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Monday, August 28, 2006 - 11:51pmSanction this postReply
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One very colorful figure in medieval philosophy was Peter Abelard, 1079-1142.

He was extremely handsome, atheletic, and intellegent. However, as is the case with many beautiful and bright people, Peter Abelard was also a bit arrogant and prone to show-off. He often drew attention to himself by eloquently arguing with his teachers. Ultimatetly, he became so skilled at this that he won his points. He discredited one of his very famous religion teachers and started a new school of thought on the subject of universals.

At this time in the history of the church, the problem of universals, a trivial concern today, was crucially important.

Abelard's first teacher was a Nominalist named Roscelin. A Nominalist believes that only individual things exist outside the mind. Socrates and Plato existed as individuals, but the concept of "man" is just a "snort of the voice." Roscelin held that genera and specis, unlike specific individuals, don't have independent, concrete existence.

This position could get one into trouble with the church, and, indeed, Roscelin's writings were condemned as heretical. He was forced to retract and abjure them. His Nominalism allowed the existence of the Father, Son, and holy Spirit; but the "Trinity" would be only a snort.

Opposed to this position was Abelard's second teacher, William of Champeaux, an extreme Realist. A Realist believes those terms we use in Aristotle's syllogisms are about universals. We say, in the major premise of a deductive argument, something like "All men are mortal." If "men" doesn't have independent existence, then knowledge is impossible. We wouldn't be able to conclude that Socrates is a man if Socrates is mortal. This is what a later Nominalist philosopher, David Hume, also concluded; that if all things are entirely loose and separate, then reasoning must be ultimatly a delusion. William of Champeaux, however, held that man has a nature, an essence or substance which is the same, and individual men differ only in their accidental forms.

This can get one into trouble with the church also. If all men share the same divine substance, this is Pantheism, another heresey.

Is there a common nature that all men share? Is it form or substance? Is it like cooky dough being cut with molds? Are we all cut with the same mold, or does it differ slightly with each of us but we share the same dough, the same substance? Is it the same mold but the dough is a little different in some places, perhaps a bit dryer or thicker or something? Or, do each of us have a unique substance and form? Is essence or nature just a meaningless snort? Is there nothing we share in common with other individuals? We do seem different than rocks and plants and other animals and insects.

(Plato thought this form was an other worldly real thing, but Aristotle thought it could be found in the natural world. Existentialists claim we make our own nature. It doesn't pre-exist us.)

Well, Abelard concluded maybe there isn't a humanness separated from particular humans that happen to exist. It is, in a sense, insensible, but that doesn't mean humaness is just a "snort." It is a meaningful noise. It signifies something that is predicated of many, to use Aristotle's phrasings. The problem of universals is just a problem of explaining how terms have meaning. We pay attention to the respects in which creatures and things are similar while neglecting individual differences. Humans are more than "featherless bipeds." They could be deformed and missing limbs, but still be human if they have the potential to reason, to volitionally manipulate symbols. (Abelard didn't say these last two sentences. I'm putting in my own two cents.)

Anyway, after Abelard discredited William of Champeaux, he became a religion teacher, himself, and charmed his students with wit and personality. He was popular and had a great following, especially among females, even if he did make enemies of some teachers and religious leaders.

Abelard could have had his pick of any of the young women who flocked to him in his classes. He had it all; the looks, the body, the intellegence, and the charm. He used it all on Heloise, the young, virginal child whom Peter Abelard choose.

He approached her uncle, who was her guardian, to arrange private tutoring sessions for Heloise. Her uncle agreed to the arrangement thinking Peter was a fine, upstanding teacher whose personal concern for Heloise's education was fortunate. For Peter, however, the shepherd had relinquished his prize sheep to the wolf. Heloise had no chance. She fell in love with Peter, and during their private tutoring sessions, they could not keep their hands off each other.

When Heloise became pregnant, Peter approached her understandably upset uncle again, this time with the intention of making things right. He offered to marry Heloise.

Heloise refused him. She did not wish to hurt his chances of promotion to priesthood within the church. She decided, instead, to move to a distant small town, separating herself from Peter, to have his child.

Heloise's uncle, more concerned with his own humiliation than with Heloise's welfare, hired thugs to seek revenge on Peter Abelard. They entered his room one night while he was sleeping. They grabbed him and castrated him.

These thugs were soon caught and, themselves, castrated, but this did not help Peter Abelard.

When Heloise heard about what happened to Peter, she entered a convent and remained faithful to him. From the convent, twelve years later, she wrote several passionate love letters to which Peter could only respond with coldness. He still loved her, but he urged her to forget him and turn her affection to Christ. His heart was broken.

Peter Abelard continued to teach. He still had the talent for teaching, and he still had the intellegence for examing church dogma. When others said they believed in order to understand, Abelard said he had to understand in order to believe. His writings got him into some trouble with factions of the church leadership who considered his thoughts heresy.

Peter Abelard died, still out of favor with powerful factions. Heloise, when she died, was buried beside him.

 
bis bald,
 
Nick


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Post 1

Tuesday, August 29, 2006 - 5:58pmSanction this postReply
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Nick,

=========
Is there a common nature that all men share?
=========

Yes.



=========
Is it form or substance?
=========

Both. Our shared features come in the form of form, and in the form of substance.



=========
Is it like cooky dough being cut with molds? Are we all cut with the same mold, or does it differ slightly with each of us but we share the same dough, the same substance?
=========

It's really not all that much like cookie dough, but rather Silly Putty (or Play-Dough -- if you will), Silly Putty in a warm environment. That's what it's like -- malleable, though not infinitely so.

Cookie dough, on the contrary, is something that, eventually, gets baked. Now, it's true, some people get baked, too (usually young adults, or else folks born in the late 1950s/early 1960s) -- but this is actually beside the point.

The point about the baking, is that it's a pretty terminal endpoint -- but human life is a constant process of personal growth and adaptation -- adaptation to environmental, and intra- and inter-personal demands.



=========
Or, do each of us have a unique substance and form?
=========

We each have a uniqueness in our substance, and the very position of one's body in space -- rationally justifies THAT proposition (no one else occupies the same space that we do). As for uniqueness of form, again, we have a unique psychological continuity.

Our memories, which we uniquely carry within us for later retrieval, are not shared by other folks (folks who have their OWN unique memories, depending on what they've focused on in their life -- and what values they've attached to what it is that they've focused ON).



=========
Is essence or nature just a meaningless snort? Is there nothing we share in common with other individuals?
=========

Negatory (on both accounts).



=========
We do seem different than rocks and plants and other animals and insects.
=========

Nick, our difference from rocks is not something that can only be intuited -- as you are insinuating here. Please be more honest about what it is that you are capable of knowing, Nick. Don't continue to pretend to not truly know that you are different from a rock, okay? It smacks of head-in-the-sand, give-up-on-epistemology existentialism.



=========
Existentialists claim we make our own nature. It doesn't pre-exist us.
=========

Our nature co-exists "with" us (actually, it IS us). It never pre-exists. Pre-existing is something Platonic. There is no seperation of a man from his nature.

Existence IS Identity. Get THAT through your thick skull, Nick.

Ed

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Tuesday, August 29, 2006 - 10:13pmSanction this postReply
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You are breaking the rules agreed upon by your fellow Objectivists. You are talking to me. Others are avoiding me. Don't you think you might be feedng a troll?

Rand tried to identify herself as an Aristotilian type realist when she said, " facts are facts, independent of man's feelings, wishes, hopes, or fears." And, she wanted to make sure nobody confused her with Plato, who also believed in an independent reality but of an ideal kind coming from the inside and being projected outside rather than being perceived from outside and processed on the inside. However, most realists are not as certain as Rand is. They go on approximations and inductive leaps of faith rather than dogmatic certainty.
 
Rand rejects nominalism, that humans merely group objects accordng to how they resemble each other and then categorize them with names. She would rather be an essentialist, think that universals are really out there in reality and, yes, we name them, but we are just discovering what is out there, not putting it there with our minds. However, not everybody discovers the same things, and there are disagreements among rational men, something Rand says is not possible. And, there is time and space, which have to exist prior to experience, not be abstracted from experence.
 
Some people think of Rand as a conceptualist, that universals are both man-made and reality-based. Is this your interpretation?
 
bis bald,
 
Nick


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Wednesday, August 30, 2006 - 1:29amSanction this postReply
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Nick,

While you do have troll-potential you are not technically a troll. You are someone who has a goal in your communications, and trolls don't have goals. Or rather, the goal of a troll is to not communicate, but to indoctrinate.


=====================
Some people think of Rand as a conceptualist, that universals are both man-made and reality-based. Is this your interpretation?
=====================

Bingo! Nick, as I made so incontrovertibly clear in this thread ...

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0170.shtml

... Rand was an intentional conceptualist (ie. one who thought, correctly, that universals are the human way of conceptualizing about things).

All other ways of thinking about this issue -- are assinine.

Ed




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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 12:00amSanction this postReply
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Ed, you say a number of things which trouble me, one of which is the following:

 

Our nature co-exists "with" us (actually, it IS us). It never pre-exists. Pre-existing is something Platonic. There is no seperation of a man from his nature.


 

Yes, Plato believed in a pre-existing reality, but so did Rand. And, in one way, so do I. Objective reality is independent of man. It exists prior to man and is discovered by him. If no man existed, there would still be a reality and nature of man just as there would be gravity even if nothing falls. There would be sound even if no sensing thing is there to hear it. It is not minds which bring things into existence or come into existence with the coming into existence of things. According to Rand, A is A does pre-exist what A is. It is essence prior to existence.

 

Now, in some places, Rand sounds almost like a nominalist, like an existentialist. She says, in ITOE, that ultimate truths and values, while objective, are experienced. This would mean that they are derived subjectively. She said, “Man is the measure, epistemologically—not metaphysically. In regard to human knowledge, man has to be the measure, since he has to bring all things into the realm of the humanly knowable.” This is consistent with something Sartre would say, that reality is meaningless without man, that man puts meaning into the world. According to Sartre, it doesn’t pre-exist us. It is existence prior to essence.

 

I hold that there is a pre-existing nature to man but that it also becomes and can be self-determined to an extent. This would be necessary for free-will. It is freedom within objective parameters. So, I try to combine essentialism, that essence is prior to existence, with its opposite, that existence is prior to essence.

 

BTW, Ed, can you address the point I made about how time and space would have to pre-exist sense-empirical experience. Do you see how this might conflict with what Rand says about how we get knowledge first from sense experience and then integrate it with our reason?

 

Bis bald,

 

Nick

(Edited by Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani on 8/31, 12:02am)


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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 2:02amSanction this postReply
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Nick,

======================
If no man existed, there would still be a reality and nature of man just as there would be gravity even if nothing falls. There would be sound even if no sensing thing is there to hear it. It is not minds which bring things into existence or come into existence with the coming into existence of things. According to Rand, A is A does pre-exist what A is. It is essence prior to existence.
======================

On the contrary, if no man existed, there would be no nature of man (because Identity IS Existence). What you postulate -- Identity "before" Existence -- is epistemologically improper.



======================
If no man existed, there would still be a reality and nature of man just as there would be gravity even if nothing falls ...
======================

If no man existed, there would be no nature of man (ie. Identity IS Existence).



======================
She says, in ITOE, that ultimate truths and values, while objective, are experienced. This would mean that they are derived subjectively.
======================

Not if they are discovered by objective means -- means appropriate to ANY human.



======================
BTW, Ed, can you address the point I made about how time and space would have to pre-exist sense-empirical experience. Do you see how this might conflict with what Rand says about how we get knowledge first from sense experience and then integrate it with our reason?
======================

Time is nothing other than a measure of motion (time wouldn't exist, without change). Space is nothing other than a differentiation of the placement of things (space wouldn't exist, without change or differential allocation). So, in answer to your question: No. I don't see the conflict that you do.

Ed

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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 7:49amSanction this postReply
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Nick, you continue to treat a concept like "essence" as though it has metaphysical status. If you think Ayn Rand shared that premise, I can see why you'd conclude that she was like Plato. However, that premise was *not* held by AR. She makes that crystal clear in ItOE, which you should read.

According to AR, the only things that have metaphysical status are entities and their actions (which are self-generated in the case of living things or not in the case of nonliving things). That's it. Concepts like "essence" are epistemic; they're merely mentally *derived* from the observation of entities. They exist only in the minds of individuals; they don't exist independently of minds. Seriously, how could there be a "nature" of something if there IS no something?

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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 10:25amSanction this postReply
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Good points, Jon.

I'd only refine this one thing that you said ...

=======================
Concepts like "essence" are epistemic; they're merely mentally *derived* from the observation of entities. They exist only in the minds of individuals; they don't exist independently of minds.
=======================

While concepts aren't independent of minds in general, they are independent of minds in particular (or of a single, particular mind; to be very clear). Things that are dependent on a single, particular mind (like the pain of a toothache, for example) -- are subjective things; while concepts are objective things.

The reason I bring this up is that it seemed to be a point of contention with Nick (the subjectivity of existentialism vs. the objectivity of Objectivism). So, in recap then, concepts are those things that require someone's mind to exist, but they aren't things that require any particular mind -- in order to exist.

Concepts aren't like toothaches.

;-)

Ed



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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 10:45amSanction this postReply
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Jon and Ed, you are exactly right. Nick's interpretation of Rand's theory of concepts will not survive an encounter even with her "Foreword" to Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. For further elaboration, see the closing several pages of Chapter 5, "Definitions," in which she clearly repudiates the position Nick attributes to her, and distinguishes her view from the other major epistemological schools.

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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 11:36amSanction this postReply
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That's it. Concepts like "essence" are epistemic; they're merely mentally *derived* from the observation of entities. They exist only in the minds of individuals; they don't exist independently of minds. Seriously, how could there be a "nature" of something if there IS no something?



Either this is a meaningless contradiction, or it is nominalism, pure and simple. Concepts are "derived" from other things because an objective essence or nature exists there and is discovered or perceived by a consciousness, episteologically derived, or our ideas are only images of concretes, names we give to arbitrary groupings. They exist in our minds but not independently of our minds.


How could a "nature" of something be if there IS no something? It is the nature of unicorns that they have one horn, but there are no unicorns.

Objectivism implies that reality and values exist prior to being known, and values presupose entities for which something can be of value, entities with a nature. A is A, which means entities have a specific nature, exists prior to entities. Reality and values are not contingent upon personal experience but recognized by means of reason, the faculity that perceives, identifies and integrates the evidence of reality provided by man's senses. (One problem with this is that a construction of time and space is necessary before one can have evidence provded by senses.)

"Metaphysically," states Rand, "the only authority is reality; epistemologically--one's own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second."

You guys, Jon and Ed, may have read what you tell me I need to read, which I have, but you don't seem to understand it. I do, to the extent it is capable of being understood. Much of it is not.

bis bald,

Nick

(Edited by Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani on 8/31, 11:39am)


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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 12:58pmSanction this postReply
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Nick wrote:

Concepts are "derived" from other things because an objective essence or nature exists there and is discovered or perceived by a conscious
The essence of X per Rand and even others is not equivalent to the full nature of X. The essence of X is its attributes that are most important to its nature. What is most important in Rand's view is determined by humans. It is not "given" by X itself. Even in Aristotle's view, in which essence is a part of X per se, it is not the entire nature of X. He, as have many others, distinguished between essential (or necessary) properties and "accidental" (unnecessary) ones.


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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 1:49pmSanction this postReply
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Nick,

Concepts are "derived" from other things because an objective essence or nature exists there and is discovered or perceived by a consciousness, episteologically derived, or our ideas are only images of concretes, names we give to arbitrary groupings.
Apparently, you didn't read my Intentional Conceptualism thread. In this statement, you have merely chosen the flipside of the Realism-Nominalism coin (you're taking the Aristotelian position of the moderate realist).

Here is a quote from my thread, Nick. Please take the time to answer the 4 questions ...

Who's who (in this debate)?

*4 questions (utilizing 4 modes: non-existence + 3 existences) that, when taken together, sufficiently delineate all available positions. 
=============================================================

1.  Do universals exist?



**If yes, proceed to question 2;

 

**if no, you're a cursed nominalist - you may have "trouble" communicating with others as your words have no objective "meaning" - seek psychiatric help if the situation warrants

=============================================================

2.  Are universals extra-mental (an existence independent of thought)?


**If yes, you're a cursed ontological realist - probably one of those Scholastic types - go read some more Plato and give away any books by Aristotle, and especially those of Rand;

 

**if no, proceed to question 3

=============================================================


3.  Are universals located in the mind (as the "content" of cognition)?



**If yes, you're a cursed, classical conceptualist - probably one with an arbitrarily invented "criterion of classification" - one who thinks that "units exist qua units"

and not solely as "things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships"2 - you probably don't believe that "[t]he conceptual classification of

 

newly discovered existents depends on the nature and extent of their differences from and similarities to the previously known existents."3 ;

 

 

**if no, proceed to question 4

=============================================================


4.  Are universals merely the form in which humans conceptualize (ie. the "mode" of cognition)?


**If yes, congratulations!  You're an "intentional conceptualist" - the type of thinker Rand was, though she never explicitly stated it in such sufficiently illustrative terms - you realize that "units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships" and that "units do not exist qua units" either in your mind OR outside of it - you realize that units have existence by way of THE INTERACTION of a mind with reality (they're not in the mind or out in reality; they are in the relation of mind to reality;

 

**if no, you're probably a shifty, post-modern relativist, taking pains to avoid the explicit identification of anything important to humans, probably because of the frightening personal "responsibility to think" that these identifications entail

=============================================================



Ed




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Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 3:30pmSanction this postReply
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The essence of X per Rand and even others is not equivalent to the full nature of X. The essence of X is its attributes that are most important to its nature. What is most important in Rand's view is determined by humans. It is not "given" by X itself. Even in Aristotle's view, in which essence is a part of X per se, it is not the entire nature of X. He, as have many others, distinguished between essential (or necessary) properties and "accidental" (unnecessary) ones.

 

I understand the difference between essential and accidental properties, Merlin. Socrates and I are essentially the same. We are both humans and are mortal. He has a beard which is an accidental property that I don’t share with him. We still have the same human nature, the same essence.

 

Apparently, you didn't read my Intentional Conceptualism thread. In this statement, you have merely chosen the flipside of the Realism-Nominalism coin (you're taking the Aristotelian position of the moderate realist).

 

I did read your post, Ed. I just disagree with it. Yes, I think Aristotle is a kind of realist, but he is also a sophisticated nominalist. Perhaps you didn’t read my post on the paths to knowledge. Number 2 is Aristotle, but number 3 is Plato and closer to Rand then number 2.

 

Bis bald,

 

Nick


Post 13

Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 4:54pmSanction this postReply
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Nick, you're incorrigible.

Ed


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Post 14

Thursday, August 31, 2006 - 5:48pmSanction this postReply
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4.  Are universals merely the form in which humans conceptualize (ie. the "mode" of cognition)?


**If yes, congratulations!  You're an "intentional conceptualist" - the type of thinker Rand was, though she never explicitly stated it in such sufficiently illustrative terms - you realize that "units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships" and that "units do not exist qua units" either in your mind OR outside of it - you realize that units have existence by way of THE INTERACTION of a mind with reality (they're not in the mind or out in reality; they are in the relation of mind to reality;

 

This is not Rand’s position. It is not Objectivism. Reality is objective if it exists prior to being known. Yes, you say existence is identity. This is just the existence exists principle which implies two corollaries 1.) that something exists which one perceives and 2.) that one exists possessing consciousness, the faculty of perceiving that which exists.

 

To exist, according to Rand, is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes “…Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.”

 

Reality is what it is. To know truth is simply to recognize reality for what it is, and this is done with reason, the faculty which perceives, identifies, and integrates the evidence of reality provided by man’s senses. So, there is that which is perceived, objective reality, and the perceiver, the consciousness which perceives that one objective reality, even though this sets up an operational dualism. Saying that consciousness and reality are part of each other and interact is what some of the Asian philosophies do by becoming one with the whole. Rand really objected to that.

 

I don’t think I’m being incorrigible, Ed. I think I understand this stuff, to the extent it can be understood, and you are being incorrigible.

 

Bis bald,

 

Nick

 

  


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Friday, September 1, 2006 - 1:40amSanction this postReply
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Nick,

This is not Rand’s position. It is not Objectivism.
Prove it.

So, there is that which is perceived, objective reality, and the perceiver, the consciousness which perceives that one objective reality, even though this sets up an operational dualism.
Prove it.

Saying that consciousness and reality are part of each other and interact is what some of the Asian philosophies do by becoming one with the whole.
Prove it.

I think I understand this stuff, to the extent it can be understood ...
Prove it.

Nick, your bold conjectures are getting tiresome. If Rand (in ITOE) rejected moderate and extreme realism, and she rejected moderate (classical conceptualism) and extreme nominalism -- then what in the hell DID she accept? You say that she didn't accept Intentional Conceptualism -- but you offer no argument (you merely make bold conjecture, without supportive reasoning).

Either back up your statements, or stay quite about the matter. Your "personal feelings" about it aren't interesting.

Ed


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Friday, September 1, 2006 - 11:04amSanction this postReply
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Nick,

This is not Rand’s position. It is not Objectivism.

Prove it.

I did. I explained that reality is objective if it exists prior to being known. That is what “objective” means, independent of one’s wishes and whims. I explained that existence exists, according to Rand, implies two corollaries 1.) that something exists which one perceives and 2.) that one exists possessing consciousness, the faculty of perceiving that which exists. This is Rand’s position. It is not the same as your position, that units have existence by way of THE INTERACTION of a mind with reality.

So, there is that which is perceived, objective reality, and the perceiver, the consciousness which perceives that one objective reality, even though this sets up an operational dualism.

Prove it.

I did, above. However, you can check in Atlas Shrugged or on page 124 o the paperback version of For the New Intellectual. “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.” This is the operational dualism, the perceived and the perceiver.

Saying that consciousness and reality are part of each other and interact is what some of the Asian philosophies do by becoming one with the whole.

Prove it.

Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism all try to avoid the western dualism of self v. reality by making self part of reality. Rand really hated this because it conflicted with her egoism. She also didn’t like the constant process of samsari, which conflicted with her essentialism, her static, objective realty which is discovered, not brought into existence by an interaction of consciousness and reality.

I think I understand this stuff, to the extent it can be understood ...

Prove it.



Nick, your bold conjectures are getting tiresome. If Rand (in ITOE) rejected moderate and extreme realism, and she rejected moderate (classical conceptualism) and extreme nominalism -- then what in the hell DID she accept? You say that she didn't accept Intentional Conceptualism -- but you offer no argument (you merely make bold conjecture, without supportive reasoning).

 

You are wrong. I did tell you that, in the post on paths to knowledge, Rand’s position was closer to number 3, Plato’s position, than she was to Aristotle’s position. This s what in the hell she DID accept. The supportive reasoning for this is that for Plato and Rand, truth (existence) is what corresponds to Truth (essence), what “matches” the image.

 

O’Neill sums it up best:

 

For Rand, a knowledge of ultimate reality exists, not merely a posteriori, relative to particular experience, but a priori, as certitude which lays the foundation for knowing itself. Knowledge does not grow out of personal experience. Quite the opposite. Certain basic truths are self-evident, in the sense of being implicit within experience itself. They are neither chosen (which would be subjectivism) nor derived on the basis of contextual knowledge (which would be relativism). They are projected as a sort of paradigmatic vision of ultimate reality. All men recognize these truths, because a recognition of such truths is implicit in the nature of man as man. Man is rational by definition: he is the animal who is possessed of intuitive insight—an insight which can be suppressed but never successfully denied.

 

This is what Rand meant when she had Galt say, “The extreme you have always struggled to avoid is the recognition that reality is final, that A is A and that truth is true.” It is that people already know but tend to deny or avoid recognizing reality for what it is, like you avoid recognizing that I have proven my statements and demonstrated my understanding

 

Bis bald,

 

Nick.


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Post 17

Friday, September 1, 2006 - 11:18amSanction this postReply
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Ed T. said that Rand held that universals are the form in which humans conceptualize. Nick replied:

This is not Rand’s position. It is not Objectivism. Reality is objective if it exists prior to being known.
Ed is far closer to the truth than Nick. "Objective" per Rand pertains to the relationship between consciousness and the rest of reality.

Nick quotes O'Neill:

For Rand, a knowledge of ultimate reality exists, not merely a posteriori, relative to particular experience, but a priori, as certitude which lays the foundation for knowing itself. Knowledge does not grow out of personal experience.
That is a gross misunderstanding of Rand.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 9/01, 11:29am)


Post 18

Friday, September 1, 2006 - 12:15pmSanction this postReply
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Ed T. said that Rand held that universals are the form in which humans conceptualize. Nick replied:

This is not Rand’s position. It is not Objectivism. Reality is objective if it exists prior to being known.
Ed is far closer to the truth than Nick. "Objective" per Rand pertains to the relationship between consciousness and the rest of reality.

Nick quotes O'Neill:

For Rand, a knowledge of ultimate reality exists, not merely a posteriori, relative to particular experience, but a priori, as certitude which lays the foundation for knowing itself. Knowledge does not grow out of personal experience.
That is a gross misunderstanding of Rand.

Wow! Talk about making unsupported assertions!

I backed up my statements. Merlin presents no reasoning nor evidence, just personal feelings.

Nick



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Friday, September 1, 2006 - 1:07pmSanction this postReply
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Nick wrote:
I backed up my statements. Merlin presents no reasoning nor evidence, just personal feelings.
No, you didn't, and I did in the first instance, saying what "objective" generally meant to Rand.

Please show us any evidence in Rand's own words that say anything like either of the following written by you.
Reality is objective if it exists prior to being known.
For Rand, a knowledge of ultimate reality exists, not merely a posteriori, relative to particular experience, but a priori, as certitude which lays the foundation for knowing itself. Knowledge does not grow out of personal experience.


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