|
|||
 |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|||
 |
|||
|
|
|
|
Determinism is a Form of "Relativism;"and the Concept of Morality Entails "Agency" Below, I have included excerpts from The MacIntyre Reader, with comments on each from myself. I have interjected the conept: determinism -- for the more general, but inclusive, concept: relativism, as well as for some of the uses of the concept: morality. My interjections (regardless of subject matter) are in bold ... p 204 =================== 2 What puts the relativist [e.g., the determinist] at odds with those about whom she or he writes? The protagonists of those standpoints which generate large and systematic disagreements, like the members of the moral communities of humankind in general, are never themselves relativists [e.g., determinists]. And consequently they could not consistently allow that the rational justification of their own positions is merely relative to some local scheme of justification. Their claims are of a kind which require unqualified justification. Aristotle articulates their claim in speaking of fourth-century Greeks who 'consider themselves of good breeding and free not only among themselves, but everywhere, but the barbarians [e.g., the determinists] of good breeding only where they are at home, taking it that being unqualifiedly of good breeding and free is one thing, being qualifiedly so another' (Politics, 1255a33-36). ... =================== Here, MacIntyre is shedding light on how an “unqualified justification” is required for humans to argue about basic human subjects which deal with basic human nature. For instance, when arguing about morality or, just the same, when arguing about determinism. Just as you can't be a relativist and, at the same time, argue about morality (because if you're a relativist, then for you, there is no such thing as a valid argument for 'human morality'), likewise you can't be a determinist and, at the same time, argue about determinism (because if you're a determinist, then for you, there is no such thing as a valid argument for determinism. The latter point above is true because determinism stipulates that all personal arguments be predetermined to come out in one predetermined way for you (and for those with which you attempt to argue) – whether the predetermination was primarily genetic, or from past experience with the external environment (the important thing is is that it mustn't involve personal agency; aka: choice). p 204 =================== What is being claimed on behalf of each particular moral [or determinism] standpoint in its conflict with its rival is that its distinctive account ... of morality [or determinism] ... is true. Two aspects of this claim to truth are important to note at the outset. The first is that those who claim truth for the central theses of their own moral [or determinism] standpoint are thereby also committed to a set of theses about rational justification. For they are bound to hold that the arguments advanced in support of rival and incompatible sets of theses are unsound, not that they merely fail relative [or deterministically] to this or that set of standards, but that either their premises are false or their inferences invalid. But insofar as the claim to truth also involves this further claim, it commits those who uphold it to a non-relativist [non-deterministic] conception of rational justification, to a belief that there must be somehow or other adequate standards of rational justification, which are not the standards internal to this or that standpoint, but are the standards of rational justification as such. =================== Here, MacIntyre shows how all claims to truth involve at least 2 further commitments: p 207 =================== Aristotle said that 'Truth is the telos of a theoretical enquiry' (Metaphysics, 993b20-21) and the activities which afford rational justification are incomplete until truth is attained. What is it to attain truth? The perfected understanding in which enquiry terminates, when some mind is finally adequate to that subject-matter about which it has been enquiring, consists in key part in being able to say how things are, rather than how they seem to be from the particular, partial [or deterministic] and limited standpoint of some particular set of perceivers or observers or enquirers. Progress in enquiry consists in transcending the limitations of such particular and partial [or deterministic] standpoints in a movement towards truth, so that when we have acquired the ability of judging how in fact it seems or seemed from each limited and partial [or deterministic] standpoint, our judgments are no longer distorted by the limitations of those [deterministic] standpoints. And where there is no possibility of thus transcending such limitations, there is no application for the notion of truth. =================== Here, MacIntyre shows how to arrive at the truth of a matter (i.e., by shedding the subjectivity – a concept which, by the definition of determinism, is implied by determinism -- and adopting a kind of 3rd-person and fully-integrated objectivity). He also shows how it is that progress occurs (by noting, and transcending, the limitations of rival views). And he also shows how truth could become useless to a sect of humans persistently interacting with each other -- when none are willing or able to transcend their personal limitations (e.g., Relativists, Subjectivists, and Determinists, for instance). Ed Thompson
Discuss this Article (26 messages) |
 |
 |
|
 |
|
