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Wednesday
December 26, 2007

It's deja vu All Over Again by Tibor R. Machan

Back in 1971 the late Harvard behaviorist psychologist B. F. Skinner published his popular best seller, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, Knopf). The book followed several more technical works by Skinner arguing that the belief that human beings have free will and are morally responsible is all wrong, a pre-scientific prejudice that needs to be discarded and replaced with a technology of behavior.

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Discuss this Article (22 messages)

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 8:42am

"They cannot have it both ways--deny that people make decisions but then proceed to make all sorts of significant decisions themselves!"

Well said: in an upcoming piece I explore free will a little bit, in that even though it's an unproven concept, we have plenty of evidence that people will like they have it, regardless.

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 6:25am

Mr. Machan. Has any scientific investigation established the existence of mind in anyone's body. How does one find a mind in a body that is not his own?

One can observe electrochemical activity (to a degree) by means of EEG and PET Scan. One can observe some density changes in the brain tissue with an MRI scanner. One can track longer range changes in the brain with a CT Scan. One can monitor changes in the blood chemistry. On a behavioral level one can observe utterance, writing, body language, facial express, the gleam of sweat and even sniff the smells given off by other people. But where in all this objective observation does one find mind, in the sense of res cogitens, a substance distinct from res extensa, physical entities?

Bob Kolker

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 9:48am

"unproven concept" Steve D.

How so? What would you consider proof? Maybe you could give us a preview of your thoughts here.

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 10:20am

Jeff, my piece doesn't touch too much on the subject, but there is an argument that I can see. Abstract concepts like free will must have concrete referents; however, every concrete referent that would normally explain free will can be "explained" by determinists, in that events were meant to be and that choice is an illusion. And 'round and 'round we go, with the most dedicated determinist claiming that everything, including this conversation, is determined by causation (or God) and is a function of God's mind (or of the elements of the brain interacting with each other).

Ultimately, though, people are going to act as if they have free will, and the argument is largely not important in the larger "war for men's minds".

EDIT: Oh, I missed a question. What would I consider proof? I think that's a great question; I'm not sure what I would consider proof that determinists couldn't just say "meant to be" to. I suppose that's kind of my point: proof really isn't important because I'm going to act like I have it.

I guess you could say I'm a free-will agnostic.

Any ideas?
(Edited by Steven Druckenmiller on 12/26, 10:24am)

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 10:25am

Is this to suggest that humans are like all the other animals, which are deterministic, and that conceptualness is an illusion? Hardly.

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 10:46am

"Any ideas?"

I've been too busy with work the past few days to answer Bill's comments on the other thread. I hope and expect to get to that in the next couple of days, where I'll answer the question in detail.

Like you, I don't expect it will change the mind of a committed determinist, but one can only lay it out and let the argumentative chips fall where they may.

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 10:52am

In order to understand why human beings have conceptual capacity , it is useful to understand the ways in which human brains differ from animal brains. Humans have a six-layer neocortex, with lots more memory capacity than other primates. Also, humans' sensory and motor function is highly integrated into the neocortex compared with other animals.

Pattern recognition occurs at each layer and inputs are passed up to a higher level in the neocortical hierarchy. If a concept, situation or object is unfamiliar it is passed farther up the hierarchy. If something is completely novel it will go all the way up to the hippocampus at the top of the hierarchy.

Unlike dolphins and whales which have a 3-layer neocortex, the human brain is much more suited for nested abstraction.

Jim

(Edited by James Heaps-Nelson on 12/26, 11:03am)

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 12:10pm

Here's an interesting question to chew over:

1. Man's minds are a metaphysical given; is reason a metaphysical given as well?

2. If man's minds are metaphysically given, does that mean the diseases of it (the psychological ones) metaphysically given as well?

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 1:42pm

What do you mean by "metaphysically given"?

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 2:19pm

Not so.

One could attribute all the processes of intellect and concept formation to the brain alone without producing a logical contradiction. The existence of Mind as a separate substance from matter is NOT axiomatic. Furthermore the is not a single piece of intersubjectively verifiable evidence (aka objective evidence) to show that minds exists. Brains are quite sufficient to do all the things that some attribute to Minds.

Bob Kolker

Wednesday, December 26, 2007 - 7:51pm

I certainly didn't claim that the mind is some kind of separate substance from the brain. However, the mind is an aspect of the brain, its exertion of certain kinds of powers. As to the concept of free will having to have a referent, it doesn't follow from this that the referent must be some kind of physical entity. What of the capacity to initiate action? Generally, there are concepts that refer to aspects of things, like the edge of a table or height of a tree. These are real but not some physical thing. What is the physical referent of horse power or the transparency of glass? Or the playfulness of a child or the somberness of an adult concerned about death? All of these are quite real, part of the actual world, but not reducible to some physical stuff. Which is not to say they could be what they are without being connected to some physical stuff. Like that edge of the table there!

Thursday, December 27, 2007 - 10:05am

Jeff - I mean that minds exist! Of course, I suppose there's an element of question-begging in that, but akin to the way that ants and deer are metaphysically given (that is, they exist), so do men's brains (not the same as minds, but I think that perhaps the mind is a self-evident concept.)

Thursday, December 27, 2007 - 10:26am

Steven,

I agree, except I wouldn't call it question begging. It isn't question begging to assert that reality is objective, that we are aware of it, that contradictions don't exist. All knowledge starts somewhere. That I have a mind is as evident to me as that I possess the power to regulate certain of its functions. That doesn't entail that it is some kind of separate substance, nor that it could exist apart from the brain, etc that makes it possible.

Thursday, December 27, 2007 - 11:56am

That I have a mind is as evident to me as that I possess the power to regulate certain of its functions. That doesn't entail that it is some kind of separate substance, nor that it could exist apart from the brain, etc that makes it possible.

That is certainly implied, if not actually stated, in Galt's speech - where consciousness can only exist if there is something existing to be conscious of, that to be conscious of only itself is a contradiction in terms..

Thursday, December 27, 2007 - 11:15am

Prof. Machan writes, in an earlier post, about things that are not referent to a substance, like the height of a tree, or the edge of a table. These properties are unlikely (impossible?) to be the basis of free will. The height of a tree is some sort of a count of the number of atoms that are stacked on top of each other, and the edge is the place where the atoms stop being there any more.

Then he refers to playfulness as another one of these properties. This is a behaviour pattern, right? It's probably about as hard to explain playfulness as it is to explain free will, so this doesn't really move the ball.

Saturday, December 29, 2007 - 11:43am

James,

In order to understand why human beings have conceptual capacity , it is useful to understand the ways in which human brains differ from animal brains. Humans have a six-layer neocortex, with lots more memory capacity than other primates.

But it's not extra memory (a perceptual power of awareness) that puts us above other animals. Some animals -- e.g., birds -- can remember long songs after hearing them just once. There's even a parrot that remembers -- without conceptual integration [!] -- a particular referent for each of 700 different words!

Unlike dolphins and whales which have a 3-layer neocortex, the human brain is much more suited for nested abstraction.

Good point.

Ed

Saturday, December 29, 2007 - 12:00pm

Michael,

Then he refers to playfulness as another one of these properties. This is a behaviour pattern, right? It's probably about as hard to explain playfulness as it is to explain free will, so this doesn't really move the ball.

"Playfulness" is not a particular behavior pattern -- it can be instantiated in countless forms.

For instance, it can be something shared or solitary (e.g., "catch" or "solitaire"), involving objects or merely persons ("dice" or "tag"), involving a competition or merely a solitary achievement (running a "race" or building a "house of cards") -- or no expected achievement at all ("humming"). It can be conceptual or merely perceptual ("lateral thinking" or "Concentration"). It can change midstream or remain the same thing over time ("hide-n-seek" turning into "tag" -- or not).

So no, "playfulness" is not a behavior pattern; though, like free will, its genuine instantiations can be indicated ostensively -- as I have just done (above).

Ed

Sunday, December 30, 2007 - 3:34am

Reply to Post # 4.

We have a more efficient brain than other mammalian species.

Bob Kolker

Sunday, December 30, 2007 - 8:01pm

Bob:

Upon reading some arguments herein (not to mention elswheres), I'd caveat that 'we' with a mere 'some of us.'

LLAP
J:D

Tuesday, January 1, 2008 - 2:05am

J:D,

The air is thick with your smug; have you nothing constructive to say? Or are insults your lone trick?