| | Robert B' writes:
A major problem here is that everyone seems to be ignoring the concept that distinguishes justice from revenge:
Retribution.
The linked essay makes a case for retributive justice, which it distinguishes from revenge.
This is an exceptionally long essay -- about 24 pages or 1/10th the length of a whole book. It's also extremely well-researched and carefully written, and thus worth reading. But it's also rather rich, complex, and subtle intellectually -- so I only had time to run thru it quickly.
In general, Robert Bidinotto makes the case for criminal justice based upon a new or Objectivist version of "retribution," and not "revenge." He also argues against utilitarian and "traditional retributive" notions of criminal justice, which seem to be the two current major alternatives. It's a compelling case. And it also significantly relates to the current discussion on "getting rights right." Robert's position in both debates seems very similar to Ayn Rand's.
His essay, however, is mostly legal or governmental. It only briefly considers the notion of social or inter-personal justice, which is the thrust of the current discussion. This is also the nature of my commentary here.
In general, it may well be the case that the term and concept "retribution" is superior to "revenge." I don't have a problem with this, altho' I have to note that the common sense and dictionary definitions of both are rather similar. But possibly the term "revenge" has an ugly connotation, at least in part, which makes it worth abandoning. Ayn Rand, however, may well have enjoyed it, for purposes of provocation and to inspire discussion and thought -- as I do.
This essay seems to reject standard, widely-accepted, "utilitarian strategies of crime control [which] aim not to avenge any specific victim," as well as traditional retributivism -- for its tendency and vulnerability to collectivist interpretations. This last surprised, and never previously occurred, to me; but Robert makes a very strong case here with many citations. His monograph also seems to generally praise a justice of "retributive purposes, such as exacting revenge" and one which "satisf[ies] our craving for revenge."
I found this whole piece very well-considered and informative (and somewhat difficult), but at the risk of hijacking the RoR thread (again), I actually think, as a sidebar, that human justice has three aspects -- criminal/legal, social/inter-personal, and existential/natural. This last notion is briefly considered and then basically rejected by the essay, but it occurs to me that a person can sometimes legitimately make a complaint of injustice against Father Reality in the form of bad luck as well. But this may just be an interesting side note.
Basically I agree with the whole essay and found it rather educational! I also thought the analysis against abstract notions of justice, and the arguments for trying to stay focused on the actual, practical individual, were persuasive. They were certainly a bit different from my usual approach.
But this is all rather complex. Robert's definiton of justice in the essay is: "a moral principle recognizing causality and attributing individual responsibility in social relationships." My own definition, just scribbled down quickly, seems to run to 5 or 10 times the length! I'm not inclined to bore anyone with that.
I'm still somewhat interested in hearing, however painful the subject-matter, something not much considered in Robert's essay, to wit: What RoRians think would have been the correct, moral, and (socially/inter-personally) just response of Barbara Branden and Nathaniel Branden to the seeming high injustice of their sudden, extraordinary, horrific purge and excommunication in mid-1968. (Of course, I'd love to hear Barbara's and Nathaniel's hind-sight perspective on this most of all -- but perhaps they'll prefer not to respond.) Ultimately, I have a hard time believing that their evident quietude and passivity was morally respectful of themselves, or just, or personally psychologically healthy, or good for the Objectivist Movement, or good for the world and philosophy and human progress.
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