Distorting Determinism

Despite my disagreements with some aspects of Objectivism, I can admit that many Objectivist writings provide interesting insights into a variety of issues. However, if I had to name a single issue that I have never seen an enlightening discussion of in Objectivist circles( at least in official Objectivist publications), that issue would have to be debate over the freedom of the will (or in other words, whether human beings possess free will or not).

Very often, Objectivists treat determinism as if it is self-evidently false. That such a self-evidently false doctrine has captivated many minds in the history of philosophy from Benedict Spinoza to David Hume to Brand Blanshard has not given them room for pause. That the vast majority of the top biological scientists, neuroscientists and psychologists are determinists of some sort does not worry many Objectivists the slightest bit. And for good reason: the number of people who believe something doesn't make it true or false.

However, what is determinism? What is this self-evidently false philosophy (and I say that tongue in cheek) that many philosophers have believed and others have ridiculed? I will return to present a short analysis of determinism, why it is important that its opponents get the issue right, and how determinism actually expands human freedom and the freedom of the will rather than limiting it.

Post 1

Friday, October 29, 2004 - 11:03pm

Very often, Objectivists treat determinism as if it is self-evidently false. That such a self-evidently false doctrine has captivated many minds in the history of philosophy from Benedict Spinoza to David Hume to Brand Blanshard has not given them room for pause.

You're quite right that we don't really know why determinism is not true. But that doesn't change the fact that it “obviously” isn't.

It isn't that Objectivism sees determinism as self-evidently false, but that it sees the opposite of determinism (volition) as self-evidently true. Everyone makes choices. The fact of choice is an irreduceable primary in human experience. We can point to something in our consciousness and say “Here is volition,” as we would say “Here is the color purple.”

I recognize that this is a fairly weak argument and hardly likely to convince anyone determined, pun unintentional, to doubt his own power of volition. It would be desirable if we could find a physical explanation for volition, just to put the specter of determinism to rest once and for all. But accepting the self-evidence of volition seems to work well enough, and I think that most Objectivists have better things to do than to sit around wondering if we're really making those choices we think we're making or not.

Post 2

Saturday, October 30, 2004 - 12:50am

Determinism, in the widest sense, is a philosophical position on causes and effects. In its strongest form, it argues that “that every physical event, including human cognition and action, is causally determined [and necessitated –Next Level] by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences.” (www.wikipedia.com). A consequence of this definition of determinism is that free will as many people understand it is an illusion.

I’ll explore that thought for a second. Hard determinism, which is the strictest form of philosophical determinism, argues that all effects are logically (or sufficiently) necessitated by their causes. This position is rejected by some people because of its fatalistic implications. The argument goes something like this: the future is inevitable and nothing makes a difference - only one choice and one future was possible so choice is an illusion - such a position would undermine human responsibility - ah, hard determinism is dangerous - I must reject determinism.

Even if hard determinism were true, it is a very uninteresting doctrine as it stands and fear of it is ill-motivated. I am indebted to Steven Pinker for showing me why in very clear terms in his book, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. OK, let’s assume that I prove hard determinism – ok, shut off your brain and stop thinking before you choose for the next week – whatever you do is hopeless to prevent the future that is determined. You can see that this is obviously nonsense. Deliberation is a brain (or if you prefer, mind) function that no one can turn off. Volition is very real in that sense, so the nature of the mind is very much untouched by the truth and falsehood of hard determinism in its existential form. People will continue to think and make choices – existential determinism has little effect on the reality of choice because it doesn’t argue that human beings don’t choose.

What makes determinism interesting is that it argues that choice can be reduced to a process with determinants that necessitate its results, which is a very different thing from arguing that choice doesn’t exist. The claim that choice can be reduced to a process with determinants that *necessitate* its results cannot be defended empirically (because one can never tell when he has exhausted the determinants) so I will not deal with it for now, though I will return to it later to show that even hard determinism isn’t the hell hole many think it is. However, I will take on a much milder form of determinism in my next part - this milder form simply argues that determinants are influences - the hard determinist position would be that when all these influences are summed up, what happened had to happen. What I will show is that one cannot avoid the idea that there are factors that influence human choices and preferences, sometimes to the point of arguably necessitating those choices. What most people do is choose those influences they like and give them credibility and discount those that they don’t like – deterministic analysis is a part of the human mind’s nature, and we shall see that it is even more credible than some people allow for.

The decomposition of any process or structure into smaller elements for analysis is the philosophy of reductionism, and it can take a variety of paths with respect to the mind/brain. I will look at idea-based reductionism, genetic reductionism and environmental reductionism in my next part. There will be a few thought experiments and some scientific research cited - fasten your seatbelts!

Post 3

Saturday, October 30, 2004 - 8:44am

Determinism isn't true, because quantum mechanics (QM) -- the fundamental governing principles of the universe -- disallow it.

In QM, nothing is certain... everything is merely potential, until those potentialities solidify into a particular certainty. All available options are being "felt out" beforehand by the fundamental subatomic particles of mass and energy, such as the electrons and photons.

These particles ultimately settle into their final values in ways that seem to defy all notions of pre-determination. They obey things like seeming randomness, and "wavefunction collapse". In QM, only by the making of an actual measurement, does a person "force" a reality to congeal, which was only a spread-out field of multiple probabilities before.

If you want to read more, you can check out the book I've posted in the book forum, called Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed.

Post 4

Saturday, October 30, 2004 - 12:13pm

Why, Orion Reasoner, you poisonous little coward. I might have known; so that's what got your game, is it?

My need for a bedrock of real trust in my life is far too powerful for me to consider approaching life in any other way.

All right, don't consider it, my very good empiricist.
And you hedge against NIOF!... and... and... O, brother. LOL!! You idiot, you poor thing!

"we have met the enemy, and it is us"

regards at a distance,

]*Pyrophora Cypriana[

Post 5

Saturday, October 30, 2004 - 10:45pm

Why, Orion Reasoner, you poisonous little coward. I might have known; so that's what got your game, is it?
My need for a bedrock of real trust in my life is far too powerful for me to consider approaching life in any other way.

All right, don't consider it, my very good empiricist.
And you hedge against NIOF!... and... and... O, brother. LOL!! You idiot, you poor thing!

"we have met the enemy, and it is us"

regards at a distance,

]*Pyrophora Cypriana[

What in flaming hell are you even talking about??? Is this translated Swahili???

You are living in a dream world, if you think I'm going to try and drink the 50 gallons of Ovaltine it would take to get the Dick Tracy Decoder Ring that allows me to figure out what in the icy rings of Saturn you are talking about...

If you want me to understand you, consider dropping this autistic secret language that you or some subculture group have invented that only makes sense in your own head, when you talk to me. Attempt to use references that mean something to those outside yourself, because a post like this is as useful to me, as pockets on the back of a shirt.

Otherwise, I'm just going to stop reading these posts. The choice is yours, and frankly, I'm not much motivated to care any more.

(Edited by Orion Reasoner on 10/30, 10:47pm)

Post 6

Sunday, October 31, 2004 - 4:26am

"Determinism is the theory that everything that happens in the universe--including every thought, feeling, and action of man--is necessitated by previous factors, so that nothing could ever have happened differently from the way it did, and every thing in the future is already pre-set and inevitable. Every aspect of man's life and character, on this view, is merely a product of factors that are ultimately outside his control. Objectivism rejects this theory."
Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series, Lecture 1.

For an understanding of what Objectivism accepts, I recommend reading the section, "Human Actions, Mental and Physical, as Both Caused and Free", from Peikoff's Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, chapter 2, "Sense Perception and Volition."

Post 7

Sunday, October 31, 2004 - 8:02am

Since I am very busy today and will probably be unable to add new substantive material, I'll respond (most likely unsatisfactorily) to some of the posts already written. I thought that some of my future posts would address the questions asked and I think that they still will.

To Nature Leseul:

I hope I have addressed your point by discussing the position of most determinists I know in my second post, which is that volition is a real phenomenon. What most determinists are interested in are the determinants of the volitional process and how they affect the results of the process. What most determinists argue is that if we understood or the all the factors that went onto choice, it would be in principle predictable. This is a variant of the hard determinists' claim.

One problem that obscures the debate between free-willers (or libertarians or indeterminists as opposed to compatibilists) and determinists is the notion of causation being used. Some free-willers seem to argue (and sadly, I have to classify Ayn Rand as one of them) that because choice cannot be determined (necessitated) by some single factor, those single factors are not determinants or influences. All of this would depend on how one defines causation, and in the end, I think that the proper causation is systematic and complex.

To concretize the point: does the fact that I am hungry play no role in my decision to seek breakfast simply because I could have chosen otherwise?

To Orion Reasoner:

Quantum indeterminism cannot be reconciled with individual and moral responsibility because current understandings of it make it a random process. Determinists have no problem with inherently random processes (which by the way, do not *seem to* occur in our macroscale world)- they just admit that they are of no help to libertarians who argue against determinism to avoid the purported moral implications.

But maybe there is some revitalized version of this argument that I have not heard. I seriously doubt it though.

To Bob Palid:

Yes, I have read OPAR's treatment of determinism and have a decent Ayn Rand and Objectivist library. An Objectivist who recently visited me mocked me for spending money on Objectivist books than some Objectivists! But back to the point you raised, which I might discuss in further detail later, though there are lots of good treatments of the issue online. Some of my treatment here I owe to those sources, and I would definitely single out Scott Ryan for commendation.

I find it a bit problematic that OPAR (and Rand in " The Metaphysical vs. The Man-Made" in PWNI) allows only man to possesses volition while relegating the rest of the universe to determinism. How did beings with libertarian free-will arise in a deterministic universe? Well, it is easy to just say that we should just wait for science, but I guess that if you do not see something at work there, that is fine.

I will stay away from more empirically motivated criticisms of Peikoff's parodies of genetic determinism and to some degree, environmental determinism. However, the real question from a philosophical perspective was considered very closely by Daniel Dennett in "Elbow Room" and "Freedom Evolves", the latter being the book that I am more familar with. The question is this: what does it mean for an action to be under your control? In what sense are you powerful or powerless? Are you powerless because your immense physical strength is a necessary result of your biochemical structure? Are you really unintelligent because your intelligence is a partly a result of larger cerebral cortices? If free will and our choices are necessary results of biological processes and there is no "ghost in the machine", is it less free? Only if the libertarian view of human choice is the legitimate view of choice.

That the human body/brain/mind is itself a system that can be reduced to causes and effects *internally* is an issue that Objectivism doesn't deal with at length. I think that this is one of the reasons why Objectivism has unenlightening discussions of determinism with respect to human beings - it refuses to reduce the mind causally, an approach that might have made sense when doctors couldn't open brains without killing people but which. is strongly opposed to that of modern science (to put it mildly).

Cheers and see you all later.

Post 8

Wednesday, November 3, 2004 - 9:27pm

I had written a response earlier, but lost it when posting (sigh - that is very deflating), so I'll try to cover the key point of the post.

I was going to discuss milder varieties of determinism. I call these varieties "milder" because all the look for is possible determinants or influences on volition.

The strongest of these milder varieties are grounded in the biological sciences of evolutionary biology, genetics and neuroscience. Before discussing these sciences, let us see what Peikoff, speaking for Objectivism in OPAR, has to say about one of them: genetics. I consider Peikoff's statement to be a rationalistic parody of what genetic determinism really involves. He cites no genetic determinists and for good reason: no genetic determinists exist, and the people who were labelled genetic determinists (researchers like Dawkins and E.O. Wilson) never subscribed to the ideas that their opponents (who defined them in the terms that Peikoff does) claimed that they did.

"The [heredity] school of determinism treats emotions as a product of innate (genetic) structures. Everything essential to man, it holds, including the character and feelings he will eventually develop, is a product of factors built into his body at birth. No one who understands the nature of emotions could entertain this theory for long. Such a person, rejecting materialism, would recognize the epistemological impossibility inherent in the approach. Innately set emotions, he would see, imply innate concepts and value-judgements, i.e. innate ideas." - OPAR, pg 203-204.

Modern science pretty much disagrees with every single statement that Peikoff has made except the last line, and even Peikoff's view of innate concepts and value judgments has to be qualified, given the highly important role given to verbalization in concept formation in Objectivist Epistemology, to be reconciled with the modern scientific view.

What are a few of the modern experiments that have validated genetic influences on human behavior?

The most popular of these experiments involve experiments on identical twins. Identical twins have identical genetic codes. Fraternal twins are like brothers and sisters or siblings: shared genes from the same parents, but not identical genetic codes. Finally, random individuals selected from the population will not share genes from the same parents.

If genes influence human behavior, we will expect to find great similarity in human behavior between identical twins, a lesser similarity between siblings and fraternal twins, and a lesser similarity between random individuals selected in a population. And this is precisely what science finds: on a wide variety of behavioral characteristics, like IQ, moral temperament, sexual orientation and susceptibility to depression, identical twins are far more similar than siblings, and siblings far more similar than individuals randomly selected.

Does this mean that genes determine everything about an individual? Of course not, and no one claims that. In the paradigm used by scientists, the environment (or nurture) has a substantial role to play in how some traits are expressed. Identical twins, for example, do not always share the same sexual orientation. However, this is not a claim that sexual orientation is chosen or that if it was, it would be reversible. It's just a claim that current science doesn't think it is 100% genetically determined.

I've not seen a single discussion of identical twins studies in Objectivist literature. Back to Peikoff's claim about the "heredity school."

Yes, emotions, character and many but not all aspects of human behavior are at least in part influenced by genetic structure. If genes influence brain development as they mos certainly do, they indirectly influence aspects of choice too. However, one of the problems with some Objectivists is that they are unable to understand that causes can be complex with certain influences or determinants being NECESSARY but not SUFFICIENT causes of phenomena. On this understanding, genes are necessary but insufficient causes of certain behavioral and physical traits. Genes are what make animals the kinds of animals they are and they make identical twins far more similar than random individuals.

Peikoff's understanding of materialism with respect to the mind is highly flawed, and might be based on a confusion of scientific and philosophic materialism. A materialist views the mind as the product of brain activity: some argue that it is possible to understand human behavior as the result brain activity without referring to the mind, while others argue that the mind has no causal power and is simply our conscious access to states of activity within the brain. These positions can be tested for plausibility and are not going to refuted by verbal proclamations, so even if philosophic materialism as defined in any way is false, it still doesn't affect the empirical question of whether the brain creates the mind or not.

And finally, the question of whether ideas have a physical basis in brain mechanisms and whether there are certain fully formed concepts in the brain is not separated by Peikoff. Since Objectivism tends to regard ideas as explicitly formed and referenced concepts and not tools of cognition that can tested by actions, it is hard to see whether Peikoff is conflating issues or not. For example, a baby might not have explicitly formed the concept of length or dimension but he or she must use it to crawl from place to place, and must have an intellect capable of forming it in the first place. If this intellect, and aspects of it (for emotion and value judgement) have a physical basis that correlates quite well with the intensity of our feelings or the quality of our intellect, it could be argued that we have innate predispositions or innate differences which differ from individual to individual which might explain some differences in ability. A damaged brain might form ideas less well. It is this minimal position of innate ideas that I will defend eventually, though there is some evidence for stronger innate concepts.

Some of these differences, with respect to the brain and other topics in neuroscience, will be the subject of my next contribution to this thread.

Post 9

Tuesday, December 14, 2004 - 7:27am