| | I missed this.
Back in April, Brad wrote: If objective morality exists epistemologically, if moral statements have truth value, then they would be falsifiable and provable. But while you can point to an objective standard of value, you can't prove that it ought to be adopted. As Rand acknowledged, her moral principles all follow from the assumption that one makes the choice to value life. Absent that choice, morality isn't applicable. So logically, it's incoherent to say that one ought to value life. The decision to value life precedes morality. These statements need to be unpacked. First, the statement "if moral statements have truth value, then they would be falsifiable and provable."
Well, moral statements do have truth value, and they are falsifiable or provable. If no moral statements were provable, there would be no such thing as a science of ethics and no moral principles that are rationally demonstrable and therefore deserve to be followed. There would be no such thing as rights or the obligation to respect them. Nor would there be a political system that is incumbent upon man to adopt and defend.
Second, consider the statement: "But while you can point to an objective standard of value, you can't prove that it ought to be adopted."
Oh, yes you can, but the "ought" in this case is conditional. One "ought" to adopt an objective standard of value (i.e., man's life qua man) if one's life is worth living -- if one values what life has to offer. It should be noted that all "oughts" are conditional. One ought to do X if and only if X is a means to Y (to something one values for its own sake, as an end in itself).
And finally, the statement: "As Rand acknowledged, her moral principles all follow from the assumption that one makes the choice to value life. Absent that choice, morality isn't applicable. So logically, it's incoherent to say that one ought to value life. The decision to value life precedes morality."
In a certain respect, that's true, but the word "choice" can be a bit misleading. People don't typically make a conscious "choice" to live in the same way that they choose, for example, to pursue a particular career. What Rand means by "choice" in this context is something more akin to "value." In her essay "Causality Versus Duty," she writes: "Reality confronts man with a great many 'musts,' but all of them are conditional: the formula of realistic necessity us: 'You must, if--' and the 'if' stands for man's choice: '--if you want to achieve a certain goal.'" (Philosophy Who Needs It, 118, 119), Observe that Rand equates "if you want to achieve a certain goal" with "if you choose to achieve a certain goal." For unless people have a good reason to commit suicide, they do want to live and do make that choice. Therefore, if you value your life -- if you want to achieve the values that life has to offer (which, with very rare exceptions, everyone does), then you ought to adhere to a standard of value that enables you to achieve that goal. You ought to adopt man's life qua man (the life proper to man) as your standard of value.
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