The Nature of the Physical and NonPhysical

The Nature of the Physical and NonPhysical

Per Jordan's suggestion, and because the subject is a diversion in the context of the Concepts/Percepts thread, I begin this thread on the nature of the physical and the non-physical.

The questions seem to center around whether or not the mind is "physical" and whether or not there can be anything, any existent, which is not in some sense physical.

I probably won't have much time to participate in this thread (famous last words), but I'll offer portions of some of my posts, slightly edited, from that thread as grist for this mill, if anyone is truly interested in further discussion. If not, just consider this an article of sorts. NH

From the tread:

Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Post 99

How do we define "physical"?

I doubt it's any more possible to actually define "physical" or "energy" than "existence."

These are so close to the fundamental facts of existence that ostensive definition is all that is practically available. Quoting dictionaries just leads to tight little loops of A is B is A.

That's to be expected at that level of description of things. Words have their limitations--some things simply have to be experienced, the nature of an ostensive definition.

NH

Post 71

Is there something beyond what we call the "physical"?

In my view, all existents can be described as:

1. Physical, which includes all forms of matter and energy and phenomena arising from the nature of these, like space-time.

2. Organization, pattern and process, all of which is conveyed [as information borne by a medium] by the physical world or other subpatterns.

It should be said that these are not mutually exclusive, but mutually inclusive. In other words, the physical cannot exist without the organizational, and the organizational ultimately depends upon the physical as a medium.

NH

Post 97

Aren't ABSTRACTIONS non-physical?

I can hold the abstract concept "unicorn." The REFERENT of the abstraction does not exist, but the abstraction-as-concept is encoded in the patterns of my living brain.

For us to say that my abstraction-as-concept is not "physical," we would have to deny that organization of matter is not physical.

That might not look like much of a problem on the surface, but it might actually entail an almost infinite regress of denial! It may well turn out that most of the nature of matter itself is organizational--physics certainly seems to be leading us in that direction.

If the physical turns out to be largely organization with very little actual "substance," it seems consistent to hold that organization at macro levels is also "physical."

NH

Post 96

Doesn't the 'physical' refer to matter and the 'nonphysical' refer to energy?

That's an understandable view to adopt, because matter (like rocks) feels so "solid" and energy (like light) feels so insubstantial.

But not only did Einstein demonstrate the equivalence of energy and matter with E=mc^2, much of the apparent solidity of matter owes entirely to energy. (Ultimately, it all may--there may be no actual 'solids' if we go down to the incomprehensibly small sizes of superstring theory.)

The floor holding you up, for example, is largely empty space between atoms and molecules, held together with electromagnetic energy billions of times stronger than gravity. (That's why the Earth doesn't pull you through the floor.)

When a nuclear device is exploded, some matter is actually converted to energy.

All this is why in post in my post 71 of this thread I made both matter and energy "physical," and contrasted that with "organization," though the latter two classes are theoretically inseparable.

NH

Post 110

Can't mental processes be said to be non-physical?

Nathaniel Branden, The Psychology of Self-Esteem, ch. 1, pg. 9:

"... It is a species of what philosophers term “the reductive fallacy” to assert that mental processes are “nothing but” neural processes—that, for example, the perception of an object IS a collection of neural impulses, or that a thought IS a certain pattern of brain activity. A perception and the neural processes that mediate it are not identical, nor are a thought and the brain activity that may accompany it. Such an equation is flagrantly anti-empirical and logically absurd.”

That, as that nasty President man said, is a matter of what IS is.

I can't think of any sane person (which excludes a few philosophers) who would claim that a Patek Philippe Calibre 89, the most complicated mechanical watch ever produced, is just a collection of metal and glass chunks.

Yet is IS "a collection of metal and glass chunks." It differs from other metal and glass chunks only in the nature of its organization.

This is not to minimize the transcendental nature of that organization. It is to say that what Branden writes is, taken literally, incorrect.

So far as we know, mental processes ARE "'nothing but' neural processes... a collection of neural impulses, ... a certain pattern of brain activity." Furthermore, "a perception and the neural processes that mediate it" ARE inclusive and identical.

If, as Mr. Branden claimed in this early work of his, equating brain activity and thought is "anti-empirical and logically absurd," it is incumbant upon the claimant to produce that empirical evidence and logic. I'm not sure he would still make this claim in this fashion. I will put the question to him.

Further, quoting J.B. Pratt:

“[Reductive materialism] maintains that consciousness IS A FORM OF BRAIN ACTIVITY … To say that consciousness IS a form of matter or of motion is to use words without meaning … "

"To say that consciousness IS a form of matter or of motion is to use words without meaning..."

Not at all. Every day thousands of AI researchers are putting matter into motion (computers) and producing machines which are more and more becoming "conscious" in very sense of that word.

Their consciousness does not yet quite resemble HUMAN consciousness, but it does resemble that of lower animals. To demand anything more is absurd--nature had 3 billion years to evolve human intelligence, and we've been working on the problem in a substantive way barely over 3 DECADES. We are still about 10-15 years away from having raw computer power equivalent to that of the human brain, and an unknown number of years away from modeling the PROCESSES of the human mind.

Those who hold that consciousness/mind is "something more" than physical brain and organization/pattern are obliged to say what that might be. Just claiming that the physical/organizational is "not enough" without stipulating what else is required is hollow denial.

That position could conceivably (though I doubt it) be ultimately correct, but I would require evidence and sound reasoning to be persuaded.

NH

Post 90

How can we be sure that the non-physical couldn't exist?

I don't believe anything in the absense of evidence, but my study of physics has led me to keep an open mind about everything.

Nature doesn't care whether we can conceive of something or not, and more than She cares if a dog can comprehend Riemannian geometry and the curvature of space-time. Nature, if She has a sense of humor, may well be laughing at our manipulated words and other symbols, our fuzzy ideas and our pronouncements about the ultimate nature of things.

Or, maybe not. Regardless, NOTHING, no claim imaginable, could be any more bizarre and counterintuitive than the claims of modern physics.

If somebody says, 'There can be something beyond our physical realm and the organization superimposed upon it,' I will respond by saying that I can't conceive of such, and that I think even parallel dimensions would still fall into that "physical" category, but...

...do I detect a smile, Mother N?

NH

END

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/11, 2:24pm)

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/11, 4:30pm)

Post 1

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 3:48pm

I dont understand NH's separation of the physical from the organizational. In my view, the latter is a subset of the former. That is, it seems the physical entails organization, or organization is a necessary property or attribute of the physical. But the way NH sets it up, it sure looks like organization is something overlapping but distinct from the physical. To me, it's like saying there're two kinds of donuts: sweet ones and big ones. <shrug>. Might just be semantics. In the other thread, it appeared to me that NH might also be using "physical" to mean what others normally refer to as "substance" and "organizational" to mean what others normally refer to as "form." Substance and form are often traditionally considered to be basic properties or attributes of the physical.

Anyway, some folks who call themselves Objectivists reject the view that all that exists is physical and only physical, which is why this topic sparked discussion in the other thread. I think Rand is probably one of those folks who'd reject physicalism. Just so we know what we're talking about, Wikipedia sums up the basics of physicalism here:

Underlying every form of physicalism is the claim that everything there is supervenes on the physical; that is, that every particular or property is at root a physical property or particular. In effect, this means that any change in a physical particular or property will cause a change in the corresponding supervening particular or property, just as any alteration of the physical properties of a painting will have an effect on its artistic properties. We can therefore be reasonably sure that every physicalist will agree with the following conclusion of physicalism:
No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.
The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:
No two people (or beings, or things) could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.

The talk of "two worlds" might confuse people who haven't studied modal logic. If so, maybe I can explain later.

-Jordan

Post 2

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 5:51pm

Jordan:

Good points.

I dont understand NH's separation of the physical from the organizational. In my view, the latter is a subset of the former. That is, it seems the physical entails organization, or organization is a necessary property or attribute of the physical.

I've already pointed out that the two are mutually inclusive.

At one level, it wouldn't be correct to refer to organization as a SUBSET of the physical, for that would imply that there were properties of matter which did not depend upon organization. But what property of matter/energy is not also an arrangement?

If this view of the physical is correct, then in one sense organization is no more a "property" or "attribute" of the physical than is existence. Existence and organization, in this view, are inherent in all existents.

In fact, just as Rand axiomatized "existence exists," I have also axiomatized "values vary."

Implicit in the notion of values is the notion of organization and pattern. Perhaps I can elaborate on this in the future.

So why does my formulation consist of the 1) physical and 2) the organizational?

Because there is another sense in which organization IS an "attribute" of the physical. Consider the two following sequences of symbols:

a) 123456

and

b) 124356

As sequences of symbols on your screen, not as numerical values, what is different? One of the attributes which makes them different entities is their pattern/organization/arrangement.

Let me see if I can briefly formulate the difference:

ORGANIZATION is both inherent in the metaphysical nature of all existents and an attribute of all particular existents.

But the way NH sets it up, it sure looks like organization is something overlapping but distinct from the physical. To me, it's like saying there're two kinds of donuts: sweet ones and big ones. <shrug>. Might just be semantics.

No, I think your intuition was telling you that a distinction needed to be made. Well-spotted!

I hope I've clarified.

In the other thread, it appeared to me that NH might also be using "physical" to mean what others normally refer to as "substance" and "organizational" to mean what others normally refer to as "form."

I think substance/form might be acceptable synonyms, but I choose physical/organizational because I think it better fits, as terminology, questions about mind and consciousness.

Substance and form are often traditionally considered to be basic properties or attributes of the physical.

At the most fundamental level, being inherent, I don't think "property" or "attribute" is the right word. To BE something is not a property or attribute--if you follow my meaning. (Refer to my distinction above between the metaphysical and the particular.)

Anyway, some folks who call themselves Objectivists reject the view that all that exists is physical and only physical, which is why this topic sparked discussion in the other thread. I think Rand is probably one of those folks who'd reject physicalism. Just so we know what we're talking about, Wikipedia sums up the basics of physicalism here:

Underlying every form of physicalism is the claim that everything there is supervenes on the physical; that is, that every particular or property is at root a physical property or particular. In effect, this means that any change in a physical particular or property will cause a change in the corresponding supervening particular or property, just as any alteration of the physical properties of a painting will have an effect on its artistic properties. We can therefore be reasonably sure that every physicalist will agree with the following conclusion of physicalism:

No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.
The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:
No two people (or beings, or things) could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.
The talk of "two worlds" might confuse people who haven't studied modal logic. If so, maybe I can explain later.

I haven't time to comment on that beyond asking, rhetorically: What would those differences be?

I'm really glad you put those up, though. They fit in with something else I'm working on.

Nathan Hawking

Post 3

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 7:43pm

Hi Nathan,

I think substance/form might be acceptable synonyms, but I choose physical/organizational because I think it better fits, as terminology, questions about mind and consciousness.

The problem with choosing physical/organizational is that if we are to distinguish the two terms, then the former must entail that which is non-organizational, and the latter must entail that which is nonphysical. That is, if "organization" were completely and only "physical," then "organization" would be wholly redundant to "physical." And if "organization" were not completely and wholly redundant to "physical," then "organization" must entail that which is nonphysical.

The only reason to introduce a new term is if it conveys new information. Of course, the term could convey new information about the same thing that some other term conveys information about. That is, the terms could be mutually inclusive, but each term still must convey new information for it to be useful.

No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.
The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:
No two people (or beings, or things) could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.
Jordan: The talk of "two worlds" might confuse people who haven't studied modal logic. If so, maybe I can explain later.

Nathan: I haven't time to comment on that beyond asking, rhetorically: What would those differences be?

I do hope some folks who call themselves Objectivists and who accept nonphysical entities will answer that.

Jordan

Post 4

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 9:04pm

Jordan:

I think substance/form might be acceptable synonyms, but I choose physical/organizational because I think it better fits, as terminology, questions about mind and consciousness.
The problem with choosing physical/organizational is that if we are to distinguish the two terms, then the former must entail that which is non-organizational, and the latter must entail that which is nonphysical.

That is, if "organization" were completely and only "physical," then "organization" would be wholly redundant to "physical." And if "organization" were not completely and wholly redundant to "physical," then "organization" must entail that which is nonphysical.

Ordinarily I'd say you were correct: using similar terms for things at different levels of abstraction or different metaphysical levels is potentially confusing.

Unfortunately, the limitations of language sometimes force us to share terms between metaphysical levels.

For example, suppose a person on the street is struck down by an automobile. His heart is stopped. His brain activity has been irreparably disrupted. Is he dead or alive?

As a functional human being he is dead. But the vast majority of his cells are still alive. At one level he is fatally disorganized, while at another level, the level of some organs and cells, "he" is, for the moment, still living.

"He's mostly dead." --The Princess Bride

These are problems of scope, and we simply do not neologize for every change in scope--our language would grow impossibly cumbersome. We STIPULATE per context, or we qualify with descriptive modifiers.

This is especially true when we get near metaphysical levels, like "physical" and "substance" and "exists" and "life" and "form" and "organization."

If, however, you have specific recommendations for terms you feel would be better, and reasons for them, I'd be glad to hear about that.

The only reason to introduce a new term is if it conveys new information. Of course, the term could convey new information about the same thing that some other term conveys information about. That is, the terms could be mutually inclusive, but each term still must convey new information for it to be useful.

I think my descriptions of the classes, physical/organizational, and my specification of their use at metaphysical and particular levels is sufficient, but am open to suggestion.

No two worlds could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some other respect.
The corresponding conclusion about the mental would be as follows:
No two people (or beings, or things) could be identical in every physical respect yet differ in some mental respect.
Jordan: The talk of "two worlds" might confuse people who haven't studied modal logic. If so, maybe I can explain later.

Nathan: I haven't time to comment on that beyond asking, rhetorically: What would those differences be?

I do hope some folks who call themselves Objectivists and who accept nonphysical entities will answer that.

Wouldn't that be interesting?

Nathan Hawking

Post 5

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 9:24pm

The earth and sun have a relationship. The first dances around the other. That dance is real, I’m not making it up—it is not “noumenal” or mystical. Anyone can observe it. That dance, qua dance, is not the earth, it is not the sun.

I realize there can be no dance without the dancers…but does “The Nutcracker” exist? Can you put some of it in my hand so I can look at it?

When you can point to the “The Nutcracker” in my noodle, I will concede that “The Nutcracker” is physical. Until then, I say it is an abstraction, a mental phenomenon. You can describe the electrical charges in my brain all day long—but those are not The Nutcracker.

Jon

Post 6

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 12:45am

Jon:

The earth and sun have a relationship. The first dances around the other. That dance is real, I’m not making it up—it is not “noumenal” or mystical. Anyone can observe it. That dance, qua dance, is not the earth, it is not the sun.

True. It's neither the Earth, nor the Sun. It's an "orbit."

It is so precisely describable by Newton's physics that we can predict the orbits of planets and their spatial relationships within just a few miles and just a few seconds.

It is, as I state in my original post, an arrangement, an organization, albeit dynamic.

Is the orbit an "existent"? I think so. Otherwise we could not predict it. (How could we predict nonexistents?)

I realize there can be no dance without the dancers…but does “The Nutcracker” exist?

The Nutcracker exists in many respects.

When it's being performed, it has a pattern, an arrangement--a process, if you will--that while less precise than orbiting planets, could be described by someone familiar with it. A Tchaikovsky fan sitting beside you could describe an upcoming scene.

Could anyone predict the nature of a nonexistent?

Can you put some of it in my hand so I can look at it?

Is that the criterion for existence?

I don't think so.

If I describe a nonexistent, such as a unicorn, to you, and you search your whole life and never find one, and discover that nobody else has seen one, you would likely conclude that unicorns do not exist, that they are a mythical abstraction.

Suppose, however, that you are a visitor from another planet, and I describe a bird to you. Upon showing you around this planet, we see just such a flying marvel. You are astonished--birds actually exist!

What is a bird if we take away the dance and still the music? What is a bird but a choreography of feathers and flesh, a symphony of song and flight?

Buy a chicken from the supermarket and hurl it into the sky. Where is the "birdness" in the lump of flesh which falls to Earth? The dance of living molecules which made it a bird is gone forever.

ORGANIZATION is what creates identity.

Is a ballet troupe performing Nutcracker any less real than a bird performing flight?

Not for me.

When you can point to the “The Nutcracker” in my noodle, I will concede that “The Nutcracker” is physical. Until then, I say it is an abstraction, a mental phenomenon. You can describe the electrical charges in my brain all day long—but those are not The Nutcracker.

That argument is what philosophical types call argumentum ad ignorantiam. The form is 'unless you can explain this completely you must be wrong.'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_ignorance

And I cannot yet map your thinking about The Nutcracker. Science is just not quite there. What I could do, if I were very lucky, is stimulate just the right portion of your brain electrically and you would have vivid images of the ballet.

But face it, the burden of proof is not mine. The burden of proof falls upon those who claim that the brain and human body just aren't enough, not enough for life, and not enough for consciousness. My questions are:

What, in addition, is required? Why?

Isn't is simpler to believe that the equipment nature gave us are sufficient unless it's demonstrated otherwise?

Nathan Hawking

Post 7

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 7:14am

Nathan,

I don't think my point is getting across. By positing "organization" you are accepting that the nonphysical exists. Stipulation or not, I think this will confuse people.

Also about your descriptions of your terms:

1. Physical, which includes all forms of matter and energy and phenomena arising from the nature of these, like space-time.

I think it's confusing to say that "physical" refers to forms because I find "form" to be nearly if not completely synonymous with "organization." Why not just say physical is that which is matter and energy? (And again, I would urge you to drop "physical" and replace it with "substance" or "substance.")

2. Organization, pattern and process, all of which is conveyed [as information borne by a medium] by the physical world or other subpatterns.

And here it's confusing to say that the physical world (or other subpatterns) convey anything. That gives the physical world a more active, and perhaps even an intentional, role that I wouldn't be comfortable assigning to it.

As for me, I am most comfortable defining "physical" either as (1) that which has both substance and form or (2) that which has dimension. I tend to favor the latter in that I find it difficult if not impossible to determine whether something has substance.

Jon,

When you can point to the “The Nutcracker” in my noodle, I will concede that “The Nutcracker” is physical.

Physicalists aren't saying that The Nutcracker is the same as your noodle cognizing (or retaining/identifying/whatever) the Nutcracker. However, you may be interested to know that scientists "can tell you what kind of object a person is looking at -- a face, a house, a shoe, a chair -- by the pattern of brain activity it evokes." See http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/09/010928071529.htm. Isn't the Nutcracker just as real as a shoe or a chair? Or are musicians and dancers just pulling our chain?

Jordan

Post 8

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 2:44pm

Jordan:

I don't think my point is getting across. By positing "organization" you are accepting that the nonphysical exists. Stipulation or not, I think this will confuse people.

I understand--you're concerned that I'm unintentionally implying a distinction. The fact is, though, that in some respects I am.

(Bear in mind my assertion that "organization" exists at two levels, at the metaphysical and in the nature of the physical particular.)

I'll keep your concern in mind, though, and see if the explanation can be restructured to lessen potential confusion.

Also about your descriptions of your terms:

1. Physical, which includes all forms of matter and energy and phenomena arising from the nature of these, like space-time.

I think it's confusing to say that "physical" refers to forms because I find "form" to be nearly if not completely synonymous with "organization." Why not just say physical is that which is matter and energy? (And again, I would urge you to drop "physical" and replace it with "substance" or "substance.")

I've thought about your suggestions, but my rarely-wrong writer's ear is telling me "physical" is the better choice. Probably because of the way science uses the word these days, "physical" more easily conveys the notion of energy as well as matter, while "substance" has a distinct connotation of something one can touch. "Substance" is a traditional philosophical word, but I'm more interested in bringing philosophy into line with physical reality, with physical science, so I think my choice is likely clear.

Too, I don't really mind that my "Physical" has connotations of forms or arrangement. If anything, I need to stress that Physical/Organizational are not reductionistically separable. But I'll give that suggestion more thought.

2. Organization, pattern and process, all of which is conveyed [as information borne by a medium] by the physical world or other subpatterns.
And here it's confusing to say that the physical world (or other subpatterns) convey anything. That gives the physical world a more active, and perhaps even an intentional, role that I wouldn't be comfortable assigning to it.

I think I make that clear in my bracketed enlargement.

I fear, Jordan, you may be falling into the trap which ensnares so many philosophy writers, the desire to preclude all possible misunderstanding. That leads many to write three pages where three sentences will do. And far fewer will actually read those three pages, because they're tedious.

Better a few misunderstand our writing than a few read it.

Writing, all verbal expression, is a tradeoff.

As for me, I am most comfortable defining "physical" either as (1) that which has both substance and form or (2) that which has dimension. I tend to favor the latter in that I find it difficult if not impossible to determine whether something has substance.

Alas, no definition (explanation, really) is without its drawbacks. "Dimension" is used in far more ways than three-dimensional space. What are the dimensions, for example, of an apparently-massless photon? Conventional space-time may not even apply.

I'll keep your substance-form suggestion in mind, but at this juncture I'm inclined to feel that my word choices are more meaningful to more people than the alternatives.

Jon,
When you can point to the “The Nutcracker” in my noodle, I will concede that “The Nutcracker” is physical.

Physicalists aren't saying that The Nutcracker is the same as your noodle cognizing (or retaining/identifying/whatever) the Nutcracker. However, you may be interested to know that scientists "can tell you what kind of object a person is looking at -- a face, a house, a shoe, a chair -- by the pattern of brain activity it evokes." See http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/09/010928071529.htm. Isn't the Nutcracker just as real as a shoe or a chair? Or are musicians and dancers just pulling our chain?

Good.

Nathan Hawking

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/13, 12:26am)

Post 9

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 7:58am

Nathan,

(Bear in mind my assertion that "organization" exists at two levels, at the metaphysical and in the nature of the physical particular.)

I don't understand this dictinction.

I fear, Jordan, you may be falling into the trap which ensnares so many philosophy writers, the desire to preclude all possible misunderstanding.

Nah, the correction I'm suggesting is so easy to make. I don't want to clear up all possible misunderstandings, just perhaps some of the easy-to-fix ones. The one I'm suggesting calls not for 3-pages but for substituting just two words with two others. And those other words are what philosophers have traditionally used to talk about what I think you're talking about.

I still don't think my basic point is getting across. If you want people to think that your view includes the nonphysical, then continue on with your use of "physical/organization," for that's exactly what such a dichotomy implies. As a physicalist, I would want to avoid such confusion. Perhaps you're really not a physicalist, so you're okay with people thinking that your view includes the nonphysical. If so, then I was mistaken.

*

"Dimension" is used in far more ways than three-dimensional space.

Not to be defensive, but I'm well aware of this.

What are the dimensions, for example, of an apparently-massless photon?

Photons have measurable trajectory and/or position. This indicates their dimensionality. As an operational definition, the ability to be plotted on a space-time graph (chart/matrix/whatever) indicates the dimensionality of a thing (event/attribute/existent/whatever).

-Jordan

Post 10

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 1:56pm

Jordan:

(Bear in mind my assertion that "organization" exists at two levels, at the metaphysical and in the nature of the physical particular.)
I don't understand this dictinction.

To summarize:

We have already discussed how difficult, probably impossible, it is to conceive of the physical apart from the organizational, that it's part and parcel of the nature of existents.

You may recall my Axiom of Value, a companion to the Axiom of Identity and the Axiom of Existence. That would entail organization at the metaphysical level. At that level nothing can exist independent of organization, and that kind of organization is included in my Physical category.

My Organization category amounts to meta-organization. A static example would be quartz crystals. They are a heirarchy of organizational levels. The top level is the crystal latticework, the next level the silicon dioxide molecules, the next the nature of the silicon and oxygen atoms, the next the nature of electrons and nuclear particles, the next quarks, etc.

We can melt a quartz crystal and remove the highest layer of organization. We can use chemicals to destroy the second layer of organization, particle accelerators to break up the atoms, higher energy particles to break the nuclear particles into quarks, and so on, until we are at the most fundamental level of physical existence--whatever that is.

All irreducible organization remaining, at the metaphysical level, is inherent in the Physical classification, which includes energy.

All of the levels of organization we have destroyed belong in the Organizational category. They are variables, and reducible.

Life, consciousness, the nature of our universe, entail the 1) Physical (which includes inherent organization) and 2) Organization superimposed upon 1).

I fear, Jordan, you may be falling into the trap which ensnares so many philosophy writers, the desire to preclude all possible misunderstanding.

Nah, the correction I'm suggesting is so easy to make. I don't want to clear up all possible misunderstandings, just perhaps some of the easy-to-fix ones. The one I'm suggesting calls not for 3-pages but for substituting just two words with two others. And those other words are what philosophers have traditionally used to talk about what I think you're talking about.

Perhaps the above explanation will suggest why I'd choose a departure from ordinary philosophical terminology. That, and the reasons I gave in my previous post.

I still don't think my basic point is getting across. If you want people to think that your view includes the nonphysical, then continue on with your use of "physical/organization," for that's exactly what such a dichotomy implies. As a physicalist, I would want to avoid such confusion. Perhaps you're really not a physicalist, so you're okay with people thinking that your view includes the nonphysical. If so, then I was mistaken.

But I don't think "substance/form" is any different as terminology. I believe it suffers from exactly the same potential for misunderstanding. If I'm wrong, perhaps you can help me see how.

Can one have substance without form? No.
Form without substance? No.
Can one have form superimposed upon substance-with-inherent-form? Yes.

In short, if I used those words they would simply be synonyms. I choose the others (physical/organizational), however, because they have connotations lacking in the more traditional words.

"Dimension" is used in far more ways than three-dimensional space.
Not to be defensive, but I'm well aware of this.
What are the dimensions, for example, of an apparently-massless photon?
Photons have measurable trajectory and/or position. This indicates their dimensionality. As an operational definition, the ability to be plotted on a space-time graph (chart/matrix/whatever) indicates the dimensionality of a thing (event/attribute/existent/whatever).

Existing IN space is not the same thing as TAKING UP space, though.

My own take is that any "thing" with dimension would be physical, but that not all physical things require it. It is sufficient but not necessary, in other words.

Nathan Hawking

Post 11

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 4:07pm

Hi Nathan,

You may recall my Axiom of Value, a companion to the Axiom of Identity and the Axiom of Existence. That would entail organization at the metaphysical level. At that level nothing can exist independent of organization, and that kind of organization is included in my Physical category.

I don't understand "metaphysical level." What other level is there? I also don't understand your axiom of value. Define "value" so I know what you're talking about.

We can use chemicals to destroy the second layer of organization, particle accelerators to break up the atoms, higher energy particles to break the nuclear particles into quarks, and so on, until we are at the most fundamental level of physical existence--whatever that is.

All irreducible organization remaining, at the metaphysical level, is inherent in the Physical classification, which includes energy.

All of the levels of organization we have destroyed belong in the Organizational category. They are variables, and reducible.

I don't see why you include "organization" in "all irreducible organization remaining." You also seem to have slipped into monadology here, which is (in case you're unfamiliar) a study coming from Leibniz that explores that nature of "monads," which are nothing but "simple substance," "substance" meaning: "without parts." If so, I don't see why you'd call monads "physical" but compounds of monads "organizational."

But I don't think "substance/form" is any different as terminology. I believe it suffers from exactly the same potential for misunderstanding. If I'm wrong, perhaps you can help me see how.
Can one have substance without form? No.
Form without substance? No.

I think your use of physical/organization is probably synonymous with substance/form. The problem is that other folks don't use your words the way you do. They traditionally use substance/form instead, viewing them as the basic and inseparable components of the physical. I doubt it'll help, but let me put it to you this way: what do you call that which possesses the physical/organization? I would want to call it the physical, but that'd be circular. However, what do you call that which possesses substance/form? No circularity problem here. Again, if you want to suggest to your audience that your view includes the nonphysical, then you're headed in the right direction. Why or why not do you acknowledge the point in the last sentence?

Existing IN space is not the same thing as TAKING UP space, though.

So what? Both qualify for bearing dimension. And I'm fine with saying dimension is sufficient but not necessary for being physical. It's hard for me to say whether anything is necessary, save a few axioms. I can say that what I call physical corresponds 100% to that which has dimension and 0% to those alleged existents that don't.

Jordan

Post 12

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 5:20pm

Jordan:

You may recall my Axiom of Value, a companion to the Axiom of Identity and the Axiom of Existence. That would entail organization at the metaphysical level. At that level nothing can exist independent of organization, and that kind of organization is included in my Physical category.
I don't understand "metaphysical level." What other level is there?

I'm using metaphysical in the sense of 'the ultimate nature of reality.' In this use, the organization which is metaphysical could not be removed.

Nonmetaphysical forms of organization, properties of objects like quartz crystals, can be removed or altered.

I also don't understand your axiom of value. Define "value" so I know what you're talking about.

That's not possible. That's why it's metaphysically axiomatic, and only be ostensively defined, like 'existence.'

It is the recognition that identity and existence would not be possible without values. I call identity, existence, and value the Holy Trinity of Metaphysical Axioms, tongue firmly in cheek, of course.

Ask yourself what Aristotle HAD to assume to posit his axiom of identity, A is A, and by implication A is not NOT A.

First, he had to implicitly assume the axiom of existence. We cannot talk about an A without assuming it. Second, he had to implicitly assume the axiom of values. We cannot talk about A not being NOT A without differentia, and there are no differentia without values.

If there is NO difference between A and B, no variation in some value, then A IS B by another name.

We can use chemicals to destroy the second layer of organization, particle accelerators to break up the atoms, higher energy particles to break the nuclear particles into quarks, and so on, until we are at the most fundamental level of physical existence--whatever that is.

All irreducible organization remaining, at the metaphysical level, is inherent in the Physical classification, which includes energy.

All of the levels of organization we have destroyed belong in the Organizational category. They are variables, and reducible.

I don't see why you include "organization" in "all irreducible organization remaining." You also seem to have slipped into monadology here, which is (in case you're unfamiliar) a study coming from Leibniz that explores that nature of "monads," which are nothing but "simple substance," "substance" meaning: "without parts." If so, I don't see why you'd call monads "physical" but compounds of monads "organizational."

I don't see the universe as monadic, but I do think it's probably ultimately composed of relatively few entities and basic relationships, everything else being combinations of these.

I think I've explained the two kinds of organization to which my Physical/Organizational formulation refers as clearly as I know how, and lack the time to elaborate further right now. I need to move on to other subjects.

But I don't think "substance/form" is any different as terminology. I believe it suffers from exactly the same potential for misunderstanding. If I'm wrong, perhaps you can help me see how.
Can one have substance without form? No.
Form without substance? No.
I think your use of physical/organization is probably synonymous with substance/form. The problem is that other folks don't use your words the way you do.

Perhaps that's true for philosophers. I'm writing to a broader audience. If philosophers wish to understand me, they can read my definitions. I believe my terms work better for the reader-at-large.

They traditionally use substance/form instead, viewing them as the basic and inseparable components of the physical. I doubt it'll help, but let me put it to you this way: what do you call that which possesses the physical/organization?

Nothing. I call it nothing.

I would not use the word "possesses" as if "nothing" were some medium which bears "something." The physical/organizational, in my view, IS the ultimate reality, all other existents being forms of the physical/organizational.

If something must "possess" my physical/organization, then what possesses the possessor? That's a pointless infinite regress, and devoid of content from the outset.

I would want to call it the physical, but that'd be circular. However, what do you call that which possesses substance/form? No circularity problem here. Again, if you want to suggest to your audience that your view includes the nonphysical, then you're headed in the right direction. Why or why not do you acknowledge the point in the last sentence?

Sorry if I missed something. Do you mean: "Again, if you want to suggest to your audience that your view includes the nonphysical, then you're headed in the right direction."

I thought I did. I disagree, and believe I said so. I don't believe the average reader will see my term "Organizational" and the accompanying explanation and conclude that I'm implying the "nonphysical." If you still do, then we must agree to disagree. I'll bear your view in mind, but I must go with my judgment for now.

Existing IN space is not the same thing as TAKING UP space, though.
So what? Both qualify for bearing dimension. And I'm fine with saying dimension is sufficient but not necessary for being physical. It's hard for me to say whether anything is necessary, save a few axioms. I can say that what I call physical corresponds 100% to that which has dimension and 0% to those alleged existents that don't.

I think we mostly agree on that, then. I can think of theoretical exceptions to this, but it's not an issue I feel like flogging at present.

I appreciate your thoughts.

Nathan Hawking

Post 13

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 8:28pm

Very well. We spoke our peace. I suspect our views largely coincide although how we explain them apparently differs. Best of fortune.

Till the next discussion,
Jordan

Post 14

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 9:39pm

Jordan:

Very well. We spoke our piece. I suspect our views largely coincide although how we explain them apparently differs. Best of fortune.

For what it's worth, I will certainly include your suggested terms, substance and form, within the body of my explanation in future writings.

I think that's a good idea, and am grateful for the feedback.

Nathan

Post 15

Monday, November 23, 2009 - 7:04pm

bump

Monday, November 23, 2009 - 8:40pm