RoR: Forum

Thanks, David, for those points on imperialism in the name of "free trade." Indeed, there have been plenty of attempts to legitimize various interventionist acts by using the rhetorical devices of classical liberalism as justification.

Rhetoric is ~key~ in politics. Take a look at this interesting story, brought to my attention by Arthur Silber at the Light of Reason (a blog that I mention in my article), which suggests that the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction was simply one that the administration used to justify what appears now as an otherwise "strategic" decision---hardly a question of principle.

http://boston.com/dailynews/148/technology/Iraqi_weapons_only_one_reason_:.shtml

Even if one supports the Bush administration, the problem remains U.S. government credibility and honesty. When antiwar protestors were questioning the administration's "hidden" motives, they were dismissed as unpatriotic. But I didn't have to criticize "hidden" motives for this war (some of the ones that the left conjured up, like a war for "oil," just didn't make complete sense) because the stated explicit motives (alleged WMDs, Hussein's "imminent" threat to US security, "democratic" regime change and nation-building, spurious ties between Hussein and Al Qaeda) were worth criticizing on their own terms.

I suspect there is a lot more to come in terms of information-gathering with regard to the recent war and the current occupation.

Cheers,
Chris

http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/notablog.htm

Post 41

Thursday, May 29, 2003 - 3:54pm

I would like some more discussion of two of the points Chris has made.

"Furthermore, the extension of this kind of arrangement will only cause more distortions in global peace and security . . ."

"The problem, however, is that Rand herself recognized how US foreign policy was creating dislocations world-wide; this version of democracy has ~internationalized~ the domestic policy of 'pull-peddling.' To pull a single thread from the complex tapestry that is 'the New Fascism,'and to act as if we can create a new tapestry (known as 'Iraqi democracy') as if the rest of the tapestry doesn't exist is, quite simply, the very 'context-dropping' against which Rand railed."

The first is oddly worded. Distortion of peace? I assume it means something bad for peace.

I find the second passage puzzling. Reading it in the light of the first, I guess Chris's point is that if U.S. occupation creates a new Iraq that is pro U.S., but at the same time pours in large amounts of aid, the net outcome will be bad for world peace and U.S. security.

I don't think this is obvious. If this is the claim, it could use some support.

Consider the article I linked on the Marshall Plan. For convenience I repeat the link.

http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-19-03.html

The author concludes that the Marshall Plan was at best unnecessary, and probably did more harm than good. But if U.S. policy in Europe succeeded despite rather than because of the Marshall Plan, nonetheless it did succeed. The former Axis countries were rebuilt as democracies, resulting in some very effective security co-operation.

Keep in mind that even if the U.S. were to withdraw its troops, giving up the opportunity to guide Iraq's political development, there would almost certainly still be foreign aid to whatever government emerges in Iraq. Saddam received such aid before the first Gulf War.

Post 42

Thursday, May 29, 2003 - 4:34pm

:Chris- Indeed, there have been plenty of attempts to legitimize various interventionist acts by using the rhetorical devices of classical liberalism as justification.

David- I think it is more than a matter of rhetorical justification.

When Catherine the Great invaded Poland, liberals like Voltaire hailed her as a liberator, because she had established religious toleration in Russia and extended it into Poland.

When the French National Assembly declared war on Austria in 1792, liberals voted with the majority. The war was partly pre-emptive, since Austria had been threatening to intervene against the revolution. But this war could also be viewed as the first manifestation of the "global revolution" doctrine, later taken up by Trotskyists, neo-cons, and some Objectivists.

I think it has been a constant temptation for liberals to such schemes, for spreading liberal values by military liberations. Why should individualists respect "national sovereignty", or the "legitimacy" of illiberal regimes? John Quincy Adams's famous statement - "America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy" - could be regarded as a triumph of prudence over principle.

Post 43

Friday, May 30, 2003 - 3:33am

Hey, David, your contributions are very much appreciated.

What I meant by "distortions in global peace and security" is not necessarily war. As I argue in the article, a policy of "money, munitions, and political machinations" is partly what got the US into trouble to begin with; its goal may be to ~stabilize~ various regions and countries, but its consequences are either the opposite of that, or, as you point out, the stability that results is often ~in spite of~ the policy.

Thanks again for repeating that Cato link; the policy study that Ian Vasquez points to, by the way, was written by Tyler Cowen. It's a small world: I know Tyler from my days as a student activist protesting the return, under President Carter, of draft registration. As college undergraduates, we were both members of Students for a Libertarian Society, and I'm always happy to see Tyler's work, which is almost always thought-provoking.

David is correct that "The former Axis countries were rebuilt as democracies, resulting in some very effective security co-operation." But I do think the circumstances were radically different, as I pointed out in my essay. Both Germany and Japan, for example, had histories of experimentation with democratic procedures, and neither of them had any potential allies left in their respective regions of the world.

David is also correct "that even if the U.S. were to withdraw its troops, giving up the opportunity to guide Iraq's political development, there would almost certainly still be foreign aid to whatever government emerges in Iraq. Saddam received such aid before the first Gulf War." That is the current arrangement, and until or unless the domestic policies of the US change, there is no reason to suppose that foreign policy will be changed in any fundamental way. But I'm at a loss as to how long and what shape that foreign aid will take---given the constantly evolving situation in that region of the world.

Thanks, too, David, for drawing some additional historical examples on the use of liberalism as a justification for war. I suspect that ~any~ ideological group convinced of the rightness of its ideals---from liberals to Christian missionaries to communist insurgents---will always have the temptation to spread its value by military means, when other means prove inconsequential. If this is something endorsed by liberals, libertarians, conservatives, or Objectivists, then I think it is appropriate to wonder if ~pragmatism~ has become the guiding doctrine: Do the ends ~ever~ justify the means?

I know Rand's answer to that question.

In her essay, "The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion'," she writes: "The end does not justify the means. No one's rights can be secured by the violation of the rights of others."

In her discussion on writing book reviews in THE ART OF NONFICTION, she writes: "Never use a bad book for some improper or irrelevant purpose, just because ~your~ purpose is 'good.' The end does ~not~ justify the means."

In her column, "War and Peace," she writes: "There is no moral justification for the vicious doctrine that some men have the right to rule others by force. But so long as men continue to believe that some sort of alleged "noble purpose" can justify it—violence, bloodshed and wars will continue."

In "The Goal of My Writing," she emphasizes: "There is no dichotomy, no necessary conflict between ends and means. The end does ~not~ justify the means---neither in ethics nor in esthetics. And neither do the means justify the end . . . the end and the means . . . must be worthy of each other."

In "The Roots of War," she writes: "Men are afraid that war might come because they know, consciously or subconsciously, that they have never rejected the doctrine which causes wars, which has caused the wars of the past and can do it again—the doctrine that it is right or practical or necessary for men to achieve their goals by means of ~physical~ force (by initiating the use of force against other men) and that some sort of "good" can justify it. It is the doctrine that force is a proper or unavoidable part of human existence and human societies."

And Leonard Peikoff has written (in OPAR): "We are often told that someone's 'noble ideal' can be attained only by evil actions, which we are then urged to perform ('the end justifies the means'). Objectivism rejects this license to immorality. The end does ~not~ justify the means. The truth is the exact opposite: an immoral means invalidates the end. The full statement of Ayn Rand's view is that the end-in-itself, man's life, determines the fundamental means of human action (the proper principles); and these in turn delimit the concretes one can validly pursue in a given context."

And finally, there is this warning from Ayn Rand (from "The 'Inexplicable Personal Alchemy'"):

"A dictatorship has to promulgate some sort of distant goals and moral ideals in order to justify its rule and the people's immolation; the extent to which it succeeds in convincing its victims, is the extent of its own danger; sooner or later, its contradictions are thrown in its face by the best of its subjects: the ablest, the most intelligent, the most honest. Thus a dictatorship is forced to destroy and to keep on destroying the best of its 'human resources.'"

All interesting passages to think about.

BTW, on the question of "credibility," I offer the following link---without comment:

http://billmon.org.v.sabren.com/archives/000172.html

Cheers,
Chris

Post 44

Friday, May 30, 2003 - 6:32pm

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/30/opinion/30KRIS.html?ex=1055301116&ei=1&en=310a123d5e72a5bc

"The Al Qaeda connection and nuclear weapons issue were the only two ways that you could link Iraq to an imminent security threat to the U.S.," notes Greg Thielmann, who retired in September after 25 years in the State Department, the last four in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. "And the administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things."

Post 45

Saturday, May 31, 2003 - 12:03pm

http://asia.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=2854511

A growing number of U.S. national security professionals are accusing the Bush administration of slanting the facts and hijacking the $30 billion intelligence apparatus to justify its rush to war in Iraq.

Vince Cannistraro, a former chief of Central Intelligence Agency counterterrorist operations, said he knew of serving intelligence officers who blame the Pentagon for playing up "fraudulent" intelligence, "a lot of it sourced from the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi."

http://channels.netscape.com/ns/news/story.jsp?floc=NW_1-T&oldflok=FF-RTO-PLS&idq=/ff/story/0002/20030530/131227177.htm

U.S. intelligence was "simply wrong" in leading military commanders to believe their troops were likely to be attacked with chemical weapons in the Iraq war [said Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force].

Conway said he was convinced when U.S. and British troops swept into Iraq from Kuwait that they would come under chemical or biological attack before they reached Baghdad.

But such shells have not been found even in ammunition storage sites, he told reporters.

"It was a surprise to me then. It remains a surprise to me now that we have not uncovered weapons ... in some of the forward dispersal sites," said Conway.

"We've been through virtually every ammunition supply site between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad. But they're simply not there."

http://www.freep.com/news/nw/iraq31_20030531.htm

The exiles' intelligence network, intelligence officials said, told Pentagon officials that, among other things, many Iraqi Shi'ites would welcome U.S. troops as liberators. They also said that some key Iraqi generals would surrender their entire units and that Hussein had sent a key operative to work with a small militant Islamic group, Ansar al Islam, that had ties to Al Qaeda.

Officials in the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department all warned repeatedly that past dealings with the exiles, led by Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, indicated the intelligence they provided was unreliable at best.

But Iraqi defectors produced by the INC and other intelligence supplied by the group got a ready hearing in two important places: an intelligence group set up by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and the New York Times.

The INC, said U.S. intelligence officials, bypassed the skeptics in the CIA and DIA and fed the same information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and links to Al Qaeda to both places so Pentagon officials would confirm what the newspaper was hearing and the nation's most powerful newspaper would confirm what the Pentagon was hearing.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20030531/wl_mideast_afp/us_iraq_powell_030531004225

US Secretary of State Colin Powell was under persistent pressure from the Pentagon and White House to include questionable intelligence in his report on Iraq weapons of mass destruction he delivered at the United Nations last February, a US weekly reported.

US News and World Report magazine said the first draft of the speech was prepared for Powell by Vice President Richard Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, in late January.

According to the report, the draft contained such questionable material that Powell lost his temper, throwing several pages in the air and declaring, "I'm not reading this. This is bullshit."

Post 46

Tuesday, June 3, 2003 - 4:47am

I continue to receive an enormous amount of private email on this essay, and I'm only sorry that some people have chosen not to voice their opinions publicly. This thread can remain open for as long as people like---the issues certainly won't grow old, and I will periodically check here, always willing to reply to further discussion. (As one can see, even articles that are over a year old---e.g., "Objectivism and Homosexuality--Again," regularly reappear in SOLO HQ discussion.)

But right now, it seems that David and I are the only ones willing to correspond publicly on the current SOLO HQ thread. So let me simply thank David for his many thoughts, links, and contributions.

Thanks again to all. I'll be checking periodically for additional posts and will reply accordingly.

Cheers,
Chris

--
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/notablog.htm
--

Post 47

Tuesday, June 3, 2003 - 2:29pm

Chris, I read your article and some of the responses (so far); I have a few questions. I’m most interested in your view on the importance of philosophy and culture on the prospects of liberty in regions where liberty was previously unknown.

Your cultural analysis of Japan and Germany, with respect to post-war prospects for a liberal democracy, seems to imply that there was enough in their past to make the post war success intelligible. Consider the alternative thesis. These two cultures had so degenerated that only the apocalyptic destruction and subsequent demoralization enabled the consideration of another path. Italy was defeated but not as horrifically. The liberal economic reforms were deeper and lasted longer in Germany and Japan than Italy. Comments?

I’m sympathetic to your description of Islamist cultural hostility to West liberal ideals (in the individualist classical liberal sense). However, you seem to imply that only an internal cultural ecological evolution of an undisturbed region will bring any real change. Am I wrong on this?

Given their hostility to our culture, I find it surprising that you are sanguine about a hands-off military posture. If it is our culture that attracts their youth down the wayward path away from Islam, how does the removal of our military significantly change matters? Are you assuming that they have a natural Libertarian distinction between our government on the one hand and our corporations and individuals on the other hand? If we remove our military will they still not hate us and find us a threat? Socialist didn’t make such a distinction – why would Islamists?

In other places, I sense a view that equates social engineering via a socialistic government and the establishment (even by force) of a constitutional government with protections for individual liberty and private property. The latter, even if not on the agenda, should be addressed in principle. If we chose this alternative, would you say we are forcing liberty on people? Is this social engineering? By the way, I appreciate that this should not be our primary purpose.

Finally, we disagree on the threat of the Saddam regime. However, if you agreed that they were a threat, what would your post-war strategy be? Or, equivalently, now that we are there, what’s your recommendation?

I appreciate the destructive effect war has on the wager of a war. However, I’ve limited my focus on the quandary we now face and have to face from time to time: what to do after we win given what we know about culture and the importance of ideas. I'm sure you're the right person to ask. :)

Post 48

Wednesday, June 4, 2003 - 2:08am

:Rick- If it is our culture that attracts their youth down the wayward path away from Islam, how does the removal of our military significantly change matters?

David- Do you think Islamic peoples must give up Islam itself before they can have political liberty?

:Rick- Are you assuming that they have a natural Libertarian distinction between our government on the one hand and our corporations and individuals on the other hand?

David- It's not only libertarians who are capable of understanding the distinction.

There was a writer plugging a book on C-Span a few weeks ago. He had spent a lot of time in the Middle East, and I think he mentioned Pakistan also. He had met many people who expressed that very distinction. Many of them admired American culture and even expressed a desire to live in America, and in the next breath spoke of their bitter resentment of U.S. foreign policy.

I used to work with a man from Iraq. He was one of my best buddies - smart and easy going. I have to confess we didn't spend much time talking about politics or culture. Mostly we talked about women. :-)

He did tell me he had a relative in Saddam's gulag, and naturally he hated the dictator. He also didn't think much of U.S. policy toward his country. The Clinton impeachment took place during this time, and Clinton bombed Iraq more heavily than usual. My friend was terribly worried about his family in Baghdad.

He was easy-going, as I said, and got on well with everyone. I think he was quite fond of the people in whose country he found a refuge, and had no problem distinguishing us from our government and its policies.

:Rick- If we remove our military will they still not hate us and find us a threat?

David- I don't think so. Why would they?

Granted there will always be some Muslims who hate all non-Muslims. Such people have their Christian counterparts.

:Rick- Socialist didn’t make such a distinction –

David- Why do you say that?

I have worked with many leftists in the anti-war movement. I haven't known one who didn't distinguish between the people of a country and its government's policies.

The only people I know of who _don't_ make that distinction, are chauvinists who call dissidents "America-haters."

:Rick- why would Islamists?

David- Why wouldn't they? Islamists are internationalists, not national chauvinists.

I think "why would X be true?" is a less significant question than "what is the empirical evidence that x is true?"

On this point, I offer another book-plugging author on C-Span. The author was a journalist who had written a book on bin Laden, and his research including following his subject around Afghanistan for a time. He was telling an interviewer that bin Laden was always talking the same way he did in his fatwas - complaining about infidel troops in Saudi Arabia, the blockade of Iraq, the plight of the Palestinians. The interviewer asked about the other things that might irritate an Islamist - separation of church and state, shameless women, corrupting movies, etc. The author answered with a single, crisp sentence: "He never mentions them."

Have you seen this?

http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf

I've posted this elsewhere on the web. So far no one has even tried to rebut it.

Rick- In other places, I sense a view that equates social engineering via a socialistic government and the establishment (even by force) of a constitutional government with protections for individual liberty and private property.

David- I took issue with Chris on a similar point, where he drew an analogy with central planning.

:Rick- If we chose this alternative, would you say we are forcing liberty on people?

David- I wouldn't say that.

What it might mean to "force liberty" on someone is a question of some theoretical interest. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment bars people from selling themselves into slavery. Is that a deprivation of liberty? Is it sacrificing a small liberty for the sake of greater liberty?

I don't care to explore such questions; nor do I think they shed any light on our present inquiry.

:Rick- Is this social engineering?

David- That's an excellent question.

I want to say there is a difference between "social engineering" and reform of a political system. On reflection, I realize that I have never defined what I mean by "social engineering", although I have used the term from time to time.

Fortunately, I haven't used it on this thread. But Chris is on the hook. :-)

:Rick- Finally, we disagree on the threat of the Saddam regime. However, if you agreed that they were a threat, what would your post-war strategy be?

David- That would depend on how big a threat. Suppose we had definite information that Saddam was hiding in Iraq and planning a bio-weapon attack on the U.S. Then the best course probably would be to keep control of Iraq until he had been hunted down.

:Rick- Or, equivalently, now that we are there, what’s your recommendation?

David- Those two questions aren't equivalent by any means. The first is about a hypothetical alternate world. The second is about the world we inhabit.

I don't have a recommendation. I can think of three possibilities. I'm not sure which is least bad, but I'm confident none are as bad as the present course.

The first would be to drop everything and leave. The upside is no more Americans dying in Iraq, and possibly less ill-will against the U.S. The downside is the possibility of a disaster that will win even more ill-will than continued occupation. In spite of the latter possibility, I am by no means sure this isn't the least bad option.

The second would be to stay for a few weeks, working with local Iraqi leaders to restore security. Then U.S. forces could leave, and let the Iraqis work out their national future for themselves.

The third would be to hand Iraq over to a U.N. force. On past experience, such a force would probably be effective in preventing Iraq from collapsing into chaos. The downside would be that U.N. administration would promote corruption and retard Iraq's economic growth. The U.N. option should be chosen only if there is reason to expect the alternative would be a disaster.

Post 49

Wednesday, June 4, 2003 - 4:34am

Just when I thought the conversation was waning... :)

Thanks Rick and David for your additional commentary. A few points in response:

1. Rick suggests that Japan and Germany's cultures "had so degenerated that only the apocalyptic destruction and subsequent demoralization enabled the consideration of another path." Given the context of what was happening in World War II, I agree with you in general. But there were still ~elements~ of a democratic past from which one could draw in ~both~ countries. Indeed, in the case of Germany, those elements weren't even of a ~distant~ past---since the Germans elected themselves into dictatorship. A similar dynamic would occur in any nation whose culture abandons the path of individualism, and Muslim fundamentalism is certainly a threat in the context of such "majority rule." But because the problem is personal, cultural, ~and~ structural, we can't forget the fact that Germany and Japan (structurally speaking) had ~no~ allies left, none from which to draw structured political opposition to the US role. That is not the case in the Middle East, where there are many potential allies of fundamentalist elements across nations in the Muslim world.

2. Rick asks: "However, you seem to imply that only an internal cultural ecological evolution of an undisturbed region will bring any real change. Am I wrong on this?" No. What I'm saying is that even an attempted structural change from without ~requires~ the nourishment of internal cultural forces, which were present in the German and Japanese models, but are ~less~ obvious in the Middle East. That doesn't mean that it is ~impossible~ to affect ~any~ change in the Middle East; but the scope of change is so broad that it makes the possibility of negative unintended consequences all the more real and lethal.

3. Rick asks: "If we remove our military will they still not hate us and find us a threat? Socialist didn't make such a distinction why would Islamists?" I'm not sure that the socialists didn't---it depends on which socialists we're talking about. The US military and political intervention overseas was a problem for the socialist Soviets, but not the socialist Swedes. The key here is that while the culture wars are real, it is only political and military wars that lead to the kind of massive, armed resentment that we see in the Islamic world. The problem that some Iraqis have had with Americans is not American secularism (indeed, that is ~one~ hopeful sign among Iraqis: they are far ~more~ secular than others in the Muslim world); the problem that some Iraqis have had with Americans is related to political-economic sanctions, which have contributed to the economic blight of their country, and military campaigns on their soil.

4. Rick disputes the equation of "social engineering via a socialistic government and the establishment (even by force) of a constitutional government with protections for individual liberty and private property. The latter, even if not on the agenda, should be addressed in principle. If we chose this alternative, would you say we are forcing liberty on people? Is this social engineering?"

It is social engineering ~if~ it does not entail a nourishment of cultural factors necessary to the sustenance of liberty. See especially the Hayek quote above. The US can certainly try to impose a constitutional government, but if there is no ~cultural~ appreciation for individual liberty or private property, it won't matter. The socialist imposition of central planning depended, ironically, on the spontaneous creation of extra-socialist, quasi-capitalist institutions---black markets---to sustain the economy. A constitutional imposition, in the absence of cultural change, would have a similar, though opposite, effect: it would bolster extra-constitutional means of social coordination (like the emergence of private para-military mafiosi---most likely tribal warlords---throughout Iraq), which would have the cultural legitimacy that a constitutional imposition would lack.

There is a distinction, of course, between socialist and constitutional "social engineering": In the socialist case, no amount of cultural change would have mattered since socialism contradicts metaphysics and epistemology. In the constitutional case, however, cultural change is indispensable.

5. Rick asks, "now that we are there [in Iraq], what's your recommendation? I'm sure you're the right person to ask." Just as long as we're clear that I'm not the only person, and probably not even close to being the best person, to ask. :) It's like asking a person who is fatally allergic to cheese: "But if you could eat cheese, what would you prefer: Blue Cheese or Mozzarella?" For a person who is allergic to cheese, picking the poison won't much matter.

That said, my comments here are purely off-the-cuff: I don't think the US can ~reasonably~ be expected to leave in the short-run. I think the central concern should be the establishment of civil order first and foremost. I think a phase-out of US troops can begin as soon as order is obtained. De-Ba'athization, like post-World War II de-Nazification, will probably be essential to the establishment of any kind of post-war Iraqi government, but I don't believe that the setting up of democratic procedures should be a priority. I'm with Tyler Cowen, General Director of the Mercatus Center, on this: Ideally, the US shouldn't emphasize democracy, elections, or infrastructure development. Tyler also makes the following point---well worth remembering:

"Countries rich in natural resources have a harder time becoming well-functioning capitalist democracies. The political incentive to plunder wealth is simply too strong. Japan, Hong Kong, and many other places have developed without many resources at all. Privatizing Iraqi oil is a good idea, but we still do not know how to prevent a future Iraqi state from simply seizing the resource. This is one of the biggest problems that Iraq faces and we have no ready answer at hand."

And I can only add that this is a key problem, given the "neofascist" status quo: political incentives to plunder wealth are ~built~ into the current ~US~ system, let alone the one in Iraq.

Cheers,
Chris

---
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/notablog.htm
---

Post 50

Wednesday, June 4, 2003 - 8:27am

David:

I believe your comments revolve around the distinction between government and people. However, I was focusing on culture and what it represents – not Americans as people. There is a large difference. However, before I comment (with an exception below), I’d like to read your other posts and give it more thought.

Chris:

Concerning points 1 & 2, I think we are more in agreement than not. I have less hope for a positive and lasting change in Iraq than that which occurred in Germany and Japan after WWII. You’ve answered and dispelled some of my concerns regarding some general implications and ambiguities (isn’t it wonderful when you can ask the author himself?).

We are in general agreement regarding point 4: cultural change is indispensable for lasting political liberty. However, that doesn’t imply that it must always come first. I read Hyack’s excellent quote (above) and it accurately describes a lasting condition for constitutionally protected liberty as well as the natural preconditions for its establishment. Still, a back-and-forth process between “structure” and “culture” (would one say dialectic? or reciprocal causation?) may be a more appropriate expectation for change in today’s Iraq. While structure can’t create culture, cultural makers will respond to it. The current structural change will be a temporary opportunity; Iraqis might take this opportunity and advance a better culture. But if they don’t change culturally, this structural graft will not take root. Fair enough?

I’m in general sympathy with your feelings on how we should now proceed. However, let me point out that it raises the possibility that we may leave Iraq in a position where the people have an opportunity to start down that road to a culture with greater respect for liberty. Let me stress that I would never advocate intervention for such an outside chance. If I didn’t think there were warranted threats requiring our military intervention, I would be totally opposed to military action – as I was in Kosovo, Panama, etc. While I agree Neo-Conservatives exaggerate the hope, I sense that you may exaggerate the lack of hope. Let’s continue with regard to this concern.

Several commentators have described the cultural situation in the Mid-East as a struggle between fundamentalist Islam and Western style fascist/authoritarian regimes. When Arab countries became independent, as with may other colonial subjects at that time, the dominant Western ideal was a controlled economy – perhaps even totalitarianism. Islamism, circa 1970s, can be seen as a rejection of this failed Western “modernization” paradigm. Given the neo-liberal revival, even if it is far less than we’d like, can we not assume that this general change in world culture will give hope that Arab intellectuals, with an openness to Western modernization, will create a moderate hybrid of liberal and welfare politics? In this way, a return to totalitarian oppression is significantly lessoned compare with interventions 30-60 years ago. From some of your comments above I suspect you’d agree. Am I right?

Turning now to Islamism (as opposed to Iraq), let me raise the following point in regard to both David’s and Chris’ view that it is our military that invokes a violent response. Is this really plausible? Before 9/11, which country did we militarily conquer and establish a puppet regime? Morocco? Algeria? Libya? Egypt? Jordan? Syria? Iraq? Arabia? Iran? Pakistan? Even Iran established an Islamist regime without invoking the response of our military. Did we overthrow and re-establishment a friendly regime? Further back, we even opposed the UK and France in the Suez! Is culture so fragile or insignificant that the meager military presence prior to 9/11 should be such a significant factor in the overall fundamentalist Islamic movement?

If anything, Islamists have created a self-fulfilling prophecy by attacking us on 9/11, Bali, etc. We have now replaced the regimes of two countries by military invasions. But notice that we no longer see the street demonstrations in favor of bin Laden. Where is the big uprising that Islamist hoped and we feared? I suggest that within Arab and Islamic cultures, nothing gains respected more than military triumph – not that this “respect” should be our goal. Was it too great a presence that invoked an Islamist attack or was it too meager and hesitant a military response that emboldened a fantasy of taking down the “paper tiger”? I find it hard to believe that this meager structural factor is so culturally fundamental. Don’t you?

Let’s me close by noting that I haven’t commented on a significant portion of your original article because it is intelligible and raises good points. Instead, I wanted to clarify and pinpoint some of your ideas on the importance of culture in general, cultural challenges in the Mid-East and cultural repercussions as a by-product of our actions.

Regards,
Rick

Post 51

Wednesday, June 4, 2003 - 1:24pm

Hello, Chris,

In the "better late than never" spirit, I thought I'd add my two cents to the discussion here. While I see many problems with Rand's views on foreign policy as presented by you (as well as much agreement), the most glaring inconsistency to me is in her opposite positions on US support for Israel & Vietnam. Specifically, I can't see why she chose in any principled way to take the specific positions she did on those two countries. Why not the opposite? Her hypothetical position on Vietnam could've been:

"...she opposed the appeasement of the Soviets, and recognized the strategic importance of Taiwan and South Vietnam-despite her antipathy toward the latter's socialist, religious, and tribalist nature. South Vietnam was preferable to the Viet Cong, argued Rand, which had abdicated any "rights" it may have once held by engaging in a sustained policy of terror..."

Or, her position on Israel could've been:

"...[Rand] wondered why the U.S. had 'sacrificed billions of dollars, to protect a primitive people who never had freedom, do not seek it, and, apparently, do not want it'..."

IOW, wasn't South Vietnam just as preferable to the Viet Cong as Israel was to the PLO? Wasn't Israel just as tribalist, religious, and socialist as South Vietnam? What made the South Vietnamese any more "primitive" than the Israelis? Couldn't it also be said of the Israelis that they had never had freedom, didn't seek it, and apparently didn't want it?

Actually, I would disagree with Rand's characterization of the South Vietnamese as not having, seeking, or wanting freedom. The fact that about a million North Vietnamese voted with their feet after the Geneva Accords in 1953 to migrate to South Vietnam proves that South Vietnam was freer than North Vietnam, and that many Vietnamese did want and seek that greater freedom available to them. The fact that a similar number of Vietnamese fled South Vietnam when the People's Army of Viet Nam invaded in 1975 adds further evidence to this.

Nor would I really apply Rand's description of the South Vietnamese to the Israelis, either. They may not have ever had freedom, but they certainly did want and seek it, to the best of their understanding.

As another poster already pointed out, the South Koreans could not be plausibly be said to be any more desirous or in seek of freedom than the South Vietnamese, but South Korea is a free country and a democracy today in large part thanks to U.S. military assistance in the defense of South Korea against North Korean and Communist Chinese aggression. The Taiwanese, too, are a free democracy today, despite having been no more desirous or in seek of freedom back in the 1960s when Rand morally condemned South Vietnam to mass terror, mass enslavement, and mass murder at the hands of the Viet Cong.

Nor, for that matter, were the South Koreans and Taiwanese in possession of any of the remnants of democracy to which you attribute the success of Japan and Germany in the postwar period, as neither country had any democratic political tradition. Japan and Germany had so little as to make this explanation in their case questionable in my mind, but South Korea and Taiwan had literally none at all. The Kuo Min Tang was a dictatorial national socialist one-party movement, and Korea had been an absolute monarchy prior to its occupation by Japan starting in 1905. So much for your vaunted indigenous cultural prerequisites for democratic success.

In fact, in all of these cases, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and even South Vietnam until 1975, democracy succeeded or was succeeding thanks to exogenous influences which were leading to the privatization of land to its tillers, respect for human rights by their rulers, multi-party democracy, privatization of industries, etc. In many ways, South Vietnam in 1975 was a more advanced democracy than Japan or Germany were in 1945, having freedom of religion, multi-party democracy, private property, and having recently had land reform which redistributed land from absentee feudal landlords to the peasants which actually tilled it.

Post 52

Thursday, June 5, 2003 - 5:34am

Thanks Rick for your reply and ... ~Tim~ ... where have you been? I'm very happy to see your voice added to the discussion, for even when I've disagreed with you on other forums, I've very much respected your command of the subject. Better late than never, indeed.

A few brief points in response:

1. Rick, I'm happy to have "answered and dispelled some of [your] concerns regarding some general implications and ambiguities," and actually, I do agree that it is a wonderful thing when writers and readers can interact. The Internet is a terrific institution for this kind of dialogue, and I'm delighted that such forums exist.

2. Yes, I agree, there is a "dialectic" or "reciprocal causation" between structure and culture, and at certain times, in certain circumstances, it is possible to use structural means for affecting cultural change. Indeed, I don't think I could ever oppose scaling back the reach of government domestically simply because the USA hasn't yet embraced Objectivism as a philosophic or cultural ideal, which is why I think Branden's quote above---about the mutual reinforcement among philosophical, moral, political, psychological, sociological, economic, and cultural factors---is so insightful. Fair enough, indeed.

3. In general, I do agree that a neo-liberal revival does create the global context for "a moderate hybrid of liberal and welfare politics." But I want to emphasize that it is not necessarily the US ~military~ that has engendered violent responses abroad. As my article suggests, the global implications of neofascism are not primarily military; they are ~primarily~ financial, political and economic. The US has bolstered the establishment of puppet and friendly regimes for many years, from the Shah of Iran to the House of Sa'ud. When the Iranian fundamentalists threw out the Shah, they directed as much hostility toward the U.S. not ~just~ because of its Western values, but also because the "Great Satan" had been supporting the oppressive Shah for ~years~. The irony that the theocrats simply replaced one form of oppression with another has been lost on the Ayatollahs.

There are also those who have argued (Stephen Schwartz, THE TWO FACES OF ISLAM) that the house of Sa'ud's alliance with fanatical Wahhabism was strengthened from 1945 on, when the US government solidified a partnership with the Saudis, in which pull-peddling Western oil companies---especially the Arabian American Oil Company [ARAMCO] partners, a merger of Esso, Texaco, and Mobil---aided economically and politically "the continuation of dishonesty and injustice in Arabia." (For a handy overview of Schwartz's book, see Richard Bernstein's "The Saudis' Brand of Islam and Its Place in History," The New York Times, Nov. 8, 2002, archived excerpt can be found at http://www.gospelcom.net/apologeticsindex/rnb/archives/00001141.html; for an essay discussing the Saudi-US government alliance: http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn14772.htm --- I don't agree with all of its political premises, but it points out some important facts.)

4. I should mention that I have never really believed that invasion ~per se~ would create a big uprising of Islam, but I do think that a sustained ~occupation~ could very well contribute to it. This is something that needs to be evaluated long-term, and I certainly hope that my fears are unfounded. I do believe, however, that those (e.g., Jack Wheeler, a Rand-influenced writer) who advocated the nuking of Mecca after 9/11 didn't think through the possibility that such an action would ~radicalize~ the whole Muslim world in a violent way against the U.S. I'm glad that President Bush has been more prudent than that.

5. Tim is correct to note certain inconsistencies in Rand's views concerning Israel and Vietnam. And I've not denied that structural change can affect cultural change. But I wonder where Tim would draw the line. It seems to me that what he's suggesting has an inner logic to it, which would lead to the US socializing the costs of defending virtually every country across the globe so as to assure the triumph of democracy. I don't believe this is a legitimate US role, and I don't believe that the potential benefits outweigh the enormous risks.

I'd also be interested to hear more from Tim about what ~he~ believes is the relationship between cultural prerequisites and political success. Was Ayn Rand wrong about the relationship between culture and politics?

Cheers,
Chris

--
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/notablog.htm
---

Post 53

Thursday, June 5, 2003 - 11:55pm

Where do I draw the line? I actually think that the Bush Doctrine has it right: when it comes to dictatorships that are both sponsoring terrorists against the USA and our allies and developing weapons of mass destruction, then the appropriate goal of US foreign policy with regards to those regimes is to democratize them - peacefully, if possible, by force if necessary. I think that narrows down the list of countries to be subjected to regime change quite a bit, and I don't think military power will be required to change all the regimes which fit that profile. The borderline cases, in my opinion, are Iran and North Korea, and in both of those cases there are peaceful policies which can be pursued at the present time which have a reasonable prospect of success.

As for the relationship between cultural prerequisites and political success, I think an answer to that question has to start with an analysis of things like the great wave of democratization that has occurred during the 20th century, especially after the end of the Cold War. Many countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America that used to be dictatorships are now democracies. This transformation has taken place with largely the same "culture" that previously supported the dictatorships in those countries.

However, the big one to understand is really the Soviet Union, because of its global influence, both ideological and material. There certainly was cultural change that influenced the Soviet implosion, but there was also economic failure, military failure, etc. There was also the comparative success of the Soviet Union's rival superpower, the USA.

However, when you study the Soviet implosion, you will not find that it fit the Randian model of ideological "revolution from above," which starts with philosopher-kings with the right ideas in the top academic institutions in the country, then trickles down to the man in the street through the "New Intellectuals" who work for the established media to popularize the ideas of the philosopher-kings. What you will find, instead, is that dissidents, both in the Soviet Union and the USA, who were largely outside the establishment, managed to keep the ideas of freedom alive and managed to criticize the established institutions of their society. Those institutions then did the dissidents the favor of discrediting themselves when it came to fulfilling the promises on which they'd been based.

Post 54

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 3:41am

That's an interesting response, Tim.

I think the "Randian model of ideological 'revolution from above'" that you point to may need some revising to help us understand the varying processes by which ideas are filtered through a society. There are all sorts of permutations that might be involved here, but I think that the major change to consider is the formation of alternative or parallel institutions of culture for ideological dissemination, the most important of which has been the proliferation of electronic media, and other forms of global communications, which increase the speed of information and ideological "delivery." I also believe that more attention needs to be paid to "popular" culture, where certain individualist ideas may still hold sway, even as "high" cultural institutions abandon them. Rand herself noted this trend in her essay "Bootleg Romanticism," but I think more attention needs to be paid to the ~influence~ of pop culture on general ideological trends. Yes, pop culture often "apes" the dominant cultural ideas, but some pop cultural expressions are clearly "countercultural"---and these need to be analyzed in much greater detail. (Discussions of the impact of Rand's ideas on everything from music to comics will be published in forthcoming issues of THE JOURNAL OF AYN RAND STUDIES.)

As an extension of this, I think there are ~levels~ of ideology to consider. For example, cultural ideas about the nature of the individual, "man's metaphysical nature," gender roles, sexuality, and such, are much more tenacious and slow to evolve than, say, ~economic~ ideology. I suspect that what drove the transformations of which Tim speaks was a crisis in the culture of ~political economy~, fueled of course, by the collapse of state planning.

I think Rand-influenced thinkers need to do a lot more empirical work to better grasp the interrelationships among different levels of ideology. Even an enriched theory can't proceed along the lines of "one-size-fits-all." Rand's maxim to "keep context" is one that cannot and should not be ignored in any full-scale investigation of a given case.

Interestingly, there are some parallels to be drawn between Rand on the one hand and the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand. Gramsci argued that changes occur in societies all the time but that a fundamentally ~radical~ one could not happen until a massive change in the dominant culture---as filtered through all the institutions of civil society. On this basis, he claimed, a revolution from civil society would make a ~political~ revolution superfluous. But it is also interesting, I think, to examine the relationships between structural change (what I refer to as Level 3 in my essay) and cultural & personal change (Levels 2 and 1, respectively).

This is virtually uncharted territory in Objectivist theory. Much work to be done.

BTW, in a semi-related point about the current situation and the relative "success"---or not---of nation-building, we've been discussing Iraq quite a bit. And yes, the jury is still out on the Iraq case. But for a brief discussion of the problem of Afghanistan, see Arthur Silber's recent post:
http://coldfury.com/reason/comments.php?id=P662_0_1_0

Cheers,
Chris

---
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/notablog.htm
---

Post 55

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 6:05am

Re: “revolution from above”

I join both of you with respect to Tim’s statement: “…when you study the Soviet implosion, you will not find that it fit the Randian model of ideological "revolution from above," which starts with philosopher-kings with the right ideas in the top academic institutions in the country,…”

However, I suggest that Russia is considerably hobbled by its inability to understand exactly what it is in a semi-Capitalist country that is the source of our prosperity. I suggest a modification of the Objectivist approach that respects the importance of philosophy and its limits: philosophy provides the foundation for a full and secure establishment of rights over the long-term. To the extent that one has a clear idea of individual rights and its justification, one’s ability to secure the fruits of liberty is enhanced. But the establishment of liberty doesn’t have to be a linear path from full understanding to full implementation. I’d make that stronger: it can’t be such a path. It has to be a “spiral” process (dialectical, reciprocal causation, etc.).

Compare the American Revolution to the French Revolution to appreciate the power of philosophy and experience reinforcing each other. Let’s remember that we Americans enjoyed living the dream, to a significant extent, under the British; we had liberty and self-rule during a period of relative benign neglect. It wasn’t so much the initial limits to our liberty but, more importantly, it’s subsequent restriction, that inspired revolution. The French had a very different experience that lacked the Lockean tradition of rights (and I suggest empiricism); their revolution shows the failure of an over-reliance of top-down rationalist philosophy. Their path to liberty was more painful – but they eventually achieved a level of liberty similar to other countries in Western Europe.

For additional proof, add the experience of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Contrast that to Continental Europe. I don’t think we should ever want a “revolution from above”. I shutter to think of such a process – even lead by Objectivists/Libertarians. I agree with Chris, much work needs to be done in this area. The interplay of ideas and action are non-trivial and fascinating.

Post 56

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 12:50pm

Tim and Chris' rejection of the "Randian model of ideological 'revolution from above'" goes against the relevant facts of reality. The collapse of the Soviet Empire started in Central Europe, with attempted revolutions in Hungary and then in Czechoslovakia, and finally a successful revolution in Poland. The Soviet Union was just a (late) domino in this process. And when it fell, it simply collapsed, and (unlike Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which are now stable constitutional republics with liberal market economies) replaced communism with an unstable hybrid of empiricism, nihilism, fascism and Christian theocracy.

Poland's successful revolution followed the "Randian model of ideological 'revolution from above'" precisely and exactly. The suppression of Polish language and culture in the Russian and Prussian zones during the nineteenth century shifted the center of Poland's intellectual and cultural life to Krakow and Lwow (Lemberg) in the Austrian zone. Thus in Poland, as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which were also part of the same Austro-Hungarian empire, all academic scholarship in the humanities and social sciences was strongly influenced by classical Austrian liberalism. Although the Communist regimes in those countries promoted Marxists to top academic posts, all of Poland's top Marxist intellectuals were engaged in deep dialectic with classical liberalism.

Poland's most eminent Marxist economist was Oskar Lange, a childhood friend and lifelong scholarly interlocutor of Ludwig von Mises. Lange's work included formulation of empirical tests by which the facts of reality, as observed in the actual functioning of Marxist and liberal economies, could be used to confirm or disconfirm Misesian and Marxists models of economic calculation. Thanks to Lange, graduate students of economics in Polish universities were required to study Austrian as well as Marxist economics, and so eventually were intellectually prepared to move Poland in the direction of a market economy. Lange died in 1965. His work was continued by the eminent American Marxist economist Robert Heilbroner, who followed the facts of reality to the eventual conclusion that Mises was right.

Poland's most prominent Marxist philosopher was Leszek Kolakowski, the first Marxist to engage, with any seriousness, the idea of grounding social thought in metaphysics and ethics (before Kolakowski, Marxist social thought was grounded almost exclusively in in the study of history and political economy.) Kolakowski left Poland in 1968, but even _in abstentia_ guided intellectual activists in Poland until their eventual success. Exactly as in Rand's model, Kolakowski's ideas reached the masses through popular writers whom he influenced, especially the best-selling popular novelist Marek Hlasko and playwright Henryk Grynberg.

Poland's most influential Marxist sociologist was Zygmunt Baumann, who also eventually left Poland but remained extremely influential among politically active Polish inelligentsia. Baumann developed most of the current sociological theory of social solidarity as a dynamic of effective, self-interested collective resistance against oppressive institutions. The Solidarity movement, the actual political vanguard organization of the general strike that overthrew the Communist dictatorship, was named in direct reference to Bauman's sociological theory. Baumann also formulated an explicit model of the social dynamics of political change - a model nearly identical to the "Randian model of ideological 'revolution from above'." This idea led to the formation of KOR ["Komitet Obrony Robotnikow" - "Committee for the (Intellectual) Defense of the (Striking) Workers"], the academic organization responsible for Solidarity's ideological program, and for the practical application of Baumann's theory of social solidarity to create overwhelming popular support for Solidarity.

In short, the actual facts of reality, of how Communism was first overthrown in Poland and of its replacement by liberal market societies in Central Europe, provide exact, verbatim confirmation of Rand's model of intellectual -> cultural -> political change.

Post 57

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 2:12pm

Thanks to both Rick and Adam for their contributions here.

Let me clarify something, however. I agree with Adam and, actually, he's made an excellent contribution to our understanding of the changes that were, indeed, going on in the area of "economic ideology." But note what I said above:

==
As an extension of this, I think there are ~levels~ of ideology to consider. For example, cultural ideas about the nature of the individual, "man's metaphysical nature," gender roles, sexuality, and such, are much more tenacious and slow to evolve than, say, ~economic~ ideology. I suspect that what drove the transformations of which Tim speaks was a crisis in the culture of ~political economy~, fueled of course, by the collapse of state planning.
===

I believe, therefore, that I'm in complete agreement with Adam with regard to the ~changes~ in "the culture of ~political economy~." He is correct about the changes going on in the Eastern bloc prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He is correct about the intellectual revolution that was sweeping away communism. And it was an intellectual revolution that was fueled by the ~failure~ of communism to deliver a functionally efficient economy.

But... please note what I said above: I think that there are different ~levels~ of ideology at work. The ideological revolution that Adam emphasizes is one that centers on economic and political ideas. To the extent that the intellectual revolution does ~not~ embrace those other levels that I mentioned, it is and remains incomplete. And, given what Rick has said about the incomplete changes in Russian society, this may also help to explain why the collapse of communism has not resulted in the embrace of capitalism. It will take a significant alteration of broader social conceptions of the individual, individual responsibility, private property, and accountability, and an alteration of social practices that express and perpetuate culturally-accepted altruist moral codes.

Let me make a suggestion... and stick with me here, because this will be hard to convey without posting a second image. Recall my tri-level model:

http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/images/model.gif

We can use this model to illustrate my points about social change. Let's call the original model: Model A. Model A (image above) refers to the dimensions upon which oppressive social relations depend. These are reciprocally reinforcing dimensions, which means that a full and complete revolution must ~overturn~ those oppressive social relations on every level: The personal (level 1), which entails ethics, psychology, psycho-epistemology; the cultural (level 2), which entails ideology, pedagogy, aesthetics, language, etc; and the structural (level 3), which entails political and economic institutions.

Now let us envision a similar model. Let's call it Model B. It has the same structured interrelationships and dynamics as Model A (so keep that image in mind). But Model B is ~strictly~ about ideology. In Model B, Level 1 refers to ~ideas~ about psychology, psycho-epistemology, and ethics; Level 2 refers to ~ideas~ about aesthetics, language, culture; Level 3 refers to ~ideas~ about politics and economics.

Thus, if we reconceptualize the original tri-level model (Model A) as a model of different levels of ideology (Model B), I would suggest that the intellectual changes which Adam emphasizes are changes in Level 3 ideology. This ~can~ and ~will~ have a profound effect on the social relations of Model A, especially Level 3 social relations (in political and economic institutions). But unless there is a corresponding shift in the ideological dimensions of Levels 1 and 2 in Model B, the revolution in social relations (Model A) will remain incomplete. Society will change, but it will still have unresolved "internal contradictions."

And in a sense, this is what Rand argued about the American Revolution. That revolution was fueled by an Enlightenment culture (level 2) and a libertarian politics & economics (level 3). But it took place without the requisite egoist moral code (level 1). Rand argued that "America's inner contradiction was the altruist-collectivist ethics," which ate at its roots slowly over time (Man's Rights).

Ultimately, then, the Randian revolution is one that must encompass all levels of Model A and all levels of Model B. (There's ~another~ model at work too; for that I refer readers to page 357 of AYN RAND: THE RUSSIAN RADICAL, which involves a more detailed discussion of "articulated" and "tacit" dimensions in social change.)

Clearly, however, social change has to start ~somewhere~, and the fact that there has been change on Level 3 (political and economic ideology) in Model B, and that this change fuels and is fueled by corresponding changes in Level 3 social relations (Model A) is something that should be celebrated.

Jesus... this verges on what Linz would call "Polish"... but I'm trying to provide a graphical model and explanation of something that has not been fully explored in Objectivist circles.

To make a long story short: The revolution is far from complete.

Cheers,
Chris

Post 58

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 2:13pm

I only wish I had time to address all the interesting points that have been raised. I hope to get to most of them in due course.

For the moment, there is a provocative question I would like to see discussed.

Suppose a country like Iran becomes "democratized." Then, as a democracy, it continues to support terrorism, keeps its germs and gases, and keeps working toward nukes. What then?

Post 59

Friday, June 6, 2003 - 11:04pm