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Post 20

Sunday, September 26, 2004 - 1:47pmSanction this postReply
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In the July, 2004, issue of the American Philosophical Quarterly there's an interesting discussion of Kant, specifically the Critique of Pure Reason. The following from the author, Charles Huenemann of Utah State University, will be of interest to those who have been discussing Kant here: "In this particular section of the Critique ["Architectonic of Pure Reason"], Kant is concerned especially with explaining the nature of human reason, its limits, and the connection it has with values and morality. As it turns out in his philosophical system of transcendental idealism, human reason is responsible for the objective nature of experience, the laws of morality, the purposiveness in nature, and the beauty of art. All value derive from the nature or structure of human reason, and we are essentially nothing other than that human reason...." I believe this remark pretty much expresses the view that Kant is indeed a subjectivist--the objective nature of experience is a function of reason, not of reality! Etc.

Post 21

Sunday, September 26, 2004 - 9:22pmSanction this postReply
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I believe this remark pretty much expresses the view that Kant is indeed a subjectivist--the objective nature of experience is a function of reason, not of reality! Etc.

Here's a kicker to the above: Kant also smuggled in intuitionism using this kind of process:

Under Kant's system, it is permissible to blurt out anything which one "feels" is true and then watch or listen to others to see if one was correct. Example: [I'm pulling a sneak which I'll explain later] "Professor Machan got the watch he is wearing as a gift!"

How could I know this? I have never met Professor Machan face-to-face, let alone seen if he wears a watch or not, so I cannot justify this using the empirical mode of thought. As far as more deductive justification is concerned, all I can say is "Men wear watches, most of them, and Professor Machan is a man!"

Shoddy reasoning; shoddy. But what if I'm right - as confirmed by agreement by Prof. Machan and others, to make sure he isn't telling me an incorrect answer just to spite me?

This is the type of guesswork that the Kantian system lends prestige to. The model works like this: make a guess and pass it around. If everyone agrees, then the guess is shown to be true knowledge; if everyone disagrees - well, there will be better luck with the next one, or so I hope, since the noumenon is unknowable to me too. I'll try again later - and in the meantime, I will be as forgiving [or as righteous] with respect to your guesses as you were with mine.

Note how this seals the irrational mind shut because science and logic can be declared to be a formalized system of guess-works. It's easy to justify.

The counter-argument that guesses are random in character is almost as easy to defeat. Just find a mathematical sophisticate to compute the odds and to come up with a mean value of right answers versus wrong. And compare that answer to my own documented track record, and then ask that same sophisticate to compute the approximate odds that my track record could have come from chance. The simplest in vacuo statistical hypothesis with respect to the watch guesses, or any other kind of guesses that a fortune teller can make, will use 50-50 odds, and would give the typical profesional fortune teller a highly improbable probability rating.

Now here's the sneak. The actual relative frequency of men who wear watches that they received as a gift vs. men who wear watches that they bought themseves is actualy much higher than 50-50. I don't know the precise odds but a rudimentary Gallup-style survey could pin them down easily.

To tie this example into the overall discussion: Kantianism actually lets in shrewdness as a valid form of knowledge. His epistemological system justifies precisely this mode of thought, and wrap up all other modes into it.


Post 22

Tuesday, September 28, 2004 - 7:23pmSanction this postReply
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I've posted an article replying to the substantive comments (such as they are) made by Fred in his article to which this thread is linked.

In the meantime, and in reply to Fred's later one-footed arguments, let me say that the key argument about Kant is whether or not he severs knowledge from reality. All else comes from that and it's what we began discussing.

Having said that, to describe as 'realism' a position in which it is held that the 'out there' is unknowable is not exactly precise, if not to say completely disingenuous. But expand, Fred, expand - tell us what it is you say Kant said about this realm about which he says we can say nothing.

[As for Fred's sidebar question, asking FWIW what I consider Rand's view of metaphysics to be, I would say I understand her view on this to be substantially the same as Aristotle's, to whit, that it is the science of the first and most universal causes, rather than the attributes of things that have a contingent existence. Metaphysics is the study of "being qua being", or the study of attributes that belong to things merely insofar as they exist, e.g. existence, unity, sameness and difference. Can anyone - anyone? -  imagine Kant agreeing with that?]


Post 23

Friday, October 1, 2004 - 11:51amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

"Doc (may I call you that?)"

Call me Fred, the Dr. is just for Mr. Cresswell. Tee hee.

"Kant was stuck in the quicksand of "paddlehack" - my term for those otherwise intelligent thinkers of the past (PDLHK; Plato-Descartes-Locke-Hume-Kant) who never quite got around to recognizing that the mind has conceptual powers."

I agree with you about Descartes (and the other two big rationalists) who define perception as unclear conception. Hume in some sense tries to reduce everything down to the perceptual (or even sensational) level. But I think Kant breaks free from PDLHK (which, if I am right, becomes PDLH). For him, perception or sensibility is the faculty by which objects are given; understanding the faculty by which they are thought.

Fred

Post 24

Friday, October 1, 2004 - 12:14pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

"You make the leap from my claim, paraphrased as: Kant-can't-justify-knowing-his-own-thoughts (without contradicting his writings)"

Actually Kant can know his own thoughts as they appear to him in time, he just can't "know" them as they are in themselves, i.e., as they do not appear to him. Now that may be wrong but it isn't contradictory.

Fred


Post 25

Friday, October 1, 2004 - 12:29pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

"Under Kant's system, it is permissible to blurt out anything which one "feels" is true and then watch or listen to others to see if one was correct."

This is so far removed from anything I know in Kant. Perhaps you could give a cite.

Fred

Post 26

Friday, October 1, 2004 - 9:04pmSanction this postReply
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Mr. Cresswell,

[Side bar. Do you agree with George Walsh when he writes the following. "For Rand the function of metaphysics is to provide us with a unitary world view." For Kant, "the function of metaphysics is to provide us with a unitary world view."]

The above is my sidebar. Here is your reply.

[As for Fred's sidebar question, asking FWIW what I consider Rand's view of metaphysics to be, I would say I understand her view on this to be substantially the same as Aristotle's, to whit, that it is the science of the first and most universal causes, rather than the attributes of things that have a contingent existence. Metaphysics is the study of "being qua being", or the study of attributes that belong to things merely insofar as they exist, e.g. existence, unity, sameness and difference. Can anyone - anyone? -  imagine Kant agreeing with that?]

Note you did not answer my question, which was Do you agree with Walsh. I did not ask FWIW what you consider Rand's view of metaphysics to be.
So let me re-ask my side bar. See if you can answer it now.

As to your question, "Can anyone-anyone? imagine Kant agreeing with that?"

I can. And his name is George Walsh. See his paper in JARS, the section title "The Centrality of Metaphysics." As George points out, Kant used the term "metaphysics" in three different senses, one of them being the study of "being qua being." Kant thought that kind of metaphysics (sometimes called 'general metaphysics' could be set on the secure path of a science. George writes, "By way of a preliminary comparison of Kant's conception of metaphysics with that of Ayn Rand, we can already say that they agree on two points: that metaphysics is the study of everything in so far as it is, or of being qua being, and that the fundamental issues of existence fall within the scope of metaphysics."

"let me say that the key argument about Kant is whether or not he severs knowledge from reality."

I agree, please see my latest article where I discuss Miller's take on the infamous "obstacle" argument.

Hope that helps,

Dr. Seddon

Post 27

Saturday, October 2, 2004 - 8:26amSanction this postReply
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Fred said:

"Actually Kant can know his own thoughts as they appear to him in time, he just can't "know" them as they are in themselves, i.e., as they do not appear to him."
--------------------

... but Ed had said:

There is a real (and "knowable" - in its real form) psychological continuity involved in being a human - I need not appeal to reading anyone's mind to arrive at that truth. Now, either Kant's works jive with that truth, or they don't - that is the (weak) point I'm getting at. Here's a paraphrase that rocked my world the first time I had read it (added for shock value):

"The objective view of the mind is the subjective view of it."
--------------------

... then, astoundingly, Fred said:

"Now that may be wrong but it isn't contradictory."
--------------------

... so now Ed says:

But Kant's thoughts "as they appear to him in time" ARE his thoughts "as they are in themselves." Any non-Kant perspective of Kant's mental experience is necessarily non-objective. I repeat: The objective view of the mind is the subjective view of it.

Any call for a perspective of his mental experiences "as they do not appear to him" is contradictory and non-objective. Any extra-Kantian view of his mental experiences (ie. "as they do not appear to him") would necessarily be a subjective view of his mental experiences.

There seems to be an Ed-Fred dichotomy here (and it doesn't seem to be a false dichotomy).
--------------------

Ed

Post 28

Saturday, October 2, 2004 - 10:33amSanction this postReply
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Ed,
Maybe the fault is mine. Let me go back and ask when you say "The objective view of the mind is the subjective view of it" do you mean this to be Kant's position, or your take on his position or some third thing?
Sorry if I misunderstood.

Fred


Post 29

Saturday, October 2, 2004 - 6:40amSanction this postReply
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There's really none needed. What I wrote was a simple analysis based upon the standard Kantian model: since things-in-themselves are unknowable, the only standard possible for validation is agreement from others. My comment follows from that.

So it's over to you. 


Post 30

Saturday, October 2, 2004 - 4:57pmSanction this postReply
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Fred, I am the one. I am the one ... taking the stand ... making that bold, counter-intuitive claim (that the objective view of the mind actually is the subjective of it).

When considering the mind vs. extra-mental reality, the standard for objectivity undergoes a juxtaposition (it flip-flops).

Subjectivity is that which can only be known by one. Objectivity is that which can, in principle, be known by all. As is true with a toothache, you are the only direct observant of your own mind. You are the only observant that can provide an objective account of it - just as is true for toothaches.

Ed

Post 31

Saturday, October 2, 2004 - 6:07pmSanction this postReply
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Mr Seddon's reply to me once again side-steps the point of the 'debate.' I wrote, "To describe as 'realism' a position in which it is held that the 'out there' is unknowable is not exactly precise, if not to say completely disingenuous. But expand, Fred, expand - tell us what it is you say Kant said about this realm about which he says we can say nothing."

I note that he has failed to answer that point.

(Edited by Peter Cresswell on 10/02, 8:11pm)


Post 32

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:45pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

"since things-in-themselves are unknowable, the only standard possible for validation is agreement from others."

I don't think that would help. Since the things-in-themselves are theoretically unknowable, why would agreement with others about the things in themselves help? Kant, of course, recognizes other avenues of access to the things in themselves and none involve "agreement with others."

Fred

Post 33

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:49pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,
Are you saying no one can feel my pain? What about Bill Clinton?
Seriously, Wittgenstein has some arguments against this view but I don't know if you would buy them.

Fred

Post 34

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:57pmSanction this postReply
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Mr. Cresswell,

tell us what it is you say Kant said about this realm about which he says we can say nothing."
See my post 24 to your "Kant Didn't". Also, read Kant--he says a lot in all three critiques about "this realm", but it may sound confusing if you can't hold in focus all of his distinctions. Good luck Mr. Cresswell.

Dr. Seddon


Post 35

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 3:04pmSanction this postReply
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Fred,
 Wittgenstein has some arguments against this view but I don't know if you would buy them.
Bring it on Fred!  I'll take ole' Ludwig on.  I can navigate his serpentine twistings of logic (Ed beats his chest and postures intimidatingly, in front of his computer screen).

Ed


Post 36

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 4:05pmSanction this postReply
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Mr Seddon,

I respond to your helpful injuncton to 'read Kant' at post 26 of 'Kant Didn't.' Thanks for the specifics. :-)


Post 37

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 10:24pmSanction this postReply
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Fred, here is a sample of some philosophical giant-killing (please let me know if this was the Wittgensteinian train of thought to which you refer):

1. All thought is language
2. All language is mere social construction
3. All social constructions are "public"
---------------
Therefore, all thought is "public"

Fred, premise 2 is the where the action is at; isn't it? Premise 2 is the "business end" of this philosophical enterprise. And if this business end can't get "out of the red" (and "into the black"), then the whole enterprise goes bankrupt. And premise 2 is bollocks.

While languages (words) are used by humans as a tool for advanced thinking, they depend on initial (though sometimes, implicit) conceptualization - not the other way round. Check out my Epistemological "Primacy Pyramid" (EPP) to see where specific thoughts and mental acts come from:


.......................................politics......................................

....................................e-t-h-i-c-s...................................

..................................s-c-i-e-n-c-e.................................

..............................k-n-o-w-l-e-d-g-e............................

.........................l - a - n - g - u - a - g - e........................

...................c-o-n-c-e-p-t-u-a-l-i-z-a-t-i-o-n..................

................s-e-n-s-o-r-y -- p-e-r-c-e-p-t-i-o-n...............
___________________________________________
.............................r - e - a - l - i - t - y...........................

Key for the 2 potentially ambiguous terms:

Knowledge: a body of knowledge

Science: a body of knowledge that grows by explainable, determinate means

--------

Ed


(Edited by Ed Thompson on 10/05, 10:28pm)


Post 38

Wednesday, October 6, 2004 - 5:51amSanction this postReply
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From the first two paragraphs of http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm :

Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican Revolution," that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious:  the mind could be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of silicon chips could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e. recognized, or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as Kant alternatively puts it.
But if the mind actively generates perception, this raises the question whether the result has anything to do with the world, or if so, how much. The answer to the question, unusual, ambiguous, or confusing as it would be, made for endless trouble both in Kant's thought and for a posterity trying to figure him out. To the extent that knowledge depends on the structure of the mind and not on the world, knowledge would have no connection to the world and is not even true representation, just a solipsistic or intersubjective fantasy. Kantianism seems threatened with "psychologism," the doctrine that what we know is our own psychology, not external things. Kant did say, consistent with psychologism, that basically we don't know about "things-in-themselves," objects as they exist apart from perception. But at the same time Kant thought he was vindicating both a scientific realism, where science really knows the world, and a moral realism, where there is objective moral obligation, for both of which a connection to external or objective existence is essential. And there were also terribly important features of things-in-themselves that we do have some notion about and that are of fundamental importance to human life, not just morality but what he called the three "Ideas" of reason:  God, freedom, and immortality. Kant always believed that the rational structure of the mind reflected the rational structure of the world, even of things-in-themselves -- that the "operating system" of the processor, by modern analogy, matched the operating system of reality. But Kant had no real argument for this -- the "Ideas" of reason just become "postulates" of morality -- and his system leaves it as something unprovable. The paradoxes of Kant's efforts to reconcile his conflicting approaches and requirements made it very difficult for most later philosophers to take the overall system seriously.

So you do have a point, Dr Sedden, but how do you square your own interpretation with the difficulties mentioned above?

[As far as how Kant's emphasis on "reason" does square with what I wrote in my first response - post #21 - a paraphrase of one of Ben Franklin's wisecracks should suffice: "Surely it is a wonderful thing to be a reasonable creature - one can find a reason for doing absolutely anything!"

[Irish lilt added deliberately. Logic nuts can ask themselves how and in what way this squares with "P -> Q == ~P v Q.] 


Post 39

Saturday, October 9, 2004 - 6:31pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

What a memory rush. Haven't thought about LW in a long time. I don't teach him in my Intro. course since I use Rand's PHILOSOPHY: WHO NEEDS IT.
You might begin by checking the many references to"pain" in his PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. If that isn't enough, since many connect this to the so called "private language problem" see THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE PROBLEM by Saunder and Henze. Also look at Richard Rorty's (he was Kelley's dissertation advisor at Princeton) PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE. Rorty has a ton of references to Wittgenstein in his book.

Have fun. And let me know what you conclude.

Fred

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