O'ism: Deontic-, consequential-, or virtue-based?

Hi all,

Here I'd like to explore whether O'ism is (or should be) deontic-, consequential-, or virtue-based...or something altogether different.

Jordan

Post 1

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 4:07pm

Jordan,

Deontology v Consequentialism is a false alternative. The former emphasises moral principles to the point of excluding personal happiness, the latter emphasises "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (variously worded) to the exclusion of moral principles. O'ism transcends both by basing moral principles on individual happiness. In that sense it can be interpreted as a form of teleology (virtue ethics), as a number of scholars have argued.

MH

(Edited by Matthew Humphreys on 12/19, 4:08pm)

Post 2

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 6:45pm

Matt,

I think that you are confusing consequentialism with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is collective consequentialism. What is wrong with it, is not the evaluation of the morality of an action by that action's consequences in reality - which is good - but rather on insisting on a collectivist valuation of the consequences, which disregards the causal agency of the individual whose action it is.

Objectivism implies first of all an individualist, agent-relative (that is, first-person) consequentialism, with one's own life as the ethical standard. Principled action is action based on principles that predict desired consequences. Principled action, therefore, is a secondary criterion. Virtues are habits and attributes of character that facilitate principled action that brings about desired consequences. Therefore virtues are tertiary, BUT. Happiness, the consequential goal in Objectivist ethics, is a measuring instrument (Rand: barometer) of how well one is doing at living the kind of life that is appropriate to one's identity (the ethical standard.) Having appropriate virtues - the component virtues of happiness - is an important part of this goal.

It has been claimed, in the context of objective ethics, that all components of happiness are virtues, which closes the circle into a consequentialist virtue ethic. I have not studied such claims in enough detail to tell whether or not they are valid.

Post 3

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 7:31pm

Hi MH,

the latter [consequentialism] emphasises "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (variously worded) to the exclusion of moral principles.

You've described utilitarianism, the dominant but not sole proponent of consequentialism. Specifically, you've described act utilitarianism; rule utilitarianism includes moral principles.

O'ism transcends both by basing moral principles on individual happiness.

See this sounds just like rule consequentialism with "greatest number" replaced with "individual."

In that sense it can be interpreted as a form of teleology (virtue ethics), as a number of scholars have argued.

I've heard this several times before, yet I know other folks who'd say that O'ism is Hedonist (one strain of consequentialism, and not to be shrugged off as mere whim-worship) or Deontic (as I think Tibor Machan might've suggested with the O'ist theory of rights). It would be nice to have a little argument here and not merely an appeal to authority that "a number of scholars have argued" this or that.

But I suppose asking my question is probably unfruitful. Most O'ists I know have identified O'ist ethics as resembling Aristotle's ethics, which in turn they've identified as Virtue Ethics. So nevermind.

<with a storm cloud over his head>,
Jordan

Post 4

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 7:40pm

I posted before I read Reed's reply. Thanks Reed for laying out your interpretation.

<storm cloud lifting>,
Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 12/19, 7:41pm)

Post 5

Monday, December 20, 2004 - 2:30am

Adam, Jordan,

My apologies, I did basically conflate consequentialism and utilitarianism in my previous post. I've always tended to see utilitarianism as one form of consequentialism, and certainly here in the UK it is by far the most influential form. It would be more accurate to say that consequentialism (at least by my interpretation) emphasises practicality over moral principles, whereas deontology traditionally emphasises morality regardless of practical consequences. Both theories (or rather groups of theories) seem to share a premise that morality and practicality are in conflict. Objectivism gears its moral principles towards practical ends, thus rejecting the notion of a conflict and "synthesising" elements of both. Thus we have the various consequentialist and deontological interpretations of various aspects of Objectivism.

As for rule utilitarianism, my problem with it is that while on an individual level there's a lot that O'ists would agree with, based what I've read (and I accept there may be a lot of material that I haven't read) on a wider scale I don't think it solves much. Essentially the reasoning is that the broad acceptance of individual rights throughout society leads to the greatest happiness overall, even if the rights cause some individual instances of unhappiness. Fine, but that's still a semi-collectivist goal, and still leaves a potential conflict - what if a situation were to arise where general acceptance of rights was making a large majority of people unhappy? Wouldn't the "greatest happiness" principle at least theoretically trump rights established on such a basis?

MH

Post 6

Monday, December 20, 2004 - 7:57am

Hi MH,

No doubt, if a rights-based society didn't lead to the greatest happiness, the rule utilitarian would do away with it. Rule utilitarians are consequentialist in that they evaluate a rule (which I think is the O'ist equivalent to "principle") as good or bad by what results from it (i.e., its consequences). A good rule is one that produces more aggregate happiness. I blieve J.S. Mill is this view's founding proponent. But rule consequentialists needn't be utilitarian. They don't have to aggregate happiness. They can be individualist rather than pluralist -- like what Adam was saying.

So in order for O'ism to be rule consequentialist, I think it must be willing to ditch a rights-based system if that system doesn't result in the greatest happiness for the individual. I don't know whether O'ists would be up for that.

I think some O'ists argue that we should maintain a rights-based system, regardless of whether it yields the greatest happiness fo the individual, that it's the only consistent system and so should be followed, despite its consequences. These O'ists would be deontic.

I'll leave Virtue Ethics alone for now.

Jordan

Post 7

Monday, December 20, 2004 - 9:06am

Jordan,

The "if reality were not what it is, then" argument does not say much. Cooperation and trade with other individuals is in fact indispensable for successful human life, and requires respect for the rights of others. The whole tactic of obscurantism by decontextualization, so pervasive in contemporary non-Randian philosophy, clarifies nothing and interferes with using reason reasonably.

Post 8

Monday, December 20, 2004 - 2:04pm

Hi Adam,

The "if reality were not what it is, then" argument does not say much. Cooperation and trade with other individuals is in fact indispensable for successful human life, and requires respect for the rights of others.

You must think it's impossible for individual rights to impede success. Lots of Socialist countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands, Holland) don't respect individual rights like (as O'ists think they ought to), and I'd say many citizens over there lead pretty successful lives. These are broad example of cases where success comes despite disrespecting individual rights. Or on a more individual basis, what if X has the opportunity to steal $10 million with certainty that he won't get caught? Should he dispense with respecting others' rights here? In my view, it's quite possible for respecting individual rights to impede one's success in life, at least one's material success.

Jordan

Post 9

Tuesday, December 28, 2004 - 2:22pm

I would say that the defining mark of virtue ethics is that it takes virtue (character) to be constitutive of the good life, not simply instrumental means (as consequentialists do). A utilitarian consequentialist might consider benevolence a virtue because it tends to promote "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," but being benevolent is not a part of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. By analogy, a healthy heart is constitutive of a healthy body, but exercise is an instrumental means. So the question is, does Objectivism think that virtue is more like a healthy heart or like exercise? I tend to think the former, but opinions vary.

Post 10

Tuesday, December 28, 2004 - 8:46pm

Hi Ryan,

Rand writes that virtue "is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [value]." ("The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, pg 25). This would suggest that, according to O'ism, virtues are instrumental in achieving values and are not themselves values.

So to address your examples, I'd say that O'ism would treat a healthy heart as a value, and exercise as a virtue. But the mere fact that O'ism talks about virtue shouldn't suggest that it's virtue-based. And there are elements in O'ism that suggest it might not be virtue-based. For starters, one popular critique of virtue ethics is that it's devoid of principle. That is, it lacks a set of decision-making rules that determine right action in any situation. But there are flavors of virtue ethics that do seem to espouse principle, so the critique is limited.

Anyway, I might later cook up a problem where the deontic, the consequentialist, and the virtue ethicist will each arrive at a different solution. And we'll see which category the O'ist falls into.

Jordan

Post 11

Tuesday, December 28, 2004 - 9:22pm

I have always found that objection to virtue ethics--that it does not generate a decision procedure--off the mark. Even for supposedly "principled" ethics like deontology and rule utilitarianism, there is no idiot proof decision procedure in the offering. Wow, we ought to act such that our will could be made a universal maxim or that we maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Okay, but how the hell do we do that?! The fact is that no moral theory gives an agent a ready-made protocol that tells us which action is right in any situation.

Also, I agree that Rand seems to say that virtue is merely instrumental, and indeed, that is what she is commited to in claiming that survival is our ultimate value. But, as writers like Roderick Long and Neera Badhwar have asked, is the reason that Howard Roark does not steal from his clients because doing so would somehow be inefficient? No--it is because honesty is part of his living a good life, not simply an instrumental means to his good. If Objectivism is not virtue based, it ought to be.

Post 12

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 7:21am

Ryan,

Okay, but how the hell do we do that?! The fact is that no moral theory gives an agent a ready-made protocol that tells us which action is right in any situation.

Aristotle would agree. For Aristotle, what an agent should do depends on the circumstances, which defy principles because of their exceeding complexity. Aristotle was more concerned with describing and locating virtue (e.g., as the mean between two extremes).

But I disagree with you guys that other ethics lack decision-making procedures. I find deontology and various strains of consequentialism pretty clear-cut here. I think the universal maxim is pretty straight-forward. The only trick is whether to interpret an act broadly or narrowly. And consequentialism that deals with smaller numbers of people is also pretty straightforward. It seems to me that the extent of Aristotle's protocol is to (1) obey or pay heed to the virtuous people and (2) (for reasons apparently for social cohesion) never violate some laws -- like don't murder, steal, or sleep with your neighbor's wife. Again, I know other virtue ethics do attempt decision-making procedures, so my critique is limited. In any case, I think that if ethics doesn't tell us what to do, it's not going to be terribly helpful.

is the reason that Howard Roark does not steal from his clients because doing so would somehow be inefficient? No--it is because honesty is part of his living a good life, not simply an instrumental means to his good.

Good example. Applying Rand's bit in the O'ist ethics, we could also say that Roark was acting here with pride, the virtue that acts to gain and/or keep the value of self-esteem. And this again would render virtues (at least) instrumental. But if we follow Den Uyl and Rasmussen's interpretation, Rand's virtues are both instrumental and constitutive, which makes sense because (I think) Rand would argue that self-esteem is unachievable without pride. But then again, in Atlas Shrugged we read that "Virtue is not an end in itself. Virtue is not its own reward..." (pg 1022).

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 12/29, 7:28am)

(Edited by Jordan on 12/29, 7:47am)

Post 13

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 11:51am

Jordan-

Thanks for your response. I do tend to agree with the Den Uyl-Rasmussen reading, even if Rand might disagree. Here is the further problem with viewing virtues as instrumental. First, as you remark, is pride a part of self-esteem or merely an instrumental means? Even if we say it is simply a means, is pride part of man's life qua man or simply a means? It seems like Rand is committed to holding it as an instrumental means given her premise that the alternative of life or death (i.e. of the continuation or cessation of one's biological processes) gives rise to valuation. Therefore, pride is a means (perhaps a necessary means, but still a means) to keeping one's heart beating. Thoughts?

Post 14

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 6:45pm

Hi Ryan,

First, as you remark, is pride a part of self-esteem or merely an instrumental means?

Ya got me. =) Rand doesn't make any sense to me here. First she says that virtues are the acts of gaining and/or keeping values. Then she says that pride is a virtue. Then she says that pride is a result (as opposed to a cause) of productive work (another alleged virtue), which in turn is a result of reason (one of Rand's cardinal values). Despite this jumble, I'm not sure how go to the following:

Therefore, pride is a means (perhaps a necessary means, but still a means) to keeping one's heart beating. Thoughts?

Why would pride have to be a means to keeping one's heart beating? I think it's means just to be a means to self-esteem. Perhaps you were suggesting that cardinal O'ist virtues (rationality, productiveness, pride) should all lead to the ultimate O'ist value: life. But I think that the cardinal virtues are meant only to correspond to the cardinal values (reason, purpose, self-esteem). And I imagine those three cardinal values are fundamentally and integratively (word?) what O'ists would say constitute the life of human qua human.

Jordan

Post 15

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 8:45pm

Jordan,

You wrote:

But I think that the cardinal virtues are meant only to correspond to the cardinal values (reason, purpose, self-esteem). And I imagine those three cardinal values are fundamentally and integratively (word?) what O'ists would say constitute the life of human qua human.

Ah, so reason, purpose, and self-esteem are constitutive of the life of human qua human? This is of course to say more than they are the necessary means to biological survival. Given the foundations of the Objectivist ethics--that the literal alternative of life versus death generates values--all values must be instrumental in sustaining one's life. I think Peikoff says something like an ape cannot survive by the means of an onion, and a human cannot survive by the means of an ape. This is merely to say that human beings have unique capacities that must be exercised to sustain themselves. Yet this is to say simply that spiritual values like reason and purpose are nothing more than instrumental means to survival.

Post 16

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 9:11pm

Hi Ryan,

It's a pickle. One issue in O'ism is how to define "life." You're taking it to mean "biological survival." Others have taken it to mean "flourishing." Others have tried to reconcile the two. Dunno what to tell you.

Jordan

Post 17

Thursday, December 30, 2004 - 9:38am

Jordan, Ryan,

On the issue of survival v flourishing, I think the two are inextricably linked. If we define flourishing as effectively meaning the achievement of value(s) in one's life (realising one's potential talents and ambitions and so forth), biological survival can be viewed as one component (though a necessary one) of flourishing. How much importance one places on various values depends on an individual's context. For the middle/professional classes in western society, basic necessities such as food, shelter heat etc are essentially secure, and thus individuals are free to pursue values such as their long term careers and to the extent that they have the finances, their other interests (be these music, movies, reading, adventure sports etc). A less skilled person somewhat lower in the economic spectrum is likely to be more concerned with immediate costs of food and heating, and thus have proportionately less resources for hobbies. This doesn't mean that individuals in this second category won't have other values - many will have families and ambitions to significantly improve their social status in the future, but in their immediate day to day lives, long term survival is much more of a concern. Of course values can change depending on circumstances. For instance Roark, almost totally broke, goes to work as a labourer in order to earn cash. He still wants to be an architect but in that situation, securing the basic necessities took precedence in the immediate term.

It might also be said that in a roundabout way, the possibility of flourishing and achieving one's values assists our biological survival, by giving us a reason to live.

But to complicate matters slightly, in certain emergency situations, flourishing might ultimately require that an individual give up his biological survival. At the risk of floating to far into abstraction, suppose all your dearest friends and loved ones are going to die unless you save them, but the only way to do so means your own death. If you allow them to die you remain biologically alive, but your life may no longer be worth living. So it is probably most accurate to say that "life" in an Objectivist sense means flourishing, bur that biological survival is with few exceptions a prerequisite.

This turned out a lot longer than I'd planned but hopefully it's of some use :-)

MH

Post 18

Thursday, December 30, 2004 - 11:52am

But to complicate matters slightly, in certain emergency situations, flourishing might ultimately require that an individual give up his biological survival.

Is this really just an uncommon emergency situation? Here I'm thinking of Roark and Henry Cameron choosing to live on the edge of starvation rather than ensuring their survival via the Keating route. If Roark is taken as the model for an Objectivist artist, doesn't this suggest that artistic integrity, for example, is a higher value than biological survival in normal (as opposed to emergency) ethics?

Post 19

Thursday, December 30, 2004 - 12:42pm