RoR: Forum

Ed,

Here you are defending the validity of concepts, and of mathematics. I defend that, too.
But this doesn't address the problem of universals, a philosophical problem that was raised probably several millenia ago. I will rewrite the two questions in a more explicit way; from an Objectivist point of view,

(1) Do universals exist? In example, are the relations between concepts that constitute the laws of logic, or the laws of arithmetic, or the fundamental principles of ethics, say, intemporal and potentially ubiquitious, by necessity?, and:

(2) How a human can assert real, objective knowledge of a fact x without acknowledging its validity through the use of a priori, eternal principles, accepted by rational necessity, and true for coherence?

Regards,

Jaume

P.S.: My most recent sources are the philosophers Scott Ryan and Michael Huemer.

Post 41

Thursday, November 6, 2003 - 10:21am

are the relations between concepts that constitute the laws of logic, or the laws of arithmetic, or the fundamental principles of ethics, say, intemporal and potentially ubiquitious, by necessity?, and:

That is nearly incoherent, but supposing it does means something:

The relationships between concepts are purely conceptual. Temporal, spatial (ubiquity) qualities pertain only to material existents, and are irrelevant to relationships between concepts.

How a human can assert real, objective knowledge of a fact x without acknowledging its validity through the use of a priori, eternal principles, accepted by rational necessity, and true for coherence?

All you neo-Platonists make the same mistake. The assetion that there is no such thing as a priori knowledge does not mean we have no experiences before we have knowledge (which is actually the converse of what you believe, that you have knowledge before you have any experiences).

There are no universals and there is no a priori knowledge. All so called "universals" are only reifications of concepts of qualities. All so called a priori knowledge is the result of stupid philosophers who forgot how they learned things.

If you care to take the risk, name one of each of what you believe are 1. a universal and 2. an example of a priori knowledge, and we will be glad to show you where you are making your mistake.

When my wife asks me if the cat got into the armoire again, I take a look, and if the cat is in there, I say with absolute objective certainty, "yep, she's in there," all without aid of any a priori knowledge.

Regi

Post 42

Thursday, November 6, 2003 - 10:48am

Jaume,

My reply to your 1st question:
Universals are "correct" abstractions (non-contradictory integrations), not ontologically independent, metaphysical entities. This does not mean that they are self-obvious or even self-evident - and someone not bowing their will to the supremacy of Reason may err in identifying them.

An illuminating & analogous question to you is:
Does the product of ... (9876 X 5432) exist?

And my reply to your 2nd question:
Logic (non-contradictory integration) can be discovered & validated. Again, isn�t that enough? Please answer this fundamental line of questioning Jaume (I get the impression that you �prefer� not to evaluate the epistemological power of the synergy of this couplet).

Ed

Post 43

Friday, November 7, 2003 - 3:00am

'the epistemological power of the synergy of this couplet' !!!

Now I understand the meaning of word salad!

Post 44

Monday, November 10, 2003 - 10:34am

Alright No 6, you got me there!
Perhaps I should have said "the power of synergy from using these 2 simultaneously" or "the synergistic potentiation of ..."

Thanks for the criticism No 6 (it helps me excel),

Ed

Post 45

Tuesday, November 11, 2003 - 2:52am

[Regi (Italic)] The relationships between concepts are purely conceptual.

Regi, that is nearly a tautology. My point is that some relations between concepts need to be axiomatic and (somehow) real for us to be able to construct knowledge. Without (at least one) departing axiom, knowledge is not possible. Even Objectivists depart from axioms constructed with the use of universals.

Temporal, spatial (ubiquity) qualities pertain only to material existents, and are irrelevant to relationships between concepts.

Let's see: does the quality "whiteness" of a particular paper (a material existent) pertain only to that paper? The answer must be no, or alternatively we would invent a different concept for every whiteness we could see in every white object. And that would make the acknowledgement of the quality "whiteness" impossible.

The asse[r]tion that there is no such thing as a priori knowledge does not mean we have no experiences before we have knowledge (which is actually the converse of what you believe, that you have knowledge before you have any experiences).

I believe there are objective universals that constitute the foundations of knowledge.

There are no universals and there is no a priori knowledge.

I will define myself: on epistemology, I am a realist; in metaphysics, I am evolving between moderate realism and objective idealism.

If you really do understand what is a universal, then you are into the nominalist field.

If you don't, perhaps you are a conceptualist. ("In nominalism universals are considered arbitrary constructions of the human mind. In conceptualism universals exist only in the mind, as concepts, but they are not arbitrary, as they reflect similarities among particular things." [The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition (online), http://www.bartleby.com/65/un/unvrsls.html])

All so called "universals" are only reifications of concepts of qualities.

Regi, can you prove that the examples I provide you (see bottom) are reifications of concepts of qualities?

If you care to take the risk,

You may guess I like "philosphical" risk.

name one of each of what you believe are 1. a universal and 2. an example of a priori knowledge, and we will be glad to show you where you are making your mistake.

1. a universal: freedom.
2. an example of a priori knowledge: life is a value.

Regards,

Jaume

Post 46

Tuesday, November 11, 2003 - 4:00am

[Ed (Italic)] My reply to your 1st question:
Universals are "correct" abstractions (non-contradictory integrations), not ontologically independent, metaphysical entities.

So you think universals do exist, but that they are not metaphysical entities, only concepts. That's the conceptualists' view.

But it seems to me that metaphysical entities exist, at least, they exist as the referents of concepts. (I won't ask you for the Objectivist definition of universals.)

This does not mean that they are self-obvious or even self-evident - and someone not bowing their will to the supremacy of Reason may err in identifying them.

Yes. And nottice that rational people also err: as Romans said, "Errare humanum est."

An illuminating & analogous question to you is: Does the product of ... (9876 X 5432) exist?

Well, I don't know if that will be illuminating, but here you have my definition:

That product exists, at least, in these ways: as a "material existent" (e.g., in your computer monitor), and as a combination of concepts (e.g., in your mind). And I know that both existents are in some way related. I defend that the construction of this product is possible through the use of universals (e.g., unity, multiplicity, et cetera).

And my reply to your 2nd question:
Logic (non-contradictory integration) can be discovered & validated.

Nottice that logic can't be "made". My preferred definition of logic is from Michael Huemer:

"principles of logic are principles of inference: that is, principles stating what is and is not a valid or cogent argument. For example, "Modus ponens is valid" is a principle of logic, and it's one that we know."
["Why I am not an Objectivist", Michael Huemer,
http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand.htm#3.1]

Logic it's true, and only can be (as you say) discovered. "Validation" of logic maybe can be defined simply as "awareness" of logic.

Again, isn�t that enough? Please answer this fundamental line of questioning Jaume (I get the impression that you �prefer� not to evaluate the epistemological power of the synergy of this couplet).

Ed, I am sorry if you think I would not like not reply your message and evade the issue; I am trying to keep the discussion honest and friendly.

To "discover & validate" may not be enough if you thing on the "big questions" of life.

I thought about concepts, but they are only tools of knowledge, not knowledge itself.

I mean that, if we can't validate something without objective, universal referents, to "discover & validate" is somewhat as trying to put water in a leaky basket. I think that some of those referents must be, at least, to take one of the laws of logic as true, and one different from the tautological "A=A".
And I think the same on the principles of mathematics (algebra and arithmetics are included there), and the fundamental premises of ethics.

I understand we are discussing not only of epistemology, but also of metaphysics.

Regards,

Jaume

Post 47

Tuesday, November 11, 2003 - 4:33am

Tuesday, November 11, 2003 - 7:49am

Jaume, Ed,

Jaume has provided the following as examples of a universal and an a priori concept:

1. a universal: freedom.
2. an example of a priori knowledge: life is a value.

A universal, in the philosophical sense means one of the following:
1. Realist - universals exist independently of the particulars that instantiate them (that is, they have independent ontological existence)
2. Nominalist - only particular things exist, universals are only a general term or "name" applied to individuals that resemble each other.
3. Conceptualists - universals are only general terms applied to individual things by reference to abstract ideas or concepts. (Peter Abelard).
4. Truth - there is no such thing as universals in the philosophical sense and no need for such a concept.

The general meaning of the word "universal," 1. Of, relating to, extending to, or affecting the entire world, (everything) or 2. relating to or affecting all members of a class or group under consideration, is very useful, and many things are universal in this sense, of course, but in the philosophical sense, there are no universals.

Freedom is very broad term and actually designates several different concepts, so I will assume you mean it only in the context of philosophical politics, as the equivalent of liberty. With that assumption, it is a concept that pertains to only one class of existents, rational/volitional beings, i.e. us humans.

It is a derived concept, (not axiomatic, for example), depending on the concept of "choice." It is a relative term, and, strangely enough, a negative one. Assuming a being is capable of choice, choice is always possible so long as nothings prevents it. Not until the possibility of something preventing choice is considered does the word freedom actually have meaning.

While we speak of, "freedom to choose," where there is no danger of anything interfering with choice, freedom, is redundant, "freedom" and "choice" are identical in that context. Only if there is a possibility of something preventing choice, does the word freedom have meaning, and what it means is, "the absence of that which prevents choice."

Freedom, then, is that state in which a rational/volitional being is not prevented from exercising choice. It means nothing else, and means nothing at all except in that context. It is only a concept.

Life is a value is not only not a priori knowledge, but is not true. At least, as stated it is not true. Nothing is "just a value."

Values always presume a goal, end, or objective, and therefore, pertain only to beings capable of having goals, ends, and objectives. Before anything can be of value, the question, "of value to whom for what," must be answered. "Life," as an abstract concept, has no value, positive or negative. We certainly do not believe the "life" of infectious agents is good.

(Have you never noticed that most of the things philosophers suggest are known a priori are frequently things not widely known at all, like the principles of logic or mathematics? If they are really a priori knowledge, you'd think everybody would know them, eh?)

Want to try again?

Regi

Post 49

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 - 3:39am

You already excel Ed. Your contibution helps me excel.

Now to try and make sense of some of the above I will repeat my above statements in plane English. I am happy to stand corrected if I err but please anyone, do me the service of using plane English in reply!

Knowledge is the mental grasp of the facts of reality. It is the awareness of the identity of particular aspects of reality. It is not just an awareness of reality, but an understanding of it. It is a successfully formed conclusion about some aspect of reality. It is through the use of reason that man draws conclusions about the world. It is through objectivity that man identifies the validity of those conclusions.

Thus, false philosophies (& I agree with Joe here(never thought I would say that!) they are philosophies) do not lead to knowledge.

Post 50

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 - 7:39am

Regi,

I really appreciate your extended explanation.

My critique will be two-fold:

1. Realize your 4\+{th} definition of universal, "Truth", belongs to the nominalist field.

2. You again referred to concepts, but not to what I was asking for, which are the referents of concepts, I mean the "features of reality" that make those human-built concepts necessary for we to acquire objective knowledge --to learn real, different cases of freedom/liberty, choice, life or value.

I think that those features of reality --those universals--, e.g., the referents of the concept "choice":

(a) objectively exist (e.g., choices exists), and

(b) objectively can be present (somehow) at different times and/or contexts --and that's another characteristic of universals.

So my final questions to you, Regi, or to anyone willing to respond, would be:

A.- Do the referents of concepts (universals) exist in reality?

B.- How can we learn them (through the use of concepts) if they don't exist, or they are not "repeatable" existents, that is, they are not features of reality that can be present somehow at different times and in different contexts of reality?

Regards,

Jaume

Post 51

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 - 1:20pm

A.- Do the referents of concepts (universals) exist in reality?

B.- How can we learn them (through the use of concepts) if they don't exist, or they are not "repeatable" existents, that is, they are not features of reality that can be present somehow at different times and in different contexts of reality?

Please let me quote something from the Autonomist: "Introduction to Autonomy"

"By reality we mean all that is the way it is.

"Reality is what is so, whether anybody knows what is so or not. Reality includes everything that is and excludes everything that is not. It includes everything, not as a random collection of unrelated things but every entity, every event and every relationship between them. It includes fictional things as fictions, hallucinations as hallucinations, historical things as historical things, and material things as material things. Reality does not include fictions (such as Santa Claus) as material or historical facts. It does include the fact that Santa Claus is a common fiction used for the enjoyment of Children at the Christmas season."

The answer is in the meaning of the words existence, reality, and "material existence".

The broadest of these terms is "existence." It includes everything that is, and includes it without regard to the nature of its existence or how, or, even when it exists.

"Reality" includes all that "existence" includes, but not in the same way. Reality includes everything that exists, but only in terms of the specific nature of existents. It includes physical objects (rocks, people, and automobiles), subjects (like history and philosophy), ideas (like justice and yesterday), and fictions (like John Galt and Allah), but each is "real" only if its specific nature (mode of existence) is specified. Justice, for example, does not really exist if by exist you mean as a physical existent like a rock or automobile.

"Material existence" is all that exists which we can be directly or indirectly conscious of (perceptually) but it exists independently of anyone's actual consciousness or knowledge of it. Only things which exist materially have ontological existence.

Justice really exists as a concept. When the justice of something is being judged, for example, "that new law is just," or "that act is unjust," those concepts, "just" and "unjust" in those judgements are particulars (or referents) of the broader concept justice. They really exist, but they exist only as concepts.

Now the specific answer to your question becomes obvious:

A.- The referents of concepts exist in reality, but most do not exist ontologically.

B.- Your second question is a bit misleading. We do not learn most things by seeing or perceiving them on different occasions. The only things we can learn to identify that way (which is what all concepts are, that is, identification) are physical entities, their perceptual qualities, their relationships, and their observable behavior. Everything else we know, which is most of what we know, is learned by means of abstraction from and integration of those concepts that identify the five aspects of physical existence I enumerated.

The referents of concepts for physical entities and their perceivable attributes are those physical entities and those attributes. These are the only referents of concepts that exist both ontologically and "really."

The referents of all other concepts are other concepts. They really exist, as concepts, but do not exist ontologically. The referents of all concepts are particulars, even when those particulars are other concepts. (Note: the concept "red" is an abstract concept of all cases of the visual experience of "seeing red," but each of those experiences is a particular. There is no "universal" red, only the concept that identifies all possible particular experiences we call seeing red.

The concept is not a, "name," not a "universal," but an "identification," and what it identifies are its referents, which are also what it "means."

Now I have a question for you. If you should discover there really are no such things as, "universals," would you be dissappointed in some way?

Regi

Post 52

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 - 9:12pm

No 6, Regi, & Jaume:

No 6:
Thanks No 6 (I like your "cut-to-the-chase" summary, too!)!

Regi:
Now I don't like to give out compliments to thinkers who threaten my grandiose sense of intellectual superiority but - considering your last argument to Jaume - I have to say ... you're pretty good at this philosophy stuff.

Jaume:
First off, I think that Regi has now gotten the upper hand on you (unless you have an intellectual surprise for us, of course).

Speaking of surprising intellectual things, I think the post-Kant Friesians are pretty interesting ... possibly from another planet!

Their diagrams are cool. They seem to grab the best of Popper with emphasis on "falsification of the contradiction." However, they seem to keep the "dirty bathwater" with the "baby".

This perversity is so common nowadays (perhaps it has always been "common"):

1. Expound a new theory by ADDING to an old one that was popula

2. Never question the assumptions of the originally expounded theory on which your new one rests (and whether it itself rests on false assumption in a vertical timeline of thought)

3. Think that you can fix these imperfections by adding idealistic confabulation and ...voila! ... you sir ... have got 'yerself a shy-nee noo' fee-lossoh-fee!

I want more than "perty' noo' diahhgraamms" to show me that Friesians have added anything to our growing body of philisophical knowledge (yes ... that is a challenge for a debate on specific, practical merit)

Ed

Post 53

Tuesday, November 18, 2003 - 5:50am

Regi,

Thank you for your reply.

[Regi:] If you should discover there really are no such things as, "universals," would you be dissappointed in some way?

Well, if I should "discover" there are no universals at all, that there are no (under Rand's nomenclature, "axiomatic concepts") in example, the law of identity is not a fact of reality, then maybe I would "think" that, for example, something can be nothing, and suddenly something again.

But I think nobody will never discover there are no universals.

You said "Only things which exist materially have ontological existence.", and "reality includes physical objects (rocks, people, and automobiles), subjects (like history and philosophy), ideas (like justice and yesterday), and fictions (like John Galt and Allah), but each is "real" only if its specific nature (mode of existence) is specified."

I assume you don't think the law of identity is a physical object, nor a fiction. So Regi, what is the specific nature of the law of identity? If it exists as an idea (we humans invented), does it mean that, without humanity, there is no law of identity in reality? Or perhaps you perceive the law of indetity in material existence?

The argument now I find necessary is: universals are inescapable, primary facts of reality, but have not a sensory material existence.

Regards,

Jaume

Post 54

Tuesday, November 18, 2003 - 8:10am

[Message corrected. Can the administrator delete my previous message? Thanks.]

Regi,

Thank you for your reply.

[Regi:] If you should discover there really are no such things as, "universals," would you be dissappointed in some way?

Well, if I should "discover" that there are no universals at all, that there aren't (under Rand's nomenclature) "axiomatic concepts" --in example, that the law of identity is not a fact of reality--, then maybe I would "think" that something could be nothing, and suddenly could be something again.

But I think nobody will never discover there are no universals.

You said:

"Only things which exist materially have ontological existence", and "reality includes physical objects (rocks, people, and automobiles), subjects (like history and philosophy), ideas (like justice and yesterday), and fictions (like John Galt and Allah), but each is "real" only if its specific nature (mode of existence) is specified."

I assume you don't think the law of identity is a physical object, nor a fiction. So Regi, what is the specific nature of the law of identity? If it exists as an idea (we humans invented), does it mean that, without humanity, there is no law of identity in reality? Or perhaps you perceive --or perceived-- the law of identity in material existence?

The argument now I find necessary is: universals are unavoidable, primary facts of reality, but have not a sensory material existence.

Regards,

Jaume

Post 55

Thursday, November 20, 2003 - 7:21pm

Jaume,

You asked: ^{I assume you don't think the law of identity is a physical object, nor a fiction. So Regi, what is the specific nature of the law of identity? If it exists as an idea (we humans invented), does it mean that, without humanity, there is no law of identity in reality? Or perhaps you perceive --or perceived-- the law of identity in material existence?}

Yes. Without humanity, there is no law of identity. If there could be existence without humanity (suppose humanity annhilates itself, for example) there would be no law of identity, because it is, exactly as you said, a concept.<p>

What it is a concept of is an aspect of physical existence, which is, every existent has a specific nature and is what it is, and would remain a fact, even if there were no one to discover and identify that fact as the law of identity. (The law is discovered, not invented.)<p>

The law of identity is axiomatic and therefore "universal" in the sense that every existent is a particular of that concept. Particulars exist and have the natures they have, whether there are any concepts pertaining to them or not or anyone to have such concepts.

Particulars, including their natures, are not contingent on anyone's knowledge of them. But all concepts about those particualars and there nature, including the fact they have natures, are contingent on there being a knower.<p>

Regi

Post 56

Friday, November 21, 2003 - 5:09am

Regi,

When I used the term "axiomatic concepts" was strictly to use the Randian nomenclature.

I don't think the law of identity is a concept, nor (to put it in your own terms) an idea. The law of identity is a feature of reality that can be repeated in different contexts: that's a definition of universal.

[Regi]Without humanity, there is no law of identity.

I think that without humanity, the law of identity existed. Thats why we are able to describe and to acquire knowledge from prehuman events, events that necessarily left the law of identity inviolated.

To put it differently: if evolving extraterrestrial creatures exist, and reach similar levels of intelligence as we humans, they will necessarily use the law of identity.

The law is discovered, not invented.

If, with that, you mean that universals are --may be-- discovered, I agree. But if you mean we discover the idea of the law of identity by deduction or induction, then I don't agree.

Particulars, including their natures, are not contingent on anyone's knowledge of them.

Evident.

But all concepts about those particulars and their nature, including the fact they have natures, are contingent on there being a knower

The concept of "law of identity" is contingent of every knower, but (the law of) identity is a feature of reality. That's why you can explain the behaviour of viruses or bacteria relying on the law of identity.

Moreover, how can we perceive identity in two different particulars?

My answer: beacuse we define the concept identity from a real, unmaterial identity that is present both particulars.

Regards,

Jaume

Post 57

Saturday, November 22, 2003 - 5:06am

It looks like every one has moved on from the original article, but I wanted to bring up some thoughts that have bugged me for a few days... And hopefully someone can clarify and correct my ideas a little :)

Joe writes in the original article:

"The difference is that the belief is so fundamental that all evidence is
interpreted to support the theory...Philosophical [ideas] adjust the
evidence, or the conclusions you draw from the evidence, to fit the beliefs. "

And he looks at a few examples

1: "...free will vs. determinism. Do we make choices? Or are we simply
controlled by forces outside of ourselves?"

2:
"��objective reality vs. a subjective reality"

3: "Altruism up against rational self-interest."

Regarding question number two, I think subjective reality might be taken in two different ways. a) Reality can be altered simply by wishing or thinking. b) reality exists in your head

With b) I do think there is no answer, and no need for an answer, for this question.

The problem arises in our very definitions of the two different views of reality.
Objective reality holds that things exist in addition to ourselves, namely a form of an outside world that we all share.
Subjective reality on the other hand believes that the outside world is a creation by ourselves.

This simple truth is we cannot step outside of ourselves and view how
we exist from an outside perspective. When a person can place all evidence in
their philosophy this doesn't mean their view is right or wrong in
regard to things that cannot be proven by this evidence.

A nice way to think about this is life within the matrix. Would it be possible to prove life is an illusion or not it you were a mere participant in the matrix? No, it would be impossible to hold any knowledge of the existence of the 'matrix' in some wider reality. And I'm sure Objectivists would still exist in the matrix world.

Another case is the 'dream world'.
How do you know your life isn��t just a dream?
Impossible to know, but even within dreams you have existence.

What Objectivists hold is that 'existence exists', and this is still valid
even in supposedly 'subjective reality'. To quote from Joe's excellent importance
of philosophy page, "The very fact that one is aware of something is the
proof that something in some form exists -- that existence exists --
existence being all that which exists."
This still holds firmly no mater what possible form our reality is.
What we can't say is that we don't exist in some form.

So when Regi replies, "There is no "evidence" for the subjective view. Subjectivism is a denial of evidence." I'm tempted to ask, what evidence is there for an objective reality?

It comes down to where the onus lies.
Ask somebody to prove that their reality is an illusion created in their minds and they cannot give you any proof, but the same applies for someone
who believes an outside world that we all share.
Both require a view outside of ourselves and therefore both are impossible to prove without returning to evidence from ourselves.

How can we interpret the debate under these assumptions?

Regi writes, "Two contradictory things cannot both be an "accounting of the evidence" unless you are playing "anything goes.""
They both account for the available evidence, if we were able to look from an outside perspective one would then become able to judge how right or wrong the views are.
Regi's definition of reality is compatible with both subjective and objective views, the line "Reality is what is so, whether anybody knows what is so or not." says it all.

Please don't confuse me for a subjectivist in the sense that I believe nothing is real or that I can change reality simply by believing something is so.
Whatever form existence is, "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." Is true.
Maybe I've been overly generous to the term subjectivist reality, if so I'm interested in you definition of it.

Thanks,

David

Post 58

Sunday, November 23, 2003 - 6:03am

Good thoughts.

It is not always possible to observe 'reality'. eg gravitons(if they exist?). Sometimes by observing 'reality' we alter it in some way, (Hysenbergs uncertainty principle). To understand reality we do need our imagination. By imagining flying along on a beam of light Einstein developed his theory of special relativity. In a way this is a subjective view used to describe reality.

Post 59

Monday, November 24, 2003 - 7:42pm