Now to more serious topics, Robert …
Me: >>Therefore, prudence is not a firm enough foundation for morality because it eventually yields to might makes right.<<
You: >>1: i'm not sure if this is true. the fact of the matter is that, if you hurt enough people, they will eventually unite against you, and when enough of them unite, they will be mightier than you.<<
Well, they MAY unite against you and they MAY be mightier than you. But what if they don’t unite, or what if you assess that you are stronger than their union? And this is all assuming that your victims know you are their assailant.
What if you are a crafty fellow and conceal your tracks? If you then calculate that your misdeeds will not be attributed to you, how will prudence restrain you?
You: >>2: if it is true, then I see no reason to go along with it. of course, rand proposed a system of ethics against "might is right", but these ethics are meant as a consequence, not a primary. the prime question one must ask is: what is beneficial? morality is just an attempt to answer this. if it is a wrong answer to this question, it does not maintain its credit. it is not that we need morality in and of itself. it is that we need to know how to live in our own interests, and the objectivist ethics is proposed as a guide for doing so. if morality is against interest,, there is no longer any reason to be moral. so, if we take you at your word on this, why be good?<<
Why be good? The short answer: To thrive.
Now the long answer, Robert. The problem with defining morality strictly in terms of my self-interest is that it is subjective – e.g., my deed will be moral because it will be good for me. Who knows besides me what that is and whether prudence will sufficiently contain my aggression in pursuit of that self-defined good?
However, if I define morality in terms of the consequences of my actions upon others, that is objective – e.g., I don’t murder because of the irreparable harm that would cause my victim; a harm that everyone can recognize. It is in my interest that this objective morality be recognized by everyone. This way, all others restrain themselves from actions that may harm me.
Only by first acknowledging the basic dignity of others and then refraining from actions (other than defense) which injure that dignity, do I live by a morality that most effectively protects me from others and allows me to concentrate upon those things in life most enjoyable to me. Because of the objective nature of this morality, those around me can also recognize the same benefit and adhere to it accordingly.
By this means we still arrive at the same injunction embedded at the core of Objectivist morality: It is immoral to initiate force except in defense. So, consideration of the other before self-interest provides a strong and objective foundation for this injunction that the subjectivity of prudence does not.
Regards, Bill a.k.a. Citizen Rat
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