| | I wrote, "I would say that it is induction insofar as one came to that understanding by reasoning from particular instances of ice and water to the generalization that 'All pure ice floats on a larger volume of pure water, ceteris paribus'."
Elliot replied, But it does not logically follow from the particular instances. You only believe it due to good physics explanations (plus the instances they reference). Ah, but those good physics explanations are themselves based on particular observations. Will you answer the question about what your intended point is? I'd be happy to, Elliot, although I thought it was obvious. Your guru, Mr. Popper, had this to say: "Our theory rests on an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability which follows from the logical form of generalizations; for although these are never derivable from particular statements, they can stand in contradiction with them." (Logik der Forschung, 13)
Not true. The generalization about the buoyancy of ice follows from particular observations, as does the generalization about certain anatomical features of swans. We cannot observe all instances of ice, nor all swans that will ever live, but we can nevertheless justify certain universal statements about them.
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