an extremely narrow and nonessential definition, and practically no context, then introspecting on it and developing their logical chains. That is how valuing a self (without taking into account what a self requires in order to have value) can lead to wiping out a billion others as easily as choosing a book to read, or non-initiation of force (without taking into account that the use of force is volitional and some will choose it irrationally, being that exercising rationality is also volitional) can lead to "morally" wishing for the destruction of the USA government in today's context and claiming that man can live without any government whatsoever. These are just two examples.

I have seen people talk about caring for babies as if they had the same rights and responsibilities as adults - as fully rational traders who are receiving charity at this time in their lives since they can't pay, thus concluding that adults have no moral obligation to care for them and can abandon them at whim, and other such abominations of bad-premise reasoning.

I didn't want to get into the following point right yet (still rereading ITOE), but vagueness in a premise is what leads to stinkin' thinkin'. I intend to take you up on the vague-precise discussion later (and please, with me, let's try to use a form of posting that does not leave me brain-dead). Suffice it to say that, more than practically any issue that I have seen argued on these epistemology threads so far, this is one of the most crucial.

Michael
(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 6/16, 1:17am)

Post 91

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 1:40am

Michael:

It's late and I'm forced to read your post with half my brain tied behind my back. But it looked pretty agreeable to me.

One question, since you emphasized it in bold. What is the principal you were arguing behind the thought experiment?

The principle that if individual life has any value to us, a multitude of lives would have even greater value, that at some point in numbers we might properly assess those lives of sufficient value that we would choose to exchange our own for theirs.

Rand herself wrote about the propriety of this action for loved ones. I'm simply extending that principle to people we don't individually value as highly, but whose aggregate value is sufficiently compelling to us.

I kept my emotional reaction personal, but an emotion is a value judgment. This particular one is based on a principle. The principle is that a living being's (in this case man's) will to live is based on its possibility of living in an environment that permits it to not contradict its own nature.

I think that's a fair argument, one I certainly remember Ayn Rand making on a number of occasions.

I think what you're implying is that part of our nature, most of us, is caring about others. I wholeheartedly agree. I would not wish to associate with a person who would let a million others die, even though I'm not positing a moral obligation to do otherwise.

If I've missed commenting on anything important to you, feel free to mention it.

Nathan Hawking

Post 92

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 2:49am

Joel gives me a good one-over in Post 76 for me calling reason “the means of acquiring knowledge."

Rehashing initially what I've already pointed out, Joel goes on to say that "Reason is a tool, and tools, by definition, have no morality." I'm simply saying that reason is a tool with only one purpose when carried out thoroughly, living life. But using Joel's thought that all tools are amoral, he has committed himself to believe that morality, a code of conduct for knowing what is right, is itself amoral.

My argument is this: if a tool has a single use in which it properly works then it can rightly be qualified morally.

He asks what the "Reason is the means of acquiring that knowledge" statement has to do with morality. From my first paragraph, I believe it is rather straightforward that I'm using it to distinguishing between reason and knowledge. To expand, I'm saying that reason, carried to its inevitable--meaning non-contradictory--conclusion, will lead to what acts are moral. Yes, knowledge can be manipulated for immoral purposes. But reason is a systematic thought process meant to tease out the nature of reality. That in itself is moral because it allows humans beings to improve upon their environments. Any suggestion that to improve one's self requires immoral acts can be refuted, I believe, as contradictory.

Where Prager and I disagree is with the purpose of morality. I liken it to helping rational beings prosper in this life, while Prager sees a pre-paved road to the afterlife.

I know this will be difficult for some faith-based believes to accept. (Or you must be prejudiced if you don't believe what I do, as Joel argues.) As for Pager’s subjectivism, that should be clear enough for anyone who knows the difference between absolutism and objectivism. Misidentifying the two has been the source of Joel's contention in the second half of his reply. It's nothing more than a subjective-based absolutism masquerading as objective, provable moral truths.

And for good measure, he splits atoms by acknowledging that I may have purpose in life, but not a purpose for it. Well, presumably I since I have an interest in the first, I also have an interest in seeing it continue; that's my purpose for it, or something like that.

Think of reason, for &od's sake!

Post 93

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 3:34am

[Nathan Hawking:] "I think what you're implying is that part of our nature, most of us, is caring about others. I wholeheartedly agree."

Here I must disagree with you (and with Mr. Michael Stuart Kelly if he meant what you say). I think that when a human cares about "others", that fact has to do with the values that human has internalized, and not with his "nature" (e.g., his genes).

You assumed that care for others is a "natural" happenstance, so to speak. But that's because, according to your (Western) values, all humans "are created equal", or have "equality of rights".

Of course I agree with that, but not all the world does. Beware that that's acording to our Western mindset. We should always remember that the Universal Declaration of Human rights was defined by individuals with a Westernized set of values.

In contrast, Islam does not accept that all humans have the same rights. More information here: "Jihad and Human Rights Today."

In example, I know the history of Frank Gardner, a BBC reporter that was shot in the street in Saudi Arabia. Nobody stopped to help him. Then, he started to beg for help by yelling "I'm a Muslim. Help me."

Mr. Gardner, a reporter with an extensive experience in the Muslim world, assumed that by saying that he was a Muslim someone would then go to help him. He assumed that "caring for others" (independently of mindset, or tribe, or whatever) is not a genetic treat. And I agree with him.

By the way, the current Jihadist war is, primarily, a war against the Western Values. This book by Tal Ben-Shahar (he wrote for the Objectivist Center) is very illustrating: "A Clash of Values: The Struggle For Universal Freedom".

Best wishes,

Joel Català

Post 94

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 6:29am

[Justin Oiver:] “I'm simply saying that reason is a tool with only one purpose when carried out thoroughly, living life.”

I can’t see any intrinsic purpose in reason. Tools, by definition, have no purpose (and no volition, of course). It's the user of the tool who has a purpose.

[Justin Oiver:] “But using Joel's thought that all tools are amoral, he has committed himself to believe that morality, a code of conduct for knowing what is right, is itself amoral.”

The code defines what is moral. You can’t "demonstrate" the code, you can only verify its adequacy for living a meaningful life.

[Justin Oiver:] “My argument is this: if a tool has a single use in which it properly works then it can rightly be qualified morally.”

If a tool works properly, you can say that is a good tool strictly in the utilitarian sense, namely: the tool is useful. But not in a moral sense: the tool is "good."

[Justin Oiver:] “He [Joel Català] asks what the "Reason is the means of acquiring that knowledge" statement has to do with morality. [...] I'm saying that reason, carried to its inevitable--meaning non-contradictory--conclusion, will lead to what acts are moral.”

Not necessarily. we humans have free will. Your free will is driven by your morality, not by reason. That’s one of Mr. Prager's points, and I agree with him there.

[Justin Oiver:] “Yes, knowledge can be manipulated for immoral purposes. But reason is a systematic thought process meant to tease out the nature of reality.”

Hitler was a very smart and shrewd individual. Do you think that had any implication in his morality? I don't think so.

[Justin Oiver:] “That in itself is moral because it allows human beings to improve upon their environments. Any suggestion that to improve one's self requires immoral acts can be refuted, I believe, as contradictory.”

“Allows” is the key word in this last paragraph you wrote. You still have to choose what to do with the product of your reasoning. Decisions involve morality. Reason is related with thinking efficiently. Reason has been used to define the most efficient methods to kill innocent individuals. The use of reason per se does not involve morality. Your use of reason only requires your (implicit or explicit) appreciation that reason is a useful tool in order to reach your ends (which means: you recognize that reason is useful to pursue your goals.) My point is: I think that reason is part of the means, but not part of the goal.

Regards,

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/16, 7:02am)

Post 95

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 7:55am

Joel,

Let’s try another way by looking directly at what Prager says:

On Moral Relativism for example, he says:

“Without God, each society or individual makes up its or his/her moral standards.”

In his mind, one has to believe in God or in some form of religion in order that morality can exist. This means that there are no rational grounds on which one can defend morality. Morality is the arbitrary whim of the supernatural.

Is this desirable?

Notice how Prager says the individual makes up his moral standards. This may be the case for some or even many, but this is not what Objectivist do. Objectivist values are rational, that is to say they are not as Prager suggests arbitrary. It is the task of the science of ethics to define for men what a rational standard is, and what the rational values to pursue are. Morality is based upon very definite objectively verifiable premises. Objectivist ethics holds that man exists for his own sake, that the pursuit of his own happiness is his highest moral purpose, that he must not sacrifice himself to others, nor sacrifice others to himself. Objectivism is not egotistic, as you have suggested, but egoistic. Objectivists make no apology for that. Egoism is simply a focus on man and what is proper for man.

“But once individuals or societies become the source of right and wrong, right and wrong, good and evil, are merely adjectives describing one's preferences.” --Prager

Again there may be some who do this, but this is not what Objectivists do. One’s preferences have nothing to do with it, that would be hedonism basing morality on emotion. Emotions are not tools of cognition. Emotions may be right or wrong. Objectivism tells you that you must not accept any idea unless you can demonstrate its truth by means of reason.

Prager continues, “This is known as moral relativism, and it is the dominant attitude toward morality in modern secular society. It is too painful for most decent secular people to realize that their moral relativism, their godless morality, means that murder is not really wrong, that "I think murder is wrong," is as meaningless as "I think purple is ugly."

He is right about this and Objectivists oppose it as strongly as he does.

“but almost no act is wrong in every situation. Sexual intercourse in marriage is sacred; when violently coerced, it is rape. Truth telling is usually right, but if, during World War II, Nazis asked you where a Jewish family was hiding, telling them the truth would have been evil.”--Prager

What he is talking about here which he calls ‘Situational ethics’ is what Objectivists are talking about when they use the word context.

“the key element to Judeo-Christian morality remains simply this: There is good and there is evil independent of personal or societal opinion;-Prager

Objectivists would agree with this. Rand says,

“Before you can identify anything as gray, as middle of the road, you have to know what is black and what is white, because gray is merely a mixture of the two. And when you have established that one alternative is good and the other is evil, there is no justification for the choice of a mixture. There is no justification ever for choosing any part of what you know to be evil.”

“and in order to determine what it is, one must ask, "How would God and my God-based text judge this action?" rather than, "How do I -- or my society -- feel about it?"--Prager

Objectivists disagree here. A set of beliefs accepted on faith without justification or evidence is faith, the opposite of reason. There are many religions, many faiths. Prager is picking a particular God that he likes. In other words his preference is emotional. Emotions are not cognitive tools. What about the other religions? Prager will tell that those Gods are wrong. How does he know they are wrong? He just does!!

You might ask yourself, if God created the universe and the universe in the total of all existence, where is God located? If you answer within the universe then he is simply a phenomenon of nature, ultimately observable and knowable, not omniscient. If he is outside of the universe, then the universe is not the sum total of all existence.

As to the silly talk on this thread about sacrificing someone for millions of others, it is an absurd premise. Rand talks about sacrifice in this manner:

“My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. There is nothing wrong in helping other people, if and when they are worthy of the help and you can afford to help them. I regard charity as a marginal issue. What I am fighting is the idea that charity is a moral duty and a primary virtue.

I regard compassion as proper only toward those who are innocent victims, but not toward those who are morally guilty. If one feels compassion for the victims of a concentration camp, one cannot feel it for the torturers. If one does feel compassion for the torturers, it is an act of moral treason toward the victims.

I would step in the way of a bullet if it were aimed at my husband. It is not self-sacrifice to die protecting that which you value: If the value is great enough, you do not care to exist without it. This applies to any alleged sacrifice for those one loves.

In Atlas Shrugged I explain that a man has to live for, and when necessary, fight for, his values -- because the whole process of living consists of the achievement of values.

You ask me, would I be willing to die for Objectivism? I would. But what is more important, I am willing to live for it -- which is much more difficult.”(emphasis mine)

I perceive that English is not your first language. This is an observation, not a criticism. I hope I have managed to communicate.

Post 96

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 11:20am

I am pretty amazed that out of the posts in between this one and my last one, the only person who has even used the word "value" was Ayn Rand herself at the end of a quote. Morality is for choosing values, folks.

Nathan - To me, caring about others goes way beyond numerical evidence. It is part of what I call species-oriented emotions. Individual humans are just that, both individuals and human beings (i.e. members of a species). They most definitely are not individual lumps of some kind of life (bearing a rational capacity) cut off from all biological laws, as some would have it.

The crux of the problem is when you delve into morality. You need to make individual choices in order to survive as an individual. As a species, survival drives mostly come with the psychological and behavioral territory of merely being a species member. That is why individual and not species-oriented concerns take precedence in Objectivist ethics. However, there is a tendency for many Objectivists to ignore species-related issues completely. They are important and have a place in living. The pickings I have come across in Objectivist literature on this matter have been pretty slim, though. That is where I was first attracted to your line of thought, since you discuss some of them.

Justin and Joel - Reason is not just a tool. It may seem that way because you choose how and how much you use it. It is, instead, an integral part of a human being, like legs or arms or genitals are. (Would you call your penis, for example, an amoral tool? //;-) Reason is man's main (but not only) faculty of survival.

Morality is a set of principles to guide choices of value in life. What is not negotiable is the need to choose the principles themselves. So some standard is needed. The standard can be serving some God or it can be serving man. Objectivism holds man's life as that standard. If man's life is that standard, then morality must be based on reason, since this is an essential human survival characteristic. Once again, I suggest a read or reread of The Virtue of Selfishness.

Joel in particular - Just about every standard in life comes with exceptions - but context is also so very important. One man in just about any city in the world, not merely an Islamic city, can appeal for help from strangers and be ignored. That does not negate an innate attraction or valuing of species members by other species members - it merely points out how this can be overridden by other factors like fear. I know the Jewish-Islamic issue is important to you, but neither side will gain anything by trying to use reason to prove contempt and hatred for an entire civilization. The ideas are what are wrong and knuckleheaded, not the people. Good ideas will make people everywhere do good things, not excluding people in Islamic cultures. Bad ideas ditto, and not excluding people in Jewish cultures.

But then again, your Yahweh seems to not get along with their Allah too well. Could it be that this is what the real problem is for you, since morality is faith-based? Yahweh against Allah?

If so, then if reason is found among any of the justifications for savage aggression (by either side), I will agree with you that it is being used as a mere tool. In this instance, however, I would not characterize such use as amoral (according to my standards), but as anti-moral instead.

Robert D - You said your last Rand quote dealt with sacrifice. Her emphasis to me was on valuing, not sacrifice. btw - Notice that she mentioned the emotion of compassion (my pet species-oriented thing - and I include empathy).

Also, the idea of sacrificing the life of one person to avoid sacrificing the lives of millions is actually silly - but I see it from a different angle. Once that choice has been required, then all the lives have been sacrificed (the one and the millions), as surviving under those conditions implies an evil, anti-human-being force so great that human living means nothing any longer.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 6/16, 11:25am)

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 6/16, 1:47pm)

Post 97

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 12:39pm

OK, Joel, I'll leave you with the opportunity for the last word if you choose to respond again.

He says, "I can’t see any intrinsic purpose in reason. ... It's the user of the tool who has a purpose."

For at least this one, using it requires following through with it completely. It may be stopped short, made incomplete as a method of thought, but that is the will of the user to follow reality or not.

A person may for some time employ it to build a bomb in order to later kill innocents. But the initial stage requires that the bombmaker has decided to commit the evil, substituting reason for another, less reliable method. The person may have no religious motives and think his actions are completely rational. That does not mean they are.

Like I said before, "Any suggestion that to improve one's self requires immoral acts can be refuted, I believe, as contradictory."

I'll repeat. Reason, carried to its inevitable--meaning non-contradictory--conclusion, will lead to what acts are moral.

Not to bog down, but earlier I said, "if a tool has a single use in which it properly works then it can rightly be qualified morally."

Joel adds, "If a tool works properly, you can say that is a good tool strictly in the utilitarian sense, namely: the tool is useful. But not in a moral sense: the tool is 'good.' "

This is a straw man. I did not say that "If a tool works properly" it is good morally. I said it can be "qualified morally," as good or bad, by what purpose it serves. I expressly pointed out that I believe this to be the case for this tool, reason; that it serves a single purpose.

The essence of Joel's argument is that reason is like any other tool a person might wield. My point is that reason, the logic of thought, is self-containing, the end of the end and the beginning of the beginning.

There are costs and benefits of every action, including whether to think or not. That does not exclude us from knowing which side of the ledger is greater.

Joel ends by saying that "reason is part of the means, but not part of the goal."

I believe the two are inseperatable. The means justify the ends. To paraphrase Martin Luther King Jr., you cannot achieve just ends by unjust means.

Post 98

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 3:08pm

Joel:

[Nathan Hawking:] "I think what you're implying is that part of our nature, most of us, is caring about others. I wholeheartedly agree."

Here I must disagree with you (and with Mr. Michael Stuart Kelly if he meant what you say). I think that when a human cares about "others", that fact has to do with the values that human has internalized, and not with his "nature" (e.g., his genes).

I'm forced to disagree. The anthropological and archeological evidence that humans care for each other is overwhelming, and this is quite independent of which species of hominid we're talking about, let alone culture.

Both neanderthalis (Iraq, 100,000 years old) and erectus (Africa, 500,000+ years old) skeletons have been found with extensive injuries, healed long before the individuals died. Without social caring, these individuals would simply NOT have survived. Both of these species barely had a culture, so one must assume a genetic predisposition toward social values.

You assumed that care for others is a "natural" happenstance, so to speak. But that's because, according to your (Western) values, all humans "are created equal", or have "equality of rights".

That was not an assumption. I considered the purely-cultural hypothesis long ago, and rejected it on the basis of evidence. Caring, compassion, and empathy are hardly unique to Western culture. They are widespread. So much so that it takes a brutal and violent culture to deprecate and repress them.

This stands to reason, for the model is motherhood. Branches of the human family which evolutionarily deprecated care and nurturing for infants died out.

Of course I agree with that, but not all the world does. Beware that that's acording to our Western mindset. We should always remember that the Universal Declaration of Human rights was defined by individuals with a Westernized set of values.

The fact that a particular branch of humanity would develop and institutionalize certain values more quickly than elsewhere does not tell us, however, whether a genetic predisposition is responsible or whether it is purely a cultural, even historically accidental, phenomenon.

In contrast, Islam does not accept that all humans have the same rights. More information here: "Jihad and Human Rights Today."

In example, I know the history of Frank Gardner, a BBC reporter that was shot in the street in Saudi Arabia. Nobody stopped to help him. Then, he started to beg for help by yelling "I'm a Muslim. Help me."

Mr. Gardner, a reporter with an extensive experience in the Muslim world, assumed that by saying that he was a Muslim someone would then go to help him. He assumed that "caring for others" (independently of mindset, or tribe, or whatever) is not a genetic treat. And I agree with him.

The issue is far more complex than one of culture vs. genetics.

Using the same line of thinking, one could also conclude that Western society was similarly deficient. Was it not the United States of America who kept 4,000,000 slaves until the 1860s? Was it not the same country which stripped the native peoples of their lands and exterminated them or placed them in concentration camps? Was it not Great Britain and other western nations who practiced brutal colonialism, including de facto slavery, up into the 20th century?

I think, Joel, that most human beings have the genetically endowed predisposition to value other humans, some far more and some far less than others. I see culture and personal circumstance as something which either enhances or represses and destroys that natural inclination.

But that is really beside the point. Even if our social nature were entirely cultural, culture is as much a part of nature as our genes. Culture is simply another means by which behavior-modifying information is transmitted, and it is as much a part of who we are as our genetic inheritance.

Nathan Hawking

Post 99

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 3:48pm