About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Post to this threadMark all messages in this thread as readMark all messages in this thread as unreadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2


Sanction: 6, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 6, No Sanction: 0
Post 40

Saturday, August 15, 2009 - 3:02pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Fred, they do work, the various anti-depressive medicines.  They mean a great deal to my well being.  It feels very much like lifting gunk out - not that I am different, but more like I can operate right vs. being "out of tune"

Also - I suggest reading the book "On Intelligence" by Jeff Hawkins.  One of the reasons that the mind has that malleability - for instance, using "taste" to instead "see" is that the neocortex is extremely uniform throughout, and serves as a prediction machine - he has a lot of very interesting ideas - I think he is at least partially on to something.


Post 41

Saturday, August 15, 2009 - 5:29pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
I would second Kurt's recommendation of reading Hawkins' On Intelligence. His 100 step rule is an elegant disproof of the utility of AI as it is most commonly currently conceived.

As for the utility of psychotropics, it should not be at all surprising. For example, look at the prevalence of alcoholism in Europeans. During the middle ages, there pretty much was no such thing as clean drinking water. Beer and wine diluted with water was much healthier, since the alcohol killed the bacteria, it had caloric value, and few people lived long enough to suffer from cirrhosis and alcoholic dementia. Seasonal affective disorder, a tendency toward alcoholism, and all sorts of mental syndromes likely survive today as a genetic burden that arose because of the usefulness of being able to hold one's liquor, or sleep through the winter, and so forth.

The fact that we do not fully understand the mechanism of a drug has nothing to do with its effectiveness.

Sanction: 8, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 8, No Sanction: 0
Post 42

Saturday, August 15, 2009 - 6:26pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Thanks, Mark, and congratulations on your first Atlas icon.

I want to emphasize to you the difference between metaphysics and the specific sciences, and the importance of the difference.

A metaphysical theory is not a scientific theory. First, philosophical theories are open to all normal adults regardless of the state of human knowledge. Second, metaphysical theories are prior to physics and the other sciences, and their concepts are implicit in the layman's knowledge.

The primary question of ontology is what are the basic kinds of being. Nowadays we are apt to answer this question with reference to atoms and quarks and other subatomic particles. But these notions are complex derived scientific theories that depend on both the development of the sciences historically, and, as regards the individual, a long process of learning and education. The idea of the quark, for instance, is certainly not a perceptual given. Such theories are open to refinement, and, potentially, disproof, as was, for instance, the theory of phlogiston and the theory of the ether.

Metaphysics is different. Aristotelean metaphysics holds that entities are the primary beings, and that all other types of being in some way depend on those primary beings. What primarily exists are things, and we do not predicate the existence of things upon other types of being. For example, we can say that there is a dog, while we do not say such things as there is a red or there is a big unless we predicate redness or bigness of some entity.

The fact that things (entities) are the basic existents, along with their qualities or attributes like "red," and relationships like "big(ger than)" or "good (for)" is not a scientific theory. It is not subject to disproof. It is perceptually given, comprehensible by all normal adults, regardless of their education or the state of scientific knowledge . Aristotle's metaphysics is called hylomorphism, literally "substance-form-ism." It holds that being is a comprised of substance and form, and that definite substances are entities. (An indefinite substance is something like oatmeal or gold which when it exists concretely always exists as some definite entity, a bowl of oatmeal or a lump of gold.) Aristoteleanism holds that entities exist "of themselves" while attributes are always the attributes of some substance and relations are always relations between some substances.

Alternative metaphysical theories would be such theories as the materialism of Democritus or the idealism of Plato. The materialists hold that the basic beings are atoms and the void. Idealists hold that basic beings are minds and ideas. These theories have famous problems, and wrestling with those problems is what most of the history of Western philosophy consists of. Objectivists reject those theories at the start. Materialism is wrong as metaphysics because it treats the void as concrete and absolute, and specifically because atoms are not perceptual primaries. On the other hand, idealism is wrong because existence is prior to consciousness, and ideas must be ideas of something.

The fact that Objectivism rejects materialism as a metaphysics does not mean that it rejects the the learned and derived scientific theory of atoms. Physics and metaphysics are two different things entirely. Perhaps it is true that all bodies are indeed comprised of atoms, I certainly don't doubt it. But the nature of those atoms is learned through observation and the scientific method. It is the end result of our investigation, not the beginning. In other words, we begin with the knowledge of physical (bodily) entities and their attributes and then after much observation and induction we come up with the idea of atoms to explain how it is that a block of ice can turn into a puddle of water or how air and wood in the presence of heat can turn into smoke and ash. If we were either not to possess or were to reject the concepts of entities and their attributes, we would never be able to get to a theory of atoms.

If you understand and integrate the difference between ontology as part of general philosophy, and the concepts of the specific sciences, then you can avoid such traps as dealing with energy and ether which are concepts of the posterior science of physics at the same time as you try to deal with consciousness which is dealt with by the prior philosophy of metaphysics. I hope drawing this distinction will make it easier to understand the ideas on the nature of mind that I put forth here, here, here, amd here on a second reading.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 8/15, 9:31pm)


Post 43

Sunday, August 16, 2009 - 12:47amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
A metaphysical theory is not a scientific theory. First, philosophical theories are open to all normal adults regardless of the state of human knowledge. Second, metaphysical theories are prior to physics and the other sciences, and their concepts are implicit in the layman's knowledge.

The primary question of ontology is what are the basic kinds of being. Nowadays we are apt to answer this question with reference to atoms and quarks and other subatomic particles. But these notions are complex derived scientific theories that depend on both the development of the sciences historically, and, as regards the individual, a long process of learning and education. The idea of the quark, for instance, is certainly not a perceptual given. Such theories are open to refinement, and, potentially, disproof, as was, for instance, the theory of phlogiston and the theory of the ether.

Metaphysics is different. Aristotelian metaphysics holds that entities are the primary beings, and that all other types of being in some way depend on those primary beings. What primarily exists are things, and we do not predicate the existence of things upon other types of being. For example, we can say that there is a dog, while we do not say such things as there is a red or there is a big unless we predicate redness or bigness of some entity.

The fact that things (entities) are the basic existents, along with their qualities or attributes like "red," and relationships like "bigger than)" or "good (for)" is not a scientific theory. It is not subject to disproof. It is perceptually given, comprehensible by all normal adults, regardless of their education or the state of scientific knowledge . Aristotle's metaphysics is called hylomorphism, literally "substance-form-ism." It holds that being is a comprised of substance and form, and that definite substances are entities. (An indefinite substance is something like oatmeal or gold which when it exists concretely always exists as some definite entity, a bowl of oatmeal or a lump of gold.) Aristotelianism holds that entities exist "of themselves" while attributes are always the attributes of some substance and relations are always relations between some substances.

Alternative metaphysical theories would be such theories as the materialism of Democritus or the idealism of Plato. The materialists hold that the basic beings are atoms and the void. Idealists hold that basic beings are minds and ideas. These theories have famous problems, and wrestling with those problems is what most of the history of Western philosophy consists of. Objectivists reject those theories at the start. Materialism is wrong as metaphysics because it treats the void as concrete and absolute, and specifically because atoms are not perceptual primaries. On the other hand, idealism is wrong because existence is prior to consciousness, and ideas must be ideas of something.

The fact that Objectivism rejects materialism as a metaphysics does not mean that it rejects the the learned and derived scientific theory of atoms. Physics and metaphysics are two different things entirely. Perhaps it is true that all bodies are indeed comprised of atoms, I certainly don't doubt it. But the nature of those atoms is learned through observation and the scientific method. It is the end result of our investigation, not the beginning. In other words, we begin with the knowledge of physical (bodily) entities and their attributes and then after much observation and induction we come up with the idea of atoms to explain how it is that a block of ice can turn into a puddle of water or how air and wood in the presence of heat can turn into smoke and ash. If we were either not to possess or were to reject the concepts of entities and their attributes, we would never be able to get to a theory of atoms.


Thanks Ted. This is great stuff, but I believe that we are, for the most part, on the same page. I don't have formal philosophical training, but the above ideas are not alien to me. Your explanations of philosophical terms and succinct exposition of Aristotelian metaphysics is nonetheless helpful and thought provoking.
 
If you understand and integrate the difference between ontology as part of general philosophy, and the concepts of the specific sciences, then you can avoid such traps as dealing with energy and ether which are concepts of the posterior science of physics at the same time as you try to deal with consciousness which is dealt with by the prior philosophy of metaphysics. I hope drawing this distinction will make it easier to understand the ideas on the nature of mind that I put forth here, here, here, and here on a second reading.
You are correct. I didn't mean to posit ether theory as a metaphysical theory. If I gave you that impression, then I'm sorry. It is, however, an area of science that converges with metaphysics, in that it posits that we live in a physical universe; a universe comprised of an ultimate, irreducible physical substance, from which all other things are derived. This is the case, whether you believe, with the mainstream, in time-space or, as I do, in some modernized variation of Lorentz's ether theory; they are both, in essence, ether theories.

For now, I'll drop the term "ether" and simply say that we live in a physical universe, where everything is comprised of physical substance or some process of or interaction/relationship between these physical entities.

The idea that I was trying to convey was my belief in the hypothesis that all primary physical entities-entities that have substance-have, not one, but two irreducible properties in addition to their property of having substance:

1. They have substance
2. They have a kinetic property.
3. They have a conscious property.

All other properties are derivative of the above three. We can intuitively understand why properties that are derivative of these three can be conditional, but these are the only three properties of things that cannot be explained in terms of anything else. I think that most people understand how I feel, even if they don't agree with my hypothesis, that there is something primary about consciousness that simply cannot be explained by biological stimulus of the senses, memory and the thinking process.

I understand that this may not be, strictly speaking, a metaphysical hypothesis, but the subject is "the nature of consciousness" and metaphysics alone may not be sufficient to the task.

I look forward to your helpful criticism.-Mark

(Edited by Mark Ian Uzick on 8/16, 12:51am)


Post 44

Sunday, August 16, 2009 - 10:01amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Kurt:

My assertion was not that such medicines don't work, but the fact that they do exist and work is evidence that the 'self' relies at least in part on 'the machine inside of life.'

Our sense of self, I think, is at least partially 'wired,' and the evidence is, that sense of self can be improved with chemicals. There is a broad admission on the Cymbalta website, something akin to, 'we're not sure exactly how people work, but this drug helps...'

That, to me, doesn't make life/self any less special, or less unique or less valuable. It just is what it is. To me, it is well miracle enough.

The full context of my remark was, my unwillingness to totally dismiss Kurzweil's optimistic hypothetical about a symmetric 'the life inside the machine.'

Our brains, our self -- no matter how they objectively 'work' -- coupled with external augmented perfromance, is a different 'machine inside of life.' I don't nearly know enough about the theoretical capabilities of such a combination to ever definitively rule out 'life inside the machine' as a possibility. It may and likely will not be identical to our lives or sense of self well being that we exhibit now, but one thing I do know about the brain, from observation, is that it is a powerfully adaptive thing.

Or, better still, that life is an incredibly adaptive thing. That is not the same as saying that 'I' am incredibly adaptive, and will someday seamlessly transition into a silicon host.'

I am less optimistic about his 'transference' scenario, I think that is pure wishful thinking. But, I couldn't rule that out. I can, however, spawn human offspring. And someday, we might be able to spawn silicon offspring. That is not transference of the self, it is at best a spawning.

And someday, those human offspring and silicon offspring and augmented human offspring will all represent 'life' in some form, and compete at some level under some set of rules. And, Kursweil examines the consequences, but also observes, if it can be done, it probably will be done.

regards,
Fred



Post 45

Monday, August 17, 2009 - 1:48amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ted:
I was just discussing with a friend my hypothesis that consciousness is an innate property of all physical entities.

He happened to ask, "Is a rock conscious?" Then he suggested, "Why don't you google that and see what comes up?"

So I did and, amazingly, the first result was an article "Mind Of A Rock", which addresses the very same concerns that I've expressed in this thread and comes to very similar conclusions.

 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/magazine/18wwln-lede-t.html


Post 46

Monday, August 17, 2009 - 3:41amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Well, you know if it came from the N.Y.Times, it is fiction or fantasy anyway... ;-)

Post 47

Monday, August 17, 2009 - 4:09amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Well, you know if it came from the N.Y.Times, it is fiction or fantasy anyway... ;-)
Damn! I just knew someone would say something like that. Probably because I was thinking that too.

Seriously though: The article is interesting. I'd love to hear some feedback about it.


Post 48

Monday, August 17, 2009 - 8:02amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Because I'm a subjective being of unique individual temperament, I agree with some of the article, and disagree with some of it as well.

Re;(How could the ineffable experience of tasting a strawberry ever arise from the equations of physics?)

Via selective individual feedback weightings in our wetbit neural network which either define or augment our possibly augmented by hard-wiring sense of self-preservation, via wiring.

Clearly, it's possible to cross wire some of the pleasure and pain feedback paths.

That is an answer to that 'how could?'

There is no objective evidence that rocks have the wetbits necessary to support neural network processing capability.

I think that possessing 'particles' is far too low a bar, and disagree with the premise, conflating physics with consciousness. Rocks might 'sense' things like gravity and temperature, in that they respond to such things. If someone wants to call that 'consciousness', then I don't know why. It might come from an old worldview of 'power'. John Locke, in "Essays on Human Understanding", expressed the concept of 'power' in an odd, symmetric way, as in "Fire has the power to change Gold, and Gold has the power to be changed by Fire." Do rocks have the power to respond to gravity and/or fire? Modern physics has changed that concept; energy is the ability to do work, as in, exert a force over a distance, and power is the ability to exert energy over time. An ability to direct power is not the same thing as the ability to exert power. Stephen Hawking is conscious, and even if he cannot directly exert much power, he can certainly direct power, and beyond that intelligently direct power to effect creative change in the universe.

If 'rocks' have consciousness, then that defines Hell in this universe; awareness, with no power to interact or effect change, even if just to flee the local insanity.

On the smallest scale, the structures that make up the wiring of our wetbits go way beyond 'particles.' Receptors wrap around transmitters, creating circuits, and the sensitivity/weightings of those circuits are self-alterable via chemical manipulation-- both autonomously and deliberately, via external augmentation; drugs, both medicinal and recreational.

The current quest to discover 'what' is incomplete, but much farther along than the 'how.' (Don't get me started on the 'why.')

Gradients drive everything -- at every level imaginable. I've yet to find an anecdotal exception, even for concepts such as 'love'(which is hugely dependent on the concept 'gradient.') In the universe, absence of gradient is pretty much 'death', an absence not just of 'life' but of identity. The concept 'uniqueness' requires an abrupt gradient of 'identity'- which at its root is why the collectivist 'we are all one, even the rocks!' movement is so insidious; at its root, it is targeting 'death', the end of all gradient, especially in regards to the 'self.' Not everyone of us might have the same neural net weightings in our 'self-preservation' wiring, so we are unequally receptive to this idea of 'death of life/the self.' This hypothetical does nothing to resolve the political struggle in the war of the we against the I, because it still comes down to an imperfect disagreement on where these incompatible beliefs are taking us. "I" believe, to both private and public ruin, but so do the "We," via their own arguments.


When it comes to self mind/brain function, I highly suspect we will find 'gradient' running loose, as one of the usual suspects.

I've often hypothesized, are memories stored as simple 'particles', like magnetic bits on a linear tape of consciousness playback(even that simple model implies gradient along the 'tape'), or, are memories stored as complex multichannel wave functions? Do we remember just sights, or do we remember sights, sounds, tastes, smells, and sensations, in phase? Similarly, can we imagine sequences of similar 'experience' that never happened? Clearly, we can and regularly do imagine(interesting word.) The 'how' is presently up for grabs.

Analogous to our DNA processes, where DNA is not just a linear sequence of GATC, there is also 'rate' information encoded into our DNA. It is not just sequences of bits, but an encoding of rates of change. "Time" is wired into the unfurling of our DNA process.

Our self testing for consciousness in other entities -- not just rocks, but other human forms -- is ultimately a leap of faith on our part, because not only might others be a simple 'Data' automaton-- life inside a machine -- but deep inside of us, our 'self' could be the result of the 'machine inside of life.' You must ask your 'self', what set of self-preservation neural network weightings will balk at that, if it was the truth?

When you see 'yellow', you think 'yellow.' When I see 'yellow', I think 'yellow.' But, we confirm that with each other only by comparison with external third parties. Our common eyes and their common enough wiring feed signals to the sight processing centers of our common enough but not nearly identical neural network processors, with their individual and always changing subjective feedback weightings, and we perceive 'yellow', as an integrated, singular whole being, senses plus perception.

But, how could I ever prove to you that the perception I experience as 'yellow' is the identical perception that you experience? Only by external comparison. That flower is 'yellow' -- reference to an external standard. Yes, you say, that flower is yellow. It's not the 'blue' we see when referring to the sky. But, if 'I' were magically inside of 'you' at the perception end of the event, the act of viewing that yellow flower, would I perceive the actual same color as I do inside of my own neural net? What I perceive as 'yellow', you internally might experience as my 'blue' or even, a color I've never remotely imagined, and vice versa. But via external reference, we are all aligned, so this is never an issue at all. "The sky is blue" only tells me that you call the perceived color of the sky 'blue.' But, that is all I need to objectively interact with others; 'the sky is blue.' Even if I subjectively perceive that color totally differently. How would anyone know? So, do we actually perceive the 'same' color?

Probably. But yet unprovable. Because I can't. For all I know, what you perceive as 'yellow' I would perceive as 'blue.' But we are aligned by our common external reference to objects that we commonly sense with our similar senses, and we have learned to call that common experience 'yellow.'

There would be no consequence to the fact that we all perceived different colors. We would not call the same flower both 'yellow' and 'blue' at the same time, we would agree on the external object's attributes, 'yea, that's yellow all right.' (I'm discounting arguments over 'it's more of an off-white.')

Is it necessary to any axiom of Objectivism that all consciousness perceive reality identically, or only consistently? The sky we both look at has one color, and we agree, without hesitation or consequence, to call that color 'blue,' no matter how we subjectively perceive that color. We agree on external reality--and have no need, in any context, to actually perceive identically the same reality on every level of detail, such as 'color.'

How would this ever be proved or disproved, one way or the other? But moot, because it is also as difficult to imagine a context in which it has any consequences, subjective or objective.

Now, imagine the ability to hook into the sensory apparatus of another individual. Hook what? Our perception processing apparatus. Given the same stimuli, we'd likely still 'see' the same color for the sky. But, what would that prove? That, given similar stimuli, our neural nets perceive the same sensation.

Now imagine the ability to hook into the perception apparatus of another individual. Hook what?

My self-preservation wiring is balking at that concept, telling me that two is a crowd.

But is it? Not for me to dictate to the universe, as it is, with me in it, if it is or isn't. It just either is, or isn't, modifiable under the rules we find ourselves playing.









Post 49

Tuesday, August 18, 2009 - 2:23amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
 Re;(How could the ineffable experience of tasting a strawberry ever arise from the equations of physics?)

Via selective individual feedback weightings in our wetbit neural network which either define or augment our possibly augmented by hard-wiring sense of self-preservation, via wiring.

Clearly, it's possible to cross wire some of the pleasure and pain feedback paths.

That is an answer to that 'how could?'

That's a possible answer to how the brain works in this regard, but it's not an answer as to why the brain, in so working this way, should have this "ineffable experience", unless consciousness is a primary characteristic of physical entities, therefore needing no precursor.

If 'rocks' have consciousness, then that defines Hell in this universe; awareness, with no power to interact or effect change, even if just to flee the local insanity.

That reminds me of the argument against God called "the problem of evil"; I'm an atheist, but I will still defend the concept of God against what I think are fallacious arguments. A conscious rock, experiencing the hell you describe, sounds very much like the sort of existence we would experience if God created (living?) beings whose existence was unconditional, being protected from all evils:

quote of Mark Uzick:
This is what's known as the problem of evil. The problem of evil is a very popular, but fallacious argument against the existence of God.

Without the struggle for survival, life would have no value or meaning. A world without evil would be a world without life. If God made Man to be a being with perfect instinctual knowledge and immune to pain or death, then what challenges would there be? Man would be just be God's puppet; barely even a robot. What obstacles could he overcome? There would be no pain, but pleasure, if it even existed, would be one dimensional like sweetness without the contrasting notes of sourness and bitterness. Happiness, without the memory of sadness, loneliness and loss, would have no poignancy, but be a vague vegetative stupor. How could one even feel satisfaction or pride in any achievement that required no effort or pain? Could it even be called an achievement?

God, if he really loved Man, would leave him free to make his own mistakes; find his own values, create his own morality. He would not give commandments nor create miracles or interfere in any way. A loving God wouldn't protect us from ourselves.  If there is a God, then he did a perfect job.

(Edited by Mark Ian Uzick on 8/18, 9:14am)


Post 50

Wednesday, August 26, 2009 - 2:41pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Mark:

re: I'm an atheist, but I will still defend the concept of God against what I think are fallacious arguments.

I'm a devout agnostic, so according to our bylaws, I don't know what 'the' concept of God you are defending.

As a devout agnostic, I find it impossible to follow the logic of any discussion on the topic of God that entertains the jarring concept 'Rules for God,' which they almost always all do -- including arguments for and against God.

Who makes 'Rules for God?' Judging by history, anyone with a long weekend to kill. Certainly, both theists and even atheists regularly do.

We devout agnostics do not-- both agnostic theists, and agnostic atheists.

Here's an example of an agnostic theist: "For all I know, the universe, as it is, cold process all the way down, is God. At the very least, I believe in the Universe, as it is. The arguments against that concept are equally divided between "Not God enough" and "Too much God." To try to resolve this(a clear fool's errand)see those who make the Rules for God, because I don't begin to understand the concept 'Rules for God' offered up by the merely created, who protest for and against by jarring arguments that begin "God is..." or "God must..." or "God would..." and so on, which immediately lose me, because I am never able to get beyond the illogic of 'Rules for God' -- no matter what mere human offers them, theists or atheist.

re; God, if he really loved Man, would leave him free to make his own mistakes...

See, that is where I get lost. That assertion clearly depends on a 'Rule for God.' Either I don't understand the meta concept 'God', or that meta concept entertains being pushed around by anyone with a long weekend to kill. What merely naked sweaty ape makes 'Rules for God,' and what concept of God let's him?

re: That's a possible answer to how the brain works in this regard, but it's not an answer as to why the brain, in so working this way, should have this "ineffable experience", unless consciousness is a primary characteristic of physical entities, therefore needing no precursor.

There is plenty of evidence that there is not a singular way in which 'the brain works,' whether to provide ineffable experiences, define our sense of self, or even just 'count.'

Feynman delightfully writes about his experiences informally investigating the manner in which it is possible to internally count to estimate the passing of time. He investigated this by examining what things he could simultaneously do while estimating the passage of a constant amount of time -- his counting internally to '60' at a constant rate. He found that there were some classes of things that he could do that didn't impact the accuracy(defined as 'repeatable duration of time')of his time estimate, and some things that totally blew it up.

But in disclosing this repeatable experiment to a friend, he found that the classes of things he could simultaneously do without impacting the accuracy of his internal time estimate were exactly opposite for his friend: his 'internal' scheme for estimating the passage of time was more aural--like, a voice in his head counting the seconds -- and his friend's was more visual--like, a movie in his head of a ruled tape streaming by-- and that impacted what either could do simultaneously.

Two human beings. They could both accurately estimate the passage of time. They could both do other mental tasks simultaneously. But, they internally processed this common task differently. and could not do the same 'other mental tasks' simultaneously.

Another example are folks with Williams Syndrome, who are actually missing both DNA and brain mass, and who adapt to perform things like 'counting' using strategies far removed from the way it is done by humans who are not missing the associated wiring.

That is not to say that there is an infinite number of ways to perform these tasks with the 'machinery inside of life.' But it suggests that there is not a single 'how' the brain works to provide the ineffable experience of tasting a strawberry.

It also suggests that the human mind is incredibly adaptive.

regards,
Fred
(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 8/26, 2:46pm)


Post to this threadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2


User ID Password or create a free account.