On Passing Judgment: Politics versus Etiquette
by Ted Keer
Ayn Rand famously criticized Jesus' dictum "Judge not, lest ye be judged," responding that one must always judge and be prepared to be judged. This was a policy to which she strictly adhered in regard to her personal relations with others. There is no need here to describe in detail the many all-or-nothing breaks she had with people, often very close friends, from Isabel Paterson to Barabara and Nathaniel Branden and beyond. This policy of breaking with people has continued with certain of Rand's followers, such as Leonard Peikoff. The public necessity of repudiating people irrevocably, which is common in Islam, is a policy shared by some third generation Objectivists who were never part of Rand's inner circle. This tendency within Objectivism has led to innumerable splits and schisms. It is the subject of millions of words of hypertext. It is a source of scorn and ridicule of the Objectivist movement by outside observers and "ex-Objectivists." Is this policy, which seems so destructive, a necessary precaution or a tragic mistake?
Objectivism excoriates moral skepticism. Those who refuse, on principle, to make moral judgments, are refusing on principle to support the innocent or to condemn the guilty even when there is sufficient evidence to distinguish the two. But there is a deeper question, what sorts of guilt and innocence are there among people, and are we to treat all "guilty" parties the same? Suppose one person is guilty of murder, and another is guilty of lying about a love affair? Are we to treat such forms of guilt as equivalent so far as the necessity of passing judgment? The answer is no, because we must distinguish in human affairs between relationships which are purely voluntary, and relationships based upon force. To treat passing judgment as an absolute is to fail to make an essential distinction. In human relations where force is involved, which fall under the broad purview of the branch of philosophy called politics, passing moral and legal judgment under the proper circumstances is a vital necessity. But in voluntary personal relationships where no force is involved, which is dealt with under the branch of philosophy called etiquette, the propriety of passing judgment depends on a person's personal involvement in a situation, not upon some need for all to sit in judgment of all.
Objectivism holds that morality is of vital importance to the individual alone, regardless of whether the interests of other people are involved. If a man trapped on a desert island wishes to survive, it is immoral for him to evade the nature of his situation, and to expect wishes or passivity as opposed to thought and action to further his life. Objectivism also has a detailed political philosophy dealing with human rights, which can only be violated by others who use force. So, Objectivism deals theoretically with personal morality. And it deals theoretically with interpersonal morality where force is involved. But what of interpersonal morality where force is not involved? How is an Objectivist to treat others who are not politicians, criminals, or enemies during war time? What are the proper principles of an Objectivist etiquette?
When dealing with politicians, criminals, and enemies in war, the necessity of personally passing relevant judgments is unavoidable. In so far as a person poses a credible threat to your rights, you must judge him and act accordingly for the circumstances. Who poses a threat to your rights? Any politician who exercises authority over you can violate your rights. In a republic, therefore, you must exercise due diligence in evaluating and voting for any politicians whose jurisdiction includes your self. You must also oppose, in the proper manner, non-elected officials who misuse their authority over you, and officials in other jurisdictions who overstep their authority in a way that threatens your rights. Likewise, you must be aware of and judge credible threats to your rights from foreign powers, and exercise your influence with your representatives to take proper action. Your life and livelihood are physically involved in these cases. Further, you must form opinions of political policies, and at the minimum raise your voice against those of influence who advocate policies which involve the initiation of force not in self defense.
But what about people who are not politicians, who are not criminals, who are not enemies at war, who are not acting politically to establish a policy of the forcible violation of rights? What duty do you have to pass judgment upon the the foolish, the mistaken, the rude, the annoying, the disgusting, the vain, the gossipy? And further, what right do you have to demand that others pass judgments upon such people?
We have all had the misfortune of dealing with people whose behavior, while not criminal, is not ethical either. We have all dealt with the two-faced, with the liar, with the gossip, with the friend who backstabs and betrays. And I think it is also valid to say that we have in some ways seen such behavior in our own selves. In so far as a person's actions directly affect our own values, (by which I mean not our expressed moral values, but our actual physical and spiritual property,) we must pass judgment upon them. If a friend or a business colleague or a lover is apparently lying to us, then their actions fall within the direct circumstances of our happiness.
But what about the case where we observe such matters as third parties? Each of us has had a falling out with someone, and therefore wished not only to sever our own relations with the offender, but have also wished that our friends and acquaintances would do so also. Is it fair to demand that a third party pass judgment and take sides? If they do not do so, are they craven tolerationists?
The proper policy to hold towards a third party observer of a personal falling out between yourself and another person who is not threatening you with violence is to expect that person to understand that there is a conflict, and expect that person to take into account any relevant evidence based on current or future actions, and to act on that evidence when it becomes conclusive, but not to demand summary judgment, nor the taking of sides based on "loyalty," nor the acceptance of your accusations based upon faith. The proper application of Ayn Rand's dictum that there are no rational conflicts of interest between men requires that when there is a conflict, we allow men to use their own reason.
The third party has his own life. He has a full enough plate as it is without needing to interrupt his own pursuits to investigate another person's alleged non-violent wrongs against you. As frustrating as it may be to you, it is proper only to expect others to acknowledge a conflict, and to expect them to take into account the evidence as it emerges. Passing judgment requires knowledge, and possessing knowledge requires an effort. You have no right to demand that others go out of their way to take sides in an issue for which they have insufficient evidence to make a contextual judgment. And it is improper for you to attempt to manipulate the third party to do so.
In most such cases, if the conflict is serious, and the third party is sufficiently close to the situation, the truth will out. It may be frustrating to personally know the bad character of an enemy, yet see others treating him with the benefit of the doubt, if not respect. If your enemy continues actively lying, point it out, but otherwise show restraint. You earn respect and the benefit of the doubt for yourself when you respect a third party enough to let him make his mind up upon the evidence. And it is not your place to make the case against your enemy unbidden, and out of proportion to the third party's own real personal involvement. The inordinate need to convince somone that someone is evil is evil.
If a third party finds that making the effort to pass an informed judgment is worth his effort, he will ask us for the evidence. He will see the public vicious actions of the other without our help. And we should provide that evidence to him when he requests it as fairly and dispassionately as possible. We should recognize and be cautious of the strength of our own feelings. We need not overmake our case. We need not poison the well. We need not engage in rumor and insinuation to strengthen our case or a case we feel we might need to make in the future. Name calling and heckling and Schadenfreude on our part weakens our case. The proper stance on our side is proportion, and decency, and restraint. Our enemy, if he does not threaten us with force, has no hold over us beyond that which we grant him.
While all is fair in war, it only feels that way in love. As animals, personal conflicts with former friends strike us as just as compelling as conflicts with mortal enemies. But we are not animals. We can judge when the threat of violence is or is not involved in a conflict. Out of respect for ourselves we should not allow our feelings for our enemies to overwhelm us. Out of respect for our friends, we should let them form their own conclusions. Eventually, they will. And when they do, their judgment will be all the more strong in our favor, if we allow the facts, and not our accusations, to speak for themselves.
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