RoR: Forum

Thank you, Laure Chipman, for this clear and beautifully organized article!

Rand's definitions of reality and of faith, as you state them here, are not novel. They are standard.

Rand's definition of sacrifice is flatly non-standard. It is a special definition, and it has to be spelled out as a special, non-standard meaning of the term and concept sacrifice, whenever it is used in that way in speaking to one unfamiliar with it. Rand's definition of sacrifice is a novelty.

One definition of sacrifice in my American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language is "the forfeiture of something highly valued . . . for the sake of someone or something considered to have a greater value." As you observed, in that ordinary sense of the term sacrifice, making a sacrifice need not entail a deviation from the pursuit of one's self-interest. If the thing "considered to have a greater value" is considered by oneself to have that greater value, then sacrifice in the ordinary sense of the term could be an action of self-interest.

Rand's special definition for sacrifice was: the forfeiture of something of greater value for something of lesser value. Rand used the term in the way she did, and there is no changing that. In better step with common usage, she could have called it inverted sacrifice. That would have been awkward. And she wanted to attack additional branches in the idea of sacrifice. She wanted to attack homage to supernatural deities that goes with the term sacrifice, and she wanted to attack the sacrifice of individuals to collectives.

Post 1

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 7:38am

Laure, that was a wonderful article! Sanction!

Stephen wrote:

One definition of sacrifice in my American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language is "the forfeiture of something highly valued . . . for the sake of someone or something considered to have a greater value." As you observed, in that ordinary sense of the term sacrifice, making a sacrifice need not entail a deviation from the pursuit of one's self-interest. If the thing "considered to have a greater value" is considered by oneself to have that greater value, then sacrifice in the ordinary sense of the term could be an action of self-interest.

The problem comes when "the [...] someone or something considered to have a greater value" actually has less objective value. For instance, Christians engage in behaviors we know objectively to sacrifice the Self because they believe they actually serve the "eternal" Self through the salvation into Heaven they expect. Likewise, communists sacrifice for the sake of the collective, environmentalists sacrifice for the sake of Mother Earth, etc.

In all cases, the "Higher Cause" gets posited as a "greater value" than the individual's life on earth. As most commonly used in the worst yet most populist ways, these sorts of "sacrifice" connote the usage of the word. Hence, I do not consider Ayn Rand's use of it that way "flatly non-standard" the way you do.

(Edited by Luke Setzer on 8/10, 7:39am)

Post 2

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 7:51am

Is this correct: "Rand uses the term Reality to refer to the nature of all that exists"? I think Rand uses the term to refer to everything that exists, not just to the nature of all that exists. "The nature of all that exist" includes only the essential or fundamental aspects of all existents, not everything about them.

Post 3

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 7:57am

Doesn't Rand use "sacrifice" in contradistinction to "trade"? The sense of "sacrifice" whereby one gives up something of lesser for something of greater value is trade. In common parlance when one sacrifices something, one gives it up and there usually is no expectation of a return of greater value. There are exceptions, yes, but these are usually cases where what one "gains" is not really a gain for oneself at all but to society, God, the people, etc., all dubious beings, to say the least.

Post 4

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 8:10am

I think you're right, Tibor. But the definition of reality as simply "all that exists" would allow people to correctly say that we create our own reality, since we create things that didn't exist before, and I'm sure Rand would not have agreed with that line of thinking; I certainly don't. I had a little trouble with that part of the article: the stuff in reality certainly changes, but we can't change the nature of reality. I didn't want to misrepresent Rand, but on the other hand I didn't think "all that exists" was really intended as a definition of reality. Any suggestions on how I could have improved that section?

Thanks Stephen and Luke, for your kind comments. I'm heading out on vacation for a few days, so forgive me if I'm slow in responding further on this thread.

Post 5

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 8:42am

Thank you Stephen for your description of Laure's article, as "clear, and beautifully organized". I have been sitting here, trying to compose a suitable response to Laure, and your words are my thoughts.

For me, Laure, the most compelling feature of this article, is your tone. You have managed to present some very controversial ideas, while remaining friendly and approachable.

As one who struggles to develop "people" skills that are not unintentionally disinviting, I appreciate your modelling of behaviour that belies your surname. I see no chip on your shoulder :?) If this is the result of no chip being placed there by your parents, please offer my congratulations to them, on a job well done. If this ability to speak truth to power, without alienating your audience; is something you have had to cultivate deliberately; I congratulate you on your achievement. It is a rare trait.

I am going to be rereading this article a few times, not only for its succinct expressiveness, but its intentionally inviting mood.

Thanks Laure

Post 6

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 11:40am

Damn good!

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 11:46am

Loved it!

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 2:26pm

Bravo! Beautifully executed.

Erica

Post 9

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 3:09pm

Oh, for Pete's sake, now I'm just me-tooing everybody when I congratulate Laure on her article. I hate being a joiner. I wish I could disagree, but I can't. :-) "Thank you, Laure Chipman, for this clear and beautifully organized article!" My sentiments exactly!

- Bill

Post 10

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 4:25pm

Prof. Machan wrote:

Is this correct: "Rand uses the term Reality to refer to the nature of all that exists"? I think Rand uses the term to refer to everything that exists, not just to the nature of all that exists. "The nature of all that exist" includes only the essential or fundamental aspects of all existents, not everything about them.

The first part looks right, though the second part isn't Rand's position at all. She would (and I'm quite sure, did) say that a thing's nature is not synonymous with its essence (which she regarded as epistemological, not metaphysical), but that it is synonymous with all of the entitie's characteristics. There is no separation in Rand's metaphyiscs between an entity and what it is. And what it is, is not determined by what humans have selectively isolated as merely the essential characteristics. I thing's nature is synonymous with its identity, not its essence. (And existence is identity.)

This is pretty well in line with the Dougs' explanation of what Aristotelian essentialism is, in Liberty and Nature. I take it from the above that your view is neither the same as theirs nor as Rand's (which is basically similar to theirs).

Anyway, yes, as a comprehensive term, "reality" for Rand refers to that which exists, and that existence is identity, and that what exists, exists independently of consciousness.

On top of all this, her usage of the term "reality" looks ordinary enough; if it means in some folks' minds something other than that which exists, then they have an inadequate grasp of a pretty standard and sound understanding of the term.

(Edited by Chris Cathcart on 8/10, 4:27pm)

Post 11

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 6:02pm

Yet, the nature of X is not all of X--the nature of a human being, its rational animality, does not include a person's hair or eye color or age. "Essence" may be a misnomer in characterizing what "the nature of" means for Rand but it is also wrong to think for her the nature of something includes all of what it is.

Post 12

Thursday, August 10, 2006 - 9:42pm

Prof. Machan wrote:

Yet, the nature of X is not all of X--the nature of a human being, its rational animality, does not include a person's hair or eye color or age. "Essence" may be a misnomer in characterizing what "the nature of" means for Rand but it is also wrong to think for her the nature of something includes all of what it is.

But in reality there are only individual entities, not generic types. The nature of an entity is whatever are the characteristics of the entity -- which is necessarily an individual entity. So hair or eye color or age specific to an individual is characteristic of the entity's nature.

There is a common nature to all entities in a class -- viz., common characteristics. That's the whole basis on which we classify entities according to their similarities. So, yeah, there is a nature of an entity with respect to generic features shared with other entities -- but that doesn't rule out the rest of the entity's nature, i.e., it's individuating features, that, along with the generic features, comprise the entirety of the entity's nature.

That's pretty much the way Rand put her view about "nature" as well. I don't see any basis for the position you ascribe to her, considering that for her "nature" is metaphysical while "essence" is epistemological. (I consider the terms "nature" and "identity" interchangeable in their meaning here.)

Post 13

Friday, August 11, 2006 - 12:33am

I don't disagree with this: "there is a nature of an entity with respect to generic features shared with other entities -- but that doesn't rule out the rest of the entity's nature." I never claimed that the nature of something rules out the rest of the entity's being or identity. But (I hold that) the nature of something focuses on what it must be to be the kind of entity it is, which excludes from consideration the details or accidents.

Post 14

Friday, August 11, 2006 - 12:37am

Laure, thanks for the article. You make a good point about something we've seen a lot of lately. It's pretty clear that some of these people do exactly as you say, and use different meanings of a word as a kind of semantic attack. Interestingly, when you try to get them to narrow their usage to a single meaning for a particular argument, they come back with something like "Oh...well that's just because you defined it that way!", as if the truth of the argument is artificially constructed.

Post 15

Friday, August 11, 2006 - 10:17am

And, of course, we defined it that way because it's the best integration of the facts we've observed. What they are resisting is the creation of this new synthesis--they want to debate within the realm of the status quo--the received verbal universe.

Post 16

Friday, August 11, 2006 - 2:41pm

Prof. Machan:

I don't disagree with this: "there is a nature of an entity with respect to generic features shared with other entities -- but that doesn't rule out the rest of the entity's nature." I never claimed that the nature of something rules out the rest of the entity's being or identity. But (I hold that) the nature of something focuses on what it must be to be the kind of entity it is, which excludes from consideration the details or accidents.

That looks to be subscribing to a doctrine of natural kinds, which I believe Rand would have regarded as a variant of conceptual realism and something she would not have accepted. As for myself, I don't think I accept it, either. What is natural to entities is not their being of a "kind," but of having certain specific characteristics -- which necessarily means not just some isolated or singled-out (singling-out requiring a conscious entity) characteristics, but all of them.

You say that you didn't caim that the nature of something rules out the rest of the entity's being or identity. I didn't make that claim; I said that your position amounts to ruling out the rest of the entity's nature, although I've also pointed out that I use "identity" and "nature" interchangeably, and so would have Rand. (There was some contention here about what Rand's position was, yes?)

To reiterate: The nature of something is just what an entity is. Here, we are still in the realm of metaphysics, and not of epistemology, where we can make sense of talk of such ideas as kinds and essences. "Nature" is a concept applicable to metaphysics. The nature, i.e., the identity, i.e, the what of an entity, is the sum of its characteristics. To be an entity of a particular nature is merely to be what it is, not to be an entity regarded as a member of some class or kind.

Edit: Clarifying this last point: it's not the regarding an entity in a certain way that confers upon an entity its nature. That's what's effectively being claimed happens, though, when one equates an entity's nature with its essential characteristics. (I would have said "the entity's essence," but strictly speaking they don't have essences like some metaphysical aspect or feature of them. There is no essence "in" the entity. But they do have characteristics that are essential to them being objectively regarded and classified in certain ways. That's the unpacking of the phrase "essential characteristics.")

(Edited by Chris Cathcart on 8/11, 2:46pm)

Post 17

Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 5:55am

I admit not to be focusing here on Rand's views but more on what is the case. Rand didn't discuss "the nature of" much--she spoke of definitions, which (as I see it) state the nature of something. Just what the ontological status of the nature of something is is not, if I recall correctly (sitting here typing this post just before I board a plane), considered in detail by Ayn Rand. Yet she makes ample use of the idea of "the nature of," for example, in her essay on "The Nature of Government." And my point is that when one thinks and talks about the nature of government, one is not focusing on all aspects of governments--the doors in the offices, the paper clips, the shirts worn by the officials, and location of the offices, etc. One is focusing on what something must be in order for it to be a government. Just what ontological status this has is not my concern here.

Post 18

Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 3:55pm

Actually, quite unsurprisingly, Rand gets it exactly right on these things. She is correct to use "nature" and "identity" interchangeably. That is to imply that when you talk about the nature of something, you are talking about what is characteristic of that individual thing. So talk of "nature" pertains only to ontology. Now, what is Rand saying when she is talking about "the nature of government"? She could only be talking about what is in the nature of each and every individual government. In this, we have to be clear not to conflate the linguistic/conceptual and the ontological order of things. She could only be using the phrase "nature of government" as shorthand for the nature of individidual governments -- not of some ontologically free-floating "government". She is instead speaking of what's in the nature of each and every government -- what we could rightly say is an aspect of every government, that is common to all governments. This needn't lead to confusion; it wouldn't preclude us from being able to talk about what's in the nature of this or that government (e.g., the U.S. government) that makes it different in nature from another government (e.g., the Soviet regime), despite their commonly-shared characteristics. In talking about the nature of government, Rand used linguistic shorthand for common characteristics shared between entities that we classify as governments, omitting (this is a mental act, not an ontological dictate) for those purposes reference to distinguishing characteristics. Besides, you couldn't distinguish between them unless their natures were different. But an aspect of the nature of every government is what Rand's essay focuses on.

That marks out the ontological territory, if you will; the phrase "nature of government" marks out the epistemological-conceptual-linguistic territory. It's un-Randian and simply un-not-the-case to speak of the nature of things as defined by the needs of a conceptual-linguistic system. Nature comes first.

Also, definitions do not state the nature of things. They state that aspect of some grouping of things that we have classified as essential to their being grouped. I think she was quite clear that meaning is not the same as defnition. Meaning refers to what's the case for everything in a class. This is where analytic philosophers can stumble (and have) quite badly. Since it's not stated in the definition of cows that they don't have the capability to jump over the moon, cows not being moon-jumpers is confined to a mere "empirical/contingent/synthetic" truth, and that an analytical truth (stipulated by fiat to be so by some idiot philosopher) states only the definition rather than the meaning. Except that somehow they missed that once you go and start unpacking the meaning of "animal" (which is what cows are), and keep unpacking those meanings, you eventually encounter that you are dealing of entities of a certain nature which precludes their being moon-jumpers. Stating that the definition of "cow" captures what there is about the nature of a cow doesn't cut it under the standard analytical-philosopher treatment, though actually does when a bit of thought is put into it and meanings unpacked. I do realize here that this is a distinct matter from the nature of a classified grouping of things not specifying all that is in the nature of particular entities within that grouping. But once you start going down the road of talking about definitions stating the nature of things, you're just asking for trouble if you're not extra careful.

Tying back to the very original point: reality for Rand is what exists. The nature of reality is the identity of what exists.

Post 19

Tuesday, August 15, 2006 - 7:36pm