Moral Landscape Review
by Joseph Rowlands

The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris is a book with a theme I entirely agree with. He attempts to make the case that morality can be objectively defined, and consequently can benefit from scientific investigation and the determination of facts. In contrast, far too many people see morality as entirely disconnected from facts or science. Values are things that just are, and they can never be determined or adjusted based on facts. Harris tackles this is-ought dichotomy head on. Is he successful? Yes and no.

It turns out that there are variants of this dichotomy. Many scientists claim that you can't make any kind of factual statements about human life. Is one political system more conducive to life? They say there is no way to say. Will certain actions increase your chance at being happy? Impossible to know. Are certain lifestyles more dangerous? Forget about it!

This seems to be a wild distortion of the original idea that you can't derive values from facts. It's almost as if they heard it and treat it as a given without having any understanding of it except as a rule that they are not allowed to disobey.

It may be a challenge to connect your ultimate values to facts. Perhaps you think we should take care of our fellow man. You value helping other people. Showing how that foundational value is derived from facts would be a challenge. A more rational value, like valuing your own life and happiness, may be easier, but not so trivial that everyone sees it. But these foundational values can generate derivative values. If you want to help other people live happy lives, you can use facts and science to inform you of which actions will lead to better results. You can value things like vaccines to reduce mortality rates, or good nutrition to avoid disease and increase longevity.

So if we look at this is-ought dichotomy, it should be clear that it only really applies to foundational values. Secondary values, those accepted in order to satisfy the foundational values, can certainly be derived by facts. This assumes some kind of consequentialist morality, but such a morality can base secondary values on facts. Harris points out medicine as an example of how facts determine values, once you accept a foundational value like health or longevity.

So Harris is addressing scientists who are so averse to discussing science and morality together that they claim ignorance about any facts that morality might consider. And as far as that goes, he does an excellent job. He may not convince them, but it doesn't appear that their position is based on reason. Harris does point out the absurdity of the position and all of the different kinds of facts that contradict it.

The problem is that the real is-ought dichotomy (real as in original and more meaningful one, not real as in it's a true dichotomy) is still present. His points don't really address it, or at least not well. He essentially defines his standard of morality in a way he thinks is non-controversial, and with that foundational value set, goes on to show how what I've been calling secondary values are derived in part by facts. This doesn't really deal with the issue, and is disappointing to those with a more detailed philosophical background. Nonetheless, his approach is worthwhile in that he addresses the more pernicious version. Scientists who think they can't make factual statements related to human life or well-being are wrong, and they are adopting absurdity to defend the artificial barrier between science and morality.

I mentioned that Harris tries to define the foundational value in a non-controversial way which bypasses the original is-ought dichotomy. Unfortunately, his definition is no good. He defines morality in terms of promoting "well-being". The reason this doesn't seem controversial is because the term 'well' is a synonym of good, which is what morality defines. You can say well-being, or you can say being well. One dictionary defines it as "In a good or proper manner". It's like defining morality in terms of "doing the right thing" or "being a good person". They are empty, circular statements. 'Well-being' needs a standard to be meaningful. If it avoids controversy, it is because it is different to every reader.

In a vague way, though, it's a pretty good definition. The way the term is generally used, it is compatible with life as the standard of morality. Your well-being generally refers to living healthy, happy, successfully, etc. Well-being, or being well, is living well. And in common parlance, living well means living successfully and happily. But the fuzziness of the concept leaves it open to interpretation, and it is the fuzziness that makes it non-controversial. Not being clear on the standard means not being clear on the implications. Even obvious claims, like that slavery is bad, do not seem to be rigorous with such a vague standard.

There is a different problem with this definition that isn't clear until much later in the book. When he talks about well-being as the source of morality, whose well-being is he talking about? Is he talking about your own well-being? Or is he talking about the well-being of others? Turns out, it's the latter. So while 'well-being' may not seem controversial, again it is because he is vague about the details. And when he finally clarifies that he means that you should live your life for the sake of others, he has passed the point where he feels the need to defend it.

The book goes on with the theme of how values can be connected to facts, and how science can investigate those facts. He describes in detail many of the findings of psychology and neuroscience that can be successfully connected to well-being. This is the bulk of the book, and through it he presents a strong case that science actually can investigate the facts of human life that are used to guide our choices in values. Instead of being a purely philosophical book, he tackles the issue with a mix of philosophy and empirical data.

Viewed from the perspective of philosophical rigor, the book is lacking. It doesn't address the more fundamental belief in the conflict between facts and values. And it side-steps this with a fuzzy definition that avoids controversy by being vague. Later, as more details are filled in, he doesn't acknowledge the earlier ambiguities or that the new definition is much more controversial. He even has a section on how free will is wrong, which doesn't do justice to the topic at all. So from a philosophical perspective, it lacks rigor, detail, and an understanding of the important issues.

If you view it as addressing the irrational concern of scientists who refuse to acknowledge the most obvious facts for fear of implying a value, it's a worthwhile endeavor that I think succeeds in many ways. Harris is sharp, and as always makes penetrating observations, such as pointing out that medicine relies on certain fundamental value choices, and yet scientists don't run in fear of making statements of fact.

It almost certainly won't be the last word on the subject, but it is an important step in bringing sanity to the topic and moving beyond philosophical misunderstandings.

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