RoR: Forum

Post 20

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 12:20am

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Ed,

That was a nice try, but I really would read the book if I were you (and wanted to rebut it) because too much of what you wrote completely missed the mark.

For instance with the word "reason." You imply that there is only one definition that should be considered (the last Rand used). This is wrong. It depends on the context. For instance, when Rand talks about the difference between reason and faith, she means rational thought. When she says that men must resolve their differences by reason and not by force, she is basically talking about persuasion through discussion and other non-violent means. These are valid differences in meaning. Having more than one definition for a word is not a defect.

You mentioned that Robbins probably took older versions of a word and used them for later contexts. He made this mistake at times, not necessarily with older versions, but with different ones or even wrong ones. He did not do that with the word "reason," though (up to where I have read so far).

The idea of implicit concepts is something he got directly from Rand. Here is a quote by Rand (ITOE, p. 5-6):

"Since it [existence] is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. But it is implicit in every percept (to perceive is to perceive that it exists) and man grasps it implicitly on the perceptual level—i.e., he grasps the constituents of the concept "existent," the data which are later to be integrated by that concept. It is this implicit knowledge that permits his consciousness to develop further."

She writes more, but the problem is already here. The constituents of a concept on a primary level are percepts and units, yet she seems to be talking more about percepts than units here. As a matter of fact, on p. 7, we find that she even calls "unit" an implicit concept. Anyway, if a concept is grasped "implicitly" at a non-conceptual stage (and you must admit that this is a mouthful), then concepts exist at a non-conceptual stage. That is problematic.

I am not arguing whether this is proper or not, though. (For instance, were I to argue, I would not use the word "concept" for the early stages, but something like "existential condition," "tautology" or something like that.) It is definitely not consistent with her definition of a concept— "a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition" (ITOE, p. 10).

As a typical argument, ror instance, which characteristics are isolated when you refer to everything, as you do with "existence"? Nonexistence? Rand herself said that did not exist. I could go on, but the point is that you should read the ideas as put forth by the author before critiquing them.

These are important points that people who are influenced by Robbins's book will argue when you discuss things with them. I doubt you will convince anyone open to reason by sidestepping the Rand criticism and waving "Kant and Plato" in front of them, or claiming that Robbins's premises are the same as Bin Laden, etc.

But this depends on what you want to do. If you want to dismiss the person, telling him to go to hell seems more effective but there are many objective manners of telling him to kiss off. If you think discussing Rand's ideas with him are important and you wish to persuede him, you will take a different approach and help him analyze what he learned from Robbins.

You definitely will not "joust."

I think if a series of intelligent arguments are to be rebutted, regardless of whether they are among some arguments that are not so logical, the following conditions must be met for effective persuasion:

1. You have to make sure you are talking to a correct person within a correct environment. Obviously, you will not likely get far in persuading Robbins himself (or his wife) that he got many things all wrong. You have to talk to a person willing to listen and discuss. You also will not find a church a very good place to discuss atheism.

2. The series of intelligent arguments must be considered seriously. This means that the arguments should not simply be dismissed wholesale because the Objectivist doesn't like the author or he disagrees with some of the author's premises.

3. The arguments must be understood correctly. This means that if the author is mentioning one thing, like a disagreement with a position of Rand's for instance, it should be understood as a difference of idea, not a personal attack on Rand. If an error is present (and it often is, but not always), it should be mentioned and corrected. The person should not be subjected to railing against the evil intent of the author or the fact that he is a religious nut or something like that.

4. As a continuation of (3), Objectivist definitions should not be used exclusively as if these were what the author meant in his arguments when it is clear he was using a different meaning altogether. This means that in addition to properly defining terms, the differences in meaning should be made explicitly clear when the same word is used with different definitions.

5. The Objectivist version of the argument should be stated clearly, using both Objectivist language and language closer to what the author uses (or at least what the person in the discussion uses).

6. The author's position should be stated clearly and without insults, using both Objectivist language and language closer to what the author uses (or at least what the person in the discussion uses).

7. Only after all this should premises be mentioned. Then they will make sense to the person who is discussing. If premises are brought in too early, the person has no referents nor logical chains to follow other than the simple words spoken by the Objectivist—and mere words will not hold his attention for long during a disagreement. He needs ideas he can relate to for that, and he needs to see how the premises apply and how they were arrived at for those ideas.

8. Then, as a finale, some of the author's less successful arguments (especially a few boneheaded ones) should be mentioned using the same system.

The impact of the influence of Without a Prayer can be disputed, but the fact exists that it is published and sold and read. As the author is Christian, I suspect that it is more influential than it appears to be.

I admit that the system above is not for all. So like I said, let them dismiss Rand critics to their heart's content. Don't worry about it if you do not want to bother. I personally intend to do some work in this area.

Michael

Post 21

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 7:47am

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In response to Post 18 of this thread, according to the Wikipedia article on Mein Kampf:

Even before Hitler came to power, Mein Kampf was already selling quite well. From the royalties he was able to afford a Mercedes, while still being imprisoned. Moreover, he accumulated a tax debt of 405,500 Reichsmark (6 m euros/8 m US$ today) from the sale of about 240,000 copies by the time he became chancellor in 1933 (at which time his debt was waived) ^[2][3].

After Hitler's rise to power, the book gained enormous popularity and became the virtual Bible of every Nazi. Despite rumors to the contrary, new evidence suggests that it was actually in high demand in libraries (topping the lending lists), and often reviewed and quoted in other publications. By the end of the war, about 10 million copies of the book had been sold or distributed in Germany (every newly-wed couple, as well as every front soldier, received a free copy), and Hitler had made about 7.6 m Reichsmark from the income of his book (when the average income of a teacher was about 4,800 Mark) ^[2]^[3].

Without a Prayer stands without a prayer of ever enjoying this kind of success.

As I said, the book remains unworthy of further consideration.

(Edited by Luke Setzer on 2/19, 8:22am)

Post 22

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 12:53pm

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MSK,

=====Ed, That was a nice try ...=======

Actually, it was more than that. But don't take my word for it. Instead of just stating that it was more than a nice try, let me show how this is indeed the case here and now ...

=========For instance with the word "reason." You imply that there is only one definition that should be considered (the last Rand used). This is wrong. It depends on the context.=========

In an irrelevant sense, you are most definitely correct here. Definitions ARE, in a narrow way, dependent on context (i.e., specifically when that new context involves a deeper or wider body of knowledge). The reason why definitions have to be dependent on context in this narrow way, is because definitions need meet 2 criteria. They must:

1) contain the epistemologically essential characteristic (that distinguishing characteristic of all known characteristics which explains the greatest number of all of the other known characteristics of a thing)

2) effectively differentiate something from everything else currently known

Using these 2 criteria for forming a definition then, it's okay if a toddler who had only ever seen dogs, if she labels the first cat she sees -- upon visiting a relative's house, for instance -- as "doggy." This is true because her distinguishment of dogs from everything else that she had been exposed to up to that moment (e.g. perhaps as "furry moving thing") -- was working best for her at that time.

But this won't stay true for her as her body of knowledge grows. Eventually, she may learn that dogs often show their emotion, while cats tend to remain outwardly aloof; or that dogs bark, while cats purr or meow; etc. When she does learn these new things about those same objects, her definition must change to continue to reflect what is epistemologically essential, while effectively differentiating the types of things she's been cumulatively exposed to.

This is the only time when it is proper to "change" a definition of something (i.e., to acknowledge 2 different definitions of the self-same thing) -- when your background body of knowledge of that defined thing grows.

========... when Rand talks about the difference between reason and faith, she means rational thought. When she says that men must resolve their differences by reason and not by force, she is basically talking about persuasion through discussion and other non-violent means. These are valid differences in meaning.=========

No. No they are not valid differences in meaning (regarding the definition of "reason"). If you follow Rand's prescription for cases just like this (ITOE 51),:

======To know the exact meaning of the concepts one is using, one must know their correct definitions, one must be able to retrace the specific (logical, not chronological) steps by which they were formed, and one must be able to demonstrate their connection to their base in perceptual reality.

When in doubt about the meaning or definition of a concept, the best method of clarification is to look for its referents--i.e., to ask oneself: What fact or facts of reality gave rise to this concept? What distinguishes it from all other concepts?===========

... then you'll find that you've -- in adopting multiple meanings for what is ESSENTIALLY the same thing -- that you've multiplied the "meaning" of reason beyond necessity.

While I'll leave the actual exposition of this as an exercise for the reader, key clues will help in jump-starting the process and in keeping one on track:

When asking what facts gave rise to that alternative way of knowledge acquisition called "reason" (as opposed to faith); and what facts gave rise to that alternative way of relating to others called "reason" (as opposed to force); when one can "demonstrate their connection to their base in perceptual reality" -- one finds that they don't have any essential difference in their logical genesis. Whether in regard to knowledge acquisition or to action (which ought to be based on knowledge), reason "means" the exact same thing.

======Since it [existence] is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. But it is implicit in every percept (to perceive is to perceive that it exists) and man grasps it implicitly on the perceptual level—i.e., he grasps the constituents of the concept "existent," the data which are later to be integrated by that concept. ...======

There's an error built into this Rand quote, corrected by including the sentence before it, and including a better interpretative narrative (correction and better interpretations in caps) ...

======The building block of man's knowledge is the concept of an "existent"--of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action. Since it [i.e., THE CONCEPT OF SOME THING, ATTRIBUTE, OR ACTION] is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. But it [i.e., THE GENERAL IDEA OF THE PERCEPTION OF AN ACTUALLY-EXISTING THING, AS OPPOSED TO THE ABSURD IDEA OF PERCEIVING A NON-EXISTING THING; A "NO-THING" -- WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO: NON-PERCEPTIVE PERCEIVING] is implicit in every percept (to perceive is to perceive that it exists) and man grasps it [i.e., THE EXISTENCE OF THE THING PERCEIVED] implicitly on the perceptual level—i.e., he grasps the constituents of the concept "existent," the data which are later to be integrated by that concept. ...======

So MSK, when you say:

=======... if a concept is grasped "implicitly" at a non-conceptual stage ... then concepts exist at a non-conceptual stage.=======

... you are making a thinking error. Man initially, implicitly, grasps that the things he perceives exist -- even before he explicitly conceptualizes what it means to be an existent (as opposed to what it means to be the opposite of an existent, that which existents are to be conceptually differentiated from: non-existents). We can have a feeling that perceived things exist, even before we gain a conceptual understanding about what it means to be an existent (As opposed to a non-existent: Those things existents become differentiated from later, conceptually).

I'll stop there.

;-)

Ed

Post 23

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 1:10pm

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MSK,

Another way to respond to your last quote in the post above is to state that concepts aren't grasped non-conceptually -- but that the reality of existence (something we later form a concept for) can be perceived in the process of perceiving any real thing. In other words, we're perceiving that existences exist -- without conceptually understanding what that really means. In this respect, we're not REALLY grasping the CONCEPT OF existence, but merely the reality of existence.

Special Note:
Let's be clear about "perception": In true perception, we're perceptually aware of an extra-mental reality of "some_thing". In hallucination, we're aware -- just as we are in imagination, and remembrance -- of an intra-mental reality of "something".

;-)

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 2/19, 1:11pm)

Post 24

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 1:46pm

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Ed,

Two quick comments. (But I will not discuss your comments about developmental psychology since they are not really pertinent to what I was saying.)

1. Do not confuse a word with the concept it represents. A word is only a tag you put on a concept for reference and communication. That is why there are different languages all representing the same concepts.

When Rand used the word "reason" with two different meanings, she was referring to two different (but related) concepts. Same word. Different concepts. And I repeat, it is perfectly valid to do this, so long as the context makes it clear which concept is being used (and her contexts for "reason" are always clear to me).

2. You wrote:

"Man initially, implicitly, grasps that the things he perceives exist -- even before he explicitly conceptualizes what it means to be an existent (as opposed to what it means to be the opposite of an existent, that which existents are to be conceptually differentiated from: non-existents). We can have a feeling that perceived things exist, even before we gain a conceptual understanding about what it means to be an existent (As opposed to a non-existent: Those things existents become differentiated from later, conceptually)."

I have no quarrel with this, except that maybe it is very difficult to perceive that which does not exist. I haven't been able to do it.

I agree that man initially grasps "that the things he perceives exist." But he does not grasp the concept "existence" until he reaches the conceptual stage. He can't by definition. A concept, as defined by Rand, is a mental "thing," not something outside the mind, and it is even treated as an entity on abstracting from abstractions. (Actually it is like a file folder, but this is another discussion.)

Note that Rand makes a fundamental difference between axiomatic concepts and ALL OTHER concepts ("ostensive definition"). This is why I would favor another word for axiomatic concepts. Maybe simple "axioms." But I have no problem with the term "tautology" as originally intended ("a statement of propositional logic which can be inferred from any proposition whatsoever"), without the sneering that usually accompanies this by Rand haters and ortho-Objectivists alike from using the rhetorical meaning ("use of redundant language that adds no information). See here. This would make the existential condition (axiom) a proposition, but I still see no problem as it is arrived at later, not earlier, in conceptual thinking.

To put it another way, the idea of non-existence is not possible at the sensory or perceptual level. (btw - What the hell are the "non-existents" you mentioned anyway? Things? In the plural? They are not supposed to exist, caramba!)

Michael

Post 25

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 1:55pm

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Ed,

You wrote:

"In this respect, we're not REALLY grasping the CONCEPT OF existence, but merely the reality of existence."

This is exactly what I was saying (except maybe your version is a little clearer). Full agreement. That is why I prefer another word. The terms "implicit concept" and "concept grasped implicitly" are confusing.

Incidentally, to go back to my original point, Robbins was the one who pointed out the confusion of using the same word "concept" (to me at least). That is why I think it is good to go through his arguments carefully.

Michael

Post 26

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 5:46pm

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MSK,

========I will not discuss your comments about developmental psychology since they are not really pertinent to what I was saying.========

Okay, but I really didn't say all that much about developmental psychology. All I said was that folks start out with simple definitions and then move to more complex ones as the need arises (as their body of knowledge enlarges). I mentioned that this is the way it has to be (i.e., that we don't need to empirically-verify this with data derived from investigation by the special sciences).

========Do not confuse a word with the concept it represents.========

What I take you to mean here is that the same word can be used differently in different contexts. But, in outlining this general rule about how things are often done, you're merely making bold conjecture that Rand does exactly this with the word "reason." In short, you're just stating it, not showing it. If you wish to continue this line of reasoning, then I behoove you to say more about how Rand means different things by the same word, to show it to me (to make it clear to reasonable onlookers), and then -- and only then -- will I feel compelled to continue this part of the discussion with you.

========What the hell are the "non-existents" you mentioned anyway? Things? In the plural?========

Non-existent things are usually objects of the imagination or they are of pure fantasy (e.g., unicorns, centaurs, flying pigs, sinking ice cubes, 4-sided triangles, married bachelors, and the like).

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 2/19, 5:49pm)

Post 27

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 6:05pm

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Ed,

You wrote:

"If you wish to continue this line of reasoning, then I behoove you to say more about how Rand means different things by the same word, to show it to me (to make it clear to reasonable onlookers), and then -- and only then -- will I feel compelled to continue this part of the discussion with you."

RTFB

I am.

//;-)

(Besides, I have some essays in the works on Rand's different meanings for the same words for publication elsewhere. Here is an easy reference, though. Ron Merrill in The Ideas of Ayn Rand showed where Rand meant about 8 or 9 different meanings for the word "pride.")

Michael

Post 28

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 6:09pm

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Ed,

One other comment. You said:

"Non-existent things are usually objects of the imagination or they are of pure fantasy (e.g., unicorns, centaurs, flying pigs, sinking ice cubes, 4-sided triangles, married bachelors, and the like)."

I submit that none of these things are present at the sensory or perceptual level. They are only possible at the conceptual level and only as a mental projection. Thus, they are not to be used as a standard for defining the "implicit" concept of existence. They really do not exist at the sensory and perceptual levels.

Michael

Post 29

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 9:12pm

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MSK,

=====Ron Merrill in The Ideas of Ayn Rand showed where Rand meant about 8 or 9 different meanings for the word "pride."====

There is something that's quickly "getting old" between us, MSK; it's the difference between stating and showing. It's one thing to state something, and quite another to show it. Please make an attempt to keep mental focus on this crucial difference in your future interactions with me.

I followed your reference in Merrill's book, and I followed its reference, too. And what I found at the end of all these references, was Merrill (and, by implication, you Michael) stating something, but showing something different. On p 120 of Merrill's book, he states that there's 8 definitions of "pride." He goes on to talk about the "primary" one (and keep in mind what it is that I've previously said about any 2 definitions for the self-same thing). He makes reference to VOS 22 (pb 29). The reference?:

=====The virtue of Pride can be best described by the term: "moral ambitiousness."======

When there are different ways to describe things -- but one best way -- then it is intellectually honest to take the best way to describe these things as the proper definition of them. It is NOT, nor ever will be, intellectually honest to take the lesser ways to describe things and to mix them up with the best; just in order to try to make a point about anyone's muddledness or lack of clarity. That's fine for debates in Rhetoric 101, but it's not professional, nor philosophically mature to do something like that.

I'm getting frustrated with you MSK, but am simultaneously not surprised by that. Go figure.

;-)

Ed

Post 30

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 9:28pm

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MSK,

======EDT: ... pure fantasy (e.g., unicorns, centaurs, flying pigs, sinking ice cubes, 4-sided triangles, married bachelors, and the like)."

MSK: I submit that none of these things are present at the sensory or perceptual level. They are only possible at the conceptual level and only as a mental projection. Thus, they are not to be used as a standard for defining the "implicit" concept of existence.========

Just when I felt we were getting somewhere, I see that you're reading me wrong again, Michael. To repeat myself, there is no "implicit" concept of existence. There is just the perception of things. And, within the perception of these really-existing things, lies the pregnant, but as yet, unborn, notion of a concept about the actual existence of these perceived things. This conceptualization about the existence of the perceived things isn't primary, only the actual percepts are.

This conceptualization about the existence of the perceived things is something that happens far after the fact of the first perception of them.

Do you get it now, Michael? That there's an initial perception of things and then, some time far after that initial perceptual experience, there's an eventual, conceptual distinction of things as "existents" existing?

I know it's hard to keep all this straight Michael, but I'm asking you to try anyway.

;-)

Ed

Post 31

Monday, February 19, 2007 - 10:07pm

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Ed,

Frankly, I have no idea what you are talking about all of a sudden. Even when I agree with you, you disagree. I will recap what I was talking about in this thread to better focus (since I have such a terribly hard time doing this):

1. People should be careful about endorsing Mr. Paul in the name of Objectivism because he endorses a strong opponent of Objectivism (and I gave quotes).

2. I take serious arguments against Objectivism seriously and I consider Mr. Robbins to be a serious critic. I prefer not to dismiss serious critics, but refute their arguments (when they are wrong) for their own readers. This generally excludes Objectivist forums as they tend to be dismissive and insulting and are not read by such readers.

My interest goes to this point only, yet you seem to be interested in some other point, with requests for me to provide more references than I have already provided. My time is limited, but I am quite willing and able to comply (as you well know from my history and rhetorical style) so long as this is not a wild goose chase to scratch some kind of vanity itch—or an attempt to push me into defending Mr. Robbins or something like that.

I admit that I am unable to discern what your real interest is. This is probably due to my limited mental capacity and lack of focus. So please enlighten me on what point you are actually interested in proving.

Better be quick, too. God knows how long I will be able to concentrate...

Michael

Post 32

Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 10:37am

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Pretty good "comeback", Michael.

===========Frankly, I have no idea what you are talking about all of a sudden.===========

I'm talking about misconstruing Rand to have meant that there are some kind of "concepts" before the conceptual stage of human awareness. This is not true, and Rand does not say that this is true -- but you and Robbins say that Rand DOES say that this is true. Is that clear enough now (that you and Robbins are misconstruing Rand's words)?

=============People should be careful about endorsing Mr. Paul in the name of Objectivism===========

A very good point, Michael. Thank you for alerting me to this. I had previously given a sort of blanket support for Ron Paul. After being enlightened by you on this, I have now amended my behavior on the matter (Paul no longer gets cart blanche support from me).

=============I take serious arguments against Objectivism seriously and I consider Mr. Robbins to be a serious critic.=============

And I merely take these arguments sincerely (not necessarily seriously), which explains my wily rebuttals to things said here in his name.

;-)

=============I prefer not to dismiss serious critics, but refute their arguments (when they are wrong) for their own readers.=============

And I prefer to refute their wrong arguments right here -- and I "cordially" invite any critic of Objectivism, anywhere -- to come in here into the Dissent forum and to try to tangle with me (or Bill Dwyer!) on Objectivist issues -- if they have the guts to do that, in front of a critical audience. Something which segways into your next point below, I 'spect.

;-)

=============This generally excludes Objectivist forums as they tend to be dismissive and insulting and are not read by such readers.=============

Well, I think that you're at least half-right there, Michael.

;-)

Ed
[has a very high capacity for -- but a merely moderate exercise of -- cordiality]

Post 33

Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 11:05am

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I wanted to be the first to make note that my title and my wily behavior here -- make me seem awfully hypocritical. I guess it all depends on your definition of what "outreach" means, huh?!

;-)

Ed
[much more cordial in person]

Post 34

Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 11:23am

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Ed,

Are you engaging in competitive discussion? See who WINS the argument? See who BEATS the other? (And is there a prize at the end of the tournament?)

If so, we have different purposes. This could be a reason why we seem to be on different wave-lengths, even when we agree. I am not competing, but seeking wisdom instead.

So, despite the fact that I often focus on where we disagree, this is more for space conservation on the posts than anything else. It can get awfully tedious for the reader to read, "I agree," time after time on repeated points. (I see this on candy-striping a lot and I usually skip the post.)

I am not trying to WIN, WIN, WIN! You can have the trophy (or whatever the prize is). I gladly take second place and do not even expect an award. All I want is clarification, even when it leads to highlighting differences. And we do agree on so very much. That should not be forgotten.

You wrote:

"I'm talking about misconstruing Rand to have meant that there are some kind of "concepts" before the conceptual stage of human awareness. This is not true, and Rand does not say that this is true -- but you and Robbins say that Rand DOES say that this is true."

All I can say is, "If you say so." I did provide a quote for that and your arguments did fail to convince me of anything positive or negative about Rand's choice of words and terminology. Frankly, I don't think you really dealt with the issue at all except to emit an opinion, but your arguments did agree with what I think in substantive terms about concept formation as regards axiomatic concepts.

You wrote:

"And I prefer to refute their wrong arguments right here -- and I "cordially" invite any critic of Objectivism, anywhere -- to come in here into the Dissent forum and to try to tangle with me (or Bill Dwyer!) on Objectivist issues -- if they have the guts to do that, in front of a critical audience."

You make an insinuation that any Rand critic (including, I presume, readers of Robbins's book) who does not come on RoR to the Dissent forum is a coward, but I don't think many will come for other reasons, starting with the fact that most simply will not read your cordial invitation because they do not read Objectivist forums. I will grant you, though, that there may be a coward or two out there trembling in the knees at the thought of engaging knowledgeable Objectivists.

But like I said, don't worry about it. It's a free world (relatively) and you are free to engage any of these people or not wherever you wish. So am I. You choose one place and I choose another.

I must stop. I think I have over-saturated my limited attention span and my already-weak focus is starting to drift...

Michael

Post 35

Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 8:09pm

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===========Ed, Are you engaging in competitive discussion?===========

Is there any other kind? :-)

Most "discussions" can be distilled down to a "competition of ideas" -- and this is as it should be.

But, I think what you mean by those words is more than merely weighting ideas according to merit. I think that you see me engaging in some sort of "in-it-to-win-it" behavior, where the ends justify the means, and any tactic is allowed -- just as long as you appear to come out on top when all is said and done. And, if this is true of how you feel about my behavior, then I don't agree with your assessment of me.

:-(

Ed

Post 36

Tuesday, February 20, 2007 - 8:46pm

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Ed,

You wrote:

"And, if this is true of how you feel about my behavior, then I don't agree with your assessment of me."

It's a component, not the whole story. However, I don't see that component as "any tactic is allowed" because you are a man of integrity. In this instance, it was more like "attack from any angle that looks promising and fly by the seat of your pants (within rational limits)."

But you do it well. And you have a good head and heart. And I like you—a lot.

Michael