I here offer two contributions. I will propose some limits on what should pass for Objectivist politics. I will dissent from the conceptual opposition of Libertarian and Objectivist politics.
Libertarians divide into those who think there is at least one proper function of government and those who donít. Libertarians who think there is a proper function of government think there is only one such function, and that is the legal protection of individual liberty. Under legal protection we should understand not only laws that prohibit or enjoin for the sake of individual liberty (such as the criminal and tort law) but laws that confer legal powers for the sake of individual liberty (such as laws of inheritance, wills, contracts, partnerships, and corporation; laws of adjudication and legislation; and laws of criminal and civil procedure). These basics of Libertarianism are familiar from principals who developed that school after mid-century (such as Hospers, Nozick, Rothbard, D. Friedman, and Narveson).
In Randís political philosophy, there is only one proper function of government, and that is the protection of rights. All rights are rights of individuals. The purpose of these rights is to protect the free exercise of the individual mind in the conduct and service of his life in a social context. That is a type of individual liberty. Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Therefore, Objectivist politics is always a type of Libertarian politics.
That is not to conclude that every rights-based non-anarchist variety of Libertarian politics is an Objectivist politics. Nozick, for premier example, would gladly not have his political philosophy in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) taken for Objectivist. Rightly so, for there is nothing distinctly Objectivist about that political view, notwithstanding its sameness with Objectivism in being rights-based and not anarchist.
By the way, Nozick wrote some serious things about the distinction of rules and principles in his book The Nature of Rationality (1995). The distinction and relation between them is important in all rational moral and political philosophies. I donít think it is distinctive to Objectivist philosophy.
Returning to political philosophy, Randís was enormously incomplete. She had, for example, no worked-out theory of property rights in land (in the economic sense). Without that and its integration with her concept of government as holding a legal monopoly on the use of retaliatatory force in a given geographical area, the way is open for various more developed political philosophies consistent with Randís as far as it went.
To proclaim any such further worked-out version of Randian politics as ďthe Objectivist PoliticsĒ requires a proof of unique trueness to Randís philosophy so far as she developed it. Consistency with Rand and trueness to reality does not warrant such exclusive name-taking. Not by any quarter.
Iím not suggesting one work on proving that what one takes to be a true view in politics is uniquely true to Randís philosophy. Seek not ďthe Objectivist PoliticsĒ in anything beyond Rand.