Intentional Conceptualism - Valid Concept or Red Herring?

The rough draft of this article was regarded as an unacceptable submission. I've started a new thread on it because I feel that the gems of understanding captured by this article should not be casually dismissed and thrown back into the vast ocean of mental fog and disarray without first undergoing public inspection. Here it is:

How to understand every position taken (including Rand's) in the Realism-Nominalism debate

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This essay serves 3 purposes:

1) Identification of the distinct positions taken in the Realism-Nominalism debate
2) Identification of Rand's (implicit) position in this debate
3) Final resolution of the "Problem of Universals" (by creating an understanding so clear and sufficient that the problem is decisively transcended)
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Background

"Universals are features (e.g., redness or tallness) shared by many individuals, each of which is said to instantiate or exemplify the universal. Although it began with dispute over the status of Platonic Forms, the problem of universals became a central concern during the middle ages. The metaphysical issue is whether or not these features exist independently of the particular things that have them: realists hold that they do; nominalists hold that they do not; conceptualists hold that they do so only mentally."¹

Background Summary

Human thought requires regarding universals as "shared features." Questions or disputes regarding the fact of their existence, taken along with those regarding the nature of any affirmed existence, will altogether exhaust the available positions.

There are 4 options regarding the precise genesis of universals: They may be taken to have no instantiation (nominalism); instantiation in entities (realism); instantiation in a particular mind (classic conceptualism); instantiation that is inherent in the MODE of interaction between reality and ANY human mind (intentional conceptualism). The possible positions are summarized below:

A. No existence of shared features (no universals): "nominalism"
B. Shared features in the ontological sense (extra-mental; entity-instantiated): "realism"
C. Shared features in the subjective (objects in the mind) sense: "classical conceptualism"
D. Shared features in the intentional (objective) sense: "intentional conceptualism"

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Who's who (in this debate)?

*4 questions (utilizing 4 modes: non-existence + 3 existences) that, when taken together, sufficiently delineate all available positions.

1. Do universals exist?

**If yes, proceed to question 2;

**if no, you're a cursed nominalist - you may have "trouble" communicating with others as your words have no objective "meaning" - seek psychiatric help if the situation warrants

2. Are universals extra-mental (an existence independent of thought)?

**If yes, you're a cursed ontological realist - probably one of those Scholastic types - go read some more Plato and give away any books by Aristotle, and especially those of Rand;

**if no, proceed to question 3

3. Are universals located in the mind (as the "content" of cognition)?

**If yes, you're a cursed, classical conceptualist - probably one with an arbitrarily invented "criterion of classification" - one who thinks that "units exist qua units" and not solely as "things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships"² - you probably don't believe that "[t]he conceptual classification of newly discovered existents depends on the nature and extent of their differences from and similarities to the previously known existents."³ ;

**if no, proceed to question 4

4. Are universals merely the form in which humans conceptualize (as the "mode" of cognition)?

**If yes, congratulations! You're an "intentional conceptualist" - the type of thinker Rand was, though she never explicitly stated it in such sufficiently illustrative terms - you realize that "units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships" and that "units do not exist qua units" either in your mind OR outside of it - you realize that units have existence by way of THE INTERACTION of a mind with reality (they're not in the mind or out in reality; they are in the relation of mind to reality;

**if no, you're probably a shifty, post-modern relativist, taking pains to avoid the explicit identification of anything important to humans, probably because of the frightening personal "responsibility to think" that these identifications entail - go rent all of Michael Moore's films and have a movie marathon with a popcorn-bowl full of lightly-salted Prozac pills and some diet-soda with double aspartame

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Final note on this new term for an "old" (Randian) type of conceptualism: "intentional" (In order to clarify exactly what "intentional" means in this context).

"Intentional existence is not independent of the human mind, but it is also not dependent on the existence of any one individual mind, as subjective existence is.

Objects that exist for two or more minds, objects that they can discuss with each other, have intentional existence. If there were no minds on earth, there would be no objects that had intentional existence. To summarize this middle ground between real existence and mental existence. It consists in (1) not being dependent on the acts of any particular human mind, and in this respect it differs from subjective existence. And (2) not being independent of the human mind in general, and in this respect it differs from real existence. It is a mode of existence that depends on there being some individual minds at work."⁴

Conclusion

Possible positions regarding the Realism-Nominalism debate can (and should) be put in an ordinal scale. These positions can (and should) be compared for the global perspective that this scale provides. Here is such a scale (along with tags* to identify the respectively-assumed genesis of universals):

Realism ------------- Intentional Conceptualism ---------- Classical Conceptualism -------- Nominalism

*Universals are:

[things "out" there] [relational mode of "in" to "out"] [things "in" here] [non-existent]

The quote above (regarding intentional existences) decisively captures Rand's stance, albeit in terms she didn't explicitly use (this clearly categorizes her thought under the newly differentiated position in the ordinal scale: intentional conceptualism).

What is remarkably evident is that the intentional existence of concepts is what makes communication possible (acknowledging this position in the scale is necessary to explain, without the contradictions of the other positions, how it is that we can communicate about reality). This occurs because of the "public" nature deriving from the inherent objectivity of proper concept formation (what is subjective is private; what is objective is the same for all).

Reality is continuous, but human minds must delineate (due to cognitive limitations, we cannot treat each of the trillions of entities on an individual basis).

In sum, universals don't exist independently, but (human) thinking makes it so. This solves the "Problem" and illuminates Rand's position, putting it in a explicit perspective with regard to the other possible positions.

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Reference:

1. [online] Philosophy Pages (link to dictionary). Accessed 30 Jun 2004.

Available:< http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/index.htm>

2. IOE, p. 7

3. IOE, p. 73
4. [online] Adler On - Topical Index to the Works of Mortimer J. Adler (link to "Being"). Accessed 30 Jun 2004. Available:< http://www.thegreatideas.org/apd-bein.html>

Post 1

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 1:31pm

Hi Ed,

I appreciate not having to wait to see this, brave, bold, staccato style Epistle of St. Ed to the Soloites. Thanks for posting it.

Rather than comment on the whole thing, because I am sure there will be others who will have comments, I would like to examine one thing at a time. If we resolve that, and others have not already brought up other possible questions, I'll move on to another thing.

So, my first question is, what do you mean by "universals?"

In the beginning you say, (quoting the online dictionary, which is pretty good, by the way), "Universals are features (e.g., redness or tallness) shared by many individuals, each of which is said to instantiate or exemplify the universal...."

At the end you are talking about, objects, "Objects that exist for two or more minds, objects that they can discuss with each other, have intentional existence."

I have discovered this is a very common thing when discussing the concept of universals, which is perfectly understandable, since it is useless and provides no knowledge of anything, anyway. But I digress.

So, which do you mean by universals, the attributes of things, or things themselves? I think you might inadvertently be letting the concept "essence" slip in as well, because that is also confused with "universals."

That's enough to start.

Regi

Post 2

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 2:12pm

Hi, Ed.

I read your explication of the different approaches to the problem of universals. I found it to be helpful, especially because of my ignorance of the topic. So, if you don't mind, let's see if I learned anything.

Are you saying that if I see ten different objects of various sizes and shapes that are all red, my comprehension of their commonality in this respect is a construct of my mind? The redness of each object is, of course, an aspect of that object without regard to my awareness of it, so its redness is metaphysical. But my concept of red is a generalization of that metaphysical fact that allows me to categorize as the same all red objects.

In other words: Each thing has a unique identity. That identity is a set of qualities, such as redness. All of that is metaphysical. However, we can take our perception of these qualities, pull them apart from the various sets of identity they belong to, re-organize them into groups on the basis of their sameness, and then call these groups "universals".

Right, wrong, or somewhere in between?

Regards,
Bill

Post 3

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 10:30pm

Regi and Bill,

Thank you for your questions. I agree with Regi's sentiment that discussion of this essay could easily turn into an arduous task - and I'd add that it has great potential to devolve into semantics and pedantics.

With this precautionary view in mind, I am going to try something new - perhaps even something that is not "my style" (and I'd appreciate Rodney's input on this!).

Although at this point, I will attempt a short answer to Regi's question on "features" vs "objects":

Regi, the talk of objects in the intentional sense is the talk of the objects OF the mind, not objects IN the mind (the word "object" is used figuratively here). In other words, these "objects" are objects of our thoughts, and they are not "our thoughts" themselves - or our "concepts" themselves (note: this alludes to one of Hume's mistakes regarding "relations of ideas" IN OUR HEADS - thinking that we are conscious of our ideas themselves, and not the referents of ideas).

That is as direct as I feel is appropriate for now. How about something indirect, but perhaps even more revealing ...

Rather than taking your questions head-on and one-by-one (which is the intuitively superior method), I will attempt something counter-intuitive. I will attempt to allow you to "see inside my head" by taking a gander at a collection of my stored notes for this essay.

This sample (some of the only notes I stored on a computer) is mostly derived from Gotthelf's "On Ayn Rand" - although there are tidbits from M. Adler's "Adler's Philosophical Dictionary" mixed in. It (at least somewhat, or partly) provides answers to both of your posts in a broad sweep. Here it is (some of my notes):

UNIVERSALS
There are no classes or kinds (universals) out in reality, but "thinking" makes it so!

The "man-ness" in men is not some identical essence running through all individual men - it is the possession of a large set of distinguishing characteristics that must exist in some non-zero quantity (within the range permitted by those characteristics).

ESSENCES
The (epistemological) essence of a concept can change with an increase in knowledge (we don't come to "know" concepts better; we "learn" to better "understand" concepts (by an increase in our knowledge of their referents).

However - the (metaphysical) essence of any one of a concept's referents - if there is one such thing knowable by us - cannot change. In fact, this essence is that which does not change while any one-and-the-same entity undergoes the "accidental" changes that it goes through!

IDENTITY
In STATING the identity of a thing, we may only state the kind of thing it is, or only the essential properties of a thing of that kind, as reflected in the definition of that kind.

But the identity of an entity is the SUM OF ALL of its attributes, including its capacities for change.

A thing's identity is not restricted to its being a member of a kind; nor to its essential properties as a thing of that kind.

Nor is there any justification for a METAPHYSICAL distinction between essential and non-essential properties.

3 LONG THINGS
"Length" is not some identical abstract attribute "length" that long things possess (as if it is some abstract thing that we can just take and add "5 inches" to, for things 5 inches long; and "12 inches" to, for things 12 inches long).

Nor is it that each long thing possesses DIFFERENT, BUT IRREDUCIBLY SIMILAR attributes (such as being 5 INCHES LONG, being 12 INCHES LONG, etc).

Instead, it is that each "long thing" possesses the same attribute or characteristic (length) in different measure or degree (such as being "x inches long").

Hope that helps - though I welcome ANY further inquiries! By the way, I WILL TRY to be as direct as possible on future examinations - it's just that this issue is perhaps the most contentious fundamental issue in all of philosophy. This makes me a little fearful that a good thing here can be lost by mere word choices.

As justification for my "fear" here, someone once said - and I'm paraphrasing here - something of this sort:

"Words are like spectacles (eyeglasses); they obscure that which they do not make more clear" (and that quote scared the hell out of me!)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/30, 10:36pm)

Post 4

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 9:09am

Marc, you said"

"You sketched three alternatives to Nominalism, which you called realism, classical conceptualism and intentional conceptualism.� The trouble is that it's not clear that these three positions are really any different to one other."�

Marc, I take it that when you say: "it's not clear that these three positions are really any different to one other." that you are seeing that universals are somehow found in, or associated with, each of these 3 positions. And that, because they all allude to universals, their distinction (difference) from one another is unclear. Is this right (so far)?

"If you ask professional philosophers, I'm not so sure that they would draw the distinctions you mention."

Marc, my retort to this point is that professional philosophers - on the whole - are victims of the WORDS-WILL-EITHER-PROVIDE-MORE-CLARITY-OR-THEY-WILL-PRODUCE-MORE-OBSCURITY maxim that I introduced as a quote. In short, those poor souls are trying to get clear, drinkable water from the Ganges (probably the dirtiest river in the world)! Their goals may be noble, but I do not expect great things to flow from their work - due to what they "swim in."

�
"It could be that realism and nominalism are really the only two possibilities.� In which case the debate is really just a matter of semantics."

Marc, realism and nominalism are not the only two possibilities - realism and nominalism are the only two OPPOSITES (they provide the terminal end-points of the ordinal scale which I created).

Marc, instead of saying more, I will stop there. I really think that this subject is like a philosophical "64-ounce steak" and should be taken in little bites (and anything else would lead to indigestion at least, and possibly a stomachache)!

Ed

Post 5

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 11:49am

On the ordinal scale:

When viewing the scale from left to right (Realism -> Conceptualisms -> Nominalism) the characteristic that is changing (units of this horizontal "axis") may be best regarded as the "tie to reality."

On the far left, we have realism: advocating that universals are so tied to reality that a mystical intuition is required to identify them (they are assumed to be part of the fabric of reality; and our method of identifying them is left unexplained).

On the far right, we have nominalism: advocating that there never is, was, or will be any such tie to reality (names are mere arbitrary social constructions). On this view, all things appearing universal are considered to be artifacts of language, custom, etc. ("universality" is regarded as a "thinking error" or a misconception).

We also have classical conceptualism: advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by the mind and that these designations somehow stand in a logical relation to reality; and finally, the "new-kid-on-the-block" (intentional conceptualism): advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by reality and related to how the mind interacts with reality.

Ed

Post 6

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 12:59pm

Hi, Ed.

>>We also have classical conceptualism: advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by the mind and that these designations somehow stand in a logical relation to reality; and finally, the "new-kid-on-the-block" (intentional conceptualism): advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by reality and related to how the mind interacts with reality.<<

I don't mean to slight your efforts, Ed, but how profound is all this? (I really don't know.) For example, isn't "red" simply a definition deduced from the observation of various red objects, which once defined is then taught to others? In this way, we all commonly understand what is meant by red. The definition works because it corresponds with reality; but it is still somewhat arbitrary. After all, what makes something red and not orange, or vice versa. When does tall become short, or light dark?

I can see how from the observation of reality we pin certain meanings to words. If they lack precision in communicating what is needed to be known, then we can use other words -- e.g., oh, you mean fire engine red not scarlet red. But these other words are meant to be very specific. They convey something that is metaphysically real, therefore are objectively understood by all of us. Whereas, mere "red" has a fuzzy imprecision that suffices when the particulars aren't important or are unknown. But there is nothing universal about this imprecision, unless it is the fact of imprecision itself that is universal.

I think what I'm getting at is that if red were a universal (beyond the imprecision of the word), whether in reality or in the mind, it would be just that, universal. Right? Yet, when I think of red, I see in my mind's eye something very particular: Scarlet red. I'm sure others think of different shades. Then, as I touched upon above, when does red stop being red? For example, my wife and I were arguing this weekend over whether a truck was painted red or orange. (Yes, I do live an exciting life.) Yet, we were both observing the same color.

Regards,
Bill

Post 7

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 6:40pm

Bill, you said:
�
"... isn't "red" simply a definition deduced from the observation of various red objects, which once defined is then taught to others?"

Bill, "red" objects are only deduced (regarded in the new way: "red") when contrasted with non-red objects. The existence of non-red things led to that "special regard" that we now have for red things, contrasted against non-red things.

The similarity of 2 red things - their "redness" - can always and only be recognized by us in contrast to non-red things (and this difference is what generates any existential importance of "color" in the world). To paraphrase one thinker's take on this: whoever it was that first discovered water, it wasn't a fish.

"In this way, we all commonly understand what is meant by red.� The definition works because it corresponds with reality; but it is still somewhat arbitrary. After all, what makes something red and not orange, or vice versa.� When does tall become short,�or light dark?"

Context determines the appropriate precision needed. It is the other aspects of existence (those we need to differentiate from) that determine what is meant by red, orange, tall, short, light, or dark.

�

"Whereas, mere "red" has a fuzzy imprecision that suffices when the particulars aren't important or are�unknown.� But there is nothing universal about this imprecision, unless it is the fact of imprecision itself�that is universal."

We see reddish things possessing the same attribute (color) in different measure or degree.

The only way that we know that we are talking about red things (as opposed to orange things that are merely a reddish type of orange) is because the sum of all colors - ones we've been exposed adequately, so that they have made an impression on us - places them in the red-range.

Here is a thought experiment to prove this point:

Aliens from Redwhite - a planet where only 2 colors exists (red and white) - gaze at a red apple and an orange tangerine. When questioned, they will call the tangerine "red" because it is more red than it is white.

If this were the only orange thing on their planet (all else was either red or white) it may even be APPROPRIATE for them to call it red, rather than to invest mental energy on developing a new concept for this single, particular thing (concepts should not be multiplied beyond cognitive necessity).

Bill, do you see where this is going (context determines the appropriate precision needed)?

�
"I think what I'm getting at is that if red were a universal (beyond the imprecision of the word), whether in reality or in the mind, it would be just that, universal.� Right?� Yet, when I think of red, I see in my mind's eye something very particular:� Scarlet red. I'm sure others think of different shades.� Then, as I touched upon above, when does red stop being red?"

When you see "Scarlet red," that's due either to all the "reds" you've been exposed to, or to a possible personal bias in your preference for that shade.

If you had only seen one shade, THAT shade would've been your "red." If you had only seen 2 shades, one that was orangish-red and one that was scarlet red (AND YOU'VE SEEN ORANGE THINGS), then you're seeing the "right" shade when you say you see Scarlet red.

"For example, my wife and I were arguing this weekend over whether a truck was painted red or orange.� (Yes, I do live an exciting life.)� Yet, we were both observing the same color."

For one, the objective color could be determined by examination of the wavelength of light reflected. But you still request an explanation, don't you?

My answer is that you two have either seen, or always focused on, different shades of the 2 colors; giving rise to 2 unique "backgrounds of difference" that you are each contrasting the truck with.

Again, objectivity is possible by either exposing you both to more shades of each color, or examining both of your personal preferences and checking for bias regarding the 2 different colors.

Ed

Post 8

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 8:33pm

Ed,

You have provided some very interesting long answers to my very short questions. Agains, I am intentionally restricting myself to one concept at a time, so to speak.

This is what I have picked: The (epistemological) essence of a concept can change with an increase in knowledge (we don't come to "know" concepts better; we "learn" to better "understand" concepts (by an increase in our knowledge of their referents).

There is something wrong with that, but I am not sure exactly what it is, because I am not sure exactly what it says. I seems to say a concept or the understanding of a concept changes with new knowledge or additional information. If that is what it says, it is incorrect.

What we may learn about the referents of a concept is open-ended, and we can probably always learn more about them. Also, how we define a concept may have to be adjusted in the light of new knowledge. However, a concept's meaning is only its referents, whether we know anything about them or not, and no new knowledge ever changes the meaning of a concept in any way at all. What a child means by "dog" and what a veterinarian means by "dog" are exactly the same thing, even though the difference in knowledge about dogs between a child and a veterinarian is very great.

The problem is the word essence. Like universals, it is a hangover from ancient philosophy that is more problematic than elucidating. Things have essential qualities (those it must have to be the things they are), but a better term for those would be necessary qualities. It is not, however, required that we know what those necessary qualities are to form a concept for the existents that have them; we only need to identify the existents themselves in terms of the qualities we recognize as unique to those existents.

Regi

Post 9

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 8:50pm

Bill,

I think you need the benefit of the wisdom of experience.

You said, my wife and I were arguing this weekend over whether a truck was painted red or orange.

In all such cases, I have learned, that the wife is always right. If your wife, for example, said the truck is red, and you said it is orange, you are wrong. This assumes your are interested in the truth, of course. The truth is, you are only interested in some kind of accuracy which, if you really think about it, you would be at pains to describe, but your wife, because she loves you and hates to think you might make a fool of yourself, only wants you to be practical and say things that make sense to others. While you might have some personal subjective reason to insist some color ought to be called one thing rather than another, your wife knows what most people will call a color, and insists you call it that, so you won't look like the prig you actually are.

Ha, ha ha, ha ha.

Regi

Post 10

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 2:21am

Marc, I take it that when you say: "it's not clear that these three positions are really any different to one other." that you are seeing that universals are somehow found in, or associated with, each of these 3 positions. And that, because they all allude to universals, their distinction (difference) from one another is unclear. Is this right (so far)?

Correct. As far as I can make out, each of the three alternatives to nominalism that you sketched basically affirms the existence of Universals. Check out the arguments in the other thread. I can only point again to post 137 there, which says it much better than I could.

Post 11

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 5:47am

Hi, Ed & Regi.

Ed: Thanks for the meaty response and the thought experiment. Yes, I understand context, which I think is what I was getting at in my clumsy way. Nevertheless, I need to think some more about what you've written. This is a new area for me.

Regi: It certainly doesn't help my case that my wife is a designer whose expertise is color, does it? Well, life can't be lived strictly by the dictates of prudence. ;)

Regards,
Bill

Post 12

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 9:56am

Regi,

Ed:
This is what I have picked: The (epistemological) essence of a concept can change with an increase in knowledge (we don't come to "know" concepts better; we "learn" to better "understand" concepts (by an increase in our knowledge of their referents).

Regi:�
There is something wrong with that, but I am not sure exactly what it is, because I am not sure exactly what it says. I seems to say a concept or the understanding of a concept changes with new knowledge or additional information. If that is what it says, it is incorrect.

What we may learn about the referents of a concept is open-ended, and we can probably always learn more about them. Also, how we define a concept may have to be adjusted in the light of new knowledge. However, a concept's meaning is only its referents, whether we know anything about them or not, and no new knowledge ever changes the meaning of a concept in any way at all. What a child means by "dog" and what a veterinarian means by "dog" are exactly the same thing, even though the difference in knowledge about dogs between a child and a veterinarian is very great."

-----------
Regi, a toddler's first concept of "man" may come from the effective differentiation (by that toddler) as the: "moving, speaking, upright walking beings that feed me when I cry."

And that EPISTEMOLOGICAL "essence of man" (which was appropriate for the toddler!), WILL CHANGE and become the more appropriate "rational animal" as the child learns more about the living things on this planet (the referents of the concept "man" in contrast with - or differentiated from - other things).

When I said that you don't come to "know" a concept better (read into this: if properly formed, you "know it" well enough from the start) as you improve on your initial differentiations (by gaining knowledge about referents in contrast to other known things) - and, instead, I said that what you are doing is "understanding" it better; all I was really saying is what you are saying:

"What a child means by "dog" and what a veterinarian means by "dog" are exactly the same thing."

The veterinarian has an improved understanding of dogs (types of things that, when taken on the whole and on average, live for about a decade; types of things that tend to get arthritis at around the 9th year of life; etc). The power of "knowing" what-type-of-thing-is-meant-by-dog, was already present in the child (though the vast understanding of the veterinarian wasn't).

So Regi, when you say that my quote: "seems to say a concept or the understanding of a concept changes with new knowledge or additional information." and "If that is what it says, it is incorrect," then I must retort that "the understanding of a concept [does change] with new knowledge [of its referents]."

A child and a veterinarian both know what a dog is; but a veterinarian really understands better what it means for a creature to be a dog-type of creature.

Ed

Post 13

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 10:29am

Regi, in various posts you seem to equate a thing's essence with its nature. Not having yet had the time to evaluate your theory as expressed in the perception essay, I would like to ask you (and others) whether you adhere to this terminology consistently--if I am correct that that is what you are doing.

Post 14

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 12:27pm

Rodney, Regi, and others:

A tentative (and speculative!) "rubric" or set of definitions; so that we can determine exactly what it is that each of us is talking about when we use these words (these words often elude being pinned down as that "one-most-rational-thing" which they really are - in a given context). If you don't like them, well then, don't curse the dark - light a damn candle and improve on the (my) clarity! If you don't wanna' pick one of these, then OFFER your own insight.

intentional
a : as concept: a concept considered as the product of attention directed to an object of knowledge
b : having external reference

nature
a : a kind or class usually distinguished by fundamental or essential characteristics
b : the external world in its entirety
c : the genetically controlled qualities of an organism

essence
a : [METAPHYSICAL] the permanent as contrasted with the accidental element of being
b : [EPISTEMOLOGICAL] the properties or attributes by means of which something can be placed in its proper class or identified as being what it is

universal
a : a universal proposition in logic
b : a predicable of traditional logic
c : a general concept or term [that which: can be said of many things]

identity
a : sameness of essential character in different instances
b : sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing
c : the distinguishing character of an individual
d : the condition of being the same with something described or asserted
e : the taxonomic position of (a biological specimen)

unit
a : things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships - such as 2 things both having a variable measure or degree of length (both of them being "x inches long")

Post 15

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 3:17pm

Ed: �We also have classical conceptualism: advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by the mind and that these designations somehow stand in a logical relation to reality��

As far as I understand it, �classical� conceptualism as proposed by the likes of Abelard regarded universals as general terms that named or referred to non-physical entities called concepts, so in that sense the conceptualist universal is mind-dependent and cannot be found in the external world.

But these non-physical entities called universals are said to derive from perceived likenesses between real world objects, that is, likenesses as they appear to the observer. So there�s no mystery about their genesis, and the perceived likenesses are available to all men, as they must be if there is to be agreement that �this object� and �that object� can both be called �red�.

Ed: ��and finally, the "new-kid-on-the-block" (intentional conceptualism): advocating that a designation of universals is dictated by reality and related to how the mind interacts with reality.�

Which is pretty much standard conceptualism, except that a conceptualist would probably say universals are "suggested� rather than �dictated� by reality. The notion of a dictatorial reality suggests realism, in that such a reality would �force� us to accept its own �classifications�. The mind then becomes a mere passive recipient of whatever reality dictates, whereas conceptualism suggests a more active engagement with reality.

Ed: �unit; a : things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships...�

There�s one aspect of the unit that I�ve had difficulty ascertaining, and that�s its ontological status. Is the unit metaphysical � that is, does it have real existence in the external world � or is it epistemological?

Brendan

Post 16

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 5:47pm

Hi Rodney, Ed,

Regi, in various posts you seem to equate a thing's essence with its nature. Not having yet had the time to evaluate your theory as expressed in the perception essay, I would like to ask you (and others) whether you adhere to this terminology consistently--if I am correct that that is what you are doing.

Not exactly, because I do not personally use the word essence. It is an abstraction that adds more confusion than light. On the previous thread I meant only if the concept "essence" has any legitimate meaning it must be the one implied by this statement of Ayn Rand:

"A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are."

Instead of "essence" I prefer "essential qualities" (using qualities to mean any characteristics, attributes, or properties), but I prefer "necessary qualities" over that, because the qualities, "without which a unit would not be the kind of existent it is," are necessary. Any other qualities an existent may have are possible, but not necessary.

I prefer "possible" to "accidental," because not just any other qualities can be other qualities of an existent, only those qualities that its necessary qualities make possible.

Necessary and possible only pertain to existents as units of a general concept. For any particular existent, all of its qualities (including those which are only possible to units of the concept it is a unit of) are necessary, because without them (or with any others) it would not be the thing it is.

What the concept "essence" can add beyond that, I would not know, but if it does not mean that, it is a mistake.

Now to be fair, you are going to have to say what exactly you mean by that concept "essence."

BTW, you said, Not having yet had the time to evaluate your theory as expressed in the perception essay, but my "Perception" article only makes a passing reference to essential qualities, since it is only addressing the fact all we can be directly conscious of (perceive) are existent's perceivable qualities.

Ed, I included you in this post because I realize it is related to your, "speculative rubric," which I might address. You can see already, from this post, we have some differences.

Regi

Post 17

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 6:29pm

Brendan,

Thought I would just comment on this statement:

As far as I understand it, �classical� conceptualism as proposed by the likes of Abelard regarded universals as general terms that named or referred to non-physical entities called concepts, so in that sense the conceptualist universal is mind-dependent and cannot be found in the external world.

Since Abelard is one of the philosophers I am especially interested in, I was delighted to find this succinct description of his view on universals on the Philosophy Pages:

Abelard invented a novel solution to the problem of universals that rejected both realism and nominalism in their most extreme forms. Only individual things exist for Abelard, but general terms have universal applicability to things whose common features are known by a process of mental abstraction.

Here's an example. I see a tree that has leaves on it. I see another tree that has leaves on it, then another, then another. Then a see a tree that does not have leaves but needles, then another, then another. I can form the abstract concept, "having leaves," or simply "leaved" for that feature of trees with leaves, and I can form the abstract concept, "having needles," or simply "needled" for that feature of tree with needles. Now the abstract concept "leaved" is not in any trees at all, it is only in my head and means, "having leaves." But the leaves are on the trees and are real ontological things. The concept "leaved" is a valid concept only because there are trees that do, "have leaves."

"Leaved," is an attribute of trees that have leaves, but you can see how silly it would be to say, "leaved is in more than one tree at the same time," or any of the other nonsensical things that are usually said about universals. Abelard got it right and would have been perfectly right if he had just dropped the term universals altogether.

If you choose to call such concepts, "universals," those universals are not "mind-dependent," but "ontological-dependent." They are valid only because they say something true about actual ontological existents.

Regi

Post 18

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 6:32pm

Like Rand, I avoid the term essences and I think we both do it because, like universals, it is not a very useful or advisable term. The index and lexicon entries for the term in her books refer you to either "Definitions" or "Essential characteristics."

Therefore, when she says "A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are," she does not mean the total, "omniscient" nature of every aspect of the referents pure and simple (which is metaphysical), but those qualities necessary for them to be the kind (members of a class) of existents they are within the context of all other knowledge (which makes essentiality an epistemological thing). Thus, I disagree that she is wrong when she says essence is epistemological, because insofar as she uses the term, this is what she means.

Post 19

Saturday, July 3, 2004 - 1:37am