RoR: Forum

... to deny free will is, implicitly, to endorse the unavoidability of prejudice, bias, subjectivity when it comes to human knowledge and understanding about the world.

How true.

Post 1

Thursday, July 19, 2007 - 9:37am

Tibor, I like this one, because as much as I'm a fan of explaining the "physics of free will" I think it's strange that people seek it rather than recognize its effects on how we think. Our logic, our perception, and our knowledge suggest free will as the basis of our mental capabilities. First, our logic depends on the ability to choose the 'right' answer, where it is not impliticly or explicitly decreed, except by looking at a particular logic proof on the whole rather than at its parts. Second, our perception, by virtue that it's automatic in the respect of accrue what we 'see', but not automatic in ensuring we integrate what we 'see.' And third, our knowledge is the bluntest, most obvious proof for free will, it doesn't come automatically, nor can it be deduced by our perception alone, otherwise other animals with similarly accute "perceptual engines" would have done so already (apes, certain parrots, and other critters).

Essentially, the "physics of free will" will come as our understanding of our brain becomes better, and not before. It will vindicate the work of many, but it will be more akin to the final in the coffin to such mystical thinking that knowledge is automatic, that perception (sentience) equals thought (sapience). And that logic trumps the world (Nature).

-- Brede

Post 2

Friday, July 20, 2007 - 11:19am

Tibor- unlike those you suggest are bored with the topic, I'm fascinated with it- thanks for writing about it.

Perhaps a definition of free will would help the discussion. People typically have different conceptions of what constitutes free will and the extent to which the will is free. Even people who call themselves determinists often disagree on the extent of the bondage of the will.

Post 3

Friday, July 20, 2007 - 2:38pm

The only prob with continuing the subject of 'free will' (aka, for some, 'volition') is the lack of analytically Identifying the fundamental meanings involved in the assumed-as-understood terms of knowledge, judgement...and especially...identification. Choline, Inositol, B-vitamins, network-connections, etc are irrelevent to such.

When THESE terms are relatable in a purely biochemical (or neural-network) framework of thinking (which is a tipoff, btw, to an already deterministically 'materialist' view of mental operations), then there'll be something new worth considering; elsewise, same-o, same-o.

LLAP
J:D

Post 4

Friday, July 20, 2007 - 5:57pm

For something to be free (in the sense in which is relevant in "free will") is for it to be independent of determinates other than itself; so, for example, a free citizen isn't under the control of others but determines his or her own thinking and actions. The will, in turn, is the beginning of action--it isn't a thing but a power or capacity--so a free will is a beginning of someone's actions not determined by other than the agent, caused only by the agent (which does not mean there aren't various conditions that are required for the agent to produce the conduct in question).

Post 5

Saturday, July 21, 2007 - 11:56am

Dr Machan,

There is, furthermore, the plain fact of the enormous differences among human beings, in their practices, institutions, beliefs, styles, culture, art, politics, and philosophy, all of which implies that people are free to choose in very many different ways rather than compelled to do as they are allegedly hard wired or forced by their environment. Even those who strongly defend determinism falter on this point because they realize that what they believe about free will versus determinism is not shared by many others and to explain that without crediting people with the freedom to think as they will is impossible.

A determinist has no problem with human variety - he would say that humans are extremely complex systems subject to enormously varied genetic and environmental influences. It's true that no two humans are ever alike; on the other hand, if I throw a handful of sand into the air, the pattern it makes when it falls will be unique as well. But the falling of the sand is quite deterministic - it's just very complex and can be totally altered by tiny factors like small breezes etc. There is a whole field of maths devoted to completely deterministic systems which are nevertheless hard to predict ("chaotic systems").

But we can, in fact, predict people's behaviour in a lot of cases, and not just when they tell us what they are going to do. Identical twins are generally very similar to each other, not just physically, but in terms of their behaviours, and not just for psychological traits which might be seen as outside of volition (such as IQ), but for things like committing crimes, the archetypal volitional choice. Yet they are two seperate people, two quite distinct "agents". Why do they behave so similarly? For the determinist, the answer is boringly obvious - they share the same determinants. (Whether genetic or environmental ones is not really the point here, although in most cases studied so far, both seem to be important).

Clearly, if anyone has a volitional choice to commit crimes or not, the twin of a criminal also does. Twins are just normal people who happen to have unusual siblings - they are no more or less free than anyone else. But as a matter of empirical fact, the twins of criminals commit crimes much more often than other people. Why? Now the answer to this question may be to do with genetics, or it may be all about the environment - or both. In fact, it could all be down to the mystical influence of the stars, if you like. The point is that all of these are deterministic explanations, and as far as I can see there cannot be a non-deterministic one - that would be the same thing as no explanation at all. Correlation implies causation - wherever there is a correlation between X and Y (unless it is merely a random chance finding), there is a cause for this correlation - some kind of chain of causes and effects linking X and Y. (But it may not be direct - it might be Z causes X and Z causes Y.) And if either X or Y is a human behaviour than this implies that that human is not "independent of determinates other than itself".

Jeremy B

Post 6

Sunday, July 22, 2007 - 3:23pm

Regarding Jeremy B's comment about identical twins, are you sure of this claim that twins are both more likely to become criminal, say, than two brothers? If you could provide further background to this finding, I'd really be interested.

However, even if this were true, there could still be an explanation consistent with free will.

People who become criminals are, in a sense, psychologically dependent on other people. That is, rather than view life's challenges as problems they can solve through persistent effort and pondering, they view those challenges as personally insurmountable. The key to solving those challenges, they seem to feel, is to commandeer the thinking and efforts of others, or even the love and physical affection of another, through lying, cheating, stealing, rape, and even murder. Within the subconscious mind of a criminal, it would seem, "other people" are essentially different than he or she is. "Others" have the power and efficacy to "make things happen" that the criminal wordlessly believes he lacks; "others" have the unique ability to grant or withhold that which the criminal needs to be happy, or at least temporarily content. In short, "others" loom larger and bigger than life, to a criminal. At least, this seems to me to be a reasonable inference from the choices criminals make.

If my inference is true, then this mindset I've attributed to criminals is craziness--a gross mischaracterization by the criminal of himself--of his own possibilities for achievement--and a misunderstanding by the criminal of the nature of other people. Grownups don't usually reach such distorted conclusions out of the blue. But children, subjected perhaps to abuse or cruel torment by a seemingly (from a child's perspective) bigger-than-life adult, do reach such distorted conclusions. Such a child might conclude, while suffering some intensely or repeatedly traumatic experience, that his fate is metaphysical helplessness; that "other people" are powerful while he is weak, that "other people" hold the key to his ability to survive.

Identical twins could share certain genetic traits that make it more difficult to bounce back emotionally from the trauma of abuse. We've all noticed at times that some people are more easily disturbed by rudeness or abusiveness than others; some are more sensitive while others seem to have a higher threshhold of biological-emotional resiliancy. If twins were more sensitive and perhaps even also more intelligent types, their feelings about the experience could be more intense and shocking, then might be the feelings of less sensitive twins; and their insights about the experience could lead them to attribute greater significance to the threat the experience poses to their well-being, than duller twins might attribute to that same experience.

In other words, twins with certain traits--I do not claim to know exactly what these traits might be--that make them more vulnerable to disorientation and suffering in the wake of abuse, would probably have a more difficult time maintaining realism. The emotional upset of such twins could make it more difficult for them to think clearly, or to persevere in thinking, thereby making them more vulnerable to reaching false conclusions about themselves and others. Such false conclusions could lead to criminality later in life.

In contrast, brothers have some genetic dissimilarities, so the intensity or significance of the emotional disturbance might vary between them. One brother might crumble under the stress and reach damaging and unrealistic conclusions that he subsequently internalizes, while the other manages to remain more realistic.

Of course, I don't have much in the way of proof behind this idea. It is all based on inferences I have drawn.

Post 7

Sunday, July 22, 2007 - 3:50pm

Another possible explanation, consistent with free will, for a statistically higher incidence of crime (or any other behavior) among twins relates to their similarity of experience flowing from their identical genetic makeup. Such a makeup might create a higher incidence of similar feelings and abilities. I'm not claiming that identical twins feel the same most of the time, because one's feelings are automatic emotional responses to one's ideas and perhaps also to one's earliest pre-thinking experiences. And I'm not claiming they have the same interests, or develope the same skills. Twins--and everyone else--think for themselves.

But identical twins might have similar intellectual capabilities and strengths. Math or language might be easier or more difficult for them both. They might both feel more passionately, or more detached, or more impatient, or more sensitive. They might both be more easily depressed.

These similarities, while encompassing only a minor part of their respective experiences, might happen often enoough for the twins to unconsciously develope a sort of symbiotic relationship, in which the experiences and even the choices of one develope some influence over the experiences and choices of the other.

Now, I'm flying through fantasy land. I don't even know if this is possible.

Post 8

Wednesday, July 25, 2007 - 3:35am

I have something to say about the available research on twins and criminality. I have retrieved 6 relevant primary research publications found in peer-reviewed scientific journals (don't thank me too soon, Jeremy). I present them (and my comments) as articles of debate. Here are some excerpts from each one -- along with my comments on each one -- in chronological order:

Gurling HM, Oppenheim BE, Murray RM. Depression, criminality and psychopathology associated with alcoholism: evidence from a twin study. Acta Genet Med Gemellol (Roma). 1984;33(2):333-9.

A study of 74 twin pairs with alcoholic probands from the Maudsley Hospital is reported. Pairwise concordance for alcoholism as categorised by the SADS-L Research Diagnostic Criteria is similar in MZ twins (29%, 8/22) and DZ twins (33%, 13/39). Concordance for all diagnoses other than alcoholism is however significantly greater in MZ twins (48%, 13/27) than DZ twins (21%, 8/39, P less than 0.001). ...

Data on criminality revealed that 21% (32/148) of the twin sample had non-alcohol, non-traffic offences on record at the UK Home Office.

Most relevant finding:
With these 148 twins -- who shared genes related to alcoholism or criminality -- "genetics" failed to even explain a 50% proportion of variance in behavior outcomes. What this means, of course, is that the environment -- the external environment (e.g., family) + the internal environment (e.g., willful inhibition of 'acting-out' merely because of a given disposition) -- was found to be more important than genes in "determining" behavior outcomes.

Mednick SA, Kandel ES. Congenital determinants of violence. Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 1988;16(2):101-9.

Congenital factors include inherited characteristics and perinatal experiences. Evidence for inherited characteristics in criminal behavior is approached through family studies, the study of twins, and adoption studies. Of those three, adoption studies provide the most fertile ground for study.

Predisposition toward criminal behavior is noted to be limited to property crime. The second congenital factor is the perinatal experience. Minor physical anomalies appear to be strongly related to hyperactivity and later criminal involvement, but only if the offender was reared in an unstable, nonintact family.

Relevant findings:
Where genetic inheritance explained a proportion of the variance of criminal behavior, it was always a property crime (not other crimes). For outcomes related to perinatal experiences, environment (again) was the linch-pin needed to get the criminal ball rolling. No unstable environment, no evidence of congenital effects.

Carey G. Twin imitation for antisocial behavior: implications for genetic and family environment research. J Abnorm Psychol. 1992 Feb;101(1):18-25.

Methods of analysis that permit reciprocal twin interaction not only provide better statistical fits to the data but also yield estimates of heritability that agree with adoption data. The results suggest that the genetic influence on registered criminality may be more modest than previously thought.

Relevance:
Most of the relevant, published research (research which was published before 1992) incorrectly over-stated the level of genetic control of behavior outcomes.

Lyons MJ, True WR, Eisen SA, Goldberg J, Meyer JM, Faraone SV, Eaves LJ, Tsuang MT. Differential heritability of adult and juvenile antisocial traits. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1995 Nov;52(11):906-15.

The unique environment (plus measurement error) explained the largest proportion of variance in both juvenile and adult antisocial traits.

Recap:
Environment trumps genetics.

Lyons MJ. A twin study of self-reported criminal behaviour. Ciba Found Symp. 1996;194:61-70; discussion 70-5.

The common environment, but not genetic factors, significantly influenced early criminal behaviour. The environment shared by the twins has an important influence on criminality while the twins are in that environment, but the shared environmental influence does not persist after the individual has left that environment.

Recap:
Kids (15 and younger) in unstable homes explains the decisive proportion of variance in criminal behavior outcome (until the kid moves out).

Kendler KS, Prescott CA, Neale MC, Pedersen NL. Temperance board registration for alcohol abuse in a national sample of Swedish male twins, born 1902 to 1949. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1997 Feb;54(2):178-84.

METHODS: We examined Swedish temperance board registrations from 1929 to 1974 (n = 2516 individual twins) in all male-male Swedish twin pairs of known zygosity from the population-based Swedish Twin Registry; these twin pairs were born from 1902 to 1949 (n = 8935 pairs).

RESULTS: The lifetime prevalence and probandwise concordance rates for temperance board registrations were 13.2% and 47.9%, respectively, in monozygotic twins and 14.6% and 32.8%, respectively, in dizygotic twins.

Relevant findings:
In these thousands of twins, while the "genetics" of identical (monozygotic) twins explained a larger proportion of variance in behavior outcomes than non-identical (dizygotic) twins did, "genetics" failed to even explain a 50% proportion of variance in behavior outcomes. Which means, of course, that the environment -- the external environment (e.g., family) + the internal environment (e.g., willful inhibition of 'acting-out' merely because of a given disposition) -- was found to be more important than genes in "determining" behavior outcomes.

Any thoughts?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/25, 3:37am)

Post 9

Friday, July 27, 2007 - 3:30am

Ed:

Yep, quite a few. I wrote a rather long post, but my browser managed to lose it. Sorry.

My point, however, can be expressed succinctly - I never said that the reason twins behave alike in regards to criminality was because they shared genes. My point was that whether due to genes, environment, astrological influence, or whatever else, they behave alike, and only a deterministic explanation can account for this correlation. Contrary to Dr Machan's argument that determinists cannot deal with human variety, I claim that only determinists can deal with human similarity! It's my opinion that genetic factors probably do account for a substantial proportion of the similarity between twins (it is difficult to say whether they are absolutely more or less important than environmental ones - since this depends on how many different environmental factors are in play, and this will vary geographically and historically), but that's another story entirely, and it's a very complex empirical issue which is not really for us to judge.

Mark:

Your explanation is creative, and possibly true in some cases (although the evidence is that criminals are, in fact, generally less intelligent than the average) but, I think, still deterministic. It is not "mechanistic" - it does not propose that criminals are just mindless animals or robots - but then, I don't think that determinism has to do that.
(Edited by Jeremy B
on 7/27, 5:49am)

Post 10

Friday, July 27, 2007 - 2:21pm

Jeremy B.,

It's my opinion that genetic factors probably do account for a substantial proportion of the similarity between twins (it is difficult to say whether they are absolutely more or less important than environmental ones - since this depends on how many different environmental factors are in play, and this will vary geographically and historically), but that's another story entirely, and it's a very complex empirical issue which is not really for us to judge.

No, it's not another story it's this one (facts have to all fit together -- reality is not discontinuous), except with apparent dis-integration on your part. I'll say more about this in my next post.

[re: genes] ... it is difficult to say whether they are absolutely more or less important than environmental ones - since this depends on how many different environmental factors are in play, and this will vary geographically and historically ...

As this is a side issue, I won't continue pressing it. But take note that 6 out of 6 (100%) of the marshalled relevant and acceptable scientific investigations into this matter (which varied geographically, though not historically) all cross-validated each other regarding the non-gene aspect of a person's experience as the decisive factor in behavior outcomes. Also take note that "experience" is often called the environment, but this word -- as commonly used -- seldom correctly integrates the internal environment which we all have (where we sometimes exercise the willful inhibition of acting-out merely because we had a given pre-disposition to act-out).

Another way to say this is that non-gene factors explain the predominance of variance in behavior outcomes -- and 100% (not 90%, or 50% -- but 100%) of the investigating scientists -- in the marshalled 6 studies -- were even able to measure this aspect of reality. Jeremy, if you can say that "it is [still] difficult to say" -- in spite of powerful contradictory evidence (plus your dissembling mention of "history" which serves to, somewhat arbitrarily, inject the idea of "historical relativism" into a debate on human nature), then I'd rather be done talking about this side issue.

... whether they are absolutely more or less important than environmental ones ... but that's another story entirely, and it's a very complex empirical issue which is not really for us to judge.

There are 2 points made by you above:

(1) The question of whether genes or "environment" predominate in explaining the noted variance in human behavior -- has no bearing on whether or not determinism is true (because either genes or "environment" would simply merely then become the determining factors in said behavior!)

(2) The question of whether genes or "environment" predominate in explaining the noted variance in human behavior is complex and empirical, and that means that we must withhold judgment and remain in an epistemologically "undetermined" (pun intended) position on that matter.

This is either because "complex" means "impossible (for laymen) to understand" or it means that "empirical" means "factual truth" which, to humanity's dismay, stands in opposition to "logical truth". Another way to say this is that logical truth, which every quasi-intelligent being can potentially come to know, has nothing to do with our empirical experience of the world (which is limited to only those things we've personally perceived, and that's all -- no integration). And still another way to argue this point is to say that Peikoff was wrong (in ITOE, p 113) when he stated: "It is the use of logic that enables man to determine what is and what is not a fact."

Jeremy, (1) fails to integrate that there are, at least operationally, 2 "environments": external (society, etc) and internal (mental, willful, etc). This is a limitation in sufficient understanding which is shared by many, many acclaimed experts on the matter. You can't merely claim that environment automatically excludes the mental, or the willful -- though perhaps the best understanding would include a triad of interacting factors: the genes, the external environment, and the "organism" which, by definition, makes the concept: "self-determination" more than merely possible).

And (2), as is already shown in my description of what you must also believe in order to make that statement without internal contradiction, is self-refuting.

I'll stop there because I want to bring up a 1994 essay by Alasdair MacIntyre ('Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification) which proves how determinists can't ever stake any claims to the truth of a matter -- because of an internal contradiction found in their basic premises.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/27, 2:35pm)

Post 11

Friday, July 27, 2007 - 9:53pm

Ed wrote,

I'll stop there because I want to bring up a 1994 essay by Alasdair MacIntyre ('Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification) which proves how determinists can't ever stake any claims to the truth of a matter -- because of an internal contradiction found in their basic premises.

Ed, are you going to present MacIntyre's argument? I'd be interested in seeing it, because I have yet to see a valid argument either here or elsewhere in the Objectivist literature that determinism is self-refuting or self-contradictory.

- Bill

Post 12

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 2:02am

To assert that one hasn't seen a valid argument in the Objectivist literature that determinism is self-refuting, etc., is easy. I can turn around and say, just as easily, that I have never seen any argument in the Objectivist literature that shows that belief in free will is a mistake, that arguments for free will are mistaken, etc. Several people have made attempts to defend determinism and to refute free will and it is easy to say that none of these have been successful. Showing it is another thing entirely. Over the years I haven't encountered any successful refutation of free will and defense of determinism (of the sort that denies free will--self-determinism and free will are, of course, fully compatible). One can make assertions like this all over the place but why on earth should anyone believe they are true? Where is the beef? Has anyone in the Objectivist community produced a sustained work of philosophy--say some book, some peer reviewed published philosophy paper--that defends the idea that human beings are, in all their conduct, being compelled to behave as they do by forces over which they have no independent control, that they behave as, say, do clouds or pebbles or earthquakes? No one in the Objectivist community has done this, whereas there are several sustained book length, scholarly arguments as well as published papers on record in which the case for free will is made and the various alleged refutations of it are dealt with in considerable length. As to their success, one thing is for sure--saying they lack it or have it just isn't enough.

Post 13

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 1:27pm

Tibor,

As you well know, I've done more than simply assert it. I've argued this issue to death on this forum and elsewhere. Do you really want me to repeat the arguments, as you insist on doing? I can if you wish, but I don't see what point it would serve.

- Bill

Post 14

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 2:39pm

Bill,

I have submitted an essay outlining MacIntyre's argument (as a new RoR article). There is much more to say about it than is already found in the essay (perhaps culminating in a dozen or more added posts!). I wanted to devote a unique thread to it because I foresee that I (and perhaps 2-3 others here) and you and Jeremy B (and perhaps 1-2 others) will be philosophically attempting to rip each other's arguments to shreds -- i.e., I expect something akin to a 6- to 8-man, philosophical cage-match (6-8 men enter; 3-4 men leave)!

;-)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/28, 2:44pm)

Post 15

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 4:36pm

Ed, thank you for posting the findings of twin studies relating to criminality. I read through your post, but I don't understand much of the meaning of the studies. A higher incidence of alchoholism, or crime, or other behavior, among identical twins, as compared with non-identical twins, seems interesting. But it doesn't prove determinism or free will. I'll look forward to reading your article soon.

Jeremy, I think you suppose that one must embrace determinism to uphold cause and effect. But as Ed and Tibor have pointed out, cause and effect is also consistent with self-determinism, i.e. free will. The idea that cause and effect applied to human choice requires determinism stems, I think, from reductive materialism--the belief that because man is atoms-in-motion, that process necessarily excludes volition. But why should it? Why is it impossible for matter to produce consciousness, including the distinctly human consciousness of volition?

William, there is a fundamental contradiction in stating that one knows a fact to be true; while also asserting, in effect, that one lacks the requisite means to identify anything as true or false, as fact or fantasy. For the ability to make such distinctions requires that one have the ability to be objective. But determinism is an argument that objectivity is an illusion; that people only imagine they're capable of objectivity. I don't think the issue is so slippery or hard to figure out. I'm sure one could present complex arguments on behalf of determinism that require a lot of pondering and sorting through. But careful thinking would eventually lead one back to the essential contradiction in determinism.

Post 16

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 7:18pm

Mark, you wrote,

William, there is a fundamental contradiction in stating that one knows a fact to be true; while also asserting, in effect, that one lacks the requisite means to identify anything as true or false, as fact or fantasy. For the ability to make such distinctions requires that one have the ability to be objective. But determinism is an argument that objectivity is an illusion; that people only imagine they're capable of objectivity. I don't think the issue is so slippery or hard to figure out. I'm sure one could present complex arguments on behalf of determinism that require a lot of pondering and sorting through. But careful thinking would eventually lead one back to the essential contradiction in determinism.

I've dealt with this argument elsewhere on this forum, but I gather than you haven't been following the discussion. So, let me give you a brief reply.

Despite the arguments of its opponents, determinism does not imply that objectivity is an illusion. Objectivity is unbiased thinking, which I've argued is determined by one's values, just as biased thinking is. The fact that some people's conclusions are determined by the failure to value intellectual honesty and objectivity does not mean that everyone's conclusions are determined this way, any more than the fact that some people commit unintentional errors in thinking means that everyone's conclusions are suspect.

The fact that the quality of one's thinking is determined by one's values does not mean that one's reasoning is, therefore, biased and non-objective -- not if objectivity and truth are the values motivating one's thinking. How does one know that these are the values motivating one's thinking if one is determined? The same way that one knows it if one has free will -- namely, by a careful assessment of one's reasoning processes -- by asking oneself, am I being objective here? Am I looking at all the evidence and being fair in my judgments? Whether one is determined to adopt this approach or freely chooses to adopt it does not matter for the objectivity of one's conclusions. What matters is whether or not one's reasoning is well-motivated, and well motivated reasoning can occur whether it is determined or freely chosen.

You also wrote (to Jeremy):

The idea that cause and effect applied to human choice requires determinism stems, I think, from reductive materialism--the belief that because man is atoms-in-motion, that process necessarily excludes volition...

Not necessarily. That cause and effect require determinism can also stem from the idea that one's choices are goal directed -- are made for the sake of a value -- with the value or object of interest determining the choice. If one makes a choice, it is reasonable to ask, why did one make it? -- for the sake of what end or goal? To give an answer in terms of the goal for which the choice was made implies that the goal was the (final) cause of the choice -- that it determined the choice and that given that goal, no other choice was possible. Determinism does not require mechanistic causation; it does not require that people behave as clouds, pebbles or earthquakes, to use Machan's examples, but is perfectly compatible with a principle of final causation.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 7/28, 8:14pm)

Post 17

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 9:06pm

Bill, objectivity is a mental outlook by which one considers and logically integrates into one's conclusions all relevant evidence that one discovers relating to some issue. The basic feature that makes one's thought processes objective is congruence with reality, meaning in this case, congruence with the law of identity.

For if one's thinking is non-objective, one either contradicts the law of identity by choosing to neglect some data that one knows is pertinent, or one violates the law of identity by incorporating contradictions into one's thoughts.

The basic feature that defines mental objectivity is not human choice or values, because one could not value something that did not already have an identity. So objectivity is not a product of the thinker or valuer; objectivity is a fundamental aspect of existence. Reality is objective, so thinking must be objective to be efficacious.

True, one can choose to think more or less carefully; one can seek objective clarity, or one can choose to ignore information one doesn't like, and embrace contradictions. But one's values and choices do not give objectivity identity and meaning; objectivity gives one's values and choices identity and meaning.

And finally and again. If it were determined that one thinks something, then one lacks the power to think any other way. Which is to say, one lacks the ability to think at all, because thinking is the logical process of making distinctions: identifying facts, discarding errors.

Post 18

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 10:12pm

Mark, I find your answer to Bill compelling, with one glitch (in mere semantics). When you say that:

... thinking is the logical process of making distinctions: identifying facts, discarding errors.

... I'd refine that to ...

"... [reasoning] is the logical process of making distinctions: identifying facts, discarding errors."

... in order to account for invalid reasoning (such as a fallacy), which is still "thinking" -- i.e., bad thinking -- but only merely masquerades as "reasoning." In utilizing a fallacy, "the naive" may think that they have reasoned out the matter, but "the astute" understand that the naive simply are not in possession of an adequate mastery over the words which they have uttered.

;-)

MacIntyre's essay deals intimately with this issue.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/28, 10:15pm)

Post 19

Saturday, July 28, 2007 - 10:25pm