...though of course they are not actually immortal in the strict sense (For those who've not seen the show, the Immortals can in fact be killed, but only by another Immortal!).

To Mr. Stolyarov: What I meant was that life is a process of self-generated and self-sustaining action—its inherent goal and that of any of its sub-processes is to perpetuate the entire process (as you doubtless know). Anything that threatens to interfere with the “machinery” is attacked and dealt with by the process. Thus, in the case of germs, antibodies are produced; in the case of dictatorships, philosophical ideas are produced. It is a metaphysical given, therefore, that death is always a possibility—that living beings are mortal. It is this fact that gives rise to the whole phenomenon of values.

It is in this sense, the metaphysical sense, that immortality would be incompatible with the pursuit of values. This is the concept of immortality that I was saying is a fantasy. No technological breakthrough can change such a fact.

Even if science were able to stave off all foreseeable causes of death, what about the unforeseeable ones? New diseases? A meteorite? Irrationality and evasion? Low self-esteem? Honest error? Forgetting to look both ways when crossing the street because one got distracted at exactly the wrong moment?

So, if you think about it, immortality is impossible in every sense. Mortality is a metaphysical fact, values spring from the situation, and there is no justification for projecting alternative worlds.

Greetings.

A lot of comments have been made, and I intend to respond to all of them. This has been quite an interesting—and atypical—discussion thus far, both of which are extremely desirable in my estimation.

Mr. Lamont: As much as I am loath to detract from the spirit of this article and engage in this rationalistic, sci-fi fantasy, what we are talking about here is an indestructible human. Not merely a human with a long (or even infinite) lifespan. The nature of life is the basis for the entirety of the Objectivist morality. If you radically change the nature of life, it follows that you radically change the required morality.

Mr. Stolyarov: Whatever you may think, I will contend that this discussion is crucial to this article, since this article hinges on defeating itself by claiming to “affirm life,” yet loath the unhindered, dynamically perfect manifestation of life, toward which man and technology should strive.

I contend that any peril can be technologically remedied eventually. This means that, sometime in the future, given the requisite economic and political freedoms, man will develop solutions to every known problem plaguing our time. This means that every disease and potential cause of accident known to us today will someday be cured. If new diseases or causes of accident should arise, they will someday be cured as well. Then I ask: is there an infinite possibility of diseases or causes of accident? If the nature of existence does not permit simultaneous infinities, I do not see how this is the case. (This topic will deserve a more extensive discussion of infinities, which ones can exist and which ones cannot, and the mistakes that can be made concerning them.)  If my premise is granted, there is only a finite amount of perils that can ever afflict man. Given that man’s conscious faculty is capable of perceiving and interacting with all of reality, there is no reason why it inherently cannot someday devise cures to the entirety of possible perils.

Thus, it is possible that man may someday be indestructible, literally, as a result of employing his own reason. The individuals that devise cures to these perils may make permanent contracts with customers like George, whose invincibility will thus be guaranteed him, without him having to do anything but allow advertisements to be played in his head for a few hours.

How does this alter the nature of morality if reason was required to devise all these protections? Please note that it is impossible to consistently embrace a state of being while rejecting those attributes that brought it about. It is, for example, impossible to reject capitalism while embracing economic prosperity, or to reject individual liberty while embracing moral actions. Once you take away the prerequisites, the consequences collapse like a skyscraper without a frame or foundation. This was the mistake made by the socialists (who sought to redistribute wealth that free commerce created) and by “progressive” moralists (who sought to impose certain moral actions on people while abolishing the chosen nature of such actions, which renders them moral).

Thus, the indestructible man will find it impossible to consistently reject reason or the Objectivist morality!

Mr. Lamont: Linz also mentioned that this hypothetical creature is denied the barometers of pleasure and pain. (So if “George” feels pleasure, he’s somewhat of a strawman as a challenge to Linz’s argument.)

Mr. Stolyarov: Now, why would George be a strawman, if he is closer to a human being than this imagined creature you put forth, yet he possesses the very qualities that Mr. Perigo condemns (i.e. immortality, which is as far as Mr. Perigo goes to describe it)? George is human, looks human, experiences the human mode of thinking, and is capable of feeling anything that a human today would feel, except that he can technologically condition himself to feel in a manner appropriate to his objective well-being. (That is, were George to try a drug, he would feel pain, instead of pleasure. However, George is a rational man who loves his life, and would never take drugs or anything else that would hinder his objective well-being.)

Mr. Lamont: What am I saying? It doesn’t need to “live” anywhere!

Mr. Stolyarov: Mr. Lamont, tell me, how would having a Leonardo painting on the wall of your house protect you against death? It would not. But it is a value, nevertheless. If George were immune from death or harm, he would still have no reason to view Leonardo’s art as being of less value to him than had he been mortal. And, in order to display Leonardo’s art, he would need a building to put in it! The same goes for any other esthetic element of his existence.

I ask you this, closer to the present age: why do some people wear collared shirts? It seems that an ordinary T-shirt protects one from the elements just as well. Wearing T-shirts and wearing collared shirts has the same effect on one’s survival, which, in temperate climates, is almost nil. It is not an arbitrary decision, I will add. If anyone forced me to wear a T-shirt when I am not exercising, I would consider that person a tyrant. I can explain this fenomenon: all things esthetic are a representation of an individual’s character. I enjoy the firmness and geometric intricacy of collared shirts, and would pay the extra money to buy them, just as I would pay the extra money to purchase my vast classical music library, or invest the hours needed to create Mr. Stolyarov’s Gallery of Rational Art, though, if the world had nothing but Pollock blobs in it, I would not be fysically harmed by such a fact.  I value these things, and expend some of my present resources to obtain them. Yet, they are just about fysically neutral.

Yes, there is no mind-body dichotomy in the sense that the values of the spirit should not counteract those of the body. (Also, these values have fysical manifestations!) But, having values of the spirit does not make one’s body a bit healthier. Why does one pursue them, then? Because there is more to life than merely escaping death! And if that escape from death were guaranteed, the more part would be emfasized in an individual’s value pursuits. This changes nothing about his fundamental morality!

As for having top hats and canes, there may be a symbolic dimension to this as well, demonstrating one’s essential agreement with and appreciation of the great 19^th century industrialists and gentlemen who sported such attire. George, an immortal man, realizes that, without those industrialists, his immortality would not be possible. Thus, he honors their legacy symbolically, just as we honor capitalism through the symbol of the dollar, or the United States through its flag.

What I have written here covers a lot of the later comments as well.

Mr. Firehammer: 1. if one could experience no pain or pleasure at all, there would be no essential difference between eating garbage and eating a steak, between cutting off one's arm or lifting weights.

Mr. Stolyarov: Ah, but you still make that same mistake! You attribute intrinsic value to sensations rather than states of being! I claim that running for fourteen miles is objectively good, no matter how it makes you feel, while taking drugs is objectively bad, no matter how it makes you feel. If so, then feelings in themselves cannot be legitimate objects of value, but rather states of being. I feel nothing when I finish a book or a worthwhile article, yet intellectually I experience immense pride and contentment. No external stimulus has altered the balance of chemicals in my brain, but, rather, my volitional faculty itself, tells me, “You have done a good job.” That is reward in itself. If it is accompanied by feelings of pleasure, this is absolutely fine. But those feelings should not be pursued for their own sake!

Eating garbage is objectively bad, so is cutting off one’s arm. Even if I were to be immune from pain while doing these things, I would still not do them. What these perils do to my organism does not equal my response to them. My feeling of pain does not cause what they do. My pain is not in itself what they do. Rather, it is consequent upon what they do. It is an active response of my organism, i.e., my agency. If my agency were absent, the nature of the perils would remain, they would still exist and would still inflict harms of an identical magnitude. What technology could accomplish is condition the responses to properly meet the perils. Then, the pleasure-pain barometer could indeed become a useful indicator of states of being, and a good tool, but nothing more.

Mr. Firehammer: 2. if one did experience pain and pleasure, if those experiences were not connected to what is true, if one felt pleasure for what is bad and pain for what is good, pleasure and pain would be disconnected from reality and have no value whatsoever….

Mr. Stolyarov: True. This is why the pleasure-pain barometer in the status quo must be treated with great scrutiny, skepticism, and caution. It cannot be unconditionally embraced or elevated to the level of a filosofical truth, in the manner most modern Objectivists do.

The next part of your statement, I disagree with, however.

Mr. Firehammer: …which for someone who could not die, for whom nothing is at stake, is exactly the kind of meaningless pain and pleasure they would experience.