Manfred’s Reply to Prof. Seddon

The old country song says: “Sticks and stones can break my bones, but words can break my heart”. It is particularly heartbreaking, at least for me it is, when somebody says that he is an Objectivist – meaning by this that he stands by Ayn Rand’s philosophy and not by Plato’s, that is – and then goes out defending people like Kant and trying to subvert Objectivism with it: That we are dealing with a subversion, though the culprit himself may not be aware of it, is shown in the following Confrontation Table which I had originally prepared for another reader of the thread corresponding to my article “Kant and the new tactics…” The table’s structure follows Rand’s procedure when requested to state her philosophy “while standing on one foot”. This table will be helpful when replying Prof. Seddon’s listing in “A Reply to Manfred F. Schieder”:

Metaphysics:

Objectivism: Objective Reality. One and only one world. NO “two aspects” world.

Kantianism: Dualism, a “noumenal” world nobody knows (excepting Kant?) nor can know and a “phenomenal” this world that is “not the real thing”.

Epistemology:

Objectivism: Reason

Kantianism: No tool of knowledge available or, at best, “feelings” to know the “noumenal” world. A mutilated reason to understand either the “phenomenal” world. “Mutilated” because it cannot be used to know the other, noumenal, world.

Ethics:

Objectivism: Egoism

Kantianism: Duty

Politics:

Objectivism: Capitalism, Free individual decision

Kantianism: Obedience to authority (Bureaucracy). The dedications in Kant’s books reek of subservience. Further on, Kant was a professor and as such and as every teacher was and still is in Germany, an employee of the State.

Esthetics:

Objectivism: Romantic Realism. Concretizing abstractions.

Kantianism: Esthetics haven’t any practical purposes.

The table presented proves not just that Kantianism cannot be associated with Objectivism and replies in general to any argument having the intention to associate Objectivism with Kant or, for that matter, any similar “philosophy”.

A special request to Prof. Seddon: I notice a total silence from your side in what refers to what I stated about the New Left basing its premises on Kant and that Habermas, a Newlefter, is considered a direct follower of Kant.

Now going specifically to Prof. Seddon’s “A Reply to Manfred F. Schieder”:

1):

Prof. Seddon: “…Miss Rand’s works do not constitute a philosophy at all…” “Can you give me the cite that led you to say this?

Manfred: Language contains more that what is being said. In Post 38 of the thread on Mr. Perigo’s “Kant Can’t” you distinguish 3 Rands. On the 3^rd. Rand you say: “and the scholar, whom I don’t think too much of”. This contradicts what you said on the 2^nd. Rand (“who gave me the broad ideas by which I live”). The Webster defines “scholar” as follows: “A learned or erudite person, esp. one who has profound knowledge of a particular subject.” Now Rand’s “particular subject” was the all encompassing branch of philosophy (Webster: “The rational investigation of the truths and principles of being, knowledge or conduct”; emphasis mine). Stating that you don’t think too much of Rand’s particular subject and following the definition given is akin to declaring that you consider that she didn’t know much of philosophy.

You probably said what you did “in the heat of the argument” and didn’t think at that time of what was immediately implied, but since language contains more that what is being said, this is what came out. I can clarify this further: in spite of Rand’s insistence that she was primarily a writer, to write “Atlas” she had to marshal and unite an incredible amount of data from reality (reality as Objectivism understands it, not as Kant does). This required a genius such as she was (which is also the reason why her deductions didn’t come much earlier in history), else “Atlas” would have been nothing more than another thick, bulky novel and not what Rand accomplished: to present the first and only possible philosophy of reason in a novel. This is also the reason why she could use what she presented in “Atlas” for her later written articles and lectures.

To accomplish her feat she didn’t have to know every small little detail of every “philosophy” existing before her. She was a philosopher, not a college teacher who must know every particular detail of the “philosophers” he teaches to his students. Barbara Branden worded it correctly in Post 27 of Younkins’ “Ayn Rand’s Intellectual Enemy”, where she said: “…she had an ability that never ceased to amaze her friends. She could be presented with a philosopher’s view of, say, a specific aspect of moral theory and then tell us what his views would be on almost every philosophical problem of importance.” Rand herself called attention to this peculiar way of immediately comprehending the position taken by any philosopher in her article “Philosophical Detection”, which I recommend everybody to read.

Rand’s position in comparison with specifics reminds me of a story Isaac Asimov once presented in one of his essays: While working as a biochemist in cancer research he met a historian of science. After the man left, Asimov thought that “this poor chap really doesn’t know what he’s loosing: to be in the middle of the fray as I am.” Years later Asimov himself became a historian of science (among other things). By then he saw it clearer and looked at the long past meeting differently. “That man was right,” he thought. “It’s HE who at that time was on top of the mountain seeing everything science is doing.”

I hope that the spirit of what I say comes through clearly.

2):

Prof. Seddon: “My work on Kant is not an attack on Objectivism qua philosophy.”

Manfred: Isn’t it? Judging from the foregoing Confrontation Table and the remaining part of this writing it seems to me that it evidently is.

3):

Prof. Seddon: “… and made you the keeper of the flame…”

Manfred: You got me on the wrong foot this time. For a while I thought that if I kept very, very quiet and didn’t say anything, nobody would notice it and I could bath in the exclusive glory of considering myself the “Lone Ranger” holding the fort... But, what the heck, it all came to be nothing but an illusion. The place is getting so crowded around here with all these other people creating more and more Websites to promote Objectivism and all that voices blaring the “good Gospel” (as dear and, unfortunately, since long dead Bea Hessen used to call Objectivism) to the world out there. What do all these people think they are doing, taking away from me the hope of carrying the glorious banner on MY shoulders? There’s an Objectivist Website even in Turkey, to say nothing of Germany, Austria, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, etc. etc. etc. Even New Zealand! Really, it’s more than I can take! All my exclusivity gone with the wind…

And in what refers to the “Fountainhead”: The Confrontation Table shows that you are a Kantian and not an Objectivist. But in my article I also stated very clearly that you are free to defend Kant… as long as you don’t mix it with Objectivism for the table cited shows the contradiction that results.

Besides, judging from the way you worded your reply you seem to resent those who defend Objectivism. This is in itself a strange attitude for someone who considers himself to be an Objectivist. It also speaks whole chapters for whom your heart is really beating, and it’s not Objectivism as far as I can see…

4):

Prof. Seddon: “… at least you didn’t resort to ad hominem…”

Manfred: I would never, since “ad hominems” are not arguments at all. They are a disgusting way of avoiding arguments. Here we are discussing a very serious matter! As you said in the present thread: This is business.

5):

Prof. Seddon: “Is that why he wrote a book “Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone”.

Manfred: The title itself is a contradiction in terms. Reason can never be associated with religion. Rand demonstrated this to the very hilt. Further on: Kant lived in the middle of a time of Deism which had quite some following in Germany and attracted also Kant, who incorporated it in an intention to place theology on a scientific basis in his “transcendental theology”. 1794 he published “Religion within the limits of reason alone”, which in my view is an attempt to overcome what he had said in his “critique of pure reason” about “suspending” (meaning by this shoving aside) knowledge to make place for faith (more on this a moment later). For doing this he immediately received a harsh warning from his master, the King of Prussia, who ordered him to stop presenting opinions on religious matters. Since Kant knew from where he was getting his bread and butter he hurried to shove everything aside that could in any way have harmed faith. His basic intention was to try to unite science with faith, a position which even today many scientists try to accomplish (for example Beadle and Hawking) but this, of course, is impossible. At his time it was even prohibited.

Freedom of speech was never too highly valued in Germany, least of all in Kant’s times. Did you know that Schiller, who lived when Kant did, originally titled and worded his “Ode der Freude” (Happiness) as “Oder der Freiheit” (Freedom)? He too received a harsh warning and had to change the wording. It was only Leonard Bernstein who worded it back to Schiller’s original when he came to Berlin in 1989 to direct the rendering of Beethoven’s 9^th on occasion of the Fall of the Wall.

6):

Prof. Seddon: “I had to limit knowledge to make room for faith.”

Manfred: What Kant really said was: “Ich muss also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen“. Norman Kemp-Smith's translation is: „I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith”. But also this isn’t quite what Kant said. What he really said was: “I have to renounce (aufheben = renounce, give up, abolish) knowledge to obtain room for faith.” Still, your way of presenting it is sufficiently clear and I will not change an iota of it.

Now, being a German (Austrian in fact, but it’s just as well) I’ll see if my way of stating it isn’t right too.

“Knowledge is a mental grasp of a fact of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation” (Rand) and “The faculty that works by means of concepts is reason. The process is thinking.” (also Rand). Since Faith is “the unquestioning belief that does not require proof or evidence… in God, religious tenets, etc.” (Webster), Reason and Faith become, thus, total opposites. Rand said this too. I could go far deeper into this but it’s not necessary for what is here under consideration. Hence, if we were to say, as you did, “I have, therefore, found it necessary to give up Knowledge to make room for Thought” we would directly face a sentence lacking any sense. Thought is a consequence of reason, reason being intimately related with knowledge. We cannot reject knowledge for then we would have a thought of nothing, which is an impossible. So Kant meant what he said, whether those who follow him like it or not.

Let’s go on a little bit further: Being a German I come to know that “Glaube” has a very specific meaning in German. It means “Religious belief”. Only as a further definition it means and can be used – though rather unusually – for “trust”. Also the majority of the word-compounds incorporating “Glaube” (Glaubensabfall, Glaubensänderung, Glaubensartikel, Glaubensbekenntnis, etc.) are all related with religious beliefs.

On the other hand, the verb “glauben” (no capitals here), signifies “believe”, “think”, “suppose”, in the sense of “Ich glaube, dass morgen ein schöner Tag wird.” (I believe that tomorrow we’ll have a fine day).

As a noun, however, Glaube is deeply entrenched with religion and thus, when I say “I found it necessary to reject reason to make room for religion” the sense of what Kant meant is perfectly translated.

7):

Prof. Seddon: …”if you can find an invalid or unsound argument…”

Manfred: I believe (J) I’ve done this more than sufficiently by now and I don’t think it to be necessary to go into every small little crevice.

8):

Prof. Seddon: “Obviously the key terms here are “known” and “think””.

Manfred: Please read my article again for I explained there and very thoroughly at that, that we cannot “think” of anything without identifying it on the basis of the characteristics it has. Besides, if Kant used both terms to designate different types of cognitive accesses to reality (from what I’ve read of Kant I haven’t got this impression) he made a mistake and the reasons for this are shown a little earlier in this writing.

In addition: can you give me an example of a thought where nothing is being thought of? I cleared this too in my article. Even trying to think of nothing includes already several characteristics (among them the characteristic of impossibility). But Kant is precisely saying this: that he can have knowledge of something of which nothing can be known. How could he do this? You see, there are no means whatsoever available to do it.

9):

Prof. Seddon: Where does Rand do this (prove the unassailability of reason)?”

Manfred: I love to imagine how every reader scurries now for his nearest copy of “Playboy’s Interview with Ayn Rand”. I will merely tell that the answer is on page 6 of said pamphlet. It starts with “Reason is…”

There is also a wonderful passage on why reason cannot be replaced by anything, thus making it unassailable (since just the intention of replacing it produces havoc) in “The Esthetic Vacuum of our Age”. It starts with: “If you rebel against reason…”

10):

Prof. Seddon: Now you’ve got me confused: Didn’t you just say “Kant said that the noumenal world cannot be known?”

Manfred: Again: Read my article!!! I said “Kant pretended (the accent fall on this word) us to accept his “noumena” to which he seemed to have a direct connection whose workings he never disclosed though he hinted at “feelings” as a tool of knowledge, like the religious do when they speak of learning the “realm of heaven”. One paragraph later I told every reader that “Kant counted with our simplicity (I could just as well have used the word “naiveté”) and expected us to take HIS words on face value.” It’s all in the same relation.

Personally and since I love spy thrillers I call his association with the beyond “The Kantian Connection”.

11):

Prof. Seddon: “Please provide your source in Kant (that our senses process (distort) what they perceive)

Manfred: Of course he didn’t refer specifically to the sense of vision but spoke of appearances as sensed in general. I thought that “a voice to the wise should suffice” and, thus, used as a practical example the sense of vision. I supply further references (emphasis mine): In his “Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics” Kant wrote: “… appearance, as long it is employed in experience, produces truth, but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusions.”

In his “Critique of Pure Reason” he states: “The receptivity of our capacity of knowledge is called sensitivity and continues to be completely different from the knowledge of the thing in itself, however deep we may consider the phenomenon.”

The conclusion to this is that our senses are, thus, defective for they can’t “sense” the transcendental. Since for Kant the world is dualistic, i.e. consisting of the transcendental (noumena) and the phenomenal (here he copies religions), our senses become immediately incomplete and incompetent. Kant repeats this way of looking at the world in his “Gedanken an den wahren Schätzungen der lebenden Kräfte” but I think the above suffices.

As I said already, I am strictly discussing a serious subject, so don’t read offense in what I say!.

12):

Prof. Seddon: “If we take your use of the term (Universe)....”

Manfred: But you don’t. Please see how the Webster defines Universe. I reached the same conclusion the Webster presents a long time earlier, when I wrote “Ayn Rand, I and the Universe”. The definition goes as follows: “Universe, the totality of all that exists.” Every Objectivist knows this. All that exists! What doesn’t exist, such as a „noumenal“ world or Plato’s „real reality“ of which this world, as he says, is only an image, doesn’t exist. “Philosophy” is filled with such nonsense.

Remember the Confrontation Table: ONE WORLD. Not several. One universe (all that exists), not parallel universes or multiverses. Not a two part universe. ONE WORLD! Is this so difficult to understand???? To challenge the Webster and the Objectivist definition is in itself a proof that whoever expresses it is not an Objectivist.

I explained it all over to “Nick Bruijn” on Post 71 (Kant and the New Tactics…) but you can also read it in an article by Nathaniel Branden published in 1962 in “The Objectivist Newsletter”, or directly from the “Fountainhead”. Rand specifies it all on page 943 of the paperback edition of “Atlas”… and now I have again everybody scrambling for the next available copy (J).

Manfred’s 2nd. Reply to Prof. Seddon

1)       Can I refer to a specific quotation where Prof. Seddon openly declares that Ayn Rand’s works do not constitute a philosophy at all? Of course not, nor did I say that Prof. Seddon did. In my article “Kant and the New Tactics to Destroy Objectivism” I mentioned “Prof. Seddon’s comments” and my recent “Manfred’s Reply to Prof. Seddon” further cleared this when I analyzed them as contained in Post 38 of the thread of comments and opinions on Mr. Perigo’s “Kant Can’t”. What Prof. Seddon wrote there lead me to understand the implications, i.e. indirect indications which triggered the few necessary steps, detailed in my reply, toward the opinion I voiced. But this wasn’t all I took into consideration. Additional details supported my deduction: for example, the about 150 further posts placed by Prof. Seddon on SOLO’s webpage and the reviews of his book on “Ayn Rand, Objectivists and the History of Philosophy” (the Editorial Review, for example, comments the book by saying that “Fred Seddon critically examines the views of Ayn Rand and some of her fellow Objectivists on several of the major figures in the history of philosophy, viz., Plato, Augustine, Hume, Kant and Nietzsche” and both the positive and the negative reader reviews do much the same. The word “critical” in the editorial review would not have been used if Prof. Seddon’s analysis would have been favorable to Rand’s views.
Judging from this entire fault finding with Ayn Rand one cannot come to a different conclusion than the one I reached. For anybody stating to be an Objectivist and then to criticize so massively Rand’s opinions on at least one other philosopher (Kant) doesn’t leave room for any other assessment than the one I presented. To change it Prof. Seddon would have to present his own proofs that I am wrong.
Continuous criticism and no defense of the thinker whose ideas one declares to share, arises in the reader the sensation that the writer of such posts has scorn rather than admiration for Objectivism in mind, a fact shown and shared by those who write on Prof. Seddon's articles and comments of Kant. Else, they would be filled with praise for Prof. Seddon’s comments.
In todays intellectually deconstructionist and twisted environment negative comments may mean a positive defense for the one negatively commented, but I still hold to the expectation that whoever says to be in favor of Objectivism should show this in his writing and present the corresponding efforts of support to the absolute excellence of the philosophy one states to favor. When this isn’t done, when a notorious absence of such a defense is encountered while at the same time another so-called “philosopher” is being protected, it is reasonable to suspect that whoever states to be an Objectivist has no major interest in standing by this banner.
I have clearly declared in my article that anybody can defend any philosophy he prefers but must then do so without any pretense to be defending or even promoting Objectivism, for the simple reason that Objectivism cannot be handled as any other “philosophy”. The reason for this lays in the fact that it is self-contained and as such self-sufficient. As I have shown in the Confrontation Table opposing Objectivism to Kantianism which, by the way, can be used as a working tool to compare Objectivism with any other “philosophy” as well, to mix it with any other “philosophy” brings forth immediately the inconsistencies and contradictions of the “philosophy” compared against Objectivism.
Also, to defend or promote Objectivism together with any other “philosophy” produces the unpalatable muddle which, as Rand mentioned in her articles, is responsible for the mishmash that is the characteristic or “standard of life” of human societies up to the present day. So, very specifically, Objectivism is totally incompatible with other ideas, particularly those who mingle religious beliefs with scientific evidence. Objectivism is the real START of PHILOSOPHY.
It is in this relation that I mentioned Habermas and not because I had any intention to introduce an additional character to this “drama”. Basically any “philosophy” developed prior or apart from Objectivism can be applied to any political idea. It can be adapted; it can be adjusted at will. Here it suffices to mention Hegel. The history of philosophy speaks of a “right” Hegel and a “left” Hegel and very often a given position of Hegel can be even used interchangeably by what is commonly called the “Right” or the “Left”. Just as much happens with Kant. Conservatives claim adherence to what he wrote and so do Marxists. Prof. Seddon might doubt that people like Habermas “read Kant correctly” but his post is a rather lonely and wrong one.
This situation stops with Rand. With Objectivism such a double standard becomes impossible. It applies to only one political system: Capitalism. This is the reason why I mention in my article in, I must confess, a somewhat ironical way, Prof. Seddon’s claim that Kant is a Proto-Objectivist. How so, if Kant stands at the root of Marxism (and Nazism and all the other Left-wingers at that)? Of course, Prof. Seddon considers that Kant must be read as he thinks he must be read, and perhaps we should even change a word in his writing here and there or refer to another book he wrote or to what he wrote at a time after a certain year, etc. But if this should be right, it only comes to show that Kant was – as in truth he was – totally arbitrary in what he wrote. What transpires given such conditions is that anything goes… But this is not what philosophy has to be.
Nothing of this sort happens with Objectivism. It is consistent and clear cut and it doesn’t allow any “biblical” interpretations, so to speak.

By now I think I have said enough to state my point unambiguously. What follows is to avoid the impression that I might leave something unanswered on purpose and this will then be followed by what can be taken as a general statement on the basis of the debate involved.

2)       Epistemology: Does Prof. Seddon see the difference entailed? He lines up five (5 !!) distinctions he understands Kant to have made, while Objectivism clearly recognizes only one tool to knowledge. Further on, he states that Reason, which Kant rejected to make room for Faith (but we had more than enough of this already), is Kant’s standard while it is Life for Rand. Then Prof. Seddon poses the question of whether Rand is right and Kant wrong and comes out in Kant’s defense by stating that “feelings” are not Kant’s standard of value. By then the confusion is perfect. Quite beside the point that there are no “values” in Epistemology (they pertain to Ethics, while Epistemology incorporates tools: either Reason or Faith) he further mixes Reason (as said, the tool of Epistemology) with Life (the main value of Ethics, the first practical branch that results from Metaphysics and Epistemology). Even leaving this incoherency aside, may I remind Prof. Seddon that there can be no Reason without Life, which uses it by the time the human level has been reached, coming prior to Reason to be used?

3)       Through all the posts Prof. Seddon placed and the replies he received, it became evident that nobody will ever convince him of being wrong, that there is no argument at all, however valid and unbreakable it may be, that will convince him. As it happens with religionists, all and every proof are rejected.

4)       Understanding from the up to here existing collection of antecedents that Prof. Seddon rejects any argument that shows his standpoint in relation to Kant to be wrong, I consider it senseless to keep up this debate and to continue an exchange of messages. In accordance I terminate my side of the dialogue herewith and inform that no reply whatsoever from Prof. Seddon will merit any attention from my side.

Manfred