|A problem with Mozes' argument ...|
Suppose A and B are two persons living alone on a desert island. A beats up B and takes the food that B has gathered. In evaluating A's actions, if you say "A initiated force, and what he did was immoral," you have, in effect, exhausted everything there is to say about it. If you then add "and on top of that, he violated B's rights!" what would that addition mean? It is, again, only in the context of an organized social system that bringing up B's rights has any meaning (since it would then imply that A should not only be morally condemned for his actions, but also legally punished). (7)
But "A" here SHOULD be legally punished, as well as morally condemned. If there is, as yet, no explicit "legal system" -- then B should seek (individual, unorganized) retribution on A for what A did. THAT would be justice (and no other course of action would be). You could say that B could keep running and hiding from A, but that's not living as a man, but a scurrying cockroach. That's not proper or just.
Basically, Mozes is saying that one man can't violate the rights of another, not unless they're both under a social system explicitly championing those very rights. It's a form of social metaphysics, to say that principles (like rights) only exist when most folks are explicitly saying that they do (or that rights "came into" existence, only after they were first penned on official documents, by the Founding Fathers).
If I've got him right, Mozes is wrong about that.