Objectivism is Structurally Weak

This is more an observation than a dissent.

Any argument consists of a conclusion with supporting premises. The premises can be viewed as chains tied to the conclusion. The longer the chain, the more vulnerable it is to attack because each link and connection between links is susceptible to challenge. The fewer the chains, the more vulnerable the conclusion is to attack because it requires the breaking of fewer chains. So stronger arguments have short and many chains.

Objectivism tends to be structurally weak for at least two reasons.

1. Objectivism emphasizes integration – no one aspect of Objectivism can be fully pr even well understood without first understanding several others. Lots of chains!

2. Second, Objectivism emphasizes fundamentalism – tracing each argument back to axioms. This makes for some super long chains!

Weak doesn’t mean wrong or worse, just vulnerable and precarious. Something worth thinking about, I’d say. That said, there're other qualities that give rise to an argument's weakness: (a) failing to provide criteria upon which the conclusion would be false, (b) failing to argue against incompatible viewpoints, (c) to anticipate objections from those who would hold incompatible viewpoints. These criteria, however, how less to do with logical strength than with rhetorical strength. I'm just pointing them out, not assessing to what extent Objectivism uses them.

Thought I'd share,

Jordan

Post 1

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 2:48pm

What a ridiculous title. Jordan, you are structurally weak. If any of the bones between your feet and your head fail, your head will fall off. Or has it already?

Post 2

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 4:06pm

Is advanced calculus structurally weak because it relies on many chains of mathematical knowledge?

Post 3

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 4:35pm

The assertion is arbitrary. No actual weaknesses are posited, just a general claim that arguments are weak. It is self refuting. The claim itself is week, for the same reason - it is a chain.

The claim is contradictory. A chain cannot be made weak by being both long and not long. And since it only takes one link to be broken, the fact that there are fewer links in a shorter chain doesn't mean there are fewer links needed to be broken. Only one link needs to be broken.

Recommended daily serving of sophistries fulfilled.

Post 4

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 4:52pm

Those were a bunch of ass-holish responses. I've done nothing to warrant such rudeness. I invite each of you to try arguing the substance of the claim.

Do you disagree that logical strength depends on the length and number of chains? Do you disagree that Objectivism, by virtue of integration and fundamentals, has longer and fewer chains?

This thread should not be threatening to anyone. Please dispense with the vitriol. It is ignoble, to say the least.

Jordan

Post 5

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 5:00pm

Jordan, Objectivism is structurally weak compared to what? Are there other philosophies that you consider to be structurally stronger? Also, how about John's question. Is calculus structurally weak? And, if it is, what is the purpose of labeling it as such?

Post 6

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 5:13pm

Jordan:

Those were a bunch of ass-holish responses. I've done nothing to warrant such rudeness.

I can see Ted and Dean's response as being harsh, but I'm not sure I understand how my response was ass-holish or rude. I certainly don't think I was being rude.

Oh well, another satisfied customer.

Post 7

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 5:18pm

Do you disagree that logical strength depends on the length and number of chains?

Yes I do disagree. I don't think the number of chains has anything to do with it. Calculus relies on a lot of hierarchal knowledge, everything in the advanced sciences draws upon a huge set pre-existing data. If you are arguing for the statistical likely-hood of being wrong on account of having many premises, I would wonder what kind of statistical matrix we can apply to such a hypothesis. It seems like an arbitrary assertion.

And again, not trying to be rude.

Post 8

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 5:20pm

Jordan, maybe you overlooked my response:

The assertion is arbitrary. No actual weaknesses are posited, just a general claim that arguments are weak. It is self refuting. The claim itself is week, for the same reason - it is a chain.

The claim is contradictory. A chain cannot be made weak by being both long and not long. And since it only takes one link to be broken, the fact that there are fewer links in a shorter chain doesn't mean there are fewer links needed to be broken. Only one link needs to be broken.

Post 9

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 6:03pm

The more parts a car has the more ways it can break down. Just the same, it needs wheels, a working engine, brakes and transmission, a place for the driver to sit and a steering wheel for him to drive with. Leave them out in the interests of lowering your chance of breakdowns and you won't have a car.

As for the other issues you raise:
(a) Don't understand this.
(b & c) True of Rand's writings, but not necessarily of Objectivism. Her time and energy were limited. This gives subsequent generations of Objectivists something to do.

Post 10

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 7:06pm

The analogy is wrong. Objectivism does not deduce everything from axioms in a long logical chain. Axioms are fundamental facts by which one integrates observed facts all along the road. Some of these facts are principles and become more detailed premises that enable further investigation and knowledge. But the main activity is gathering outside knowledge by observation and putting it together to find new knowledge.

Post 11

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 7:24pm

Those were a bunch of ass-holish responses. I've done nothing to warrant such rudeness.

My ass you've done nothing. Take a look at your ass-holish title for this thread. Its a flashy derogatory title with no merit, the kind you find on trashy news articles.

Post 12

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 9:37pm

Jordan,

You definitely have made a big claim. Taking your words at face value:

=========
Objectivism tends to be structurally weak for at least two reasons.

1. Objectivism emphasizes integration – no one aspect of Objectivism can be fully pr even well understood without first understanding several others. Lots of chains!

2. Second, Objectivism emphasizes fundamentalism – tracing each argument back to axioms. This makes for some super long chains!
==========

... then would you suggest -- either as an improvement, or as an example of something superior -- that less integration or less fundamentalism makes (or would make) something else superior?

Let me ask the questions separately:

(1) Would it be better NOT to emphasize so much integration of various aspects of reality (in a philosophy)?

(2) Would it be better NOT to ground knowledge in a hierarchy anchored firmly in the self-evident?

Thanks.

Ed

Post 13

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 9:51pm

John,

Your post wasn't ass-holish. I am sorry about that. I kind of glazed over it. Let me answer your question, which Laure kindly redirected me toward.

Calculus' many chains do not make calculus structurally weak, at least not in terms of what I'm talking about. Proofs in calculus are strictly either valid or invalid, much like proofs in deductive logic. But I'm not talking about validity; I'm talking about the strength -- not validity -- of inductive arguments.

Peter's analogy to the car of many parts is well put and entirely apt here. It would seem he thinks weakness, though an unfortunate biproduct, is nevertheless worth risking for the sake of utility or perhaps completeness. That's a respectable position, I'd say.

Laure:

Objectivism is structurally weak compared to what? Are there other philosophies that you consider to be structurally stronger?

Good questions. Weakness here is measured on an absolute scale: the 1-link chain is strongest, 2 is weaker, 3 is weaker, etc. And 1 chain to the conclusion is weaker than 2 is weaker than 3, etc. I wasn't comparing Objectivism's structural integrity to that of any other philosophy, and I haven't really thought of other philosophy's respective integrities. But I would venture to guess that the more disintegrated and non-fundamental philosophies would be logically stronger -- which I find counterintuitive, hence interesting, because I think I tend to find those philosophies less persuasive. Perhaps persuasion sometimes calls for longer chains?

Ted,

The more links there are in the chain, the more likely it is that one will break. See Peter's useful analogy. And the "argument" is not self-refuting. It has it's own measure of logical weakness/strength.

Rodney,

I believe it was Merlin who brought this interpretation (more or less) of Objectivism to my attention a few years ago. Indeed, I think it's the better interpretation than the axiom-deduction or reductionism views. However, I do think many if not most Objectivists espouse those latter interpretations, and my point with regard to fundamentals at least applies to them.

Peter, (a) refers to falsifiability.

Jordan

Post 14

Monday, August 4, 2008 - 10:22pm

Jordan:

Your post wasn't ass-holish. I am sorry about that. I kind of glazed over it.

It's ok. There seems to be a lot of ass-holish comments on this forum so I understand your frustrations. Although you may get less hostile responses if you reworded the topic header to "Is Objectivism structurally weak?" so it's more of you posing a question rather than making a declarative statement that some people may find presumptuous.

Let me answer your question, which Laure kindly redirected me toward.

Calculus' many chains do not make calculus structurally weak, at least not in terms of what I'm talking about. Proofs in calculus are strictly either valid or invalid, much like proofs in deductive logic. But I'm not talking about validity; I'm talking about the strength -- not validity -- of inductive arguments.

Peter's analogy to the car of many parts is well put and entirely apt here. It would seem he thinks weakness, though an unfortunate biproduct, is nevertheless worth risking for the sake of utility or perhaps completeness. That's a respectable position, I'd say.

Yeah I particularly like the analogy. But what particular inductive reasoning in Objectivism appears weak? I mean it's too vague an accusation. It seems you're really attacking the very idea of induction. (I think Hume argued against induction?) So in that sense I also do think it is a stolen concept. If you are making a distinction between inductive and deductive arguments, the latter being either valid or invalid and the former having a sliding scale of strength, are you not making an inductive argument and wouldn't you also thus be making a weak argument?

Post 15

Tuesday, August 5, 2008 - 7:29am

Jordan,

==========
But I would venture to guess that the more disintegrated and non-fundamental philosophies would be logically stronger -- which I find counterintuitive ...
==========

What you're doing here is capitalizing on the analytic-synthetic (or logical-factual, logical-empirical) dichotomy. Using wrong reasoning like that would lead you to say weird things -- things like Objectivism is structurally weak.

For instance, using your standard of evaluation, one would say that the 10 Commandments are structurally strong -- and we do it for 2 reasons:

(1) not being grounded-in or dependent-on earthly evidence, no evidence will ever disprove it

(2) not being dependent on long chains of reason, but rather this short chain:

a) God said so
b) do it, or you burn in hell

... there is a high statistical probability that both statements (or any 2 statements) are correct. At least a higher statistical probability than that any group of 20 -- or any group of 200 -- statements are.

I disagree with your looking at logic that way.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 8/05, 7:32am)

Post 16

Tuesday, August 5, 2008 - 8:00am

You state in #13 that your objection (a) is to a lack of falsifiability. Can you give me examples of philosophical claims or systems that are falsifiable?

Post 17

Tuesday, August 5, 2008 - 11:04am

Hi Ed,

(1) Would it be better NOT to emphasize so much integration of various aspects of reality (in a philosophy)?

(2) Would it be better NOT to ground knowledge in a hierarchy anchored firmly in the self-evident?

Overall, no to both. It would be "better" only insofar as it yields smaller and more chains. Maybe this explains in part why Dis-integrated philosophies, such as post-modernism, and non-hierarchical philosophies, such as phenomenalism, have lasted as long as they have. They are philosophical hydras, persistent little weeds that are hard to pluck.

I'm not really dealing with the alleged analytic-synthetic distinction here although I think I see why you're saying that. I'm just focusing on one particular feature of an argument, one which doesn't speak to an argument's truth, just to its potential vulnerabilities. And don't get me wrong -- lots of great ideas have these same vulnerabilities, and lots of bad ideas lack them, as I think you might've pointed out.

Hi John,

I take your point with regard to the wording of my title. Drat!

And indeed, as my observations here are inductive, they are subject to the same weak/strong evaluation I'm discussing here. I'm not attacking induction (and yes, Hume did), rather just pointing out a feature of it that is subject to a weak/strong evaluation, then applying that evaluation to Objectivism. (This is what I was relaying to Ted.) For what it's worth, I don't think deduction has this feature because deduction doesn't deal with propositions' truth values, so it would be inappropriate to subject deduction to that same weak/strong evaluation. But I might be mistaken on this point.

Anyway, I think it's indisputable, albeit rather vague, that Objectivism emphasizes integration and hierarchy, so I'm not sure I need to provide concrete examples of it. Nonetheless, just look at the interplay between Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. People cannot well understand one without the other. Same with Objectivist esthetics and metaphysics, or ethics and politics, or ethics and epistemology. Much of Objectivism proceeds not unlike Peikoff's "concepts in a hat" game.

Hi Peter,

Finding distinctly falsifiable philosophic claims is rather difficult. A basic example of a falsifiable claim is "all ravens are black." If you find a non-black raven, then the claim is falsified. More philosophic examples might include: religion makes people happy; nationalism makes people violent; capitalism makes people wealthier; captivity makes animals worse off; capital punishment doesn't deter crime; guns reduce crime rates. These are just examples, the best I could think of off the top of my head. I'm not arguing any of these. I know Michael Huemer critiques Rand for her lack of falsifiability, if you're interested. Just click here and search for "falsifiability."

Jordan

Post 18

Tuesday, August 5, 2008 - 1:11pm

Jordan,

You're still viewing logic from the perspective of a logical positivist (someone who does not yet understand the role of logic in human life). That's how you can say -- with a straight face -- that Objectivism's structurally weak. Here's an eccentric, mock dialogue uncovering this aspect of your view:

=========
Vienna Circle enthusiast:
You know, this Objectivism philosophy is structurally weak -- I've actually observed that.

Objectivist:
Structurally weak compared to what?

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Well ... it's structurally weak compared to Euclidean geometry!

Objectivist:
Okay, let me get this straight: In Euclidean geometry -- like playing chess -- you get to apply logic to a finite and completely-understood system of numbers or defined objects. And, because you can deduce everything known about the system from applying logic to the definitions -- because of that fact, Euclidean geometry is structurally stronger than Objectivism. Is that right?

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Yes! Finally, an Objectivist who sees my superior logic!

Objectivist:
Don't get ahead of yourself. Let me see if I understand you. If Objectivism were a philosophy for living on Earth where everything known about it could be deduced from a closed system of defined objects ... then you would go ahead and praise Objectivism for being structurally strong, am I right?

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Right!

Objectivist:
Did it ever occur to you that even attempting to measure the strength of Objectivism in this manner is illegitimate?

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
What do you mean? I mean, I get to postulate any kind of thing I want to -- don't I? I get to apply standards applicable to one part of reality (math or chess), change the context either explicitly or implicitly, and re-apply that same standard to totally different kinds of things! Even things like philosophies for living on Earth! I'm drunk with the power of logic! hahaha!

Objectivist:
Well, I disagree with your view and use of logic. It smacks of a sophistic parlour game. I view logic from the Objectivist perspective: as the art or skill of noncontradictory identification (objective identification) of the facts of experience.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Heh? That ties a lot of things (art/skill, identification, facts, perceptions, reality) to logic. I thought logic stood on its own. I thought that the very definition of logic -- i.e., the principle or law of noncontradiction -- was all that logic is, and that you could just rip logic out of it's normal human use (in epistemology) and use it for your own fun and games. I thought that I could take the mere definition of logic and treat it as if it were the whole of logic itself (definition = reality).

Objectivist:
Logic is what we use in order to live (humanly).

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Yeah, but can't we just have fun with it and compare things unfairly while appealing to logic as our out-of-context, floating abstraction Gold Standard?

Objectivist:
Yes, we can do this. We can misuse it and try to get folks to think odd things by proclaiming that we aren't guilty of any fallacies -- because we are still "using" logic.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Okay, I think I see your point. It's epistemologically inappropriate for me to compare the structural strength of a philosophy for living on Earth with some kind of refined and hyper-detailed/hyper-defined system such as Euclidean geometry. In doing so, I'm using an idealized standard and applying it to something inherently non-idealized.

Objectivist:
Right! It's like putting a 12-inch ruler up to someone's foot and proclaiming: "That's not a structurally ideal foot!" (because there are some things, like a group of a dozen inches, which are very much more like a foot than your foot is).

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Wuh??

Objectivist:
Nevermind, it's just that "misapplying an idealized standard" thing, again.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Oh. Well, I really really hate to say this, Mr. ... ?

Objectivist:
Mr. Objectivist.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Well, I really really hate to say this, Mr. Objectivist, but -- in this one instance -- you were more right than I was.

Objectivist:
Or less wrong.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Eh?

Objectivist:
Or whatever. At any rate, I certainly wouldn't want to gloat about it. After all, I am sure that I've learned many things from you, Mr. ...?

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Mr. Vienna Circle enthusiast.

Objectivist:
... Mr. Vienna Circle enthusiast.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Thank you. You are wise and kind and cool and magnanimous and either are popular or you should be, and ...

Objectivist:
Thanks for the compliments, Mr. Vienna Circle enthusiast. Now let's go for a cup of coffee and discuss whether the Big Bang theory breaks rules of logical thought.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Are you buying?

Objectivist:
I'm an Objectivist.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Am I buying, then?

Objectivist:
I'm an Objectivist.

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
Oh, I get it.

Objectivist:
I would be buying for you if I viewed you to be of a higher value to me than ...

Vienna Circle enthusiast:
I said I get it, already!
=========

;-)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 8/05, 1:15pm)

Post 19

Tuesday, August 5, 2008 - 1:18pm