RoR: Forum

[Duplicate deleted]

(Edited by Peter Cresswell on 10/03, 2:36pm)

Post 21

Sunday, October 3, 2004 - 2:05pm

Mr Seddon,

You say I still haven't answered your question? But you still haven't answered the article to which this thread is appended!

Frankly, given your magpie-like tendency to be distracted by bright but irrelevant baubles, I've become reluctant to offer further opportunity for departure from the trail we've been trying to follow.

[And 'Miller on Kant' still doesn't cut it, I'm afraid (perhaps only three people here have read both the Walsh and Miller papers, and I'm not amongst them) - we've been asking for Seddon on Kant.]

Mr Cresswell

Post 22

Sunday, October 3, 2004 - 10:49pm

I'm afraid I can't let another example of Mr Seddon's gibberish go unremarked.

"Of course, you can't know things in themselves," he says, "but you can know things in themselves as they appear." Sheesh. Even Kant's contemporaries thought this was gibberish.One (whose name I can't recall) commented that without the idea of the thing in itself Kant didn't have a system, whereas with it he still didn't have one.

Appearances, according to Kant, are supposed to be effected (somehow) by a things-in-themselves. But Kant's theory tells us that the realm of things-in-themselves and the way they affect us is utterly unknown,

So then, to paraphrase a popular Irish joke, with the thing-in-itself: There you are! But with the thing-in-itself: Where are you?

Post 23

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:18pm

Mr. Cresswell,

"perhaps only three people here have read both the Walsh and Miller papers, and I'm not amongst them"

That explains a lot. This whole debate is about the "obstacle" argument--recall my "Hicks on Kant" article. It is you who keeps pounding on the idea that Kant said we can't know reality and the Hicks, Kelley, Walsh, Miller, Seddon conversation approaches that ideas from the point of view of Rand's main argument from the FNI.

"we've been asking for Seddon on Kant."

I've given you that and references to additional material but you either won't read the material or prefer to ignore what I have written. We couldn't even get satisfaction on the one leg version. I tried to keep it simple, just for you.

So let try on Kant's metaphysics once more. Kant is a realist. Four words. Let see what you do with that.

Dr. Seddon

Post 24

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:36pm

Mr. Cresswell,

"But Kant's theory tells us that the realm of things-in-themselves and the way they affect us is UTTERLY unknown,"

Wrong again. Let me go slowly. Things in themselves cannot be known theoretically, but, and the "but" is big if you going to understand Kant, (1) we can theoretically think them and (2) we can practically know them. You have to be able to hold these three things in your mind if you want to have any hope of understanding Kant.

"One (whose name I can't recall) commented that without the idea of the thing in itself Kant didn't have a system, whereas with it he still didn't have one."

His name is Jacobi and Windleband reports what he said as follows, "without the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian system, and with the same could not remain in it." (Jacobi, W., II, 304) quoted in Windleband's A History of Philosophy, vol. II, p. 573. I certainly agree that Kant is a realist, just like Rand, and not an Idealist like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, among others. Do you agree?

Dr. Seddon

Post 25

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 12:39pm

Mr. Cresswell,

"And 'Miller on Kant' still doesn't cut it, I'm afraid"

Instead of being "afraid" why don't you tell us where my argument fails.

Dr. Seddon

Post 26

Tuesday, October 5, 2004 - 3:57pm

Batter up:

Mr Seddon began replying to this article by saying he had been pitched a soft ball on the first pitch, but as Tibor pointed out he then proceeded to foul his hit into the crowd. Apparently the pitch wasn't so soft - or maybe he just didn't get to the meat of the ball. :-) He then walked away from the plate and started a new game next door. I wonder why?

Anyway, here we are on Post 25 of a thread for an article replying to Mr Seddon, and Mr Seddon STILL HAS YET TO REPLY TO THAT ARTICLE. He's happier instead having a food fight over at the stadium next door. If he was playing rugby, I'd call it a side-step - a huge one. Why not respond to the article itself, Mr Seddon? That's the game we started.

Well, as he won't play inside the stadium, I'll have to go next door and play with him.

*************************************************************************************
PC: "perhaps only three people here have read both the Walsh and Miller papers, and I'm not amongst them"

FS: "That explains a lot."

Well, yes it does. Philosophy is not my job, and as you already know I'm not one of the scholars who participated in these sessions, and AFAIK the sessions were not published to the net. I prefer to defend only to that which I know, and as I'm not familar with Miller's paper I'm happy to leave that to someone who is.

Having said that, I wonder just how many are familiar with Miller's paper? I notice for example that you didn't have a copy of Miller's paper either until Irfan kindly sent you one recently - apparently these papers aren't easily available. Odd isn't it that you chose to respond to a terminally obscure paper that you knew very few can access instead of the article right here on SOLO to which this thread is appended. Odd indeed. Disingenuous even.

Even given that, your response to Miller is wanting: for example, to respond to an apparently intelligent argument by counting the number of times a particular word appears in a text (which task occupies a large part of your article) really does suggest an utter inability to handle abstract thought.

****************************************************************************************
PC: "we've been asking for Seddon on Kant."

FS: "I've given you that and references to additional material but you either won't read the material or prefer to ignore what I have written."

Well, no you haven't given us that at all. We've had Seddon on Miller on Kant, Seddon on Hicks on Kant, Seddon on Cresswell on Kant, Seddon on Younkins on Kant, Seddon on Machan on Kant, Seddon on Walsh on Kant ... but we've never seen just Seddon on Kant. Am I making my point? Not that I would now expect much from such an exposition but as my article said, you haven’t so far presented your own interpretation of Kant as a new one or in any way unique to you, in which case we’re entitled to rely on the standard interpretations of Kant - which all these commentators have, and to which you've objected. What you have said is that Objectivists to a man have got Kant wrong (except that is, for you, and the late George Walsh), and that Immanuel Kant in all his guises was in fact a ‘proto-Objectivist.’ But your evidence for this claim is still exactly zero.

As I said in my article which you haven't read, my problem is this: The interpretation of Kant given by Objectivists does not differ markedly from the interpretation given by other mainstream commentators; what differs is that Objectivists evaluate Kant’s work rather differently.

Objectivist commentators from Rand to Peikoff to Kelley to Mossof all share a similar view to that of most mainstream commentators of what Kant was saying . But not you, it seems, since you say all these Objectivists have got him wrong, even though their interpretation of what Kant says is the same as is the mainstream interpretation.

So in an attempt to elucidate whether or not you do disagree with the standard view of Kant (as you apparently do) I appended a summary of that mainstream view in the earlier article, to which you did respond and object, though in truly evasive fashion which left us no further ahead. In this most recent reply to which you haven't yet properly replied I try once again to find out whether your view of Kant is indeed a unique one or if you're just a blowhard. Since you have chosen not to respond to it I can only conclude it's the latter. I can understand trying to tease out the views of a thinker who is dead, but I find it distinctly odd having to do so with someone still living, and with whom one is having vigorous discussion.

FS: "We couldn't even get satisfaction on the one leg version. I tried to keep it simple, just for you. So let try on Kant's metaphysics once more. Kant is a realist. Four words. Let see what you do with that."

Asked and answered. I said that it is utterly disingenuous to describe as a realist someone who says we can't know that 'realm.' But perhaps you call him a realist because you've counted up the number of times he uses the word and you've found that it's quite a lot? Perhaps you have, since that's the methodology you've used in your 'Miller on Kant.'

****************************************************************************************
PC: "But Kant's theory tells us that the realm of things-in-themselves and the way they affect us is UTTERLY unknown,"

FS: "Wrong again. Let me go slowly. Things in themselves cannot be known theoretically, but, and the "but" is big if you going to understand Kant, (1) we can theoretically think them and (2) we can practically know them. You have to be able to hold these three things in your mind if you want to have any hope of understanding Kant. "

Asked and answered already. As I say in the article you don't wish to respond to: In other words, Kant says we can somehow have ‘practical knowledge’ of something, without having actual knowledge of it. This stuff of which we have ‘practical knowledge’ serves us as a sort of useful fiction, allowing us to posture and pontificate about things we really know nothing about. Like for example, models showing global warming, which give us ‘practical knowledge’ of the situation (without ever purporting to give real knowledge) and which incidentally help politicians throttle industry. This is called giving our concepts a ‘heuristic function’ – which means making of reason a floating abstraction of no use in obtaining knowledge of reality as she really is, but useful nonetheless as a guide to acting when we know nothing much. Which is just more nonsense. Subtle nonsense.

Now your view of this nonsense at least is unique to you: that if we know reality only as some sort of useful fiction we are somehow close to the Objectivist position. That view is apparently unique to you, but it's really not something to boast about.

***********************************************************************************

PC: "One (whose name I can't recall) commented that without the idea of the thing in itself Kant didn't have a system, whereas with it he still didn't have one."

FS: "His name is Jacobi and Windleband [sic] reports what he said as follows, "without the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian system, and with the same could not remain in it." (Jacobi, W., II, 304) quoted in Windleband's [sic]A History of Philosophy, vol. II, p. 573. I certainly agree that Kant is a realist, just like Rand, and not an Idealist like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, among others. Do you agree?"

Well, no I don't, for the reasons I've already stated. It is utterly disingenuous to describe as a realist someone who says we can't know that 'realm.' You're attempting to steal the Objectivist concept of realism on behalf of Kant in order to seduce slow readers. But no-one is that slow. I might easily have tried that same tack myself by calling Kant (with more accuracy, and knowing the reaction that would draw from Objectivists) a 'mongrel combination of empiricist and transcendental idealist', but I wouldn't do that. Too disingenuous. :-)

Now, I find it illuminating as to your own methodology that you choose to quote Windelband to support your claim for Kant as a realist, since as you no doubt know you are once again being disingenuous. Despite his many qualities as a commentator we must always remember that Windelband himself is an idealist - what he means by 'realism' therefore is not what we Objectivists mean (as you no doubt know). What Jacobi was pointing out (successfully) was that Kant's 'things-in-themselves' render his transcendental idealism contradictory, and what he said himself was:

I must admit that I have been much distracted by Kantian philosophy … for I have been puzzling continually over the fact that without the presupposition (of the ‘thing-in- itself’ affecting our perception) I was unable to enter into (Kant’s) system, but with it, I was unable to stay in it. (Jacobi, 1787: 223)

As more than one commentator has said, Jacobi's point is that, in presupposing the allegedly unknown ‘thing in itself’ yet by assigning to it the many functions that it played in his system, Kant is in fact demonstrating knowledge of it, thereby contradicting his own assumption of critical ignorance. Kant himself would probably say (and no doubt did say) that this would be an example of how the 'heuristic function' or 'useful fiction' of things-in-themselves can be used, but most not seduced by Kant's own disingenuousness would conclude that he hasn't made his case, and that his view of the status of reality is at best indeterminate. Identifying things in themselves as a useful fiction is hardly a ringing endorsement that existence exists, now is it?

Many commentators since have tried to defend Kant by putting a gloss on Jacobi's criticism, but none (apart from you) have tried so hard to make Kant appear as as an Objectivist therefrom. Most have just concluded that the status of Kant's 'things-in'themselves' is unavoidably interminate. In any case, I think it should be obvious now to anyone still reading why you chose the Windelband quote instead of quoting Jacobi directly, and why I would not call Kant a realist.

As I say in the article you haven't read ... oh, sheesh, why don't you just read the damn thing and respond honestly?

Post 27

Thursday, October 7, 2004 - 11:57am

Mr. Cresswell,

“your response to Miller is wanting: for example, to respond to an apparently intelligent argument by counting the number of times a particular word appears in a text (which task occupies a large part of your article) really does suggest an utter inability to handle abstract thought.”

That’s because it wasn’t my response. I was responding to his argument about Rand accusing Kant of equivocation. So, reread and look for the word “equivocation.” The counting of the number of times “delusion’ occurred was merely to establish, for those without the essay, how important that concept was to Rand and Miller. Got it now. Maybe in the future I should put little happy faces to indicate the that an argument is coming.

“Well, no you haven't given us that at all. We've had Seddon on Miller on Kant, Seddon on Hicks on Kant, Seddon on Cresswell on Kant, Seddon on Younkins on Kant, Seddon on Machan on Kant, Seddon on Walsh on Kant ... but we've never seen just Seddon on Kant. Am I making my point?”

Doubly wrong. I have given you Seddon on Kant and in the manner you requested—simple, very simple, while standing on one foot. So don’t be so disingenuous. But why “doubly?” How do you think I can write on all of those thinkers without giving my position on Kant? And I don’t just mean implicitly. For example, in the Younkins post I give my take on Kant’s position on consciousness, deontology, reason vs. emotion, and self-interest.

“What you have said is that Objectivists to a man have got Kant wrong (except that is, for you, and the late George Walsh), and that Immanuel Kant in all his guises was in fact a ‘proto-Objectivist.’”

Wrong again. (I see a pattern emerging here.) Miller and Smith also got Kant right. Miller when he states that Rand’s argument from pp. 32 and 33 of FNI is not to be found in Kant explicitly, as Rand would have us believe. Smith when she tells us that for Kant morality is grounded in reason, not emotion or feeling as Rand would have us believe.

“As I said in my article which you haven't read” and “As I say in the article you haven't read ... oh, sheesh, why don't you just read the damn thing and respond honestly?”

Doubly wrong again. I have touched on most of what your article contained in my previous posts and articles. Why “doubly?” I also explicitly examined your paragraph one and restored the context which you dropped. By restoring the context—hell, I’ve already said all of this. Read my post.

“FS: "We couldn't even get satisfaction on the one leg version. I tried to keep it simple, just for you. So let try on Kant's metaphysics once more. Kant is a realist. Four words. Let see what you do with that." Asked and answered. I said that it is utterly disingenuous to describe as a realist someone who says we can't know that 'realm.'”

Note your mistake. I’m talking about metaphysics, (Kant is a realist) and you jump to epistemology (we can’t know that ‘realm’) A realist, in Rand’s sense, is someone whose metaphysics contains a concept of that which is extramental and independent of consciousness. It is a completely different question to ask if we can know this reality or not, and if not, do we have any cognitive access to it at all--Kant answers YES. Now in this metaphysical sense, a different position is idealism, Kant and Rand are on the same page. But again, I’ve already said all of this.

“Asked and answered already.”

Me to you too. I think we have both shot our wads. Maybe we could discuss Plato?! Tee hee.

“FS: "Wrong again. Let me go slowly. Things in themselves cannot be known theoretically, but, and the "but" is big if you going to understand Kant, (1) we can theoretically think them and (2) we can practically know them. You have to be able to hold these three things in your mind if you want to have any hope of understanding Kant. "
…In other words, Kant says we can somehow have ‘practical knowledge’ of something, without having actual knowledge of it.”

Not only do you switch my context, you, disingenuously italicize the switch. You are a disingenuous bugger, aren’t you? I didn’t say, nor does Kant, that we can have “‘practical knowledge’ of something, without having actual knowledge of it.”” I didn’t use the word “actual.” Kant uses “actual” and “actuality” in a categorical sense related to but different from the Aristotelian concept of “energeia.”
Maybe one of Kant’s own examples might help. A doctor may practically know that, after a quick examination, that you have consumption, but he doesn’t theoretically know it. (See A824-B852. You do have CPR don’t you?)

“This is called giving our concepts a ‘heuristic function’ – which means making of reason a floating abstraction of no use in obtaining knowledge of reality as she really is, but useful nonetheless as a guide to acting when we know nothing much. Which is just more nonsense. Subtle nonsense.”

Maybe for you it is too subtle.

“Now your view of this nonsense at least is unique to you: that if we know reality only as some sort of useful fiction we are somehow close to the Objectivist position.”

Kant himself uses the word “heuristic” so if the commentators miss that, which by the way they don’t, then they get Kant wrong. But all the commentators I know of get Kant right about the use of the regulative ideas.

“But no-one is that slow.”

Look in the mirror.

“I might easily have tried that same tack myself by calling Kant (with more accuracy, and knowing the reaction that would draw from Objectivists) a 'mongrel combination of empiricist and transcendental idealist', but I wouldn't do that. Too disingenuous.”

But on the contrary, it would have been right on the money.

“Now, I find it illuminating as to your own methodology that you choose to quote Windelband to support your claim for Kant as a realist, since as you no doubt know you are once again being disingenuous. Despite his many qualities as a commentator we must always remember that Windelband himself is an idealist - what he means by 'realism' therefore is not what we Objectivists mean (as you no doubt know)”.

They say that no good deed goes unpunished. I used Windelband because I don’t have the Jacobi book in my library. I looked the name of the author of the quotation up for you, remember you couldn’t recall his name—and this is the way you repay me. Ah, dear Brutus.

“Now, I find it illuminating as to your own methodology that you choose to quote Windelband to support your claim for Kant as a realist”

It can’t be illuminating as to my methodology since I was not, repeat, not quoting Windelband to support my claim that Kant is a realist. That was just an add on. I was quoting Windelband to give you Jacobi’s name. And this is the way you repay me. Ah, dear Brutus. Keep this up and you’ll have to do your own research.

Well, that’s it for now. Have fun kiddo.

Dr. Seddon

Post 28

Thursday, October 7, 2004 - 1:05pm

Dr Seddon,

"This is why [you] get the big bread" I believe you said earlier? Your response to this whole debate has been both patronising and pitiful. Frankly, I'd expected a lot more, which was why I started it.

Let me summarise:

-We have not seen Seddon on Kant (not without having to tease out your view for ourselves from all your posts and articles, which should be your job not mine) and we still haven't seen you properly explain the difference between mainstream commentators and yourself.

-You have not touched on most of what my article contained in your previous posts at all, and 'restoring the context' of one quote simply served to muddy the waters - which no doubt was your intention - and which point has been answered - and to avoid you answering my responses in the article. Only you know why you've chosen not to respond properly; I can only guess.

-Your one-leg version of insisting Kant is a 'realist' is only true if as you say the only two alternatives allowed are realist or idealist. But they aren't, and as you admit yourself, calling him a 'mongrel combination of empiricist and transcendental idealist' is 'right on the money.' So let's just call him that and be done with it.

So apparently that's it. I hope someone reading this got something out of it. At least Kant didn't.

(Edited by Peter Cresswell on 10/07, 1:35pm)

Post 29

Saturday, October 9, 2004 - 5:59pm

Peter,

"Your one-leg version of insisting Kant is a 'realist' is only true if as you say the only two alternatives allowed are realist or idealist. But they aren't, and as you admit yourself, calling him a 'mongrel combination of empiricist and transcendental idealist' is 'right on the money.' So let's just call him that and be done with it."

I would urge caution here. Surely if one defines realist and idealist such that they are compliments, then they are the only alternatives. That, of course, doesn't mean that one cannot then further determine a particular type of, say, idealist. Descartes and Berkeley are idealists, but the former was a "problematic idealist" while the latter was a "dogmatic idealist."

Fred

Post 30

Sunday, October 10, 2004 - 1:54am

Fred: “A realist, in Rand’s sense, is someone whose metaphysics contains a concept of that which is extramental and independent of consciousness. It is a completely different question to ask if we can know this reality or not, and if not, do we have any cognitive access to it at all--Kant answers YES.”

This is a very useful and crucial distinction. Metaphysical realism, or the “common-sense” theory of reality, holds that there is a reality “out there” that exists independently of human consciousness. On that score, Kant qualifies as a type of realist.

But realism in metaphysics does not compel one to accept that we can know reality directly. The latter does not necessarily follow from the former, and Kant is not this sort of “hard” realist. Against this view that our knowledge in some sense “mirrors” reality, Kant claims that our minds assemble a representation of reality, what one might call a “perspective” that is particular to the human species.

Nowadays, all this is rather commonplace and not at all sinister. As to the Objectivist claim that we can know reality directly, one could well ask why this reality needs to be "integrated" into concepts in order for us to make sense of it. This suggests that reality -- as it is “in itself”-- is in some sense "disintegrated".

A theory in which reality is directly apprehended requires that the stuff of reality be more or less immediately available to the mind. But in her theory, Rand interposes a fair amount of mind stuff – “percepts”, “measurements”, “units”, “definitions” – between reality and the concept. In that case, Rand can also be charged with “severing knowledge from reality”.

Brendan

Post 31

Sunday, October 10, 2004 - 9:33am

Brendan, you and I (along with Daniel) have had this discussion before. In our 3-party talks on the subject, I answered the criticisms from both you and Daniel. Here is an example from:

http://www.solohq.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0170_1.shtml#35

--------------

Brendan:
Ayn Rand of course faces the very same problem: how to convert sense-data into the units that form the basis of concepts. Her solution is via measurement omission, and that highlights two similar problems: first, is measurement omission a perceptual, automatic, and therefore “passive” process, or does it involve an activity of the mind?; secondly, if the process is merely passive, this implies the real existence of universals, since measurement omission must be the omission of something external, since the mind is making no contribution of its own.

On the other hand, if measurement omission is an active process of the mind, then it seems that the mind is involved in some very important aspects of perception, and is perhaps not as tabula rasa as Rand seems to think.
--------------

Ed:
" ... I thought I outlined the difference between mode of cognition and content of cognition (blank slates have to do with content, not mode). Besides, the slate's only blank until the first percept! We're born with the human capacity (unrealized at first) for the human mode of conceptual awareness - which is best denoted as intentional conceptualism ... (omissions are active mental regard - actions of a consciousness)."
--------------

Brendan, let me repeat answers to criticisms from you and Daniel (for finality):

Measurement omission is an active process of the mind, though this has nothing to do with sensory perception (to which you allude above).

The blank slate is a question of being born with content in our mind. The content of thought is blank (100% potentiality; 0% actuality). The mode of thought required for human understanding is not 100% potentiality; 0% actuality (it cannot BECOME just anything - ie. it has identity).

This is why all wise folks are led to the same definition of human (rational animal), regardless of their initial implicit concepts in infancy (large things that feed me when I cry; warm, moving things I feel comfortable around; etc). We are all led to the same concept because we have the exact same mode - not because we had the exact same perceptual experience.

I can't believe that you cannot fathom this yet (I've been patient and helpful).

Ed

Post 32

Sunday, October 10, 2004 - 4:58pm

Brendan and Fred, please view my comments - which have been interjected into Brendan's synopsis - for the type of clarity that allows for a superb understanding of our difference, and of the difference it makes.

----------------
Fred: “A realist, in Rand’s sense, is someone whose metaphysics contains a concept of that which is extramental and independent of consciousness. It is a completely different question to ask if we can know this reality or not ...
----------------

Fred, it is not a "completely different question." If your metaphysics "contains a concept" of extramentality, then there is only one correct way for it to get in there (knowledge of that extramental reality). The only other - ie. the incorrect - way to put things into a metaphysics is by arbitrary fiat (Ontological Idealism).

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But realism in metaphysics does not compel one to accept that we can know reality directly. The latter does not necessarily follow from the former ...
----------------

Brendan, metaphysical realism does compel one to accept that we can know reality directly, it just doesn't do this when you abstract logic from experience (and logically manipulate floating abstractions such as "realism" and "reality" - trying to get one to logically flow from the other).

You have to think about how you even came to have mental regard for metaphysical realism in the first place. All knowledge begins in discovery. There was a discovery that allowed you to have mental regard for this subject. You can't get to that discovery in reality - you know the one, the discovery that led you to accept metaphysical realism - without direct knowledge of reality. Your I'm-not-sure-I-really-know-reality-but-I'm-sure-of-metaphysical-realism doesn't get off the ground. You either have knowledge of an extramental reality or you don't, which is it, Brendan? For us to correctly adopt metaphysical realism (by reason, not faith) we had to make real discoveries (ie. we had to know reality).

----------------
, and Kant is not this sort of “hard” realist. Against this view that our knowledge in some sense “mirrors” reality, Kant claims that our minds assemble a representation of reality, what one might call a “perspective” that is particular to the human species.
----------------

Brendan, there's no mirror or representation. You can't know if something is a good representation of something else unless you have a direct acquaintance with that "something else" which is being represented. All talk of representations which also happens to deny direct acquaintance, is contradictory and therefore, wrong-headed.

----------------
As to the Objectivist claim that we can know reality directly, one could well ask why this reality needs to be "integrated" into concepts in order for us to make sense of it.
----------------

Because we are rational distinction-makers with finite mental resources. We can't treat the millions of particulars (which we directly perceive, by the way) as non-integrated particulars - like the animals do.

----------------
This suggests that reality -- as it is “in itself”-- is in some sense "disintegrated".
----------------

Brendan, without a thinker, reality is non-integrated. Integrations are the result of our mental actions, and we perform them to make the crucial distinctions we need in order to survive.

----------------
A theory in which reality is directly apprehended requires that the stuff of reality be more or less immediately available to the mind.
----------------

Brendan, only perception is direct and immediate.

----------------
But in her theory, Rand interposes a fair amount of mind stuff – “percepts”, “measurements”, “units”, “definitions” – between reality and the concept. In that case, Rand can also be charged with “severing knowledge from reality”.
----------------

Brendan, you are attacking Rand's position from a Realist's perspective (concepts must be "perceived" passively, or else they are invalid), but this perspective is flawed, and Rand transcended its errors. You are guilty of condemning the product BECAUSE something was used to make it (claiming we're blind BECAUSE we have eyes).

Ed

Post 33

Monday, October 11, 2004 - 3:07am

Ed: “The content of thought is blank (100% potentiality; 0% actuality). The mode of thought required for human understanding is not 100% potentiality; 0% actuality (it cannot BECOME just anything - ie. it has identity).”

I’m afraid you’ve lost me here, Ed. What I’ve been talking about is whether a belief in metaphysical realism compels a belief that we can know reality directly. In reply, you draw a distinction between what you call the content of thought and the mode of thought. I’m not sure how this relates to the subject. Perhaps you can briefly expand on this.

Ed: “Brendan, only perception is direct and immediate.”

Since this seems to be where it all begins, perhaps you could explain how this direct perception works, using, say, the sense of sight. Begin with the perceived object, and show how the process works, with the end result of an image or percept in the subject’s brain.

Brendan

Post 34

Monday, October 11, 2004 - 11:55pm

There are few times when debate must actually be diverted in order to increase progress. I believe that this is one of those times.
-----------
The Ding

A prominent scholar was driving through a small town and his car got rear-ended by a farmer in an old pick-up truck. The 2 drivers pulled over to assess the damages ...

Farmer: Ahh, shoot ... I'm sorry man. Say listen, I don't have insurance ... but I'm willing to pay ya' twice what it'll take ya' ta' git' yer' bumper fixed.

Scholar: Well, hold on a second. You see, I'm a Kantian and ...

Farmer: Konshun, what's that? Is that some sorta' cult or somethin'?

Scholar: Err, uhh, well ... no ... it isn't ... Say, why don't you define "cult" for me, sir.

Farmer: Well ... that's where there's a guy tellin' ya' that what you see ain't really what things are really like. He's tellin' ya' that there's this higher reality that exists. You know, like a reality that you can't see, but it's still there. Anyway, without him ta' guide ya' - yer' basically lost and you need 'im to find your way ... to find yer' salvation and what not. That's what a cult is.

Scholar: Well, I guess I do qualify, but don't worry - my beliefs could never cause anyone harm like other "cult beliefs" have! Anyway, like I was saying, I'm a Kantian and I don't necessarily agree that you've damaged my car. In other words, you may not be giving me money after all. As an honest Kantian, there is never a case where I would be dishonest - even if a gang of serial rapists were asking me for the location of your grandmother.

Farmer: What!!

Scholar: Now, hold on, what I mean to say is that I won't take any money from you unless I can know - unless I can really know - that I deserve it.

Farmer: Sounds fair, so let's git' down to it ... I've got cows ta' milk. Regarding that ding on yer' bumper, whaddaya' say we nip 'er in the bud and I'll give ya' 'nuff ta' replace the whole darn thing and with change ta' spare?

Scholar: Well ... that's just it ... you see, I can't be too sure of that ding.

Farmer: Whaddaya' mean, dontcha' see it?

Scholar: Well ... that's not it ... I do see it ...

Farmer: Well then, what's the problem? Here ... take this $200, git' yerself a new bumper, and keep the change!

Scholar: You see sir ... while I do "see" it ... I'm not sure that I directly perceive it. Regarding my perceptions, I have to ask about whether the things perceived actually have real - or extramental - existence, apart from my perceiving them. This ding is before my eyes, but this ding is such that it can't be known to exist, apart from my internal representation of it.

Farmer: Say what?? Hvyoo' lost yer' mind, man? Say listen, if ya' lost yer' glasses or some such, why dontcha' jus' run yer' hand along the bumper n' see if you don't feel that nastly little ding there in tha' middle of it? That oughtta' settle it.

Scholar: Actually sir, it won't. Because my mind forms the structure of the world, one sense-perception cannot be used to verify another - they all flow into the same logic filter in my mind to give an internally consistent picture of the world. But this is not to say that the ding is externally consistent with the ultimate reality which I have posited.

Farmer (getting very impatient): Well sir, I've noticed that if I turn my back, then there's no ding anymore - all I see is blue sky and cornfields. So ... does that mean we can just forget about it - about the ding and such?!

Scholar: No ... no it doesn't. We will have to limit reason, in order to make room for faith. [the Scholar kneels] Bless him my Father, for this man may have just sinned. Dear Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the dings I cannot change or cannot directly perceive, the courage to change the dings I can, and the wisdom to know the difference. [the Scholar turns to the Farmer] Well sir, it's out of my hands now. You may now go milk your cows for all they're worth. Thank you for your patience in allowing me to vent my frustration in dealing with even the simplest dings of everyday life.

(the Farmer literally runs from the man and back to his truck, muffling to himself that he is lucky to get out of this alive - with such crazy city-slickers running amok)

The End
----------
Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 10/12, 8:45am)

Post 35

Tuesday, October 12, 2004 - 11:42am

Ed,

"Fred, it is not a "completely different question." If your metaphysics "contains a concept" of extramentality, then there is only one correct way for it to get in there (knowledge of that extramental reality). The only other - ie. the incorrect - way to put things into a metaphysics is by arbitrary fiat (Ontological Idealism)."

What I meant was that the question of whether we directly perceive extra-mental reality is a question of epistemology, not metaphysics. In Kelley's book ES (p. 7), he presents three different theories of the nature of sense perception. The first two, direct realism and representationalism both agree that there exists an extra-mental world--so they agree on this point of metaphysics (whereas the Idealist disagrees), but they differ on how we can know this extra-mental realm, directly in perception or indirectly by inference. That's all I meant. Maybe I was simply accepting Kelley's distinction without question.

Fred

Post 36

Tuesday, October 12, 2004 - 3:28pm

Fred, point taken. I retract any relevant criticism that has been heretofore directed toward you regarding the aforementioned, and potentially-problematic, pedantics.

More importantly, didja' like my short story about dings and such?

Ed

Post 37

Tuesday, October 12, 2004 - 9:33pm

Ed: “Scholar: I'm not sure that I directly perceive it. Regarding my perceptions, I have to ask about whether the things perceived actually have real - or extramental - existence, apart from my perceiving them.”

You do have a fondness for the barnyard metaphor, Ed. Previously, you had animals treating “millions” of particulars as “non-integrated particulars”. Now you’ve moved up a notch to what we might call the “Hayseed Theory of Perception”. Do I detect a subtext here, a Rousseaun yearning for rural purity and simplicity against the corrupting sophistication and complexity of the city?

Whatever, in the above quote you have put words into the mouth of a Kantian, and once again you have confused the Kantian metaphysics and epistemology. You are posing an epistemological question as if it were a metaphysical one.

That might be OK for an Objectivist, but it’s not how Kant proceeded. I think it can be taken as read that we all agree that there is in fact an extra-mental reality. Where we part company is in the way that this reality is known. If you can keep that distinction firmly in mind, you might have a better crack at disproving indirect theories of knowledge.

Brendan

Post 38

Wednesday, October 13, 2004 - 10:35am

Brendan:
You do have a fondness for the barnyard metaphor, Ed. Previously, you had animals treating “millions” of particulars as “non-integrated particulars”.

Ed:
Yup. Without conceptual powers, the animals' world (epistemologically speaking) is nuthin' but a meaningless string of present perceptions and memories, along with the occasional non-integrative association, of course.

-------------
Brendan:
Now you’ve moved up a notch to what we might call the “Hayseed Theory of Perception”. Do I detect a subtext here, a Rousseaun yearning for rural purity and simplicity against the corrupting sophistication and complexity of the city?

Ed:
Nah. Rousseau was hopeless romantic who had somehow learned to hate the identity of man. I don't even believe he could've survived his contemporary critics - if only he had been pressed to put his reasoning into syllogistic (pure) form.

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Brendan:
Whatever, in the above quote you have put words into the mouth of a Kantian, and once again you have confused the Kantian metaphysics and epistemology. You are posing an epistemological question as if it were a metaphysical one. That might be OK for an Objectivist, but it’s not how Kant proceeded.

Ed:
Fair enough, Brendan. You have identified a weak spot in my past argumentation (I have not been as explicit as I should have; concerning distinctions between metaphysics and epistemology). To return the favor however, I would like to make another distinction clear (one which you yourself have failed to keep explicitly differentiated): humans have 2 sets of conscious powers - perceptual and conceptual. You can't find a short-coming in one of them and then turn around and put the other on trial for it (as you did when you attacked concepts for not being both direct and immediate).

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Brendan:
I think it can be taken as read that we all agree that there is in fact an extra-mental reality. Where we part company is in the way that this reality is known.

Ed:
Okay Brendan, but I'm telling you, indirect theories of perception lead to solipsism (they contradict reality). They can be effectively removed from the "possibility table" by mere modus tollens with a "performatory contradiction" as one of the premises.

Post 39

Wednesday, October 13, 2004 - 11:14pm