RoR: Forum

On 24 July, G Stolayrov wrote: “The idea here is that one need experience SOMETHING PARTICULAR, but one can experience ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR in order to gain implicit fundamental knowledge. So, while one cannot originate concepts in a vacuum, one can originate them whether the first object one perceives is a table or a chair.”

Possibly, but in your earlier post of 18 July you also clamed: “Although the child does not know it, he has implicit concepts of "existence," "consciousness," and "identity," and employs them before he can determine WHAT IN PARTICULAR exists….”

So in order to gain “implicit fundamental knowledge” of the primary axioms, one must have experience of some particular thing; but in order to have experience of some particular thing, one must have implicit knowledge of the axioms.

Clearly enough, this line of argument begs the question, in which case the derivation of the primary axioms is logically invalid and thereby flawed. Since your line of reasoning appears to be consistent with Rand’s, this flaw throws a large question mark over the validity of her primary axioms.

Brendan

Post 21

Friday, July 25, 2003 - 11:36am

MR. BRENDAN: So in order to gain “implicit fundamental knowledge” of the primary axioms, one must have experience of some particular thing; but in order to have experience of some particular thing, one must have implicit knowledge of the axioms.

MR. STOLYAROV: Remember, Mr. Brendan, that, when a child gains the ability to perceive disjoint objects (as opposed to the indeterminate flux which he is born viewing), he is not yet aware of what these objects are. Sensory capacities are antecedent to conceptualization and identification, so he can see something even when he does not know what it is.

After seeing a chair (which happens to be his first object, though he does not yet know that it is a chair), he gains the knowledge of the implicit axiomatic concepts (which he could, too, have gained by perceiving anything else in particular, though he, again, would not yet know WHAT those particulars are), after which he proceeds to conceptualize the chair and form a term denoting similar concrete objects (chairs).

So, my two posts are in fact compatible. The progression in a child's development is as follows:

* Development of sensory perception.
* Development of conceptual faculty, beginning with basic implicit knowledge.
* Identification of objects perceived by the senses using the conceptual faculty.
* Attainment of the ability to concretize the expression of concepts via speech. From hereon forward implicit concepts are rendered explicit.

Post 22

Friday, July 25, 2003 - 11:58am

On 25 July, G Stolyarov wrote: “After seeing a chair …he gains the knowledge of the implicit axiomatic concepts…

This process does not explain how a bare perception of an object leads to the formation of the axiomatic concepts. In her book “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology” Ayn Rand offers a specific method of concept formation, involving perception, differentiation, similarity, unitisation etc to arrive at a concept. She claims that this method must be used to form all concepts. How does this method apply to the formation of the axiomatic concepts?

Brendan

Post 23

Monday, July 28, 2003 - 8:09am

Mr. Brendan,

There is a specific section in "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" which covers axiomatic concepts. Because axiomatic concepts encompass all of reality (by definition), they cannot be further broken down. Thus, differentiation and similarity cannot apply. Axioms can be specified only by ostentive definitions, that is, the ability to sweep one's hand around and say, "THIS is what I am referring to when I speak of existence. The fact that I SPEAK of it means I possess consciousness, and the fact that I speak of IT means it possesses identity."

Perception is what is necessary for a volitionally conscious entity to implicitly grasp the axioms. From the first attainment of such sensory capacity, it is possible to resort to ostentive methods of identification.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 24

Wednesday, July 30, 2003 - 7:53am

G Stolyarov wrote: “Axioms can be specified only by ostentive definitions, that is, the ability to sweep one's hand around and say, "THIS is what I am referring to when I speak of existence. The fact that I SPEAK of it means I possess consciousness, and the fact that I speak of IT means it possesses identity."

My question concerned how we are said to acquire the primary axioms, that is, how they come to be present in our minds; what is the process by which we come to know these concepts? I wasn’t referring to hand waving definitions.

You say that the axiomatic concepts cannot be formed by Rand’s method of concept formation, which she otherwise claims must always be used to form concepts. That in itself should invalidate them as usable concepts. What’s more, Rand’s method cannot account for her own foundational concepts. And that’s a pretty serious flaw, as the logical positivists discovered.

Brendan

Post 25

Wednesday, July 30, 2003 - 4:39pm

Brendan,

There are two distictions that need to be addressed to answer your criticism, and Rand did address them in her ITOE.

One is the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge. This distinction makes it possible for her to claim without contradiction that the 3 axioms are implicitly present in every concept of every human being in history, and also to claim that the 3 axioms were first formulated by the Greeks, codified by Aristotle, that important aspects of their meaning were first discovered by her, etc. She used the humorous quote: "I've been speaking prose all my life and didn't know it" to illustrate this distinction.

The other distinction is that between different levels of operation of human consciousness: the sensory, the perceptual, and the conceptual. These together form a chain leading from the sensory organs up to conceptual knowledge. She maintained that the sensory and the perceptual operated automatically and without error. They make it possible for a young child to automatically be aware of tables, chairs, and other existents, and thus to (implicitly) form the concept of existence.

Bill Nevin
Houston, Texas

Post 26

Friday, August 1, 2003 - 9:25am

Bill Nevin wrote: “She maintained that the sensory and the perceptual operated automatically and without error. They make it possible for a young child to automatically be aware of tables, chairs, and other existents, and thus to (implicitly) form the concept of existence.”

Here you seem to be saying that the child has automatically organised its sensations into an awareness of specific objects, a process that could be encapsulated as: “Some thing exists, and I am aware of it”, hence the three primary axioms.

That’s why I say the primary axioms beg the question. They have to be assumed in order to account for the act of perception; at the same time, they are said to be given in the act of perception. The implicit/explicit distinction doesn’t resolve this issue.

And this raises at least two further points. One, if the primary axioms are given in perception, they cannot be Objectivist concepts, because Rand insisted that perception is automatic, while conceptualisation is volitional.

Two, if the axioms are not given in perception, but are the outcome of Rand’s process of concept formation, they cannot be primary, because they can then be subject to further analysis: perception, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition etc.

Brendan

Post 27

Monday, August 4, 2003 - 10:09am

Brendan,

I think we are talking past each other a bit here. The axioms are true, and do not beg the question, as we can see in the example of the infant or young child who _learns_ to integrate sensations into percepts of distinct objects. The axiom are implicit in every idea he forms from that point on.

The reason for the implicit/explicit distinction (and maybe I did not use the technically correct terms there) is to get across the idea that you can't complain that the baby doesn't know about axioms. Young children, some adults, and all pre-Thales adults, don't/didn't know explicitly about axioms, but the axioms were implicit in every statement they uttered nonetheless. Just as the young child doesn't know that he is speaking prose, though in fact he keeps talking, and nothing he says is in verse.

Hope that helps. Rand really did make an airtight case in some important areas.

-Bill

Post 28

Wednesday, August 6, 2003 - 6:46am

Bill Nevins wrote: “The axioms are true, and do not beg the question…”

I didn’t say the axioms were untrue. I said the arguments in their favour were invalid. Arguments that are comprised of true propositions can still be invalid. Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” begs the question, and is therefore invalid, but most people would agree that the constituent propositions are true.

“.., as we can see in the example of the infant or young child who _learns_ to integrate sensations into percepts of distinct objects. The axiom are implicit in every idea he forms from that point on.”

Rand says perception is an automatic, brain-directed process. You say perception is a learned process. But that implies volition, which Rand says only applies to conceptualisation. Further, how does the child learn to integrate sensations into percepts in the absence of the axioms? And if the child can form percepts in the absence of the axioms, the axioms become superfluous.

In regard to question begging, if the child can identify a group of sensations as a specific object -- a process encapsulated as “some thing exists, and I am aware of it” -- it is already implicitly employing the axioms. But you say that the axioms are a result of the process of identifying specific objects.

That’s why I say that Stolyarov’s argument for knowledge of the axioms begs the question, because they are assumed to be present a priori in order to account for the act of perception, but are also claimed to be known as a result of perception, that is, a posteriori. It can be one or the other, but not both.

Brendan

Post 29

Wednesday, August 6, 2003 - 4:12pm

[Brendan wrote:]
>Rand says perception is an automatic, brain-directed process. You say perception is a learned process.

[My reply:]
Perception is automatic as Rand said, _for adults_ (and big kids). Developmental psychologists have now found it is learned by infants which, to my knowledge, doesn't contradict anything Rand wrote. She may have even dealt with it.

[Brendan wrote:]
>But that implies volition, which Rand says only applies to conceptualisation.

[My reply:]
The root of volition is the choice to think, so anything that requires thinking, like forming a new concept, requires volition. But that doesn't mean that a baby doesn't use some volition or pre-volitional faculty to develop the ability to integrate sensations into percepts.

What Rand said is true for adults and older children, which is probably the context she meant. Whether it is technically true for infants or needs to be slightly modified to accomodate the way they develop might take us outside the realm of epistemology into developmental psychology. Rand learned most of her epistemology by introspection, which in her case meant introspection _by an adult_ (along with memories of her childhood.) We can't know directly exactly what is going on in the mind of an infant, so I'm afraid that is a tangent away from the main point.

[Brendan wrote:]
>Further, how does the child learn to integrate sensations into percepts in the absence of the axioms? And if the child can form percepts in the absence of the axioms, the axioms become superfluous.

[My reply:]
Brendan, Objectivism is really not trying to bullshit you here. Please go back to Rand's ITOE and maybe David Kelley's _The Evidence of the Senses_ and try to get a really clear grasp of the essentials of what they are saying, rather than try to pick apart each detailed statement of theirs in the absence of the context of the theory in which it occurs.

_Nothing_ in terms of human knowledge, of any knowledge, gets done in the absence of the axioms. You can't even define knowledge or describe what it is without an implicit awareness of the axioms. That is why they are so important. What can get done is that people, including modern babies, ancient Babylonians, pre-Socratic Greeks, etc. can learn enough to get to the point in human knowledge where it is possible to understand the axioms explicitly. So no, the baby doesn't read Galt's speech in the womb and come out all ready to do battle with the forces of Kantian metaphysics. But the fact that the baby hasn't identified the axioms explicitly doesn't mean they are superfluous.

-Bill

Post 30

Wednesday, August 6, 2003 - 8:13pm

Brendan,

Here is a point-by-point reply to some key ideas that you have brought into focus regarding axioms …

Idea 1
“if the primary axioms are given in perception, they cannot be Objectivist concepts”

Reply 1
Brendan, the primary axioms in question here are EVERYONE’S concepts (Objectivism offers no peculiar content TO them, nor any formal proof or explanation OF them)

Idea 2
“if the axioms are not given in perception, but are the outcome of Rand’s process of concept formation”

Reply 2
Brendan, the axioms themselves (their existence; in the metaphysical sense) are not the outcome of concept formation (our awareness of their existence, in the epistemological sense). They were in existence (a metaphysical issue) before we even started thinking about them (an epistemological issue).

Idea 3
“I didn’t say the axioms were untrue. I said the arguments in their favour were invalid.”

Reply 3
Brendan, it seems that you miss a key point here. These axioms do not require any “arguments in their favour” (although a law of logic: “the denial of a true statement is false”, or what I would call the “assuming the opposite and examining for truth & validity”-method, may indirectly substantiate them to some curious minds). Moreover, due to their unprecedentedly fundamental nature, the formal reasoning required to “prove” them (via premises that count on them) to a skeptic is NECESSARILY circular (it NESSESSARILY begs the question).

Idea 4
“In regard to question begging, if the child can identify a group of sensations as a specific object -- a process encapsulated as “some thing exists, and I am aware of it” -- it is already implicitly employing the axioms. But you say that the axioms are a result of the process of identifying specific objects.”

Reply 4
Brendan, the axioms (as they exist in a metaphysical sense) are not “a result” of anything. However, our EXPLICIT AWARENESS of them (in an epistemological sense) is. It turns out that, in the epistemological processes that we use to become aware of them, we discover/recognize/identify (not derive) that they serve as the metaphysical foundation for these very processes themselves.

Idea 5
“That’s why I say that Stolyarov’s argument for knowledge of the axioms begs the question, because they are assumed to be present a priori in order to account for the act of perception, but are also claimed to be known as a result of perception, that is, a posteriori. It can be one or the other, but not both.”

Reply 5
Brendan, the issue of the axioms being “present a priori” (“present” = a metaphysical issue) and being “known as a result of perception, that is, a posteriori” (“known” = an epistemological issue) is not a valid target for the Law of the Excluded Middle. These 2 ideas are not commensurable. It appears that you have committed the “Either-Or” Fallacy and set up a false dichotomy here between “existence” (a metaphysical issue) and “explicit existence in the mind” (an epistemological issue).

Also, the axioms are “claimed to be known” as a result of simple identification or recognition, and it is the subsequent reasoning (“a posteriori”), regarding this identification, in the minds of those who are so adept that leads to the awareness of their both undeniable and inescapable nature, that’s all. This is not “just stating the obvious” (because they are not NECESSARILY obvious to ALL thinkers) but it is stating the undeniable.

Colorful Analogy
Imagine a philosophy class full of deaf students and a teacher that does not know sign-language. The students are taught with premises, arguments, etc. that are written on a chalkboard.

Every one of them needs the chalkboard to learn this particular subject, but only some of them recognize, or identify, this fact of reality (although, should one of them make the necessity of the chalkboard explicit, then all the others would immediately agree with this estimate).

The chalkboard delimits the form (but not the content) of what is taught in this classroom. This chalkboard is analogous to the axioms. It exists (and its existence requires no “formal proof”) and it is used (whether our awareness of its necessity is explicit, or not) by us, serving as a foundation on which all knowledge rests.

Ed

Post 31

Saturday, August 9, 2003 - 3:46am

Thanks to Bill and Ed for their detailed replies to my post.

Bill, if perception is a learned activity, this introduces the potential for perceptual error. As I understand it, Rand claimed that perception is inerrant; errors can only occur at the level of conceptualisation.

Bill wrote: “What Rand said is true for adults and older children, which is probably the context she meant….We can't know directly exactly what is going on in the mind of an infant…”

I‘m sure the latter is the case, but in fact Rand did use the assumed mind of the pre-linguistic infant when she explains the derivation of the first level concept “table”. She also claims that the primary axioms are “present” in the mind with the very first perception. So it would seem that she believes these very early non-linguistic mental activities have an important place in her metaphysics and epistemology.

Bill wrote: “But the fact that the baby hasn't identified the axioms explicitly doesn't mean they are superfluous.”

I didn’t word that very well. Compare the following claims. 1) The mind is tabula rasa at birth, that is, devoid of concepts. 2) The axioms seem to be a necessary condition for the organization of sensations into percepts. 3) All knowledge derives from sense experience. 4) Concepts are the outcome of a specific chain of reasoning.

Taking these claims into account, the question is: how do the primary axiomatic concepts become present in the mind? As far as I can see, there are two options. The axioms are known -- implicitly or otherwise -- either by sense experience, or independently of sense experience. Which is the correct option?

I don’t think you’re trying to bullshit me, and I don’t have any particular problem with Rand’s axioms as general statements along the following line: some things exists, a thing is what it is, some entities are conscious. But these seem to be rather prosaic inductive generalisations rather than axioms.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ed, when I referred to Objectivist concepts, I was using shorthand to mean certain concepts used in a particular way. My apologies for the lack of clarity.

Ed wrote: (reply 2) “..the axioms themselves (their existence; in the metaphysical sense) …They were in existence (a metaphysical issue) before we even started thinking about them (an epistemological issue). “

When you use the term axiom here, are you referring to the concepts themselves, the mental entities or representations, or are you referring to the referents of these concepts? I assume you mean the latter, but it’s not entirely clear.

Ed wrote: (reply 3) “These axioms do not require any “arguments in their favour”…

You surprise me. If they don’t require arguments in their favour, why are you presenting arguments in their favour? You may mean that they cannot be proved, which is fair enough. And I see we agree that any formal reasoning in their favour begs the question.

Ed wrote: (reply 4) “…the axioms (as they exist in a metaphysical sense) are not ‘a result’ of anything.”

I assume you are referring here to the presence in the mind -- implicit or otherwise -- of the axioms qua concepts. But if the axioms are not the result of anything, how do they come to be present in an otherwise tabula rasa mind?

Ed wrote: (reply 4) “It turns out that, in the epistemological processes that we use to become aware of them, we discover/recognize/identify (not derive) that they serve as the metaphysical foundation for these very processes themselves.”

This is closer to the mark. But G Stolyarov says they cannot be known by Rand’s method of concept formation. So what are the epistemological processes that we use to identify the axioms?

I will leave point 5, since it relates to point 4. I liked your analogy of the chalkboard. Oddly enough, it’s a nice illustration of the notion of Kant’s Categories. In fact, your reply 4 above is a pretty fair summation of the way Kant came to posit his categories, that is, he surmised what he thought must be the pre-conditions of experience and knowledge. Of course, his categories are not Rand’s axioms, but the reasoning process seems to be similar.

Brendan

Post 32

Saturday, August 9, 2003 - 9:58pm

Brendan,

When you say the axioms are "rather prosaic inductive generalisations" I think you are on to something. The reason we call them axioms is not because they are engraved on stone tablets on a mountain somewhere, but because they are present in all knowledge. But the way they are present in the minds of people who aren't thinking about them explicitly may just be as "rather prosaic inductive generalisations".

As far as perception being learned, it's like bicycle riding being learned, but at a younger age. As far as its being inerrant: if you see someone on a bicycle falling on his head every six feet, you don't say he learned to ride a bicycle incorrectly, you say he's incapable of riding or he's nuts. Similarly, if a 3 yr. old can't form percepts from sensations, we don't say he learned to perceive incorrectly, we say he has a brain anomaly.

At any rate, learning to perceive is not like learning the ABCs. It's a _skill_ that is picked up very early. Perhaps we should put "learning" in shudder quotes, because it might not be like regular adult learning at all, but maybe more analogous to having a speech recognition program "learn" to recognize my words. We use the same verb for that, but it actually means something different.

The details of exactly what parts of this early process are volitional and what parts are automatic aren't really known and are a subject of specialized study. Therefore, they are not philosophy. Rand may therefore have erred in putting too much detail into her description of how an infant thinks. Actually, I think she had someone in mind a little older than a true infant.

Oh, integrating sensations into percepts comes way before language, so don't get caught up in the baby being pre-linguistic. He's still into the perceptual stage.

Your point 2 is not our position. The axioms (by which I mean: awareness of the axioms) are definitely not necessary to integrate sensations into percepts. It's with the first percept that the baby is conscious of something. This answers your other question: sense experience comes before (implicit) awareness of the axioms.

One other thing. "So it would seem that she believes these very early non-linguistic mental activities have an important place in her metaphysics and epistemology." They have an important place in her epistemology. Her metaphysics is very simple: what is is. So we don't need to talk about babies to explain her metaphysics. The thing that is confusing when discussing the axioms is that they are so basic that you can talk about them from all angles: what they are; what it is about them that makes them, and not other statements, axiomatic; the order in which an individual becomes implicitly aware of them; the order in which philosophers became explicitly aware of them; why they are validated not proven, etc.. It's important always to keep in mind exactly what is being discussed.

Sorry for going over your points out of order. I just replied to what jumped out first as I was thinking your post over.

Bill

Post 33

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 8:34am

Bill wrote: “When you say the axioms are "rather prosaic inductive generalisations" I think you are on to something. The reason we call them axioms is …because they are present in all knowledge.”

I said the axioms seem to be inductive generalisations. It’s hard to know for sure. G Stolyarov originally claimed that the primary axioms are a priori, that is, known independently of experience. But you say they are inductive generalisations, which are known partly through experience. If so, they would then form the conclusions of inductive chains of reasoning, in which case they could not be foundational concepts.

“It's with the first percept that the baby is conscious of something.”

If in the first percept the otherwise tabula rasa child is conscious of something, it must have identified its sensations as being some specific object, otherwise its consciousness would consist of an unidentified chaos of sensations. But in that case, implicit in that consciousness is the proposition: Some thing exists and I am aware of it, ie the primary axioms.

“This answers your other question: sense experience comes before (implicit) awareness of the axioms.”

This contrasts with G Stolyarov’s earlier comment (28 July) that: “… certain implicit knowledge has to exist before PARTICULAR data can be processed”. You are saying that sense experience is prior to knowledge of the axioms, whereas Stolyarov seems to be saying that the axioms are prior to sense experience, given that Rand claims that such experience is always ultimately the experience of specific objects.

It seems that Rand can be read in diametrically different ways on this most basic issue. I take your points on the scientific aspects of perception. I am mostly in agreement, and wonder why Rand seemed to place so much emphasis on these aspects. I suspect she was trying to ground her epistemology in “fact”, which is a risky business, given the provisional nature of this sort of speculation.

Brendan

Post 34

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 9:09am

Mr. Brendan,

I did not say the axioms were derived independent of sense experience PER SE, but rather of PARTICULAR sense experience, as of a table. To state otherwise, as Rothbard's critique implies, is to say that a table (and only a table) must be perceived for a child to gain knowledge of the axioms (or of sociology, history, etc.). Instead, it can be a table, a chair, a rhinoceros, or a Rand text (if this peculiar child learns to read and process information before doing anything else).

This is the meaning with which I have used "a priori," and I have stated essentially what Mr. Nevin has, only in different terms that may have led you to think otherwise.

Once again, do not fall into the trap of assuming that I am endowing my interpretation of the axioms with a certain Kantian flair.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 35

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 9:56am

Brendan ,

For much-needed clarity: Throughout my last post, whenever I used the term “metaphysical” (as in: “in a metaphysical sense”, or as in: “a metaphysical issue”) I was referring to the referents (actual existents) of these concepts. I reserved the word “epistemological” for ALL talk of mental concepts (I was trying to make a sharp distinction between these 2 ideas).

When I said that: “These axioms do not require any arguments in their favour”…, I meant for the word “arguments” to be interpreted as “formal reasoning” (not this “clarity-producing discourse” that we are collaborating in).

When I said that: “…the axioms (as they exist in a metaphysical sense) are not ‘a result’ of anything.”, I meant the referents (actual existents) of them.

Ed (reply 4):
“It turns out that, in the epistemological processes that we use to become aware of them, we discover/recognize/identify (not derive) that they serve as the metaphysical foundation for these very processes themselves.”

Brendan:
This is closer to the mark. But G Stolyarov says they cannot be known by Rand’s method of concept formation. So what are the epistemological processes that we use to identify the axioms?

Ed’s response:
Brendan, with regard to the 2 fundamental questions relevant to epistemology: “What do we know?” and “How do we know it?”, here’s my attempt at answering your question ...

My answer: We know about percepts (from sense experience) and, if we successfully differentiate percepts & integrate them into concepts, all the while avoiding contradiction (for internal consistency) & maintaining a tie to reality (for external consistency – correspondence idea of “truth”), then we know about concepts as well. I’m implying here that we know about reality. After initial concept formation (from differentiated & integrated percepts), we can continue this internally- & externally-consistent process to form more abstract concepts, as long as we do not sever our initial “tie to reality” (correspondence to reality).

Brendan, I will respond to the issue of Kant’s categories in the near future.

Ed

Post 36

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 5:40pm

Brendan,

You said:
>But you say they are inductive generalisations, which are known partly through experience. If so, they would then form the conclusions of inductive chains of reasoning, in which case they could not be foundational concepts.

I reply:
No, they are not the conclusions of inductive chains of reasoning. The chains of reasoning came later, with Greek philosophy and the _explicit_ study of the axioms. What I am talking about here is much more simple: they are implicit in the child's consciousness of the first objects it perceptually observes.

I'm afraid that you might be coming at this from a slightly Kantian point of view. (I'm not using that as a hostile epithet. It is just my observation of your posts.) Specifically, you might be trying to jam the topics at hand into an inappropriate scheme of classification.

You shouldn't contrast _inductive_ with _foundational concepts_ necessarily, especially when dealing with the foundation of epistemology. Rand's epistemology is extremely inductive in its orientation. (So is all of Objectivism. Her condensation of the philosophy into Galt's speech has given many the unfortunate misapprehension that it is primarily deductive, like Euclidean geometry.)

Her spiral model of knowledge comes in handy here, to understand how concepts so subtle as the axioms might apply in our understanding of the first awareness a baby has. In the spiral model, which she believed to apply to all complex knowledge, you start not knowing something. Then you are presented with some material dealing with it. Your first pass at dealing with the material might seem confusing, and might leave you thinking that you haven't accomplished anything. But really you have digested whatever it is a little bit, therefore your next pass takes you a little farther, and so on. Each time you come at the subject you understand it better, until you have achieved true mastery. Starting from zero, you move outward mentally in increasing circles of awareness. This is the way the baby learns of the world he lives in, and the axioms are implicit at every level. It is not until he is in high school or college (if at all) that he ever reads about them, becomes aware of them explicitly as statements, and reasons about them. But nevertheless the implicit awareness of them guides every valid thing he learns of the world, even as it (implicit understanding of the axioms) grows with each new discovery. That is why it is not a question of _conclusion_ vs. _foundational concept_.

There can of course be no preconceptual concept. The spiral model, united with the sensation-percept-concept trichotomy, gets us out of that trap.

I disagree with your statement that Rand can be read in diametrically opposed ways. Perhaps my poor writing as an amateur may have mislead you in some way.

Bill

Post 37

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 5:46pm

Ed,

You wrote:
“It turns out that, in the epistemological processes that we use to become aware of them, we discover/recognize/identify (not derive) that they serve as the metaphysical foundation for these very processes themselves.”

I think consideration of the spiral model might help elucidate this point for Brendan.

Bill

Post 38

Tuesday, August 12, 2003 - 8:57pm

-Thanks Bill. Another good idea from someone claiming to be “writing as an amateur” (I would like to see THAT returned to perceptual primaries! – I happen to find your posts quite insightful and illuminating!). Anyway, here goes …

Brendan,

Wouldn’t you agree that we need separate “files” in our minds in order to hold & organize the relentless bombardment of perceptions that we undergo on a daily basis? Wouldn’t you agree that we cannot possibly have a synoptic (I like to say “God’s-eye view”) or omniscient understanding of this “file” from the start of this “file-keeping” process? Well, that’s sort of what Bill is referring to with regard to a spiral progression of knowledge (that we have to start collecting data input somewhere, and that we “grow to know” the file that it is in AS WE USE the file, not “a priori”). The “files” in this sense, are our concepts.

Ed

Post 39

Friday, August 15, 2003 - 5:09am