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Friday, June 12 - 10:19amSanction this postReply
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 The following is an insurmountable problem with regard to designing an
 
intelligent machine:
 

 We as human beings have various senses. We experience phenomena through our
 
senses. The axiomatic concepts that we understand are the product of our "experience",
 
e.g. Distance, Point, Weight, Color and Sound.
 

The most meaningful way that we can "know" something is to experience it. Experience
 
is our foundational method of knowing. 
 

Unfortunately, a machine lacks senses. It has only one sense: "on" or “off”
 
and therefore, the vast complexity of knowledge implicit in man's
 
conceptual content is something that a machine can not possibly  "understand",
 
because the machine has not "experienced" the phenomenon in question.
 

 "Everything" would be "abstract"  (i.e. not directly tied to reality)  to
 
the machine and hence not truly knowable. Therefore, it is impossible to design
 
a machine capable of human-like thought.  For us, Consciousness, (i.e. Awareness)
 
or Experience are  sensory phenomena and therefore, our "knowledge" is sensory
 
based. Our knowledge takes place at a higher level than discrete physical phenomena.
 
Rule based, domain specific systems are the best we can hope for in AI.




Post 1

Friday, June 12 - 10:32amSanction this postReply
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Your criticism is absolutely correct. The obvious solution is to create sensory systems for AI to work. You may enjoy On Intelligence by Hawkins.

Nice to meet you. You might want to fill out your Extended Profile (to some extent :D ).



Post 2

Friday, June 12 - 12:11pmSanction this postReply
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This reminds me of what Hubert Dreyfus has had to say about embodiment and interaction with the world as necessary conditions of knowledge.  He's a phenomenologist, and I've read only his exoterica.  He phrases things as if for maximum offensiveness to Objectivists, but I recommend him just the same.  Try looking him up on Google.



Post 3

Friday, June 12 - 3:32pmSanction this postReply
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I agree with you only in terms of machines that we have today. But, as we better understand the brain and technology increases, I don't why a machine, someday, couldn't be produced that is able to form concepts and reason, etc.



Post 4

Friday, June 12 - 4:59pmSanction this postReply
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I agree with Jordan.

jt



Post 5

Saturday, June 13 - 5:42amSanction this postReply
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Creating sensory systems won't solve the problem. A machine's sensory systems would have to translate its sensory inputs into binary information before it would be usefull. A machine can't "experience" "red" or "pain" etc. Its universe is profoundly limited compaired to ours. It will never "know" the qualitative nature of its translated inputs and hence it will be limited conceptually compaired to us.



Post 6

Saturday, June 13 - 8:00amSanction this postReply
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Howard,

It is a matter of complexity, not of impossibility. Granted, the level of complexity is probably greater than what current AI theory and algorithms could be expected to master. However, subsequent generations of these algorithms may eventually yield more efficient and "self organizing" algorithms that can ultimately lead to true AI.

I won't hold my breath waiting for this to happen, but it seems far more logical to expect that as long as study continues, AI will at some point be achieved.

jt



Post 7

Saturday, June 13 - 9:08amSanction this postReply
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Howard, you are making a priori assumptions about what can't be done. This is similar to saying that you know for a fact that we can't make a vehicle to travel to the moon because there is no air in space against which wings can propel a body.

Machines do not have to be digital, just look at a wall clock with a face and not a numerical display.

Nor will an artificial intelligence be a computer. The brain is not a computer, The cortex is a hierarchical memory storage and recall device. See Hawkins' On Intelligence. And of course the brain itself is a mechanism.

As for the importance of the ability to experience qualia like "red" or "salty," that may or may not be necessary for intelligence. We don't yet know how qualia work. But again, you can't just say a priori that qualia are necessary (although I think they probably are) nor can you say we will never be able to explain or understand or recreate them in a device.

Please do fill out your extended profile. Click on your name, then click "edit profile." It helps the rest of us to know what works you are familiar with, and whether we are talking to a grade schooler or a PhD in physics, etc.



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Post 8

Saturday, June 13 - 11:57amSanction this postReply
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Ted,
 
Your right about my a priori assumption of course.
 
The qualia issue however is central to my position with regard to the "level" of conceptual complexity that a given machine could achieve. If a space alien had different sensory systems then the complexity of its concepts could be comparable or greater than ours, although probably quite different in my respects.
 
My position is that a machine of whatever kind couldn't achieve a  "comparable" level of conceptual complexity unless it could treat qualia issues as axiomatic, for instance, the way humans do. For a machine to "understand" and then integrate various qualia its sensory inputs would have to convert that information to a form manageable to itself. The conversion process itself would cause a loss of the richness of that information. If from birth Helen Keller lacked mobility and the sense of touch as well as her blindness and deafness how would she have grasped such fundamental concepts as "mass" and "distance" and then what would that have done to her ability to understand the world.
 
As for my personal information, I have an undergraduate degree in the liberal arts as of 1971. That is as far as I could bare to put up with Academe. I've been a software consultant and have engaged in various entrepreneurial pursuits from would be movie producer to futures speculator and many points in between. With a background in Psychology and Philosophy I found myself attempting to design a general purpose Inference Engine several decades ago. I smacked into a brick wall of a design problem the fruits of which you have been reading.
 
Regards,
Howard  




Post 9

Saturday, June 13 - 1:35pmSanction this postReply
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Howard,

Look at it this way. It is probably a good thing that it is so difficult to evolve or create complex intelligence. If the necessary combinations were easy to achieve - whether in nature or on the workbench - think of the potential competition we might face.

Consider that at some point in the past, we started out as some proteins with nothing better to do on a Sunday afternoon, and yet we managed to combine and emerge into this incredibly complex and sentient symbiosis. I always liked Malcolm's comment in Crichton's Jurassic Park - "life finds a way". Life, and many other patterns in nature (forget the source) tends to be self organizing - have their own logical paths for growth.

Complexity builds upon complexity.

jt



Post 10

Monday, June 15 - 4:37amSanction this postReply
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Concerning AI, these two at RoR:

One and Two


Hello, Howard. Welcome.

In view of your post #8, I might mention a couple of books concerning qualia. One has been noted in another thread at RoR here. The other is There’s Something about Mary, edited by Ludlow, Nagasawa, and Stoljar (MIT 2004).

From the back cover:

In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.

There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.


(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 6/15, 7:11am)




Post 11

Tuesday, June 16 - 8:54amSanction this postReply
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Stephen,
 
Perhaps the best way to approach this is as follows:
 
The concept "proof", for human beings, has a number of presuppositions among which are Consciousness
and the Law of Identity. Therefor, any Reductionist arguments are unsupportable.




Post 12

Tuesday, June 16 - 12:52pmSanction this postReply
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Howard,

We have proofs of various sorts. We say that Roger Bannister proved that man can run the mile in less than four minutes. We say that Andrew Wiles proved “Fermat’s Last Theorem,” that is, he proved that there in no integer n greater than 2 for which one variable raised to the nth power added to another variable raised to that nth power equals a third variable raised to that nth power.

For all kinds of proof, I too think that (with one qualification) no machine will be able to accomplish a proof completely. I say that for reasons partly like yours. Firstly, I don’t think a machine can be programmed or trained to be cognizant of the distinction between the real and unreal. Secondly, I don’t think a machine can be programmed or trained to truly understand what a problem is. Proofs are certain kinds of solutions to problems, and I don’t think a non-living machine faces any problems.

So there is my one qualification: If we make living machines, there will be more fully intelligent things they could do, things that are necessarily out of reach of a non-living machine. Problems arise only in the context of life. Where there is life, engineering-type problems have been solved by nature. Intelligent life can solve problems through consciousness.

Can you explain why you think a machine (non-living) could not understand the law of identity. Is that because it could not understand identification, and any understanding of identity requires some understanding that one is engaged in identification? That is to say, because any consciousness requires some cognizance of itself as consciousness?

Surely this much is right: To understand the law of identity, which is required for proofs, one must have engaged in comprehending some identitites. As Aquinas says, "One first grasps truth by grasping something that is true." And I don't think a non-living, non-conscious machine could grasp a truth as true nor comprehend any identities.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

AI researches have made advances in giving a (non-living) machine portions of intelligence. I’ll give an important example below. It remains that without coupling to the living, conscious, truly problem-solving researchers, the machine’s activities are not truly problem solving. On the other hand, advances like this may help us understand how we ourselves solve problems.

The concept of heuristically guided search emerged in computer-design work being carried out under the assumptions that intelligence is problem solving and that intelligence requires physical symbol systems. So, to capture intelligence in the machine, problem solving needs to be rendered in a physical symbol system. A physical symbol system consists of (i) symbols and (ii) symbol structures composed of tokens of the symbols (the tokens being related to each other in some systematic way) and (iii) processes that operate on symbol structures to produce other symbol structures.

Physical symbol systems solve problems by searching. A solution (if there is one) is a path to a certain symbol structure; attainment of that structure is the goal. In problem solving systems, there is a test by which the system will be able to recognize that the goal state has been reached, a set of states (the search space) among which is the goal state, and a procedure for generating sequentially each candidate state for testing until the goal state is reached.

For many problems, the search space is enormous. For such problems, search of the space needs to proceed by a not entirely uninformed, selective sequence of candidate states. A somewhat informed, selective search is a heuristically guided search. A heuristic search may not find the goal state in the allotted time, but its chances of finding the goal state in that time are better than random selection of candidate states. A physical symbol system exhibits intelligence to the extent that it can generate sequences of candidate states in an order such that the goal state has "a high likelihood of appearing early" (Newell and Simon 1976). This was a milestone in the scientific understanding of intelligence. The intelligence displayed by the system is made possible by putting into the generator procedure heuristic knowledge about, and sensitivity to, probable structure of the search space so as to guide the generation of sequences of candidate states, thence to guide the search for the goal state.

Reference
Newell, A., and H. A. Simon 1976. Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search. Reprinted in Mind Design II, edited by J. Haugeland. MIT Press (1997).

PS
There is something else relevant to this discussion, and that is work on situated cognition.





Post 13

Tuesday, June 16 - 4:45pmSanction this postReply
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Stephen,

I'll be on the road tomorrow so give me a few days to respond. Let me say however that my problems with AI do not apply to Limited Domains or Expert Systems but rather to an attempt to create a machine of comparable or better cognitive ability than ourselves.




Post 14

Friday, June 19 - 7:25amSanction this postReply
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Hello again Stephen,
 
I've re-read your last post. It seems we're in agreement as regards a general purpose inference engine. Am I wrong?
 
As regards the distinction between the real and the un-real, we humans have trouble with that ourselves, so I'm not sure what your getting at.
 
I don't think "life" is necessary in order to solve problems. The key issue is the term "understand", which you used yourself. The way we use that term implies consciousness. A general purpose inference engine would likewise need to deal with that concept as fully as we do and I don't believe that is possible. By the way, a non-living machine does face problems such as the need for energy, or to be flippant, oil.
 
Does life imply intelligence? What of a virus? I suppose if we ever succeed in creating a living machine then ultimately a fully intelligent one would just be an engineering problem.
 
With regard to the law of identity issue, you hit the nail on the head and nicely put I might add.
 
I don't deny that AI research can help us understand our own problem solving methodologies. I don't think it's usually the most cost effective way however.
 
Your description below captures the approach that was adapted for AI research and I think correctly so given the inherent limitations of a system that lacks consciousness "as we know it".
 
You wrote: 
 
"The concept of heuristically guided search emerged in computer-design work being carried out under the assumptions that intelligence is problem solving and that intelligence requires physical symbol systems. So, to capture intelligence in the machine, problem solving needs to be rendered in a physical symbol system. A physical symbol system consists of (i) symbols and (ii) symbol structures composed of tokens of the symbols (the tokens being related to each other in some systematic way) and (iii) processes that operate on symbol structures to produce other symbol structures."
 
Intelligence, as we think of it, is the capacity to solve problems. The primary purpose to which we put our intelligence is to solve problems. But this formulation already implies conceptual isolation and integration. These goal directed abstraction processes and their on the fly redirection with regard to multi-facetted data already imply awareness and self awareness. To the extent problem resolution is going to be useful to us its going to be so complex and multi-sensory based and abstract as to imply consciousness. But this is central to my initial contention. As for proof of this I don't know that I can add more to what I've already said.
 
Her's a question: can their be consciousness without any sensory input? To be conscious is to be aware of something. Now there's a tautology. Developmentally speaking, if a human were born without any of its sensory systems functioning even in the slightest way would it ever be conscious of anything including its own mind? I think not.
 
You wrote:

"Physical symbol systems solve problems by searching. A solution (if there is one) is a path to a certain symbol structure; attainment of that structure is the goal. In problem solving systems, there is a test by which the system will be able to recognize that the goal state has been reached, a set of states (the search space) among which is the goal state, and a procedure for generating sequentially each candidate state for testing until the goal state is reached.

For many problems, the search space is enormous. For such problems, search of the space needs to proceed by a not entirely uninformed, selective sequence of candidate states. A somewhat informed, selective search is a heuristically guided search. A heuristic search may not find the goal state in the allotted time, but its chances of finding the goal state in that time are better than random selection of candidate states. A physical symbol system exhibits intelligence to the extent that it can generate sequences of candidate states in an order such that the goal state has "a high likelihood of appearing early" (Newell and Simon 1976). This was a milestone in the scientific understanding of intelligence. The intelligence displayed by the system is made possible by putting into the generator procedure heuristic knowledge about, and sensitivity to, probable structure of the search space so as to guide the generation of sequences of candidate states, thence to guide the search for the goal state."
 
Does this approach work for "all" non-predefined problem resolutions or just for certain limited goal states?
 
As for situated cognition, I checked out your supplied link. I still need a clear definition. Would the following suffice? Situated cognition is a theory of mind that views the nature of mind as encompassing the world external to and including the biological body that is a necessary condition for the mind's existence.




Post 15

Friday, June 19 - 7:59pmSanction this postReply
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Welcome to the forum, Howard.

Another related thread here at RoR is this one, from post 25 onward. You and I seem to be 'of the same mind' on this issue.

Ed




Post 16

Saturday, June 20 - 5:22amSanction this postReply
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Hello Ed,
 
I checked out the link you gave me. Thanks.
 
The emergent properties that would be necessary for true AI at the human level of efficacy would be analogous to some combination of vision, touch, hearing etc., (maybe just touch alone). This in combination with the ability to self direct. Self direction has already been achieved, at least partially, as in the ability to recognize whether a goal has been achieved. It's at the foundational level of qualia and its implication for conceptual complexity that I have fundamental doubts.
 
Howard




Post 17

Monday, June 22 - 3:47pmSanction this postReply
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Jay and Jordan Z,

There's also a spin that one can put on your conjecture about man-made consciousness:

If we, someday, can make consciousness from unconscious material, then -- in the past -- an advanced alien could have made "us" from unconscious material, too. This alien, then, would have to be conceptualized (by us) as a Supreme Being or as a Higher Power or whatever.

If you believe we can create consciousness, then you are stuck defending the possibility that it has already been done (by advanced others who may have been around these parts before).

:-)

Ed
[not arguing for the supernatural]




Post 18

Monday, June 22 - 5:19pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

[not arguing for the supernatural]

We know you're not, Ed. Of course, even in the unlikely circumstance that aliens gave our consciousness a boost, that would still not elevate them to a deity or supreme being - no more than our accomplishing it would prove any more than that we are quite clever fellows.

Crichton had more fun discussing emergent properties in his novel "Prey" - his last novel before taking up preaching.

jt



Post 19

Monday, June 22 - 10:39pmSanction this postReply
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Jay,

Of course, even in the unlikely circumstance that aliens gave our consciousness a boost, that would still not elevate them to a deity or supreme being - no more than our accomplishing it would prove any more than that we are quite clever fellows.


Well, okay. But I think of humans as the 'supreme (type of) being' on the planet. Check out my line of thinking:

We are like lords over the other life forms (plants and animals). They are not as important as we are. Not even close. They are important only insofar as they are useful or pleasurable to us. Think of the 3 types of friends Aristotle said that humans may occasion to have:

1) 'pleasurable' friends who we like to "party" with (or whatever)
2) 'useful' friends who support us, somehow (physical protection, financially, good "sounding boards", etc)
3) 'excellent' friends who we like because of their excellence (which is a healthy form of idol-worship)

Our pets are only one or both of the first two (to us). Imagine arguing that the reason you have kept your dog as your pet is because you want to be like your dog! Because, perhaps, you want to be able to pee in the yard when everyone is looking. Or because you want to be able to chase down squirrels, etc. It's absurd to think of a dog as some kind of moral ideal for a human. Their lives are too simple for that.

The simplest life is as a plant. Imagine treating a plant like it was a pet. Taking it for walks. Rough-housing with it. Buying it toys, etc. The plant's life is too simple for these things.

Also, if we gave (some) animals a human-like intelligence, then this would only serve to solidify this notion of our inherent superiority. Some call it "species-ism", some call it "human race"-ism. I want to call it "humanism", "humanist", or "humanistic" -- but less-rational others have kidnapped the term, already.

If I'm right that humans are like gods to the lesser life forms, then it appears that my reasoning holds true as well.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/22, 10:43pm)




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