A little insight here would help.....

Bill here again, thanks to the indulgence of Sir Roger.

John, you wrote, "Now, its back to the passing of notes under the door with Ed Thompson. This time, maybe I'll try to convince HIM (using Chinese symbols, of course!) that promises are willfully-accepted, binding, obligations -- or, at least, that they become prima facie duty-acceptances, in a hierarchy of possible action plans (and values), in the sense outlined by WD Ross.

'Thanks for the debate, Bill. This student was ready, and his master has appeared.'

John, I really wish I could remember the exact wording of your argument, but it's been 35 years. As I recall, it went something like this:

1) John promises to pay Bill $5,000.
2) John undertakes an obligation to pay Bill $5,000.
3) John places himself under an obligation to pay Bill $5,000.
4) John is under an obligation to pay Bill $5,000.
5) John is obligated (i.e., ought) to pay Bill $5,000.

The problem here is that you really haven't derived an "ought" from an "is." All you've done is beg the question by assuming that a promise made is an obligation undertaken. But that's the very thing you're trying to prove, isn't it?

In my view, there is no such thing as a categorical "ought." The concept of "ought" is inherently hypothetical, viz., "If you want such and such, then you ought to do such and such in order to achieve it." In other words, if Y leads to X, and X happens to be your goal, then you ought to do Y. However, what this means in so many words is simply: "Y is a means to X." A prescriptive statement is simply another kind of descriptive statement. An "ought" statement is nothing more than a particular kind of "is" statement. It is simply a statement about what is the best means to the achievement of a given end or goal.

Does that mean that there is no obligation to keep one's promises? No, but it does mean that in order to demonstrate such an obligation, one has to show how doing so furthers one's antecedent goals or values. One might argue along the lines of, if you want to be able to trust others to keep their promises to you, then you should be willing to keep your promises to them. Something like that. But the argument that you've given does, I believe, beg the question.

- Bill

Post 21

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 9:30pm

John once more (getting a lot of mileage out of the note passing with Ed Thompson! You know, he really is a great guy, and with such a great mind! I only wish I had consulted him before writing 'Rediscovery ...', but that's the way the cookie bounces) ...

Bill, ole' buddy, ole' pal -- you bemoaned:

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John, I really wish I could remember the exact wording of your argument, but it's been 35 years.
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No worries, friend. Actually, it was 41 years ago. And my exact words were:

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(1) Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.' [yes, in 1964, $5 meant something]
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(4) Jones IS under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. [caps added]
(5) Jones OUGHT to pay Smith five dollars. [caps added]
------------------

At the time, I had argued that additional statements (required to make each premise a logical entailment of its predecessor), "do not need to involve any evaluative statements, moral principles, or anything of the sort."

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In my view, there is no such thing as a categorical "ought." The concept of "ought" is inherently hypothetical ...
------------------

Bill, you make a good claim here. I retort that integrity requires that actions follow dispositions (though admittedly this does beg the question that integrity is inherently good for man). Ah ... Bill ... hold on ... Ed says he would like make a point here:

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Ed:
Hi Bill, I don't really know you, except from your debate here with John -- but I would like to add (to John's last statement), that human happiness is a categorical "ought." Folks around here may give me some flack about this position that I've taken on 'categorical happiness' -- but what can I say, it's the Aristotle in me!

If I'm right (that human happiness is not a "choice"), then virtue (Nicomachean) ethics follow, and John's 'integrity retort' holds water. Thanks for letting me interrupt ...
------------------

Bill:
One might argue along the lines of, if you want to be able to trust others to keep their promises to you, then you should be willing to keep your promises to them.� Something like that.��But the argument that you've given does, I believe, beg the question.

John:
Ed has a point, if virtue ethics hold water, then I can appeal to such and save my original argument. It involves a broader scope than I had originally intended, but all I have to do is to take the Nicomachean challenge. I agree with your initial criticism though: my argument -- as it had been outlined -- begged the question regarding the value of promise-keeping.

Thank you, Bill. I've really enjoyed the discussion, and dare say I that I've grown from it as well! Oh, and thank you Ed! You have helped to steer me to the solution of the problems which I've created for myself. There is no greater joy than self-supersedence!

John

Post 22

Monday, July 25, 2005 - 10:55pm

Greetings and salutations! Bill here again. Poor Roger is beginning to lose patience with my usurping his computer as much as I have. So, I suspect that I'll have to use my own computer from now on.

John, thanks for clarifying my rendition of your argument. I can see that I was close, but not exact. 41 years was it? Well, in that case, you wrote the article six years before you presented it us in your ethics class. Btw, how did your speech on the Philosophy of Mind go at Black Oak Books in Oakland? I wanted to attend, but my friend, Phil Coates stood me up. He was going to give me a ride over there, but couldn't make it.

I wrote, "In my view, there is no such thing as a categorical 'ought.' The concept of 'ought' is inherently hypothetical ..."

You replied, "Bill, you make a good claim here. I retort that integrity requires that actions follow dispositions (though admittedly this does beg the question that integrity is inherently good for man)."

Oh, I think it is good for man, John, but hypothetically good. If you want such and such, then you ought to do such and such and of course it follows that you ought to be consistent about it - that you ought to act with integrity.

"Ah ... Bill ... hold on ... Ed says he would like make a point here:

"Hi Bill, I don't really know you, except from your debate here with John -- but I would like to add (to John's last statement), that human happiness is a categorical 'ought.' Folks around here may give me some flack about this position that I've taken on 'categorical happiness' -- but what can I say, it's the Aristotle in me!"

Hi Ed. Didn't Aristotle say that happiness is the natural end of human conduct in that it is that which everyone desires? If it is, and I believe that it is, then it cannot be prescribed, because there is no further end to which it serves as a means and for the sake of which it "ought" to be pursued. One can certainly say that one "ought" to pursue life sustaining actions insofar as these serve as a means to one's happiness, but one cannot say that one ought to pursue happiness. "Ought to" for the sake of what value, end or goal? There isn't any, because happiness is itself the final end of one's conduct.

Ed, be sure to thank John for the stimulating discussion, and tell him that I hope to be able to attend his next public lecture, as I regret missing the last one.

Cheers,

Bill

Post 23

Monday, July 25, 2005 - 3:41pm

This is Sarah.

Josh,

No, you've now gone and confused instinct with reflex. In your karate example, defending oneself becomes pseudo-reflexive. If it were instinctive, we wouldn't need the karate class now would we. For example, an infant has a sucking instinct so it can breast feed.

If you want to go and play the definition switching game, have fun trying to get the rest of the world to switch over to your definition.

Sarah

To Sarah,

Since I was playing the "definition switching game", I will say this: An instinct is something you know. Something you know is knowledge regardless of how you came about knowing it. I know the objectivist say you only gain knowledge through reason but instinct would prove otherwise. A baby doesn't have the use of reason yet or does it? In the future, I promise not play the "definition switching game". I will just let you read the definition yourself from Merriam

REFLEX: a : an automatic and often inborn response to a stimulus that involves a nerve impulse passing inward from a receptor to a nerve center and thence outward to an effector (as a muscle or gland) without reaching the level of consciousness --

INSTINCTa : a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason.

The key word that separate the two is complex, like a bird building a nest but wouldn't the bird need some reasoning skills?

So yes, you can already have the "inheritable tendency" for instinct and when you learn karate you develop that instinct. That explains why some are better than others at karate. If you need further clarification read Wilhem Wundt. Thanks Sarah for keeping me on my toes. Jbrad

Post 24

Tuesday, July 26, 2005 - 10:09am

Bill,

What a surprise! What brings you to this side of town?

It looks like you went one step further than Bardel. Rather than viewing facts as true propositions, you view them as referents to true propositions (or maybe just to any old propositions?), yes

I don�t follow. It�s my understanding that, in the broader sense, facts and only facts can be assigned a value of true or false. Propositions can be assigned a value of true or false; therefore, propositions are facts. A proposition might be false in that its referent doesn�t obtain, but it�s a fact nonetheless.

It doesn�t make sense to me, under this broader view, to say that a referent to a proposition is true or false. In my view, the relevant value to assign to that referent is �obtains� or �does not obtain,� and not �true� or �false.�

Jordan

PS it might help me if you tell me whether you think "false facts" are possible, and what, aside from facts, can be assigned the value of true or false.

Post 25

Tuesday, July 26, 2005 - 10:34pm

Jordan wrote,

"Bill,

"What a surprise! What brings you to this side of town?"

How about, I'm a refugee from Atlantis II seeking asylum! ;-)

You write, "It looks like you went one step further than Bardel. Rather than viewing facts as true propositions, you view them as referents to true propositions (or maybe just to any old propositions?), yes.

I view them as referents of true propositions. True propositions are propositions that refer to and correspond to the facts; false propositions are ones that deviate from and contradict the facts.

"I don�t follow. It�s my understanding that, in the broader sense, facts and only facts can be assigned a value of true or false. Propositions can be assigned a value of true or false; therefore, propositions are facts. A proposition might be false in that its referent doesn�t obtain, but it�s a fact nonetheless."

Facts aren't true or false; they simply are. Propositions are true or false, depending on whether they correspond to or contradict the facts. Propositions require a consciousness, but facts can exist independent of consciousness and therefore independent of propositions. For example, if no consciousness existed to formulate the proposition that "the earth revolves around the sun," it would still be fact that the earth revolves around the sun.

"It doesn�t make sense to me, under this broader view, to say that a referent to a proposition is true or false. In my view, the relevant value to assign to that referent is �obtains� or �does not obtain,� and not 'true' or 'false.'"

Of course, a referent of a proposition is not true or false. It is the proposition itself that is true or false, depending on whether it conforms to or contradicts the fact(s) to which it purports to refer. And, yes, the referent of a proposition either obtains or does not obtain. If it obtains, then the proposition which says that it does is true; if it does not obtain, then the proposition which says that it does is false.

- Bill

Post 26

Wednesday, July 27, 2005 - 6:51am