| | Morally speaking, I think what Mr. Torain did here was indefensible. How on earth would the ethics of rational self-interest support threats of violence against a child, whether he had reasonable means of carrying it out or not? To claim there is a "philosophy behind this" means he needs to get a new philosophy--and in a hurry. I agree with Mr. Dwyer, although there is a certain "style" to the way he expresses himself, it is utterly devoid of substance--nothing but empty rhetoric. Who cares if he is a "hip" celebrity?
Fresh of law school exams, though, I want to take a look at this from a legal perspective. Mr. Bidinotto gave a formulation in post #17, which is at odds with basic Constitutional law on 1st Amendment speech. The Supreme Court disagrees with him and so do I. Mr. Bidinotto writes:
After all, who can tell which coercive statements are "idle threats" or serious ones?
So why should innocent people have to bear these costs, and live in fear of the threatened use of force? And why shouldn't people who make such threats be held responsible for that fear and harm, and face serious consequences? Nobody has a "right" to threaten violence; therefore, it is not "censorship" for the government to punish those who issue such threats The Supreme Court does regard this as censorship. The precedent case on advocating illegal activity is Brandenburg v. Ohio. Here, where KKK members threatened violence as a means of social reform, the Court struck it down. They set up the standard that the speech must advocate (1) imminent illegal activity and (2) the person must be likely to produce it. In contrast to Mr. Bidinotto's claim, the threat of violence was within their 1st Amendment rights. This is further buttressed in criminal law where, in order to be classified as an attempt, the person must take substantial steps in committing the crime.
I think this is the proper standard. Think for a second about all the subversive political groups that would be subjected to criminal liability if there was no distinction between a potential and an actual threat. Most political revolutions, including the American Revolution, are calls to violence against even specific political entities. How about even internet forums? Who hasn't seen people threaten to "kick somebody's ass" or "bitch slap" them or some things that are much worse. How about off-hand comments like "if X ever came onto my lawn or I saw him in the street, I would shoot him on site"? Is this cause for criminal liability? Or should it be classified as an "idle threat"? Obviously, setting up any "coercive statement" as a standard for criminal liability would be so broad most people would guilty of it at some point. Certainly, plenty of people say things we may disagree with or are morally repulsive, including calls to violence, but this isn't cause to put them in jail UNLESS they actually have the means to carry it out. I doubt Mr. Torain's $500 offer for the address of the girl would be considered substantial steps to actually committing the crime.
In large part, though, making coercive statements cause for criminal liability would be against one of the bedrocks of criminal liability, which is actus reus--a voluntary act. Remember, people are criminally liable for their actions, not their words. Mr. Bidinotto is right that threats are a problem, but one must be able to ascertain what actually constitutes a real threat (i.e. the intent and ability to commit an actual crime), as opposed to an "idle" one. There is an epistemological problem here as well, if there were no way to tell the difference between idle threats and serious ones, how could you ever form the concepts of "idle" and "serious" in regards to threats? Otherwise, you are in the position of concept-stealing by blurring the distinction between "idle" and "serious".
Michael
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