About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Post to this threadMark all messages in this thread as readMark all messages in this thread as unread


Post 0

Thursday, July 17, 2008 - 11:58amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
If good and evil, right and wrong exist only in relation to the quest for life, does this mean that one has no bais for doing ANYTHING if one doesn't want to live?  What about if ones life has become so painful that one wants to end it?  Doesn't the statement that things are good and evil, right and wrong only in relation to the quest for life imply that noone can have any basis for acting if he doesn't want to live?  Yet Objectivists say that some people can choose to commite suicide without commiting any lapse of reason.  I think I'm getting a headache. ;)

Post 1

Thursday, July 17, 2008 - 8:06pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Interesting issue: If one could live for a million years (which may be possible soon - google on "singularity"), but be bored to tears for all but a tiny fraction of them, then would it be rational to choose a much shorter, but more interesting, life?  On a more concrete level, if one could experience the ultimate in joy, pleasure, satisfaction with existence, etc., for a day, at the expense of losing the rest of one's life, would that be a rational decision?  What if the total amount of satisfaction would be the same, regardless of the duration of life?  Would it then be rational to choose the shortest life possible, in order to have that ultimate experience?

Another interesting issue is that of deferred happiness.  We constantly choose to do things that may even be painful in the present, in order to get something we want in the future.  A friend of mine recently died shortly after being diagnosed with metasticized cancer.  She had deferred the world exploration trips that she had always dreamed of because of her felt obligation to care for an elderly mother.  Her mother died and she commenced her plans, only to see them evaporate.  What if, like the victims of IndieMac, we discover that it was all a waste.  Obviously, we all have to take chances, play the odds, etc., but I'm not sure that we have a clear understanding of these time-deferral issues...


Post 2

Thursday, July 17, 2008 - 9:04pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hello again, Christopher,

Sure, people can have other bases for action, but under Objectivism, those basis are just wrong or evil.

As to end-of-life decisionmaking, when people cannot to any reasonable degree approximate their goal -- in this case, their own life -- then it serves them well to abandon it. If your eggs are cooked, there's no sense in keeping the burner on. Or to continue my analogy from the other thread, if your sails are shredded and the waters rough, it might be time to jump ship.

Jordan




Post 3

Friday, July 18, 2008 - 1:55pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
One possible, rational motivating factor for someone who didn't want to live, I think, could be physical pain.  Certain ammounts of pain may be deemed "bad" even if one didn't want to live.  The point may not be that they are bad to a person who doesn't want to live because they are bad for survival, but that they are bad simply because they ammount to tremendous ammounts of suffering.  Also, because  certain types of tremendous pain might be bad to a person who didn't want to live, it might be right to do something about it (e.g. commit suicide).  The point here is that it is not only the pursuit of life which can render things good or bad, right or wrong.  "Bad" can certainly exist for someone who doesn't want to live, and so also can "right".

Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 4

Friday, July 18, 2008 - 8:55pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hi Christopher,

You're describing different kinds of ethics -- in particular, a strain of negative consequentialism.

Sure, *if* we assume these other ethics, then within those paradigms, we can talk about what would be considered good/evil/right/wrong -- with reference to them. We would ask, for example: what would be the right/good thing to do in situation X, *if* I were a Christian, a Utilitarian, a Hedonist? It's just an exercise in hypothetical reasoning.

But that doesn't mean it is then rationale to choose Christianity, Utilitarianism, or Hedonism in the *first* place. Rand argued at length for why her brand of egoism was the way to go. I daresay she would disagree with you that it is reasonable for a person to swap life as *the* motivating factor in exchange for merely being pain-free. Indeed, she discusses most of this in "The Objectivist Ethics."

Jordan

Post 5

Saturday, July 19, 2008 - 10:22amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Good answer, Jordan.

Ed


Post 6

Saturday, July 19, 2008 - 9:26pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Thank you, Ed. Do you check your yahoo email account?

Jordan

Post 7

Sunday, July 20, 2008 - 10:26amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Why? Did you wire me the money? I mean, I did everything you told me to ... you know, I came onto the boards and said that you were doing a "good job" and such. But perhaps we shouldn't be having this conversation on the public forum though (because folks might "get-privy" ... IF you know what I mean).**

:-)

**Please excuse the aimless, pre-coffee rant. I usually just wake up in the morning (or late morning, in this instance) and post the first thing on my mind.

Ed


Post 8

Sunday, July 20, 2008 - 11:09amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
No worries. Expect at your front door, at an undisclosed time, two large men in black suits.

Jordan

Post 9

Monday, July 21, 2008 - 2:16pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Jordan,
I think I see what your saying, but I do think that there are grounds for the type of ethics I'm considering.  I hardly would compare the idea that if life becomes hopelessly and tremendously painful that we should end it with the idea that we should live for some imaginary god in the sky (or that we should live for "society", or whatever.)  Yet, according to Tara Smith, nothing could be good or bad, or right or wrong for someone who didn't want to live.  This, to me, is absurd...If I don't want to live, but my body and mind are constantly and hopelessly racked with tremendous suffering, I can still consider this suffering to be bad; I don't have to want to live to evaluate it as such.  Also, because I could still evaluate something as bad, it would follow that I could evaluate certain actions as being right.  (If anything is either good or bad, and one can do something about it, then it follows that certain actions would be right and others would be wrong.)
Also, it is important to understand that Smith is not merely making the argument that things can only be good or bad for living organisms; she is saying, rather, that good and bad (and, derivatively, right and wrong) can only exist for an entity which has life as it's end.  Aiming at life is essential in order for a correct process of evaluation to arise in this view.


Post 10

Monday, July 21, 2008 - 4:19pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hi Christopher,

Does Smith provide reasoning to support her view that nothing could be good/bad/right/wrong for someone who doesn't choose to live? I'm with you; that doesn't really make sense. But maybe I'm missing something. Care to supply some of Ms. Smith's arguments? 

Her view also seems to depart from traditional Objectivist thought. Objectivism holds that life is the ultimate value of all living organisms, regardless of whether that want it or choose it: "An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil." The Objectivist Ethics, VOS.
  
Jordan


Post 11

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 - 9:37amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Jordan,
She says in "Viable Values", regarding chapter four of that book: "Recall the central conclusions of that discussion.  Life makes values possible and necessary.  Distintions between things as good or bad (and, derivatively, between actions as right or wrong) are intelligible only in relation to the quest for life." 
So she seems to be saying here that chapter four (which is entitled "Morality's Roots in Life") makes the argument that we can only objectively value things for the reason that they maintain our existences.  I guess that she then thinks of "good" and "bad, and "right" and "wrong" only in terms of gains or losses of one's objective ultimate value (which, assuming one has one, would be life in her view).  In other words, she seems to be agreeing with what Binswanger says in "Life-Based Teleology and the Foundations of Ethics".  In that work, Binswanger says "What does "acting in the face of an alternative" mean here?  It means that there is something the agent stands to gain or lose, something that it has at stake in the action; it means that the outcome of the action will affect the agent, for better or worse."
Elsewhere in the same work, Binswanger states "Only choosing to hold one's life as a value gives one the stake in one's actions that is required for the whole issue of evaluation to arise."
I think that this thinking of ethics only in terms of gains and losses is wrong.  If one's life has become a hopelessly hellacious ordeal, then one has nothing either to gain or to lose.  However, if it was hopelessly hellacious, and if one could do something about that, then one should (e.g. commit suicide).  It doesn't follow from the fact that one has no stake in one's actions (nothing to gain or lose) that there is neccessarily no possibility of things being good or bad, right or wrong for one.  Certainly in the type of case that I'm mentioning, certain things would be unequivicolly bad, and certain actions might be unequivicolly right.
P.S.  I'm sorry, but this is the best I could think of in terms of one of Tara's "arguments" for that premise.  I hope I gave you what you asked for.  I realized that I might not have, but she really doesn't give any arguments for that premise that I can think of.  She seems to more or less just state it.


Post 12

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 - 2:12pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hi Christopher,

Thanks for the background. Perhaps at base you are simply disputing that Objectivism is justified in claiming life -- and nothing else -- as the ultimate value. Yes?

In any case, contra Binswanger, Objectivism holds that it is the existence -- not the choice -- of life that gives rise to the whole issue of evaluation. The choice to live simply provides motivation for exploring that issue. And even if we do choose life, Objectivism urges that there is no point exploring the evaluation issue unless there are alternatives at play.

Now if Smith and Binswanger claim that choosing life, rather than merely having life, is required for having values, rather than merely being compelled toward values, then I think they are departing from an Objectivist perspective. In other words, I do not think Objectivism holds that choosing life is required for having values; it holds that having life is required for having values and that choosing life is needed to explore and be compelled toward or away from those values.

This might not have been my most helpful post,
Jordan


Post 13

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 - 3:43pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Jordan,
It may be the case that Binswanger and Smith have departed from what Ayn Rand would have said (if you are to believe my interpretation of them anyway).  However, I think that that is unlikely given that Peikoff even said something like the premise in question in "Fact and Value".  He said in that essay "Reality, we hold--along with the decision to remain in it, i.e. to stay alive--dictates and demands an entire code of values."  I think that here, Peikoff is implying that Objectivism is not all about intrinsic value.  Am I right in thinking that you are more of an intrinsicist when it comes to your conception of value?
Also, to answer your question about whether the issue with me is whether life should be one's ultimate value:
I think that that depends on what one means by "value".  Of course, Rand said that a value is "that which one acts to gain and/or keep", but that definition itself lends to two possible meanings for me.  Either it can mean simply an end (something that one acts for), or it can mean something that enhances one's life.  Tara Smith seems to me to suggest in "Viable Values" that a value is merely and end of action (something one acts for), however Ayn Rand may have meant more than that.  She does after all have John Galt tell Dagny that, given certain circumstances, he could have no more values and would then end his life; this to me suggests that what Ayn Rand meant in that scene by "values" was more than simply "ends of action". 
I myself think that it likely that if one means by "values" things which enhance one's existence, then life is the only such value. Anything else, it seems to me, would result in subjectivsm and/or hedonism.  However, if we mean by "values" merely the ends of actions, then I think that there is room for other values.  For example, if I wanted to kill myself, and so I went to a drugstore to buy medication with which to do that, that medication would definitely be the end of an action.  Assuming also that I had a good reason to kill myself, it would even be a reasonable value.  However, it obviously would not be a value based on life as one's ultimate value.
To me, part of the ambiguity in Ayn Rand's definition of "value" is the fact that she uses the word "gain" the way she does in the definition.  This could indicate merely something which one acts for, or, alternatively, something which enhances one's life.
Finally, to mention what I think really is the issue I'm addressing:
Ayn Rand and other Objectivists seem to rule all kinds of action which do not sustain one's life as outside the realm of ethics entirely.  I think that this is absurd because I know that it is sometimes right to end one's life (although the appropriate circumstances are extreme, I'll admit).  To tell a man who is dying of bone cancer, who is rolling around in his hospital bed in constant agony from pain, that his decision to end his life is either immoral or ammoral is to pronounce an absurdity to him.  He knows (assuming that he is rational) that his decision is in every sense rational, moral, and proper. 


Post 14

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 - 5:55pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit

Life is not the ultimate value but rather the ultimate source of values.


Someone who is dying of a terminal illness does not kill himself to end his life, but realizing that life is untenable, acts to kill the pain. His suicide is not "good" per se, but rather it is blameless. Neither God nor the Nanny State, neither of which is a valuing entity, can place a duty upon us to live for them.

Some people in such situations choose not to kill themselves because they still have some of their values of life unfulfilled. A prime example is an expectant mother with a terminal illness who hangs on until her child is born, or who chooses to forgo chemotherapy which would kill the child. There is an apparent conflict. The woman is choosing certain death over the chance of possible survival. But what she is really choosing is a shorter life full of potential happiness, as opposed to a potentially longer life without that happiness. Logically, one must be alive to value, and non-living entities cannot value. God is not a person, not a living being, and hence attributing values to Him is unintelligible. But real living beings truly value happiness, not life per se as their highest value. Happiness is normally compatible with living, but not always.

The bottom line is that only biological organisms can have values. States and deities cannot. Moral codes based on religious faith or statism are incoherent. The biocentric view of value invalidates state and church imposed morality.

But the fact that the needs of biology require that we act in a certain way in order to live establishes no duty upon the individual. Nature endows us with the potential to be happy in order to goad us toward actions which have the tendency to extend our lives and the ultimate goal of passing on our biological essence to our offspring. Nature is not a benevolent mother that cares for us. She may endow us with genes for breast or prostate cancer if those genes lead to reproductive success just as easily she endows us with hunger. Nature has her own ends, and does not care for us. Our care is for those ends we choose. Our happiness does not always conform to nature's dictates.

Post 15

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 - 10:13pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hi Christopher,

You might be amused by a post a contributed to a google groups thread back in April 2003. Here's an excerpt from the Theory of Value thread I started in humanities.philosophy.objectivism:
3) She seems to equivocate on "value", sometimes using it to
mean"that which one desires"and sometimes using it to mean"that
which is of benefit to someone." I suspect that she would either (A)
accept the latter view (which requires oodles more explaining on her
part), or (B) claim that desire and benefit are not two separate
issues but are two different aspects of the same achievement--a
problematic view since that which is desirable is not always that
which is of benefit, and vice versa. 
So I'm pretty much on the same page as you when it comes to Rand's use of the term "value." While I'm at it, I found one post by HPO JURY = MALENOR in response to mine rather helpful for understand where Rand might have gotten her definition in the first place.
Rand stole her theory of value
from Ludwig von Mises classical economic treatise "Human Action,"
first published in 1949. Rand and Mises were actually acquaintances.
In the ethical context, she plagiarized from Mises his axiom of action
-- value  is that which we ACT to gain and/or keep.

[omit]

I agree with you that Rand's definition of "value" is untenable. She
may have conflated two definitions of it, that which one desires and
that which is of benefit to someone. The latter is at least more
objective. But she created an even worse confusion with her readers
and followers: she often used "value" as synonymous with "principle."
For example, Purpose is one of the primary values of her system, along
with Reason and Self-esteem; however, one cannot act to gain and/or
keep Purpose. One practices it through virtuous action, in this case,
productivity. One's life work is valuable because it reflects one's
principles in action. A productive person is, to that extent, a
principled one, especially when he practices this virtue to the
greatest extent of his abilities. Therefore a value is a moral
principle, but she often just called it values, particularly when
critiquing someone as having or not having values.
Onward...
[Peikoff:] He said in that essay "Reality, we hold--along with the decision to remain in it, i.e. to stay alive--dictates and demands an entire code of values." 
I take Peikoff to mean simply that if we want to live we need to figure out how we're going to do it, given our present situation. I don't see see this as a comment against intrincism. I also don't see this as saying the same thing as Smith and Binswanger.
Am I right in thinking that you are more of an intrinsicist when it comes to your conception of value?
I'm trying to keep my own views out of this, but no, I'm not intrincicist. I'm better described as relational, which I think aligns with the Objectivist viewpoint. But that's another story.
Ayn Rand and other Objectivists seem to rule all kinds of action which do not sustain one's life as outside the realm of ethics entirely.  I think that this is absurd because I know that it is sometimes right to end one's life (although the appropriate circumstances are extreme, I'll admit).  To tell a man who is dying of bone cancer, who is rolling around in his hospital bed in constant agony from pain, that his decision to end his life is either immoral or ammoral is to pronounce an absurdity to him.  He knows (assuming that he is rational) that his decision is in every sense rational, moral, and proper. 
I think Rand thought every volitional action was within the realm of ethics. She thought it was ethically important to figure out what her favorite colors were. Peikoff, I think, followed suit in saying that even the choice to brush or not to brush one's teeth is ethically relevant. 

I daresay she never pronounced as absurd terminally, chronically ill people who choose to end their lives. I'm unclear as to why you think otherwise. Incidentally, rarely to I share personal bits on these forums, but your viewpoint does get a sympathetic ear from me. I serve on the board of Compassion & Choices of Northern California, an organization that advocates and educations for reasonable end-of-life decisionmaking. Before that I served as an extern at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer as an ethics consultation extern, dealing with end-of-life decisionmaking on a daily basis.

Jordan


Post 16

Thursday, July 24, 2008 - 9:38amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Jordan,
Thank you very much for your message.
I found very fascinating the idea that Rand got her definition of value from Mises.
I am also glad to know that someone else has picked up on some of the same ambiguities I've observed in Rand's use of the term "value".
My obsession with the fact that Rand seems to define morality only in terms of sustaining one's life stems, I think, from the fact that I want so desperately to have an ethical system that tells man what he ought/ought not to do in any area of his life where free choice is available to him.  This would mean defining right and wrong in terms that would allow for one to choose to die in certain cases.  (This instead of just telling him that what is right is what sustains his life;  I think, obviously, that the picture such a statement makes is incomplete given that it is sometimes right to end one's life as well.)
I have thought at some times in my past however that Rand was possibly not so concerned in her ethical theories with telling man what was right or wrong in the broadest possible sense, but that she was concerned more with telling man how to achieve happiness in life when such a thing is possible to one.  If this is truly the case for her, then I would have to agree with her that only life can be an end in itself.  However, I have a sneaking suspicion that the goal of ethics should not be simply to tell man how to enjoy life (assuming, of course, that this is possible to him), but that it should deal with issues of right and wrong in the broadest possible sense.  This would require a much more elaborate system than Rand's.
Regarding the work that you mentioned you've had with various organizations, I want you to know that I myself have been touched by the event of having to deal with someone wanting to die.  My grandmother asked to be euthanised when I was about 18 (due to suffering from a medical illness), and ever since then I have had a lot of sympathy for those who knew that they could not rationally choose to go on.  While I don't think that thinking about suffering like that is good-in-itself, I would like to see a system of ethics that would encourage a society to allow people to make such a final decision if they chose to.  Unfortuanately I think that the vast majority of those who choose to die do so for irrational reasons; however, it is those cases where the suffering being endured is truly horrible and hopeless that most attract my sympathy.  I must admit that I am afraid that if we build an ethical system which defines what is right as being merely "that which sustains one's life", we might end up with a politics which doesn't even allow for euthanasia or the right to end one's life.  I think that Rand's own description of what the most fundamental right of man is reflects her ethical views.  She defined the right to life as being both the most fundamental right and also the right to promote one's own survival.  (See her essay on Man's Rights in VOS.)  If the most fundamental right in a society was viewed as being the right to self-preserevation, then how could one have the right to end his/her life?  This scares the ever living crap out of me, as I do not want to support a philosophy which (if endorsed fully and consistently) would result in the right to end one's life (of have it ended by someone else) being nullified by the government.  Consequently, I would like to help create a philosphy which is different, I think, than Rand's.
Thanks again,
Christopher


Post to this thread


User ID Password or create a free account.