| | I wrote, I didn't simply define it (arbitrarily) in such a way that a contradiction follows. I pointed out its necessary preconditions, which are that it requires a particular form and means of awareness." Claude replied, First you claimed to define consciousness; now, you claim that you weren’t really defining it, but rather “pointing out its necessary precondition”…which is not the same thing as a definition. It matters little; for what you have done here, as well as in the Evolution thread, is merely to describe consciousness (you will probably try to justify this practice by claiming that a mere description is really a higher-status thing – an “ostensive definition”!). When I said that consciousness requires sense organs and a brain, I was not claiming to "define" consciousness. YOU accused me of "defining" it and of defining it arbitrarily. You said, "You merely define consciousness in such a way that a contradiction follows if we assert its independent existence. Big deal." My reply was that I wasn't defining it arbitrarily, but was identifying its biological requirements, which is true. Then you say, A description is not the same as a definition. As for “necessary preconditions”, that could only happen if we move beyond a mere description (even if that mere description is given a deep-dish, high-falutin’ name like “ostensive definition).” Spare me the sarcasm. The term “ostensive definition" refers to something that you can’t identify without direct experience. For example, what pain feels like can only be known “ostensively.” You have to experience it to know what it feels like. “Ostensive” is a term in the Objectivist lexicon, which I thought you were familiar with, since you seemed to have some familiarity with other aspects of the philosophy. Sorry for using it, if it confused you. I wasn’t trying to be “high-falutin.” The important point I was making, which you don’t seem to be grasping, despite my having stated it over and over, is that consciousness requires a particular FORM of awareness, which in turn requires a MEANS of awareness. You’re not getting this. Stop and think about it for a minute. Any state of awareness that you can imagine has a particular form – visual, auditory, tactile, etc. It HAS to have such a form; otherwise it wouldn’t exist. But the particular form of awareness is a function of an organism’s sensory receptor(s). The kind of receptors an organism has determines the form in which it perceives the external world. Of course, human beings (and I suspect other animals) have dreams that are not perceptions of reality, but the content of these dreams takes the same form as the character of their perceptions. We know that consciousness and biological organisms accompany each other; no one knows anything beyond that: no one knows HOW . . . To say that they "accompany" each other suggests that they're independent existents, which is not true. Consciousness does not "accompany" matter; it is the product of certain physiological processes, and cannot exist without them. . . . no one knows WHY. Not even those great neuroscientists whose “incontrovertible evidence” you keep promising to cite, but somehow never get around to doing so. I didn't promise to cite any "neuroscientists." When I referred to neuroscience, I was simply noting that it has shown that particular conscious processes -- like rational thought -- are localized in certain areas of the brain -- like the cerebral cortex.
I asked, "Are you seriously suggesting that a person can be conscious in no particular form and by no particular means?!?" There are different degrees of consciousness: “self-consciousness”; “attention” (i.e., conscious of something else but not yourself); dreaming; “sleeping” (which is different from complete lack of consciousness). Self-consciousness requires consciousness of the external world. "A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something." (Rand, Atlas Shrugged, p. 1015). Therefore, self-consciousness requires a means of perception, i.e., sense organs, just as consciousness of the external world does, because without consciousness of the external world, self-consciousness would not be possible. Self-consciousness also requires a brain to process sensory information, as do dreams, which are simply a subconscious rearrangement of such information.
Earlier you said, "As long as we define our terms the way we wish, we can prove the non-existence or non-occurrence of something." I replied,
"Not true. Proof rests on concrete evidence. Knowledge isn't based on arbitrary definitions." You replied, Math and logic are replete with proofs with no concrete evidence. Either the concrete evidence is missing entirely or it’s simply unnecessary. The point of my reply was that knowledge isn't based on arbitrary definitions; it has to be connected to reality. This is true even of mathematical and logical concepts, whose foundations must rest on concepts gained from observing the real world. That doesn't mean that abstract proofs require any new or additional sensory evidence, but it does mean that they must be based ultimately on the evidence of the senses, as must all concepts. No one has to test the Pythagorean Theorem concretely by drawing right triangles in the sand with a stick (like the slave in Plato’s “Meno”). Of course not! And that's not what I meant by saying that all concepts must be based on an observation of reality.
I wrote, "Knowledge isn't based on arbitrary definitions." There are different kinds of knowledge. Mathematical knowledge can certainly be based on arbitrary definitions. No, it can't! I can't arbitrarily define the concept "four" as designating any set of five objects and claim it as knowledge. Nor can I arbitrarily define a circle as a four-sided figure and claim it as knowledge. Lots of non-Euclidean geometry is based on arbitrary definitions (“Let’s pretend that NO two lines, drawn through two points, are parallel”; or, “Let’s pretend that ALL lines, drawn through two points, are parallel.”) These are not arbitrary definitions, if their truth depends on what it is that you mean by “lines.”
I wrote, “You couldn't simply say, ‘Good people do not commit murders; my client is a good person; therefore, he didn't commit this murder.’” Quite untrue. Your defense attorney adjusts the kind of argument he uses to suit the kinds of arguments used by the prosecution. If the prosecution presents concrete incriminating evidence, your attorney either throws that evidence into doubt or presents concrete evidence to the contrary. If the prosecution presents arguments based on your character, the defense brings up arguments based on your character (such as witnesses to your character, who will attest under oath that “He is a good person / good people don’t commit murder / ergo, WD could not have committed murder.” That would be sufficient to establish your innocence if your goodness or lack thereof were the gravamen of the trial. Yes, but observe that he had to present concrete evidence of his client’s good character; he couldn’t just assert it as an arbitrary statement.
I wrote, “Claude, are you using ‘believe’ in the sense of ‘strongly suspect’ (e.g., ‘I don't know for a fact that he murdered her, but I believe he did.’). If you are, then I would agree with you. I was using ‘believe’ in the stronger sense of a ‘claim to knowledge’." Outside of math and logic, where we get to invent the definitions . . . You don’t get to “invent” the definitions. . . . no knowledge is completely certain. Outside of math and logic, all belief is of the “strongly suspect” variety. Not true. I can be certain of many things outside of math and logic. I can be certain that I am alive and well, that I am typing this post, etc.
I wrote, “I don't think the mere ability to challenge and exert power over other species is sufficient to establish consciousness. And, although intelligence is the capacity to acquire and apply knowledge, it is doubtful that plants possess 'knowledge' in any normally understood sense of that term.” There is no “normally understood” sense of the term “knowledge.” You are simply applying that term as it is experienced by an organism with self-consciousness, such as human beings. Well, if there is no normally understood sense of the term “knowledge,” then what does it mean to say that plants possess knowledge?
I wrote, “I agree that plants are not automatons or machines; they're clearly living organisms, but even though they're able to interact with their environment in a goal-directed, self-sustaining manner, that doesn't mean that they are consciously aware of their environment.” It means precisely that. You confuse your general description with a definition; then you claim this “definition” has higher status than empirically verified knowledge. I’ll stick with the plant experts on this one. The plant experts that you cite are experts in botany, not in epistemology or in the categorization of conscious processes.
I wrote, “Not true. Again, I'm not simply tendering an arbitrary definition.” That’s true. You are in fact tendering a general description of human self-consciousness, which you confuse for a definition. Then you move beyond that entirely by claiming that this general description gives you enough knowledge to tell us something about “preconditions.” I’m not confusing anything with a definition. I didn’t offer a formal definition in terms of genus and differentia. I simply stated the preconditions of consciousness.
I wrote, “Consciousness is a faculty of living organisms.” That’s a description, not a definition. Yes, it’s a description, not a definition. I never claimed that it was a definition. I claimed that it was a fact! Why are you focusing on the distinction between a definition and a description??
I wrote, “Prior to the emergence of life on earth, there was no evidence of living organisms, nor of entities that possess consciousness." Huh? “Prior to the emergence of life on earth, there was no evidence of living organisms”? Profound. I like this one, too: “Prior to the emergence of wheat, there was no evidence of wheat products such as bread or pasta.” Good one, Claude! :-) What I meant to say is that “Prior to the emergence of life on earth, there was no evidence of entities possessing consciousness, since only living organisms possess it. “
I wrote, “We also know that once an animal dies, its physical processes cease and it no longer exhibits any evidence of being conscious.” That in no way means that consciousness has disappeared. It simply means that consciousness – whatever it is – was acting through the animal, making itself known to you by means of the animal. When a TV broadcast station dies, it ceases to function; the television signals it broadcast are still out there, radiating away. No. That analogy won’t work, because consciousness is not like a television signal, which CAN exist independently of the broadcast station after the station ceases to transmit the signal. “Again, a consciousness requires a form and a means of perception, both of which cannot exist without a material basis in reality.” Again, matter and mind are polar opposites; they complement each other in Existence. With the exception of certain entities inexactly referred to as “particles”, matter requires the existence of consciousness in order to BE matter. All qualities, for example – hard, soft, green, red, loud, quiet, etc. – exist only as qualities to consciousness. Nothing is objectively “green” or “hard”. To some particles, neutrinos for example, nothing really exists: it’s all just empty space. Let me see if I understand what you’re saying here. Are you saying that the concept of “matter” is understood only in contradistinction to the concept of “mind,” so that if there were no mind, there would be no matter? If so, then I think I understand better the point you’re making. But I don’t see that it contradicts the point I'm making, which is that the mind still requires sense organs and a brain in order to exist and function. Granted, we refer to these organs as material or physical in contradistinction to the mental, but if a person dies, we would say that his physical (or material) body (along with his various organs) still exists, even though he no longer possesses any consciousness. In so doing, we recognize that his mind, consciousness or soul depends on the existence of functional physical organs.
I wrote, “Really! So inanimate matter is conscious?? The sun, the moon, the stars are all conscious? Remarkable.” I’m glad you think so, but I didn’t say that. Once more: You have zero proof – except your own definitions – that matter can exist without consciousness…this doesn’t mean that matter is conscious; it means that matter requires its complement, consciousness, in order to BE matter. Okay. I see your point, which is that the CONCEPT “matter” would not exist without the CONCEPT of “consciousness.” My point was that what we now call “matter” or “material existents”, such as the sun, moon and stars, etc. would still exist without consciousness, but that consciousness would not exist without what we now call “matter.”
I wrote, “Consciousness is ‘defined’ ostensively.” “Ostensive definition” = “mere description.” This is useful in the primitive beginnings of a discipline when you don’t have any actual knowledge about the thing you’re trying to study. It’s one of the hallmarks of pre-scientific societies that its members forever remain in the grip of ostensive definitions. It’s one of the hallmarks of scientific societies that its members move beyond them to actual empirical knowledge of the thing they are studying. No, you’re misunderstanding what I (and Objectivists) mean by “ostensive.” With certain significant exceptions, every concept can be defined and communicated in terms of other concepts. The exceptions are concepts referring to sensations, and metaphysical axioms.
Sensations are the primary material of consciousness and, therefore, cannot be communicated by means of the material which is derived from them. The existential causes of sensations can be described and defined in conceptual terms (e.g., the wavelengths of light and the structure of the human eye, which produce the sensations of color), but one cannot communicate what color is like, to a person who is born blind. To define the meaning of the concept “blue,” for instance, one must point to some blue objects to signify, in effect: “I mean this.” Such an identification of a concept is known as an “ostensive definition.”
Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well. Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible primaries, the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive definition – e.g., to define “existence,” one would have to sweep one’s arm around and say: “I mean this.” (Rand, ITOE, p. 52)
I wrote, “The point I was making is that consciousness a subjective manifestation OF THE BRAIN AND CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.” Brain and nervous system are simply the means by which this other thing called consciousness makes itself known. There is no identity between brain and consciousness, nor does the material brain have a higher metaphysical status than non-material consciousness. Without consciousness, there are no “sense organs”; just dead wiring. Yes, there is no transmission of sensations, but consciousness is the product of a certain biological organization; it does not and cannot exist independently of a material organism. Without light, there is no such thing as “red.” If you take a red apple into a darkened room, it’s incorrect to say “It’s a red apple but the lights happen to be out.” Well, yes, without light, there is no such thing as red, but what is meant by saying that “it’s a red apple but the lights are out” is that under conditions of normal lighting, the apple would appear red, i.e., would reflect light along a certain wavelength, but I get your point. If the lights are out, the red no longer exists. If consciousness is gone, even the term “sense organs” is a contradiction: there’s nothing to sense and nothing to do the sensing. Okay, but the person would still have eyes, even though they’re no longer functional, which is all I meant to say.
I wrote, “I'm not sure what your point is. If a direct experience of consciousness is not sufficient to know "what" it is, then what kind of information do you require? What would satisfy you?” Only someone ensnared by his own arbitrary “definitions” could doubt that there was something to know about some fact of reality beyond one’s mere experience of it. Claude, if you want me to continue this conversation, you need to cut the sarcasm, which seems to be your characteristic manner of dealing with those you disagree with. When you ask, “What is it,” you’re simply asking for an identification; you’re not requesting further information, which is why I didn’t understand your statement that you didn’t know what consciousness is. You can identify consciousness by direct experience – by introspection – which is enough to tell you “what” it is. Obviously, to identify it – to know what it is -- is not to know everything about it.
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 2/01, 2:57pm)
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