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Sunday, April 18, 2004 - 12:45amSanction this postReply
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I'm half-way through Peikoff's section on the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy in the second ed. of Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and I want to know if I'm understanding him correctly: Is he really asserting that concepts are extents?

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Sunday, April 18, 2004 - 8:56amSanction this postReply
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He means that concepts mean--that is, refer to--existents. When you say "cat," you mean the animal, not its definition. You mean the whole thing, not just parts of it. This is the root of Objectivism's denial of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Concepts are mental integrations of observed facts. The concept "cat" is not the cats themselves, but it means the cats themselves. And the cats themselves are mean. (Love 'em anyway.)

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/18, 8:57am)


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Tuesday, April 20, 2004 - 10:03pmSanction this postReply
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I don't understand Peikoff's problem with synthetic propositions. How does he come to the conclusion that synthetic truths are unknowable, and why does he quote some arbitrary assertion by some anonymous, extreme skeptic to demonstrate it?

[quote]
Can one conclusively prove a synthetic proposition? Can one ever be logically certain of its truth? The answer given is: "No. As a matter of logic, no synthetic proposition 'has to be' true; the opposite of any is conceivable." (The most uncompromising advocates of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy continue: "You cannot even be certain of the direct evidence of your senses—for instance, that you now see a patch of red before you. In classifying what you see as 'red,' you are implicitly declaring that it is similar in color to certain of your past experiences—and how do you know that you have remembered these latter correctly? That man's memory is reliable, is not a tautology; the opposite is conceivable.") Thus, the most one can ever claim for synthetic, contingent truths is some measure of probability; they are more-or-less-likely hypotheses.[/quote]

How does the quote by the "extreme" advocate disparaging the senses even relate to the rest of the paragraph? It seems to be there just to make the reader prejudiced against synthetic truths.

I also think he's trying to pull a logical trick here.
Examine the statement: Can one conclusively prove a synthetic proposition? -Yes. Can one ever be logically certain of it's truth? -No. Between these statements is an invisible AND symbol. So the statements come off like: Can one conclusively prove a synthetic proposition AND ever be logically certain of it's truth? -No.

It seems obvious that synthetic propositions are, in principle, knowable. For instance: My truck has a flat tire. I can easily walk into my garage to see if my tires are flat. That is knowable.

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Wednesday, April 21, 2004 - 5:15amSanction this postReply
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Did you not notice Peikoff's words "The answer given is:"? He is describing the error in terms of the arguments given for it, as a prelude to his own arguing against it. He's on your side.

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Saturday, April 24, 2004 - 1:48pmSanction this postReply
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Hi.

Rawlings is right. Peikoff is on your side. However, Peikoff isn't just shooting down some "extreme" philosopher's take on the issue. Popular philosophy never fully recovered from Hume's problem of induction. It is generally accepted that synthetic propositions cannot be certain: Ice might someday sink in water; just because it has never sunk doesn't mean tomorrow it won't. This proposition is unreasonable to the philosophers who hold this view, but they don't consider it illogical. Peikoff is trying to explain why it is not only unreasonable but also illogical.

Jordan


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Saturday, April 24, 2004 - 2:43pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks for clarifying that Rod and Jordan.

So in other words, popular philosophy is open to the idea that the laws of physics might suddenly change on us. Peikoff's use of the skeptic's perspective to bolster his own point was not hyperbole, but what they actually accept.

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Saturday, April 24, 2004 - 3:02pmSanction this postReply
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More specifically, he's saying that those who accept the analytic-synthetic dichotomy think it is not necessarily true that ice floats--because the idea is not contained in the definition of ice. In other words, they hold that the concept "ice" means only its definition, and does not include all the other observed properties and facts about ice.

Objectivism holds that a concept refers to the entire aspect of reality, including all its characteristics known and unknown. A definition serves only the purpose of pointing out to oneself what aspect of reality is being isolated and named. As part of its function, a definition seeks to encapsulate as much information as possible about the thing. That is why it is stated in terms of those qualities that explain the most about the thing. For example, a definition of a tool might include a statement of what it is for.

Definitions can change as one's knowledge does. To an early Eskimo, the definition of ice might have been "a clear rock that turns into water in your hand." Such a definition would imply different ideas about what is to be regarded as "necessarily true" about ice, if one were to accept the analytic-synthetic distinction. To Objectivism, all facts are necessary, and just as one rejects alternatives to the existence of existence, one rejects alternatives to the identity of existence.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/24, 3:36pm)


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