| | Any concept of value presupposes an entity or process to which it can be applied. If something is valuable, it must be valuable to or for something. Terms "good" and "bad" are adjectives. There must be something there which they describe. They only become meaningful in such a context.
Indestructible things cannot have anything good or bad for them because they have nothing to gain or lose. Non-living things, in a materialistic frame of reference, can have their form altered, but they do not cease to exist. They do not change from something to nothing. When a book is burned, it changes from a book to ashes, energy, and other elements, but the matter is still around.
What about life? As color and form are characteristics that physical objects have, is life a characteristic or property that living things have? Can life itself, be a thing which has matter as its characteristic?
A certain combination of elements can produce the self-generating and self-sustaining process which we call life, and living things do seem to have something substantial which they can lose. Unless we adopt an extremely untenable belief in everlasting life, we must accept the inductive fact that living things die. Death is the point at which life changes from something into nothing. Death is when life ceases to exist.
It is because of this unique feature of life that the concept of value can be applied to it. On the assumption, for the moment, that existence is preferable to non-existence and the fullest flourishment of life is intrinsically good, good as an end in itself, then that which is for life can be said to be instrumentally good, and that which is against life can be said to be instrumentally bad. Except for the fullest flourishment of life, which must be good in itself, "good" can be defined as that which promotes and protects life, and "bad" can be defined as that which threatens or destroys life.
Is existence preferable to non-existence? An existing dollar, even in today's economy, seems preferable to a hundred thousand non-existent dollars. However, an existing vile sore is not usually preferable to a non-existing vile sore. There may be a case for suicide, and "To be, or not to be." is still a significant issue.
When we are talking about the existence of life for individual human beings, then I think even apparent cases of suicide are either one or a combination of three things, none of which conflict with the preferability of life to death. Suicide can be explained as a statement about the quality of life, a wish to experience a higher form of life, an irrational decision, or any combination of these. First, in statements about the quality of life, people may feel that they would rather go on living if conditions were different. They may feel that, under their circumstances, their only chance to confirm their existence is to end it. This could be seen behavoristically as death due to external causes rather than suicide. Even protests and attempts to make a point fall into this category. Second, some people may wish to live on in a higher existence. They may believe in heaven and everlasting life. Third, some people may simply not think through their actions, or they may be deceived.
From our empirical observations of living organisms, we can generalize that life seems to reach out for a certain fulfillment. Trees, for example, appear to make full use of their equipment to gather whatever they need from the available soil, water, and air. They do not normally act against their own survival. They do not turn their leaves away from the sun, and their roots do not strive to avoid the available soil which would be of most benefit to them. Most plants, animals, and insects have predictable behavior patterns and survival reactions, and it seems that life, for most individual organisms, even when it only coincides with reproduction, is valued.
We may be wrong. There may be exceptions which cannot be passed off as freaks of nature, and biologists and other scientists may only be seeing what they want to see. Life may not be a universal value; but if it is, then we may have a solid, scientific base upon which to rest the study of ethics. We can't get to "oughts" yet without "free-will", but life for each individual organism would always be the intrinsic value. Instrumental values may differ for different organisms, but life would always be the common factor.
I wonder if we would still need to qualify life. Would we still need to stipulate that it is a flourishing life which we mean rather than just any state of life? Could we say that life either does or does not exist, and instrumental values can make it flourish?
I wonder, also, what could be said to the wiseacre who says that because life eventually leads to death, then life, itself, must be instrumentally bad. Even "bad" can be considered "good" because it is instrumental to "good".
The opposite, that "good" is instrumental to "bad" can also be said. It could be that "good" and "bad" are something like the yin and yang of Oriental philosophy. Perhaps they are like two sides of the same coin.
I could stipulate that life is a standard and, as such, cannot be measured against itself. This may serve to keep the distinction between good and bad, but it may also be a cop-out.
If life is a standard which cannot be measured against itself, then can it be measured against anything else? How can we know enough about life to determine what is good and bad for it?
Life does not seem to be a static thing. Records are being broken every day, and the optimum of life cannot be imagined. Like the concept of human nature, life is constantly in a process of becoming. Life determines its own nature, and science can only try to keep up.
If we use science to get a handle on life and use that handle as a standard for our morality, then neither science nor morality can be static. What was true and good yesterday may not be true and good today. We would need to continue to make surveys, arrive at statistical averages, and write our research papers. It would be on the basis of our most current and accurate findings that values and moral conditions of existence would be determined.
Is science up to the task? I see lots of conflicting studies. I remember studies on marijuana. When findings didn't conform to middle class standards, those findings were ignored. For every study that said one thing, there was another which said the opposite. Scientists may prove whatever they want to prove, and people are still free to accept or reject whatever they want.
Is our definition of life, then, ultimately something which is stipulated by the dominant social group? Is the standard for morality, the basis upon which we rest our study of ethics, the result of that which is haphazardly chosen by the group of people of whom we happen to be part? Is it like the axioms in our system of logic and the structure of our language? Is "good" and "bad" merely a matter of convention?
When lots of people believe the same way about something, then that belief is something with which to deal. Individuals who do not go along with the crowd often have problems. They may be ignored, they may leave messageboards in a huff, or they may end up in mental institutions or prisons.
However, some individuals manage to get on top of the crowd. After all, the crowd, the middle class, or the dominant social group had to get its view from someone. If each individual in a group waits to take the group's definition of life, then no definition of life can possibly emerge. That which we call "consensus" or "the collective view of the people" is usually the result of the influence of one or a few abnormal people. Socrates, Jesus, Gandhi, Karl Marx, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and Nick Otani (just kidding) are just a few of the outstanding people who dared to be different. (Most of these individuals have been identified as operating on level 3, stage 6 of Kohlberg's model.)
A deterministic, biological tendency for survival may be part of our nature, but we have not yet found all the answers. This means that we may still have room to grow, and we are still free to shop around and try different hypothesis. Perhaps this sense of freedom, itself, is instrumental to our proper survival. Perhaps it is good that we do not have all the answers.
Most living things, from what we can observe, do not need to wonder about their existence. Most organisms, in pursuing their own survival, automatically do that for which they are equipped. Changing conditions may help change equipment, but most living things do not behave unnecessarily in ways which are threatening and destructive to their lives. A tree, as I said before, does not turn its leaves away from the sun.
Morality is something which may be unique to creatures who are confused and free. It is not necessary to tell a tree that it ought to pursue life, but does "ought" become meaningful when applied to human beings?
On a superficial level, it is the pain-pleasure mechanism which allows man to perceive, to some extent, that which is for and that which is against him. Pain can be the signal for something bad, and pleasure can be confirmation of good. Without this mechanism, there would be no immediate way for man to know that it is not healthy for him to stick his hand in a flaming fire.
As physical pain and pleasure can sometimes guide one's choices and actions, emotional pain and pleasure may also serve as an indicator of certain values and evils. Fear, frustration, despair, sorrow, and other forms of emotional displeasure may be indication that something is wrong. Pleasure or happiness, which can be defined in a number of ways, may be indication of a flourishing state of existence.
A pain-pleasure mechanism augmented by reason confirms that primary values must be geared to realistic expectations. Without some combination of hedonism and reason, I would not be able to differentiate between the short term pleasure I receive from skipping classes to watch television and the long term pleasure I receive from continuing my education. Without some differentiation within pleasure and pain, I could not separate the pain of a tooth ache and the pain of a dentist's drill. Reason tells me that primary values must be geared to realistic expectations. The person who eats, drinks, and makes merry today is not considering what may happen if he is alive tomorrow, but efforts which aim beyond the grave are futile. A person feels much more of a sense of accomplishment after having achieved a long range goal than after experiencing a momentary thrill, but seeking goals which are much too high accompanies only frustration.
When one engages one's self in the pursuit of a long range goal, especially when the goal is so narrow as to cancel other opportunities, then one may wish to be very sure of one's self. One may wish to be prepared to face any consequence of one's decision and may wish to be fully aware of one's abilities and situation.
One way to obtain awareness is to become involved with life. Empirical and mental experience can lead to knowledge. Many of the observations and generalizations about which I am writing have come from somebody's experience. The hedonist who has successfully avoided pain cannot really appreciate happiness. I cannot credibly say man ought to pursue long range values unless I have some experience with short term pleasure. I could not say that man ought to keep his fingers out of the fire unless I have had some experience with burnt fingers. I do not need to be hit by a truck, but I do need enough experience to make generalizations. Experience even tells me my son will not be convinced about the validity of my prescriptions until he behaves in ways exactly opposite to those I prescribe. To some extent, people ought to do what they ought not do. As long as they do not get hit by a truck, people can learn much from trial and error.
Experience, however, may still need some guidelines. Experiments need some rules and boundaries. Within Jeremy Bentham's discussion of utilitarianism is a conceptual device which may help me measure various different degrees of pleasure. It is a certain aspect of utilitarianism which allows me to define happiness in terms of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity(nearness), fecundity(ability to flower or expand, leading into other pleasures), purity(without dangers or risks) and quality(to be discussed.). The best pleasures have high degrees of all of these. However, if there is a conflict between pleasures, the calculus may help to eliminate the conflict. Between coitus and conversation, conversation has the advantage. Sex wins easily on intensity and certainty, but conversation has the greatest duration, the least remoteness, and the greatest promise of things to come; not to mention purity. Certainly people get their noses bent out of shape with conversation, but I hear there are worse dangers with sex, protected or not.
All this means is that some pleasures are safer than others. It may be good to be aware of this, but if I wish always to be safe and secure, then I must resign myself to a dull life. I do not advocate safety. It is sometimes more productive to take risks. "Nothing ventured; nothing gained." It may not even be bad to face bad consequences. It's trial and error. If a person does not die of torment, that person may become stronger from it. So, let me go back and choose sex over conversation. However, there is one more criterion which may make all the difference.
Quality is an elusive concept. It escapes definition, but people seem to know what it means. It's what Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance was about. Several people have sought it, but few people have ever found it. It was quality which Siddhartha Buddha found lacking in a life of material wealth. It was quality which Diogenes found when, while lying in a gutter, he told Alexander-the-Great to stop blocking the sun. Quality is what John Stuart Mill described when he said that he would rather be a dissatisfied Socrates than a fully satisfied fool.
I agree with Mill. I would rather be aware of all the morbid, miserable, and depressing facts of human existence than be blissful in my ignorance. I would rather be a human being, with all the problems of a human being, than a serene and healthy carrot. If the carrot is of another opinion, then it can only be because the carrot is only aware of his carrot world. The carrot cannot know what it is like to be a human being. A human being, however, can imagine what it is like to be a carrot and compare it to being a human. Greater awareness, then, helps one choose qualitative pleasures and is, itself, a qualitative value.
The idea that awareness is a qualitative value has its own protection against abuse. The person who is really aware is also aware that there is much of which he or she is not aware. Socrates, himself, preferred awareness of non-awareness to the self-deceptive non-awareness of non-awareness. The person who is uncertain is much closer to certainty than is the person who claims certainty. The intellectual who becomes an arrogant, ivory tower snob is not yet aware of this.
Finally, because there is much about which people cannot be aware, there are times when experience and conceptual devices are inadequate. It is at times like these that a person must simply make a decision. Such is what freedom is all about. Standards, guidelines, rules, and boundaries are only instruments which we can use. We should not allow these instruments to use us.
bis bald,
Nick
|
|
