|Ed T. wrote:|
Take size. How do we first ("first" as it would be for cavemen) figure out that a creature is huge?We see and/or feel by touch that some things are bigger than others, period. It's basic perceptual information, period. It doesn't need to be, nor is it, inferred or merely the result of integrating secondary qualities. By the way, motion -- hence "trembling motion" -- is not a secondary quality.
Obviously often primary qualities are perceived concurrently with secondary qualities. But it is not the case that we perceive secondary qualities, from which we somehow infer primary qualities.
I would suggest, similar to Ed and Ted, that primary qualities *epistemologically* depend on secondary qualities. Primary qualities (shape, number, extension) are always inferred through observance of secondary qualities. That is, we can tell shape, number, and extension only by seeing or feeling the borders of objects.I disagree with the first two sentences. See my answer to Ed. Since when is an object's border a secondary quality? I can only guess that you place far too much stock in color, since it an aspect of much visual experience. Size, shape, direction, and number are as manifest as color is. We can detect edges and other shape features even when there is no color difference. If not, you could not distinguish between a disc and a sphere of the same color. Color differences often accompany object borders in vision. However, a color border does not imply an object border, e.g. on a tiger or zebra. Also, colors are completely irrelevant when an edge or shape is perceived by touch.
I think Rand was arguing that *metaphysically* there is no PSQD.Whatever this is allegedly means, cite the evidence. Her argument against the PSQD was a straw man -- that the PSQD says we can perceive without a means of perception.
And so Merlin, I repeat my question of post 20#.Yes, to the extent I can figure out what it might mean. The argument in the last two paragraphs of post 16 seems to be:
Premise 1. All perception is by means of qualia.
Premise 2. Qualia inform us of only secondary qualities.
Conclusion: Primary qualities must be somehow derived from secondary qualities.
If that is the argument, I reject it.