Michael,
A study (see abstract below) was done on the intra-group cooperation found in small societies versus the cooperation found in medium and large ones. It turns out that, in small societies, folks are not as generous to each other. The likely reason for that is that in small societies, there's zero-sum, jungle-law dynamics (one person's gain is another's loss) and there's very little to go around -- so folks hoard "public" goods when they can get away with it (such as in the Dictator Game mentioned in the abstract).
What it means is that living in small societies has a psychological effect on members, making them more short-sightedly and narrow-mindedly "selfish" (it makes them act like small children or even like animals). Also, in small societies, spiteful punishment (punishment of aggressor by victim) keeps folks cooperating with each other. Importantly, this effect is enough to explain all of the cooperation found in small societies.
Also, altruistic punishment (punishment of aggressor by a third-party onlooker or "vigilante") is not as big of a deal in small societies as it is in larger ones. What this tells me is that the sense of objective justice is diminished in small societies. Again, likely due to the zero-sum, each-for-himself, jungle-law dynamics of small societies. A healthy society will have a lot of vigilantes acting for objective justice. The healthiest societies take it one step further, and go ahead and create a unique entity, a government, for the implementation of justice and the protection of individual rights.
These peculiarities make the use of small, hunter-gatherer tribes as a model for man inappropriate at least, if not outright dishonest.
Ed
********************************************************** Abstract
The 'spiteful' origins of human cooperation.SourceDepartment of Anthropology, University of Durham, , Dawson Building, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK.
AbstractWe analyse generosity, second-party ('spiteful') punishment (2PP), and third-party ('altruistic') punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that 'spiteful' 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.
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